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This thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s 
German nationalist war propaganda essays written between 1914 and 1917. 
Focussing on Chamberlain’s discursive strategies of manipulation, the analysis 
explores how he uses language to suggest to his readers that they have freedom of 
thought while actually reducing or eradicating their critical disagreement space. As 
language is the sole vehicle for the manipulative dissemination of ideology in written 
discourse, this research makes a contribution to understanding the workings of 
propaganda as ideology-driven mass manipulation by exposing the linguistic 
mechanisms therein. The thesis also contributes to broader Chamberlain scholarship 
and, specifically, to as yet scant scholarship on Chamberlain as a nationalist 
propagandist rather than as a race theorist. 
After analysing the topical content of the war essays and contextualising the results 
against the local and global context of Chamberlain’s Germany, an extensive text 
analysis is provided. The text analysis follows a targeted multi-methodological 
approach combining methods of critical discourse analysis with pragma-dialectics 
and corpus-assisted discourse studies. This incorporates a corpus-assisted analysis of 
keywords and concordances, and a qualitative close-reading analysis addressing 
discourse strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation, coercion and 
dissimulation. 
The major finding produced by this research is that Chamberlain’s war essays are 
just as much legitimisations of the author and his essays as they are of the essays’ 
topical ideological propositions. They are characterised by strategies of ‘othering’ on 
two levels: the topical ideological ‘othering’ of Germany’s war enemies in relation to 
the German ‘self’ and, on the meta-level, of the ‘othering’ of the readers in relation 
to the authorial ‘self’. Using an elaborate metaphor scenario, he delegitimises the 
reader by undermining the epistemic certainty of their environment, and 
correspondingly legitimises himself as the source of ‘enlightenment’. Using 
strategies of abstractive legitimisation and delegitimisation, he makes the war a 
human-centric matter, the resolution of war reader-dependent, and the solution to the 
war author-dependent, ultimately making Chamberlain’s justification of the 





1.1 Houston Stewart Chamberlain 
Born in 1855 in Southsea, England, Houston Stewart Chamberlain arrived in 
Germany in 1870 on the eve of one of the most important nationalist events in its 
history: the Franco-Prussian war. Up until this point, Chamberlain’s childhood had 
been divided between France and England. Neither a real Frenchman nor a real 
Englishman, Chamberlain was plagued by the feeling that he was living ‘unter 
Fremden’ both in England and in France (Chamberlain 1919: 11), and that he 
fundamentally lacked a sense of Heimat (ibid.: 29). Chamberlain came to find 
inspiration in German science, literature, philosophy and music, and in particular in 
the music of Richard Wagner. Chamberlain describes the Wagnerian Circle at 
Wahnfried as ‘mir Heimatlosem eine Heimat der Seele’ (ibid.: 242). He was a 
devoted and influential member of the Bayreuth Circle surrounding Wagner, and 
wrote for the Wagnerian Bayreuther Blätter until the mid-1890s, which railed against 
the materialism of the age and the parliamentary system, among other things, and 
championed an alternative empire founded on conservative, anti-modern, and anti-
materialistic values and the return to an entirely monarchical system of government 
in the tradition of patriotic organisations such as the Alldeutscher Verein and the 
Vaterlandspartei. Thanks to his magnum opus Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten 
Jahrhunderts (1899), Chamberlain was one of the best known German anti-Semites 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and is best known as an anti-
Semite today (cf. Rash 2012: 99). 
Chamberlain published a total of 40 books, and a further 9 of his works were 
published posthumously. Moreover, Chamberlain published over 223 newspaper 
articles, a number of which were published posthumously. Chamberlain’s authorial 
and journalistic endeavours saw him assume the roles of fiction writer (Parsifal-
Märchen 1900, Drei Bühnendichtungen 1902), theologian (Mensch und Gott. 
Betrachtungen über Religion und Christentum 1921), translator (Richard Wagner. 
Echte Briefe an Ferdinand Praeger 1892), personal critic (Richard Wagner 1896, 
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Goethe 1912, Immanuel Kant. Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk 1905), 
cultural critic (1876-1896. Die ersten zwanzig Jahre der Bayreuther 
Bühnenfestspiele 1896), editor, autobiographer (Lebenswege meines Denkens 1919), 
race theorist (Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts 1899), and nationalist 
propagandist. 
Between the years 1914 and 1917, Chamberlain published a series of essays on the 
First World War, which were initially published in the Strasburger Zeitung, 
Volkserzieher, Deutsche Tageszeitung, Tägliche Rundschau, Das Größere 
Deutschland, Deutschland Erneuerung, Deutsche Zeitung, and the München-
Augsburger Abendzeitung. The Wagner Verein and the Neuer Wagner Verein 
provided Chamberlain with a publication springboard, introducing him to influential 
German nationalist circles in Austria and Germany such as the Alldeutscher Verband 
(Pan-German League), and opening doors to the print media. As Jonathan Carr 
observes, Chamberlain became one of the most influential propagandists for the 
ultra-nationalist circles surrounding the Wagner Verein (Carr 2008: 90-91). 
Chamberlain’s influence also extended beyond Wagnerian and Pan-German circles; 
Geoffrey Field notes that Chamberlain’s publications (he does not specify which 
ones) reached a far wider audience than the Bayreuther Blätter ever did (Field 1981: 
124). Carr confirms this, stating that ‘in Germany, it was not just ultra-nationalist and 
anti-Semitic circles that rallied to his support. Even balanced journals like the 
Hamburger Nachrichten praised his energy in uncovering the “real facts” and the 
persuasive way he had argued his case’ (Carr 2008: 99). Among Chamberlain’s most 
distinguished enthusiasts were Kaiser Wilhelm II, Adolf Hitler, Julius Wiesner, and 
the esteemed academic Leopold von Schroeder (Schott 1927: 10/Carr 2008: 90-91). 
Alfred Rosenberg describes Chamberlain as ‘ein Mensch, der wie nur wenige in 
ganzen Jahrhunderten bis in die letzten Verzweigungen der deutschen Seele 
eingedrungen war’ (Rosenberg 1927: 11). In 1915, Chamberlain was awarded the 




1.2 Research Topic 
This thesis presents a critical discourse analysis of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s 
war essays written between 1914 and 1917. Chamberlain’s essays are strikingly 
dogmatic works of nationalist propaganda that used social power and language to 
manipulate members of the German public with an opposing opinion or no opinion at 
all to accept and internalise the author’s ultra-conservative Weltanschauung. As 
nationalist propaganda, they constitute a consciously produced form of ideology-
driven mass manipulation that strives to alter or maintain a balance of power that is 
advantageous to the propagandist and linked to a clear institutional ideology (Jowett 
& O’Donnell: 2006: 3). Manipulative discourse is morally reprehensible or 
illegitimate because the recipient is placed under the illusion of freedom of choice, 
thereby limiting their critical autonomy (Saussure 2005: 117; Handelman 2009: 23). 
The manipulative mechanisms of written discourse are chiefly discursive, making 
language use and rhetoric the most crucial objects of analysis. 
1.3 Research Motivation 
This thesis evolved from a combination of a critical concern with the linguistic 
mechanisms of manipulation in propaganda, the impressions made by a first reading 
of Chamberlain’s war essays, and a survey of the literature on Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain. 
A review of the literature revealed an absence of scholarship on Chamberlain’s 
language use and rhetoric, in particular in the war essays, and also by recent claims 
that his language use can be viewed as a major influence on the discourse of Adolf 
Hitler. Anja Lobenstein-Reichmann identifies a ‘discursive line’ (‘eine diskursive 
Linie’) beginning with Immanuel Kant and ending with Hitler via Chamberlain 
(Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 444-45). She suggests that Chamberlain’s discourse 
was the fundamental bridge connecting race discourse of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 443), and ultimately that it paved 
the way to the acceptance of racism and fascism in the National Socialist era (ibid.: 
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8; see also Lobenstein-Reichmann 2005: 188). More recently, Felicity Rash makes a 
similar claim, stating ‘Houston Stewart Chamberlain […] exerted a major influence 
on German nationalism and anti-Semitism in the late nineteenth century onwards, 
and [his] views appealed to twentieth century nationalist extremists and anti-Semites, 
most notably Adolf Hitler (Rash 2012: 81). Although this thesis does not compare 
and contrast the discourses of Chamberlain and Hitler, it takes the observations by 
Lobenstein-Reichmann and Rash as a decisive impetus for further analysis of 
Chamberlain’s use of language in his ideological discourse. 
Chamberlain’s most extensive and widely received work, Die Grundlagen des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts [hereinafter Grundlagen), has been the preferred subject 
of what little attention has been paid to his work by both his contemporaries and by 
modern critics (see Schott 1927; Breitenstein 1936; Meyer 1939; Lobenstein-
Reichmann 2008). Although Chamberlain’s best known work is and was Grundlagen 
(cf. Clarke 1916: 6) and his most acknowledged role is that of a race theorist, the 
significance of his role as a propagandist should not be overlooked. In order to 
provide new insights into Chamberlain’s language use, the present research uses his 
propagandistic war essays (1914 –1917) as analysis material. The exclusive focus on 
Chamberlain’s war essays is justified by their wide reception and popularity at the 
time of publication. In Lebenswege meines Denkens (1919), Chamberlain reports that 
the essay series Politische Ideale, Demokratie und Freiheit, and Der demokratische 
Wahn proved to be some of his most read publications, finding their way into a wide 
variety of circles (Chamberlain 1919: 6). In a more statistical approach to 
Chamberlain’s readership and reception, Field reports that somewhere between 
750,000 and one million copies of Chamberlain’s essays were purchased during the 
war, making Chamberlain one of the best selling propagandists of the day. Field adds 
that official documents released by the Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus, or 
Abwehr Verein, (Association for Defence Against Anti-Semitism) estimated that 
Chamberlain’s pamphlets had been read by in excess of three million people by 
December 1915, a figure that continued to rise during the war (Field 1981: 390). 
Charles Clarke reports that the war essays England and Deutschland were distributed 
to several thousands of German troops in the trenches (Clarke 1916: 12), and recalls 
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that the copy that he owned was a seventh edition, indicating mass popularity (Clarke 
1916: 7). As reluctant as Clarke is to offer any positive evaluation of Chamberlain’s 
influence, he has no choice but to admit the vogue that Chamberlain’s war essays 
enjoyed in Germany, where, he writes, ‘in spite of its exaggerated assertions and 
absolutely idiotic statements concerning English life and institutions, it is regarded as 
the last word of truth’ (ibid.: 11). 
Methodologically, this thesis was motivated by existing studies of political discourse 
that have attempted to devise a typology of the discursive mechanisms of 
manipulation, but that ultimately emphasise that more work must be done to provide 
greater detail on these (Goodin 1980: 236; Saussure and Schulz 2005: 6; Rigotti 
2005: 61; van Dijk 2006: 380). Although this thesis does not claim to devise a 
complete typology of the discursive mechanisms of manipulation, it was undertaken 
with the intention of providing a substantial contribution to the body of work on 
understanding the workings of (nationalist) propraganda.  
Initial readings of the essays were struck by a tension between dogma and 
abstraction, a dichotomy also noted by the Chamberlain scholar Geoffrey Field, who 
observes that Chamberlain’s mode of expression is ‘that of a moralist rather than a 
political theorist’ (Field 1981: 375). Chamberlain was a versatile academic and 
writer, and as a student he showed what was essentially an incompatible combination 
of brilliance in the natural sciences and a passion for the arts. He studied biological 
sciences in Geneva and Florence, received his baccalaureate a year earlier than his 
classmates in 1881, and moved to Vienna to do a doctorate in botany in 1882. When 
he was diagnosed with neurasthenia in 1884, or ‘the innate, excessive delicacy of the 
nerves and the great irritability of the nervous membrane’ (Field 1981: 45), he was 
advised by his psychiatrist to desist from his academic studies. As Chamberlain 
recalls, he used this break from academia to read widely, and became increasingly 
interested in a ‘philosophical’ approach to the natural sciences (Chamberlain 1919: 
119). This movement away from the sciences and towards literature and the 
philosophy of Kant and Plato conflated with the intense exposure to the arts and 
history that Chamberlain had witnessed as a student in Florence. A conflict 
developed between a fascination for the arts and humanities and his brilliance in the 
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empirical sciences, culminating in ‘eine merkwürdige Entdeckung […] das abstrakte 
Denken strengte mich weniger an als jede konkrete Beschäftigung’ (Chamberlain 
1919: 111). The conflicting forces in his academic career define his publications, and 
in particular his war essays.  
1.4 Hypothesis and Research Questions 
The research hypothesis addressed in this thesis was formulated on the basis of a 
preliminary reading of the war essays and a review of the literature on discursive 
strategies in political discourse analysis. The thesis investigates and corroborates the 
following research hypothesis: 
Chamberlain’s war essays are manipulative propaganda whose 
persuasive force is generated by a complex network of strategies of 
argumentation, legitimisation and abstract epistemic metaphors and 
motifs. These strategies are used to gain the readers’ trust while 
simultaneously limiting or removing their critical disagreement space. 
The specific research questions that this thesis answers are based on a combination of 
the literature review and the theoretical framework for analysis devised, and ask: 
(1) What is the discursive role of strategies of legitimisation, 
delegitimisation, coercion, dissimulation and abstraction in 
Chamberlain’s discourse and how are these strategies 
linguistically constructed? 





1.5 Research Methods 
A review of the literature on the critical analysis of manipulative ideological 
discourse suggested that a multi-methodological approach integrating aspects of 
persuasion theory and pragma-dialectical theory within the broader framework of 
critical discourse analysis (CDA) would be necessary to answer the research 
questions. The theoretical analysis model was thus designed to faciliate the analysis 
of the linguistic construction of strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, 
coercion, dissimulation and abstraction using topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies and 
micro-linguistic means. On the micro scale this addresses linguistic phenomena at 
the supra-sentential level (e.g. intertextuality, translations), at the level of rhetoric 
(e.g. metaphor and metaphor scenarios, synecdoche, authorial interjection, rhetorical 
questions, etymology, idiomatic sayings), the level of pragmatics (e.g. speech acts of 
warning, questioning and admission, modality), lexical-semantics (e.g. evaluative 
adjectives, vocabulary pertaining to language and speech, vocabulary pertaining to 
cognitive confusion) and grammar (e.g. generic pronouns and adjectives of place, 
generic adjectives of frequency, passive verbs). The thesis incorporates a corpus-
assisted discourse study (CADS), combining intuitive qualitative analysis with a 
corpus analysis of empirically generated keywords and concordances. The 
identification and analysis of topoi, metaphors and linguistic phenomena in the 
qualitative analysis occurred freely using the text and not using pre-determined lists 
of linguistic phenomena. The corpus linguistic tool WordSmith 5 was used to 
buttress the insights gained from the qualitative close-reading.  
1.6 Research Aims 
First and foremost, this thesis intends to offer the first detailed linguistic analysis of 
Chamberlain’s war essays in the English language. It aims to explain and 
characterise Chamberlain’s rhetorical and argumentative style, and to reveal the 
discursive mechanisms underlying the essays’ persuasive power. 
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Secondly, this thesis seeks to show how CDA can be used to analyse not just 
ideology, but manipulation. Teun van Dijk (2006) has spoken out in favour of 
analysing manipulation in discourse for its own sake, as well as in conjunction with 
the critique of social macro-structures, stating that ‘manipulation is illegitimate in a 
democratic society because it (re)produces, or may reproduce, inequality’, and that 
the study of manipulation thereby ‘belongs to the ethics of discourse’, and is hence 
‘part of the foundations of CDA’ (van Dijk 2006: 363-4). Accordingly, this thesis 
documents CDA in the service of unmasking manipulation. It acknowledges that 
CDA must unmask ideologies, however unmasking ideology is secondary to 
unmasking mechanisms of manipulation in this thesis.  
In the context of twentieth century totalitarian regimes, linguistic and psycho-social 
research into the mechanisms of manipulation has highlighted the necessity of 
understanding how these regimes were installed, consolidated and preserved in the 
first place in order to prevent present and future recipients from becoming the victim 
of manipulative ideological discourse (Rigotti 2005: 61; Saussure and Schulz 2005: 
4-7). In an article entitled What Can We Do to Stop Propaganda in its Tracks? 
Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson list the precautionary measures that members 
of the public should take in order to block the manipulative path of persuasive 
discourse (Pratkanis and Aronson 2001: 341-345). One of the tips that the authors 
advance is simply to ‘know the ways of propaganda’ (2001: 341). Accordingly, this 
thesis aims to make a contribution to understanding the discursive mechanisms of 
manipulative (nationalist) propaganda. As such, this thesis adheres to the crucial task 
for critical political discourse analysis specified by Martin Reisigl, namely the 
detection and exposure of the persuasive, propagandist, manipulative nature of 
political discourse. Concerning the greater social influence of such critical analyses 
of political discourse, Reisigl suggests that ‘in keeping a watch on political speech 
practices related to political activities under democratic legitimation-obligation, this 
criticism locates itself in the action field of political control’ (Reisigl 2008: 262). 
Finally, this thesis aims to demonstrate the methodological synergy between CDA 
and pragma-dialectics by documenting an integrated approach to the critical analysis 
of persuasion, rhetoric and fallacious argumentation. It demonstrates how the critical 
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analysis of persuasive argumentation can be systematically theorised in relation to 
the notion of critical disagreement space, showing that CDA with a focus on rhetoric 
and argumentation can more systematically justify a critique of institutional 
ideological discourse when it is measured against the normative-pragmatic 
argumentation standards proposed by the pragma-dialectical approach to 
argumentation analysis in terms of ‘rules for critical discussion’ and corresponding 
fallacies. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into a theoretical and explanatory introduction (Chapters 1-4), 
four analysis chapters (Chapters 5-8) and a synergy of the analysis results and 
conclusion (Chapter 9). Two appendices provide a complete list of keywords for the 
Chamberlain corpus and example concordance lines for a selection of the keywords 
analysed in Chapter 7. The following Chapter 2 of this thesis reviews literature 
relevant to the present research subject and research methods. It provides a summary 
and assesessment of the scope of existing publications on Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain’s person, writings and language use, and a review of methodological 
literature describes and assesses scholarly contributions to the theory and application 
of critical discourse analysis (CDA), to pragma-dialectical theory, and to the 
synthesis of the pragma-dialectical approach with CDA. It furthermore documents 
the linguistic phenomena hitherto investigated in the framework of CDA and 
argumentation analysis, and concludes with a review of scholarly contributions to the 
theory and application of CADS. Chapter 3 details the theories and concepts that 
inform and shape the thesis and its theoretical framework., and Chapter 4 describes 
the methodology followed, setting forth the procedural guidelines, context analysis, 
corpus analysis and qualitative procedures. The first analysis chapter, Chapter 5 
explores the essays’ topical content and contextualises this against the historical 
background of pre-war and war-time Germany. Chapters 6 to 8 detail the text 
analysis: Chapter 6 outlines the main linguistic and rhetorical observations made 
during preliminary manual readings. These observations shaped the remaining 
analysis stages. Chapter 7 introduces the primary and reference corpora before 
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presenting and analysing the results of the keyword and concordance analyses. 
Chapter 8 presents and analyses the results of the qualitative analysis of 
Chamberlain’s rhetoric and argumentation, including two case studies. Chapter 9 
concludes the thesis by synthesising the analysis results in relation to the research 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The following literature review describes and evaluates publications on Houston 
Stewart Chamberlain’s life, ideology, and writings, on critical discourse analysis, 
pragma-dialectical theory, key linguistic phenomena in the analysis of ideological, 
argumentative and persuasive discourse, and on corpus-assisted discourse studies. 
Particular emphasis is placed on assessing the value of previous applications of 
critical discourse analysis models, corpus-assisted discourse analysis, and 
analysis models that combine CDA with the pragma-dialectical approach to 
argumentation analysis in order to devise the most effective analysis model 
possible for the present research. 
2.2 Literature on Houston Stewart Chamberlain 
Existing literature on Houston Stewart Chamberlain generally addresses the 
author’s life and ideological writings. Several such works were published during 
the National Socialist era in Germany and are thus sources of biographical 
information and details of the reception of Chamberlain’s work, however they 
are also inevitably biased and must be treated with caution. Secondary literature on 
Chamberlain can furthermore be divided into two categories: publications that 
paraphrase and support Chamberlain’s ideology, e.g. Georg Schott (1927), 
Desiderus Breitenstein (1936) and Gerhard Stutzinger (1938), and publications with 
a more critical stance, i.e. Leo Spitzer (1918), Geoffrey Field (1981), and Anja 
Lobenstein-Reichmann (2008). Journal articles refer to Chamberlain merely as a 
point of comparison to another, primary subject of the article, and very rarely as 
the chief subject of discussion. The following survey of literature on Chamberlain is 
divided between bibliographical information and examinations of his ideological 
writings, looking particularly at contemporary and current descriptions and 
perceptions of Chamberlain, at which aspects of his ideology have received the 
most attention, and to what extent his distinctive linguistic style has been a topic 
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of interest. Of the handful of scholars who have studied the life and work of 
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Geoffrey Field (1981) and Anja Lobenstein-
Reichmann (2008) have contributed the most valuable research. 
The majority of biographical work on Chamberlain is written in German. 
Lobenstein-Reichmann (2008) dedicates a significant section of her publication to 
Chamberlain’s life, as do Schott (1927), Stutzinger (1936), Breitenstein (1936), 
and Meyer (1939). Chamberlain’s own autobiographical writings additionally 
provide key information; primarily Lebenswege meines Denkens (1919), but also 
Mein Weg nach Bayreuth (1937). Geoffrey Field (1981) published a psycho-
biography of Chamberlain in English, detailing his character, the influences on his 
intellectual development, his career and ideas, and the landmarks in the process 
which turned him from an Englishman into a German citizen and nationalist. 
He contextualises these factors against the historical and nationalist background 
of the period 1890 to 1914. Field’s book is divided into three sections to correspond 
to the three key aspects of Chamberlain’s life and ideological development: his 
childhood and education, Chamberlain as a writer and ‘popular synthesiser’, and 
the period after he had gained attention as a ‘prophet of Germanism’ (Field 1981: 6). 
Chamberlain biographies generally identify three main chapters in Chamberlain’s 
life: childhood, early experiences in Germany and as a Wagnerite, and the period 
in which he wrote as a wartime propagandist in the run-up to and during the First 
World War. They discuss the sense of permanent transition that characterised 
Chamberlain’s childhood and his ill health, which forced him to seek a more 
beneficial climate in Germany (Field 1981: 26). They also emphasise the lack of 
national identity and national consciousness (Heimatbewusstsein) that haunted 
Chamberlain from an early age (Field 1981: 26-27, Meyer 1939: 21, Chamberlain 
1919: 29), focussing on Chamberlain’s status as a product of three cultures - English, 
French, and German (Field 1981: 48; Meyer 1939: 36). Biographies of document 
Chamberlain’s career as a biologist and his career as a writer at the end of the 
nineteenth century, but do not go beyond the outbreak of the First World War. Field 
additionally provides some information on the political circles in which 
Chamberlain moved in the run-up to and during the war (Field 1981: 110, 168) 
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and substantial information on Chamberlain’s political views at this time (see 
below). 
2.2.1 National Socialist Writers on Chamberlain 
Georg Schott’s Das Leben Houston Stewart Chamberlains in Umrissen (1927), 
Desiderius Breitenstein’s Houston Stewart Chamberlain: Ein Wegbereiter des 
rassischen Weltbildes (1936) and Gerhard Stutzinger’s Die politischen 
Anschauungen Houston Stewart Chamberlains (1938) are of some informative 
value to the present research, however they lack the critical stance of Field and 
Lobenstein-Reichmann’s research. Schott’s publication essentially paraphrases 
Chamberlain’s ideological writings. It adopts and extends Chamberlain’s ideas, 
particularly concerning the equivalence of Weltanschauung and religion, as well as 
further ‘evidence’ Schott has collected from other writers to ‘confirm’ these 
ideas. As selective and biased as he may be, however, Schott offers valuable 
information about the reception of Chamberlain’s writings (Schott 1927: 10-11), 
although this does not include the reception of the war essays. 
Stutzinger admits that his study of Chamberlain is not critical (Stutzinger 1938: 7). 
He reformulates and interprets Chamberlain’s opinions on the nature of freedom, 
religion and the state, the ‘Jewish question’, and internal and foreign affairs, 
referring always to Chamberlain within the context of his intellectual idols Schiller, 
Wager and Kant. The biographical section of his work details Chamberlain’s 
process of becoming a German; his first impressions of Germany, the influence 
of Beethoven’s music, and the influence of Richard Wagner on this process 
(Stutzinger 1938: 10-12). Stutzinger also documents the development of 
Chamberlain’s political ideologies from the time he arrived in Germany up until 
the end of the First World War, consistently comparing them to those of Wagner 
(ibid.: 13-14). Stutzinger is particuarly keen to emphasise that Chamberlain cared 
little for foreign affairs and expansionism, claiming that the only thing that 
Chamberlain wished to expand was German culture (ibid.: 75). Breitenstein’s 
1936 report of the contemporary popularity of Chamberlain’s ideas also offers a 
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substantial biographical section, interwoven with aspects of Chamberlain’s 
ideology that are cherry-picked from his writings to suit the interests of the 
author. Of interest primarily for its biographical detail and information about the 
reception of Chamberlain in Nazi Germany, this is largely a subjective commentary. 
2.2.2 Chamberlain as One of Many 
The most characteristic way of conceiving Chamberlain has been either as an anti-
Semite, a Wagnerite (Fortier 1967: 344), a proto-Hitlerite, or as a bridge between 
Wagnerianism and National Socialism (Allen 2006: 86; Biddis 1997: 86; Szaz 
1963: 930). Chamberlain is commonly perceived as an ‘ideological precursor’ of 
National Socialism (Szaz 1963: title), and his critics refer particularly to his 
influence on the chief Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg (Field 1981: 1), as well as 
to Chamberlain’s personal corresponce and encounters with Adolf Hitler (Field 
1981: 438). Lobenstein-Reichmann offers the most thorough examination of 
Chamberlain as a proto-Hitlerite, writing of Mein Kampf, for example, ‘Die 
Affinität zu Chamberlain ist stellenweise so ausgeprägt, dass man meinen könnte, 
einen seiner Texte vor Augen zu haben’ (Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 646). 
Chamberlain has almost exclusively been thematised in relation to his historical 
and intellectual contexts. Hugo Meyer and Geoffrey Field relate the relevance 
and reception of Chamberlain’s work to the cultural pessimism and sense of 
internal division following unification under the leadership of Prussia at the end of 
the nineteenth century (Meyer 1939: 11-12; Field 1981: 123). Although the 
historical contextualisation of Chamberlain’s publications plays a secondary role 
in Field’s psychobiography, Meyer’s primary goal is to contribute to the overall 
picture of the genesis of the völkisch movement by examining each aspect of 
Chamberlain’s ideology in relation to the time in which it was written. Charles H. 
Clarke and Lobenstein-Reichmann favour the socio-cultural contextualisation of 
Chamberlain’s writings, and discuss the early wartime propaganda and Grundlagen 
in relation to Chamberlain’s membership of the educated middle classes (Clarke 
1916: 9; Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 1). 
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Critics also locate Chamberlain’s ideological writings firmly within his 
contemporary intellectual context. Meyer and Breitenstein discuss Chamberlain in 
relation to his scholarly influences (Meyer 1939: 18), whereby Breitenstein 
focusses particularly on the influence of Immanuel Kant (Breitenstein 1936: 19). 
Lobenstein-Reichmann provides the most comprehensive example of this as she 
dedicates half of her extensive work to the analysis of Chamberlain’s intellectual 
sources and intertextual references, including Nietzsche, Wagner, Schiller and 
Kant (Lobenstein-Reichmann: 2008: 661). She concludes that Chamberlain was 
first and foremost an ‘ intellectual synthesiser’ who interwove existing 
intellectual discourses into one (ibid.: 654-656). Elsewhere, Chamberlain is 
associated with Arthur de Gobineau (Jonassen 1951: 158; Fortier 1967: 346; 
Biddiss 1997: 159; Wodak & Reisigl 1999: 177; Whaley 2007), Oswald Spengler 
(Biddis 1997: 73), and Julius Langbehn (Weikart 2003: 279).  
Chamberlain is discussed not only in terms of the ideological influences acting 
upon him, but also as an ideological influence himself. Etan Bloom names 
Grundlagen as a theoretical source for Arthur Ruppin’s Sociology of the Jews 
(1930) (Bloom 2007: 19), for example, although the historian and Israeli scholar 
Amos Morris-Reich disputes this claim (Morris-Reich 2008: 117). Most 
recently, Felicity Rash locates Chamberlain’s Grundlagen within the context of 
contemporary anti-Semitic writers, primarily summarising the thematic content 
and secondarily the linguistic phenomena in influential anti-Semitic works 
published during Chamberlain’s time in Germany, including Der Sieg des 
Judenthums über das Germanenthum (Wilhelm Marr 1879), Unsere Aussichten 
(Heinrich von Treitschke 1879), Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und 
Culturfrage (Eugen Dühring 1881), Handbuch zur Judenfrage (Theodor Fritsch 
1887) and Wenn ich der Kaiser wär’ (Heinrich Claß 1912). She provides a 
detailed analysis of the anti-Semitic ideology presented in chapters 5 and 6 of the 
Grundlagen: Der Eintritt der Juden in die abendländische Geschichte (The Entry of 
the Jews into the Western World) and Der Eintritt der Germanen in die 
Weltgeschichte (The Entry of the Germanic Peoples into World History) (Rash 
2012: 99-116) and highlights the ways in which Chamberlain contrasts the 
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Germanic ‘self’ with the Jewish ‘other’ in order to emphasize the superiority of the 
former (Rash 2012: 101). 
2.2.3 Linguistic Analyses of Chamberlain’s Writings 
Until recently, references to Chamberlain’s linguistic style were fleeting and few. 
However, their existence confirms that this is a valuable subject for analysis. The 
earliest observations on Chamberlain’s use of language stem from Georg 
Schott. In his discussion of Chamberlain’s attitude to religion, Schott states that 
anybody who wishes to fully understand this attitude must pay attention to the 
inferences and subtleties in Chamberlain’s writing (Zeichensprache) that may 
well have been subconscious (Schott 1927: 19). Schott furthermore analyses 
Chamberlain’s use of the word Gestalt in the Grundlagen (ibid.: 100), and his 
statement ‘ahnendes Erschauen ist hier die Pfadfinderin’ (ibid.: 75) suggests that 
he has identified the significance of Chamberlain’s sight and path metaphors, 
however he does not elaborate on this point. 
Field makes several references to Chamberlain’s writings as general exercises in 
persuasive rhetoric (Field 1981: 149, 374; see also Ballmann 1939: 63 and Allen 
2006: 91), highlighting in particular Chamberlain’s dogmatic writing style (Field 
1981: 365). Alfred Rosenberg similarly discusses the artistic creativity of 
Chamberlain’s writing (Rosenberg 1927: 96), although Rosenberg praises its 
aesthetic value, whereas Field perceives it as empty rhetoric. More recently, 
Arvidsson and Allen have both identified particular aspects of Chamberlain’s 
rhetoric as noteworthy, namely his appeal to ‘lived experience’, which Arvidsson 
classifies as an ethical strategy in the tradition of classical rhetoric (Arvidsson 
2006: 153), and his use of the organic metaphor in Grundlagen (Allen 2006: 81, 





The first definitive study of Chamberlain’s language use is Anja Lobenstein-
Reichmann’s 2008 monograph. Lobenstein-Reichmann’s primary goal is to 
examine the linguistic construction of Chamberlain’s ideological Weltanschauung 
in Grundlagen; she does not include Chamberlain’s wartime propaganda in her 
analysis. Her linguistic approach is primarily lexical-semantic, however her 
analysis is interspersed with some sentence level analysis, and with some 
pragmatic observations. The pragmatic section of her analysis examines 
presupposition, speech acts, inclusion and exclusion, and collectivisation 
(Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 9), however this is afforded significantly less attention 
than her lexical-semantic text analysis. 
The lexical-semantic section of Lobenstein-Reichmann’s analysis examines a 
limited number of terms primarily in Chamberlain’s Grundlagen according to their 
ideological perspective. The author focuses on terms from the cultural sphere, 
such as Künstler, Persönlichkeit, Leben, Willen, and Entartung, with the aim of 
explaining how Chamberlain politicises these words semantically. Lobenstein-
Reichmann’s justification for this approach is, in short, that references are 
invariably selected and constructed from the perspective of a certain ideology 
(‘der Bezugsgegenstand ist immer perspektivitätsgeprägt’ (ibid.: 223)). She also 
discusses the pragmatic functions of metaphor and focusses particularly on 
Chamberlain’s use of metaphor to paint vivid pictures in order to keep the 
readers’ attention as well as to fog over the actual content of his writings (290-1). 
Her analysis of Chamberlain’s use of metaphor foregrounds three metaphorical 
fields (Metaphernfelder)  ( 293): life and nature, including references to the 
body, to sleeping and waking, birth and death, plants and animals and 
procreation; light, including references to night and day, light and dark, shadows 
and illumination; God, race and the world, including references to purity or 
cleanliness (Reinheit), creation, history, knowledge, catastrophe, illness, war and 





The role of rhetoric and argumentation receives little attention in this study. 
Lobenstein-Reichmann acknowledges that the properties one would typically expect 
to find in motivational campaigns are indeed present in Chamberlain’s writing, 
listing as examples argumentation, emotionalisation, vagueness and negation 
(226), however this does not constitute a focal point of her analysis. Her analysis 
of the persuasive mechanisms in Chamberlain’s discourse does not go beyond the 
level of metaphor and ‘semantisierte Lexik’, (‘semanticised’ or ‘primed’ lexis) 
(227). Whereas Lobenstein-Reichmann focuses on the ideological underpinnings 
of Chamberlain’s language use, it does not address the dogmatic rhetoric that 
earlier linguistic references in Chamberlain scholarship highlight and that is the 
substance of his wartime propaganda. 
The second definitive study of Chamberlain’s language use is Felicity Rash’s 
(2012) Nationalist, Colonialist and Anti-Semitic Discourse 1871-1918. The two 
key chapters of this publication for the present purposes are Rash’s DHA of the 
Grundlagen and her review of Chamberlain’s language in the war essays. Rash 
applies discourse-historical semantics and critical metaphor analysis in a 
computer-assisted discourse- historical analysis of Chamberlain’s construction of 
racist images and ideology in the Grundlagen. She focuses particularly on the 
construction and justification of the German ‘ self’ and the Jewish ‘other’, 
looking at the key stems feind-, fremd- and Freund-, and at the use metaphors of 
light and dark, health and sickness and upward and downward movement as well 
as botanic metaphors and images of poison and poisoning to present positive and 
negative characteristics of the ‘self’ and ‘ other’, respectively (Rash 2012: 111). 
Chapter 6 of the same publication addresses the thematic content and language of 
Chamberlain’s three series of war essays, Kriegsaufsätze, Neue Kriegsaufsätze and 
Hammer oder Amboß. Rash makes some key observations regarding the language 
of Chamberlain’s entire oeuvre, namely his contrast of alleged Tatsachen with 
alleged Lügen, and his varied reference to and quotations from German, English and 
French sources (Rash 2012: 182). Although her analysis of the thematic content of 
Chamberlain’s essay series seems to outweigh her linguistic analysis, she also 
identifies some key linguistic phenomena and discourse strategies. These include 
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the contrast of the German ‘self’ with the ‘other’, the topos of history as example 
and the strategy of German self-justification in the Kriegsaufsätze, etymological 
expositions in the Neue Kriegsaufsätze, and intertextual references and the 
argumentation topos of contrast in Hammer oder Amboß (Rash 2012: 187). She 
supplements her qualitative analysis of Chamberlain’s essays with a computer-
assisted concordance analysis of selected keywords in the writings of Chamberlain 
and Paul Rohrbach, examining occurrences of Kampf, Feind, Freund, Fried-, 
Pflicht, Opfer, Lüg- and Neid, and metaphors of health, sickness and poison, and 
animal metaphors (Rash 2012: 189-194). The present thesis follows a similar 
methodological procedure to that used by Rash, combining close reading with 
metaphor analysis and a computer-assisted analysis of keywords obtained by 
comparison to the keywords identified for Rohrbach’s discourse. The present 
analysis does not adopt Rash’s focus on the construction of the ‘self’ and the 
‘other’, however, and will exceed Rash’s analysis in scope and detail. 
2.3 Critical Approaches to Analysing Persuasive Ideological Discourse 
Theoretical introductions to critical discourse analysis (CDA) by Ruth Wodak, 
Norman Fairclough, Michael Meyer and Teun van Dijk provide valuable 
summaries of this approach to discourse analysis. Fairclough and Wodak’s 
Discourse as Social Interaction (1997) offers a clear and detailed introduction to the 
tenets of CDA, including the CDA understanding of discourse as social action, the 
relationship between discourse and ideology, the practical nature of CDA in 
contemporary society, the origins of CDA in critical theory, and different 
approaches to CDA, such as social semiotics and the Duisburg School. Wodak, 
de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart’s The Discursive Construction of National Identity 
(2009) provides a further useful introduction to the assumptions and goals of the 
critical approach to analysing discourse.  
CDA has been applied in the analysis of a wide range of social and/or ideological 
issues, from mental health (Lester & Paulus 2012) and physical disability 
(Grue 2011), to corporate discourse (Breeze 2012). The most important 
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applications of CDA for this analysis are those that foreground nationalism (or 
national identity), argumentation and persuasion. Although proponents of CDA are 
reluctant to identify a fixed set of linguistic phenomena for analysis, as each study 
addresses a unique combination of texts that exhibit a unique combination of 
linguistic means (Meyer 2001: 25), the following section reviews a cross-section of 
these studies in order to identify which discursive and linguistic phenomena have 
been explored in nationalist and/or manipulative discourse.  
Teun van Dijk is particularly keen to analyse manipulative discourse from the 
perspective of the CDA approach, and to develop a ‘systematic theory of the 
structures and processes involved in manipulation’ (Van Dijk 2006: 359). Van 
Dijk’s 2006 socio-cognitive analysis of the discursive structures of manipulation 
constitutes a significant step towards achieving the kind of synthesis between 
CDA and the study of manipulative argumentation advocated by both van Dijk 
and the present thesis. Van Dijk’s analysis of the exploitation of the readers’ victim 
status in Tony Blair’s legitimisation of the war against Iraq focuses on positive 
self-presentation and negative other-presentation. It identifies lexical, syntactic 
and rhetorical discourse structures that emphasise the position, power, authority 
or moral superiority of the speaker or their sources as well as the inferior position 
of the recipients, and specifically on new beliefs posited by the speaker as 
knowledge, on argumentation and proofs advanced by the speaker, on the way 
in which alternatives are discredited, and on appeals to the ideologies, attitudes 
and emotions of the recipients. 
Indeed, argumentation strategies like othering, strategies of legitimisation and 
speaker characteristics are popular phenomena for analysis in critical analyses of 
persuasive ideological discourse. Martin Wengeler’s 2005 typology of eight 
constitutive elements of German Kriegsbotschaften (political speeches that justify 
war) provides a useful breakdown of the argumentative macro-features of twentieth 
century war discourse, some of which are compatible with the approach and 
discourse used in this thesis. Wengeler identifies the consistent occurrence of 
narratio (descriptions of how the current situation arose that depict the enemy as 
stubborn and malevolent and the home nation as pacifistic and as having no choice 
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but to defend themselves), the speaker or writer’s presentation/construction of his 
role as responsible and pacifistic (Selbstdarstellung/Selbstinszenierung des 
Redners), appeal to danger or threat to justify/legitimise present or future 
actions, the construction of the common war aims as achievable by war or 
military measures only, appeals to history or to religion to justify the necessity or 
definite success of an action, appeals to values, codified norms or obligations, 
expressions of certain victory, and appeals to internal solidarity 
(Solidaritätsappell nach innen) (Wengeler 2005: 216-228). 
Antonio Reyes’s (2011) makes a valuable connection between ‘othering’ and 
strategies of legitimisation. In his study of language as an instrument of control in 
speeches by George W. Bush and Barack Obama that justify American military 
presence during the Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2009) conflicts, Reyes analyses 
legitimisation strategies that refer to emotions and fear, a hypothetical future, 
rationality, voices of expertise, and altruism, and further identifies the linguistic 
constructions used to shape these strategies. Reyes’s observation on the tendency to 
construct the ‘self’ vs the ‘other’ in strategies of legitimisation may potentially also 
be formative for the present analysis, as initial readings of Chamberlain’s war essays 
suggest that they confirm this observation. Reyes finds that strategies of legimisation 
invariably involve the binary construction of an inclusive ‘us’ and an inclusive 
‘them’ (Reyes 2011: 787). This indicates that it would be fruitful to examine the 
extent to which this phenomenon is evident in Chamberlain’s essays, as well as its 
exact discursive function here. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this study, 
however, is that it links legitimisation to the creation of the situation. Based on an 
observation by Mey (2001), Reyes states that ‘the contextual elements of the specific 
setting invest the political actor with authority and the power rested upon his figure 
by different institutions. Therefore, speech acts are effective when they are situated. 
Not only do they rely on the situation in which they are uttered, but they actively 
create it’ (Reyes 2011: 784). This notion proved formative for the present analysis. 
Theo van Leeuwen (2007) sets out a different framework for analysing the language 
of legitimisation. He develops and demonstrates this framework in an analysis of a 
corpus of texts that legitimise compulsory education. By isolating all elements in the 
 
 28 
texts that do not constitute description (e.g. of a child’s first day at school), he shows 
that these texts are constructed using ‘reactions’ (telling parents and pupils how to 
feel on the first day of school), ‘purposes’ (ascribing purposes to the actions of 
teachers, parents and children), and ‘legitimations’ (van Leeuwen 2007: 93). It is the 
third category on which the author expands in the article. He explains that 
legitimation answers the questions ‘Why should we do this?’ and ‘Why should we do 
this in this way?’ (van Leeuwen 2007: 93). In his analysis corpus he finds and 
examines examples of legimitation via personal authority, expert authority, role 
model authority, impersonal authority, the authority of tradition, the authority of 
conformity, and moral evaluation (op. cit.: 94-97), as well as legitimation via 
naturalisation, moral abstraction, analogies, rationalisation (instrumental and 
theoretical), and mythopoesis (op. cit. 98-105). Van Leeuwen’s work demonstrates 
the necessity of analysing strategies of legitimisation in persuasive ideological 
discourse. Although the present thesis will attempt to avoid a priori categories for 
analysis where possible, van Leeuwen’s typology may serve as a useful point of 
reference for identifying and classifying these strategies in Chamberlain’s discourse. 
Together with Ruth Wodak, van Leeuwen has successfully applied his approach to 
the analysis of legitimisation in Austrian immigration control within the scope of 
CDA (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999). The authors examine authorisation 
legitimation, conformity legitimisation, rationalisation, moral abstraction and 
mythopoesis in Bescheide rejecting immigrants’ applications for residence in 
Austria. They find that moral abstraction is the most common form of legitimisation, 
followed by authorisation, and then rationalisation (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 
111). The successful application van Leeuwen’s strategies within the scope of CDA 
confirms that his approach would prove fruitful for Chamberlain’s war essays. 
Wodak (2009) notes the most common topoi used when trying to convince an 
audience of one’s interests, visions or positions, which she notes are largely applied 
to legitimise positions by replacing evidence with so-called ‘common-places’ 
(Wodak 2009: 43). Topoi typical of this discursive context are the topos of 
burdening, the topos of reality, the topos of numbers, the topos of history, the topos 
of threat, the topos of definition, the topos of justice and the topos of urgency 
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(Wodak 2009: 43). As Chamberlain too was trying to convince an audience of his 
interests, Wodak’s typology provides an informative basic list of topoi to which to be 
alert in Chamberlain’s essays. 
Perhaps one of the most methodologically valuable critical discourse analyses of the 
discourse of nationalism for the purposes of the present thesis is van der Valk’s 
2003 examination of the manifestation of ethnic dominance and expression of ethnic 
equality in the discourse on immigration and nationality of the French mainstream 
parties UDF/RPR1 in Assemblée General debates. The link that van der Valk 
conceptualises and demonstrates between the four discursive phenomena othering, 
legitimisation/de-legitimisation, fallacies and topoi is enlightening, and has the 
potential to serve as a key theoretical basis for the present analysis. Van der Valk’s 
analysis focuses on semantic strategies, sociopolitical strategies of legitimisation and 
de-legitimisation, topoi and fallacies in argumentation, and some rhetorical devices, 
including metaphor. She establishes that the discourse of the mainstream Right in 
France is highly rhetorical, making use of hyperbole, repetition, metaphor, rhetorical 
questions and irony in particular (van der Valk 2003: 330). She furthermore notes the 
prevalence of negative ‘other’ presentation,which she links closely to strategies of 
legitimation, de-legitimation and fallacies (van der Valk 2003: 316/317). She shows 
how the macro-strategy of negative other presentation is complemented by the 
macrostrategy of delegimisation, to which the straw man fallacy and the ad hominem 
fallacy are central (van der Valk 2003: 340/341). Topoi or ‘commonplaces’, so called 
because they imply simple common sense conclusions (op. cit. 323), are also 
identified to be central to the argumentation in French parliamentary discourse. Van 
der Valk identifies recurring instances of topoi of exceptional French legislation, 
immigrants are a burden, immigrants cause unemployment, immigrants come to 
profit from our country, immigrants abuse laws and rules, immigrants are given more 
advantages than the French, immigrants’ culture and values are different, stopping 
immigration is ‘for the immigrants’ own good’, stopping immigrant would 
discourage the rise of the Extreme Right, complicity (the Left favours illegal 
immigration), and immigration leads to the decline of French civilization (op. cit.: 
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324). It may thus also prove fruitful to compare and contrast the topoi identified in 
Chamberlain’s discourse with the topoi identified by van der Valk (2009). 
Within the critical focus on argumentation and legitimisation, speaker characteristics 
are a major concern of the literature on persuasive discourse. Cap 2002 provides an 
introduction to persuasion from the perspectives of psychology and linguistics. 
Focussing on the pragmatics of persuasion from the perspective of speaker 
characteristics, his analysis looks particularly at the role of politeness, consistency 
and face-threatening acts (FTA) in NATO discourse. Cap highlights the human drive 
towards consistency in belief as ‘the strongest motivator of all persuasion strategies’ 
(Cap 2002: 146) and identifies that ‘the major assumption behind consistency 
theories […] is that once the addressee is in a committed state, he will automatically 
place novel information within the latitude of acceptance rather than rejection, with 
little concern for the essence of the information itself’ (146). Cap situates the 
traditional rhetorical duo ethos (persuasion through personality) and logos 
(persuasion through reasoning) within the context of getting to addressee into a 
‘committed state’ (146). He summarises that ethos and logos (persuasion through 
reasoning) interact to achieve commitment, as ‘it is the enactment of personality that 
provides premises for successful argument and it is the imposition of a certain pattern 
of reasoning that makes message acceptance possible’ (161). Although each of the 
theories discussed by Cap may have some bearing on the present analysis, it is Cap’s 
discussion of consistency theory from the perspective of speaker characteristics that 
may be the greatest help in shedding some light on the interactive roles of ethos and 
logos in Chamberlain’s rhetoric of persuasion. In particular his reflections on the 
fickle dynamics of ethos in consistency-based theories of persuasion may serve as an 
interesting point of reference for Chamberlain’s strategies of self-legitimisation. Cap 
points out that the speaker or author must find the correct balance between 
impersonal discourse, an ‘ego-trip’, and emotion, and appropriately channel 
personality by changing mood and tone, and identifies examples of this in speeches 
by Margaret Thatcher and Desmosthenes, as well as in NATO press statements 
regarding the Kosovo conflict and eastward expansion of the NATO military block. 
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Stiff and Mongeau similarly highlight that author or speaker characteristics in 
manipulative communication are rooted in the Aristotelian notion of ‘ethos’, 
and denote the source’s self-presentation and the receivers’ perception of the 
source (Stiff & Mongeau 2003: 104-5). A survey of the vast array of research into 
source characteristics in manipulation reveals that these characteristics can be 
grouped under the categories ‘character’ and ‘credibility’. ‘Credibility’ subsumes 
the characteristics of authority (Perloff 2010: 159), expertise (O’Keefe 2002: 182; 
Perloff 2010: 167), education, occupation and exerience (O’Keefe 2002: 184), 
knowledge bias (Perloff 2010: 171), reporting bias (Perloff 2010: 174), and 
citation of evidence sources (O’Keefe 2002: 186). ‘Character’ is syonymous with 
Aristotelian eunoia or perceived ‘benevolence towards the audience’ (Kochin 2009: 
33), and includes the characteristics of trustworthiness (O’Keefe 2002: 182; 
Perloff 2010: 167), charisma (Perloff 2010: 155), similarity (Stiff & Mongeau 2003: 
119-121; Perloff 2010: 176; O’Keefe 2002:199), likeability (Perloff 2010: 175; 
O’Keefe 2002: 190) and perceived goodwill (Perloff 2010: 167). 
The work of Chilton and Schaeffner on speaker self-presentation and the 
construction of relationships between the proponent and recipient provides key 
insights for the present research. As the authors declare, their analysis of some 
of the pragmatic, semantic and syntactic choices made in speeches by John 
Major aims to ‘bring conscious consideration of the relationships between the 
speaker and others that are established during the actual utterance of the text’ 
(Chilton and Schaeffner 1997: 216). Chilton and Schaeffner stress that speech acts 
never occur without participants being assigned particular roles or positions, and 
that the analysis of pronouns in political discourse help to map the construction 
of socio-political relationships. Accordingly, they analyse how John Major 
establishes ‘leader-led’, ‘speaker-spoken to’ and ‘teacher-taught’ relationships to 
position himself as truthful narrator or messenger and man of action, concluding 
that this is a crucial prerequisite for recipients’ acceptance of orders, requests, 
advising, warnings and commitments (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997: 216-219). 
Chilton and Schaeffner demonstrate the strategic significance of discourse 
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participant positioning in political texts; an objective that this thesis seeks to 
develop in relation to Chamberlain’s political discourse. 
Research by Louis de Saussure identifies one particular aspect of authorial self-
positioning that is crucial to the present analysis. In researching and formulating 
preliminary hypotheses on manipulation and cognitive pragmatics, Saussure 
advances that a central mechanism of manipulation is the so-called ‘trouble-and-
resolution-device’ (de Sassure 2005: 133). He bases this concept on ‘fuzziness’, 
whereby the discourse proponent consciously uses obscure, vague, metaphorical or 
mystical language at the sentential and supra-sentential levels in order to create 
‘fuzziness’ (trouble)leading the discourse recipients tobelieve that their inability to 
intepret the discourse is a result of their incompetence, and to resolve the 
fuzziness by abandoning some of their cognitive abilities for the sake of accepting 
a message originating from a seemingly higher intellect (resolution) (Saussure 2005: 
134). 
2.4 Linguistic Means in the Critical Analysis of Discourse 
William Rogers’s descriptive work Persuasion, Message, Receivers, and Contexts 
(2007) offers a comprehensive guide to potential linguistic categories in the 
analysis of manipulative argumentation. Rogers examines a wide range of 
syntactical and rhetorical devices, especially metaphor, metonymy, personification, 
rhetorical questions, simile, alliteration, climax, hyperbole, and irony. At times, 
Rogers relates his micro-linguistic analysis to discursive strategies on a macro-
level, for example inoculating the audience to counter arguments by naming 
downside arguments yourself (Rogers 2007.: 51), and using consistency, contrast, 
and reciprocation to gain compliance (Rogers 2007: 53). The present study 
similarly looks at the persuasive function of counter arguments, contrast and 




Notable studies of the persuasive function of individual stylistic and rhetorical 
devices have examined the evaluative and legitimising function of proverbs and 
sayings (Gandara 2004), the topical-rhetorical force of concessives (Eggler 2006), 
and semantic-lexical bipolarity or ‘black-and-white painting’ (Danler 2005), for 
example. Lelia Gandara (2004) offers a particularly interesting perspective on 
causality in her investigation of the use of proverbs to establish a cause-and-effect 
relationship in press and political discourse. The present analysis adopts Gandara’s 
position that, particularly in societies in which authority is based on tradition, a 
proverb’s illocutionary force can overwhelm the addressee and thus project an 
argumentative mould onto a discursive situation. Instead of linking this 
phenomenon to causality, however, the present analysis analyses the illocutionary 
force of the proverb in authorial self-legitimisation. The present analysis also 
draws on Jinjun Wang’s 2006 analysis of the use of questions to exert power, starting 
from the assumption that questions are a potential means for dominant 
conversation participants to exert power over subordinate individuals. Wang 
details the way in which a questioner imposes the questioner’s will on the 
addressee by restricting, constraining and ratifying a topic of response, by 
producing the unequal allocation of turn-taking and controlling the development of 
the topic, by producing a new topic, or by redirecting the old topic. Although 
Wang’s approach is specific to conversation analysis, this article inspired a focus 
on the function of question and answer structures in Chamberlain’s discourse. Billig 
observes that concessives give the impression of advocacy or the skill of 
deliberation (Billig 1996: 186-187) while actually contributing to the speaker’s 
persuasive force and supposed legitimacy. Karl Sornig’s discussion of unmitigated 
and apodictic expressions informs the present analysis of the topoi of factuality and 
proveability (Sornig 1989: 99). Kochin’s comments on the persuasive force of fear 
appeals (Kochin 2009: 377-8) as well as Wengeler’s typology and theory of 
the argumentative potential of linguistic reflexivity (Wengeler 1996: 414) constitute 




Many CDA-based studies of nationalism and national identity focus on a limited 
number of linguistic devices. Van De Mieroop and Clifton (2012) focus solely 
on turn-taking and length of response in the interactional negotiation of group 
membership and ethnicity between a white interviewer and a former slave. On the 
supra-sentential level, Juan Li (2009) examines the effects of intertextuality on the 
discursive construction of national identities in the US and Chinese press. On a 
micro-level, Jennifer Cramer (2010) dedicates her analysis of ‘Europeanness’ as 
enacted by EU leaders versus Turkish leaders in the context of Turkish entry 
into the EU entirely to pronouns. She analyses the use and repetition of pronouns 
to create and recreate national identities. These studies are limited in scope: the 
present research holds that the linguistic analysis of ideologies should be as 
varied and comprehensive as possible.  
On the micro-linguistic level from the perspective of the DHA, Wodak et al. 2009 
focus primarily on lexical units and syntactic devices that serve to construct 
unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, change, autonomy, and 
heteronymy. These are, in particular, personal reference (anthroponymic generic 
terms, personal pronouns, quantifiers); spatial reference (toponyms/geonyms, 
adverbs of place, spatial reference through persons, by means of prepositional 
phrases such as ‘with us’, ‘with them’); temporal reference (temporal prepositions, 
adverbs of time, temporal conjunctions, temporal references by means of nouns, 
semi-prefixes with temporal meaning). The authors also look at vagueness, 
euphemisms, linguistic hesitation and disruptions, linguistic slips, allusions, 
rhetorical questions, and the mode of discourse representation (forms of reported 
speech), as well as the ways in which agents are rendered anonymous or agency 
more generally is obscured by use of the passive voice, the use of 
personification, synecdoche and metonymy, and the us of deictic ‘we’ (Wodak 
et. al 2009: 35). The present analysis accordingly acknowledges that Wodak et 
al.’s linguistic means offer some helpful pointers, but that these cannot be applied 
as a priori linguistic devices for analysis, as the present texts and research questions 
are not identical to those used by Wodak et. al. 
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2.5 Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
A review of the literature on metaphor shows that the most relevant theory of 
metaphor for the purposes of CDA is Conceptual or Cognitive Metaphor Theory 
(CMT). The greatest contributions to CMT originate from George Lakoff and 
colleagues. The earliest theoretical work on conceptual metaphor is George Lakoff 
and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (1980). Lakoff and Johnson define 
metaphor as a conceptual and systematic concept grounded in human experience and 
explain that, because so many concepts in life are abstract (e.g. emotions, ideas, 
time), human beings attempt to grasp them by referring to them in terms of other 
concepts that are more clearly delineated in their experience (e.g. spatial orientations, 
objects) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 115).  
Andreas Musolff has done key further work on CMT, and particularly in relation to 
the role of metaphor in (political) discourse. In Metaphor and Political Discourse: 
Analogical Reasoning in Debates about Europe (2004) and The Study of Metaphor 
as Part of Critical Discourse Analysis (2012), Musolff underlines the relevance of 
metaphor for social and political conceptualisation from the perspective of CMT. He 
convincingly argues that if our social experience and conceptualisations are 
organised in terms of metaphors then metaphors must also play a central role in the 
construction of social and political reality, i.e. politics must also perceived and 
constructed metaphorically (Musolff 2004: 1-2). Taking a corpus-based approach to 
critical metaphors in public discourse Musolff demonstrates that metaphor has a 
tripartite function in political discourse by analysing the source domain of FAMILY 
concepts in media discussions of the EU in the German and British press. He 
corroborates the CMT notion that metaphor not only constructs meaning in 
discourse, but that it also has an argumentative function and a rhetorical function. 
Musolff (2012) focuses on the argumentative function of metaphor in political 
discourse. Musolff’s 2012 analysis of ‘body politic’ metaphors (A NATION STATE IS A 
HUMAN BODY) in racist discourse (although the author emphasises that this metaphor 
is not resricted to racist discourse (Musolff 2012: 303)) analyses how metaphors 
pertaining to ‘the great chain of being’ allow racists to denigrate their targets ‘by 
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“demoting” them from humankind’s central position in the chain down to “lower” 
ranks of animals, plants, disease-engendering organisms or inorganic material’ 
(Musolff 2012: 302). Musolff’s analysis centres on the so-called ‘entailments’ 
(implications) of metaphors; he argues that, as the metaphor A NATION STATE IS A 
HUMAN BODY entails that a nation state can be healthy or fall ill, and when ill can 
suffer from specific diseases (e.g. cancer) and need therapy, this metaphor and others 
like it carries social, emotional and aesthetic values that influence the readers’ or 
listeners’ interpretation of the utterance (Musolff 2012: 303). Musolff concludes that 
metaphors and their entailments such as those pertaining to the ‘great chain of being’ 
have an argumentative function because, by using them, the author or speaker 
‘invites the reader or listener to access knowledge about the undesirability of illness 
and the desirability or necessity of therapy by referring to well known illnesses or 
agents of disease’, thereby avoiding having to ‘laboriously demonstrate their claims 
with facts’ (Musolff 2012: 303). 
Further reading of Musolff’s work suggests that his 2006 publication Metaphor 
Scenarios in Public Discourse may be of particular value to the present analysis. 
Using the bilingual corpus EUROMETA II consisting of British and German 
newspapers and magazines between the years 1989 and 2001, Musolff analyses 
metaphors in public debates about the European Union (cf Musolff 2004) and 
reaches the conclusion that metaphors and their source concepts may be organised 
into ‘mini-narratives’ or so-called ‘scenarios’, defined as ‘conceptual clusters’ 
(Musolff 2006: 24). Focussing once again on FAMILY metaphors, he shows that many 
of the metaphors in the corpus used can be realted to one broad source domain: LOVE 
– MARRIAGE – FAMILY (Musolff 2006: 24), and identifies conceptual specifications 
such as a ménage à trois between France, Germany and Britain as extensions of 
general mappings underlying the whole domain (Musolff 2006: 25). Perhaps his 
most illustrative example is that France and Germany figure both as marriage 
partners in the EU and as parents of the EU’s currency notion (Musolff 2006: 26). 
Musolff states that metaphor scenarios are an essential feature of metaphor use in 
public discourse as their rich conceptual structure can be easily exploited for 
argumentative and rhetorical purposes: normative assumptions pertaining to aspects 
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of love, marriage and family, for example, mean that this metaphor scenario can be 
used to frame attitudes and evaluation in public discourse (Musolff 2006: 28). The 
argumentative and rhetorical potential of metaphors in general, ‘great chain of being’ 
metaphors and family metaphors in particular, and ultimately ‘metaphor scenarios’ as 
conceptualised by Musolff indicated the necessity of analysis metaphors in 
Chamberlain’s war essays. Musolff’s work provides an ideal point of reference for 
the present analysis, which will endeavour to investigate metaphor scenarios in 
Chamberlain’s discourse. 
2.6 CDA and Pragma-Dialectical Theory 
Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkeman’s Fundamentals of 
Argumentation Theory (1996) provides the most informative theoretical 
introduction to pragma-dialectical theory. The authors contextualise the pragma-
dialectical approach by outlining the main tenets of all major approaches to 
argumentation, such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ‘new rhetoric’, and 
formal and informal logic as devised by Stephen Toulmin, among others. They 
furthermore discuss the origins of pragma-dialectics in Karl Popper’s critical 
rationalism, and define key concepts in pragma-dialectics, such as argumentation, 
analytic, dialectic, rhetoric, fallacies, controversy and discussion. Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst’s A Systematic Theory of Argumentation (2004) and van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser’s article Argumentation (2010) are further valuable 
references for definitions of the concepts ‘argumentation’ and ‘fallacy’ as they are 
used in the pragma-dialectical approach to argument analysis. Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst (1992) provide a useful guide to the methodology of a pragma-
dialectical analysis of argumentation, and particularly to analysing fallacies. The 
authors outline analysis components and provide a typology of fallacies according 
to each stage of critical discussion and corresponding rules for critical discussion.  
A key aspect of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis for the 
present purposes is Daniel Cohen’s taxonomy of logical, rhetorical and dialectical 
fallacies (Cohen 2003: 119). Cohen’s taxonomy indicates the respective pragma-
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dialectical rules for critical discussion that may be violated by each category of 
fallacies. Logical fallacies may potentially represent violations of the rules of 
inference, and include false cause, hasty generalisation, begging the question/circular 
reasoning, ambiguities, affirming the consequent/denying the antecedent, ‘not’ 
hopping, slippery slope, missing the point, appeal to ignorance, weak analogy and 
unfinished demonstration. Rhetorical faults are posited as potential violations of the 
rules of fair presentation and include suppressed evidence, unwarranted premise, 
false dichotomy, complex question, ad hominem, non sequitur, appeal to 
(illegitimate) authority, appeal to emotion, ad populum, insincerity, straw man and 
obscurantism. Dialectical offenses constitute potential violations of the rules of 
rational engagement, and include appeal to force, excessive argument, unanswered 
objections (by the proponent), unvoiced objections (by the opponent), unasked 
questions, misunderstanding, insufficient argument, insufficient counter-argument 
and ignoratio elenchi (ibid.: 119-120). This analysis addresses instances of van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst’s more general pragma-dialectical fallacies in 
Chamberlain’s discourse and uses Cohen’s taxonomy as a more detailed reference 
for the forms that pragma-dialectical rule violations can take. 
Pragma-dialectics has been used as an analysis framework for a variety of 
discursive situations. These include general problem-solving discussions (van Rees 
2003), doctor-patient interaction (Rubinelli & Schulz 2006), and pragma-dialectical 
reconstructions of teleological argumentation in a legal context (Feteris 2008). 
The application of the pragma-dialectical analysis framework in political discourse 
analysis is a recent development. Although not all scholars agree that CDA and 
pragma-dialectics are fundamentally compatible (cf. Ihnen and Richardson 2011 
and Forchtner and Tominc 2012), the present research upholds that there is strong 
potential for a useful methodological synthesis of the two discourse-analytical 
approaches.  
Isabela Ietcu-Fairclough in particular has demonstrated how valuable the study 
of argumentation along pragma-dialectical lines can be for a critical analysis of 
discourse, as both approaches are concerned with the way that social actors 
pursue and produce social change, and both are concerned with the identities set up 
 
 39 
for the producers and receivers of texts, the interactions between them, and the 
way in which their choices are linked to political strategies and goals (Ietcu-
Fairclough 2007: 42-43). She combines CDA and pragma-dialectics to analyse the 
legitimisation strategies used by and on behalf of the two presidential candidates in 
the Romanian elections of 2004, in which she looks particularly at strategies that 
draw on populist discourse. She analyses fallacies from a functional, contextual 
perspective (fallacies in context) and goes into particular detail on the argumentum 
ad populum ‘as fallacy and rhetorical ploy’ Ieţcu-Fairclough 2007: 43). As the present 
analysis aims to do, she analyses fallacies in relation to the pragma-dialectical rules for 
critical discussion, identifying that the argumentum ad populum is a violation of Rule 7, 
the Argument Scheme Rule. Ieţcu-Fairclough’s analysis also focuses on strategies of 
legitimation used by the presidential candidates to ‘diagnose’ the electorate’s needs and 
to assert their electoral messages as the ‘fulfilment’ of these needs. Initial readings of 
Chamberlain’s discourse suggests that they too feature such strategies, and thus it will 
be interesting to examine the role of the argumentum ad populum here.  
Dale Hample’s work on the pragma-dialectical concept of ‘disagreement space’ is 
testimony to the compatibility of pragma-dialectics and CDA. Hample is perhaps 
the only scholar who focusses on disagreement space per se, basing his publication 
A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Inquisition (2001) on the concept. In this 
article, he shows how the Inquisition throughout the High Middle Ages and into 
the Renaissance systematically controlled disagreement space, by which he 
specifically means preventing important standpoints from being argued about and 
directing attention to standpoints that may not have initially seemed relevant 
(Hample 2001: 135). Hample points out that, in the context of the Inquisition, 
many beliefs, wants, and intentions that were relevant in trials could not be 
expressed or argued about (ibid.: 136), and examines in particular the 
anonymity and control of witnesses (no family, no Jews, Moors, or servants were 
allowed to testify), document control, intimidation (excommunication, 
imprisonment, threat of torture, actual torture), and reflexive arguments (to deny 
one’s heresy was to exhibit it). Hample’s study is motivated by his conviction that 
the pragma-dialectical school should not continue to avoid cognitive and macro-
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sociological issues, and that it should broaden its domain of applicability in order 
to engage in the analysis and critique of large social institutions (ibid.: 148). 
Concluding that disagreement space is, in practice, not always equally available to 
both parties (ibid.: 146-147), this study represents an important application of 
pragma-dialectics in the analysis and criticism of unequal power relationships in 
discourse.  
2.7 Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) 
The advantages of fusing CDA and corpus linguistics have been the subject of a 
substantial body of literature inspired by Gerlinde Mautner (1995; 2012), Alan 
Partington (2003; 2004), and Paul Baker (2006). In Partington’s introduction to his 
edited volume Corpora and Discourse (2004) he describes the two linguistic 
phenomena as ‘a most congruous beast’, likening CADS to Ariosto’s hippogriff 
(Partington 2004: 11). In The Linguistics of Political Argumentation (2003), 
Partington uses an automated concordancer and frequency lists to explore the 
rhetoric of institutional discourse (press briefings) and the relationship between 
politicians and the press. Partington places particular emphasis on context, stating 
that questions or authorship and reception and features of interaction between 
discourse producers and receivers are of central interest to his analysis (Partington 
2003: 1). 
Michael Stubbs identifies corpus linguistics as an aid in replacing intuitive, 
introspective Chomskyan data with authentic language examples (Stubbs 1996: 24). 
Indeed, it is the applied nature of corpus linguistics that makes it compatible with 
CDA: both approaches view linguistics as an applied science, and both analyse 
authentic instances of language in use. As John Sinclair identifies, corpus 
linguistics furthermore allows the discourse analyst to examine a greater volume 
of data, broadening the empirical base that would otherwise be limited by the 
less sizeable scope of quantitative methods (Sinclair 2004: 16). ‘At the simplest 
level’, Alan Partington adds, ‘corpus technology helps find other examples of a 
phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns of use 
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previously unthought of. Inbetween, it can reinforce, refute or revise a researcher’s 
intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded’ 
(Partington 2003: 12). 
Baker et al. (2008) devise an analysis framework comprising methods used in CDA 
(or, more specifically, in the DHA) and methods used by corpus linguists to examine 
the discursive presentation of refugees, asylum seekers, immigrants and migrants 
(RASIM) in the British press between 1996 and 2005. Although the authors reveal 
important insights into the linguistic definition and construction of RASIM, attitudes 
towards RASIM in the body of newspapers as a whole, and distinctions and 
similarities between broadsheets and tabloids in their stance towards RASIM, the 
article’s primary aim is to test the synergy of corpus linguistics and CDA. The 
authors examine the respective merits and limitations of this methodological synergy, 
how best to apply it, and how the two approaches to discourse analysis can be 
mutually beneficial (Baker et al. 2008: 273). The authors conclude that corpus 
linguistic methods can benefit CDA by generating frequencies of specific 
phenomena recognised in CDA (e.g. topoi, topics, metaphors), by examining lexical 
patterns, and generally by lending CDA a qualitative dimension (Baker et al. 2008: 
296). In turn, methods used in CDA complement corpus linguistic methods by 
facilitating a more detailed analysis and taking into account larger amounts of textual 
context, structure and genre-specific characteristics (op. cit.: 296). CDA can 
furthermore identify pragmatic devices and more subtle discursive strategies that 
corpus linguistic means would not necessarily identify (op. cit.: 296). Most usefully 
of all for the present analysis, the authors devise suggested stages of CL/CDA 
analysis based on their approach to analyzing RASIM. These are: 
 Context-based analysis of topic via history/ 
politics/culture/etymology  
 Identify existing topoi/discourses/strategies via wider reading, 
reference to other CDA studies 
 Establish research questions/corpus building procedures 
 
 42 
 Corpus analysis of frequencies, clusters, keywords, dispersion, 
etc. – identify potential sites of interest in the corpus along 
with possible discourses/topoi/strategies, relate to those 
existing in the literature 
 Qualitative or CDA analysis of a smaller, representative set of 
data (e.g. concordances of certain lexical items or of a 
particular text or set of texts within the corpus) – identify 
discourses/topoi/strategies (DH approach) 
 Formulation of new hypotheses or research questions 
 Further corpus analysis based on new hypotheses, identify 
further discourses/topoi/strategies, etc. 
 Analysis of intertextuality or interdiscursivity based on 
findings from corpus analysis 
 New hypotheses 
 Further corpus analysis, identify additional discourses/ 
topoi/strategies, etc. 
(Baker et al. 2008: 295) 
The article additionally points out that both methodological approaches can be used 
as entry points, making it fruitful to start either with the corpus analysis or with the 
qualitative analysis (op. cit.: 295). These methodological guidelines and 
considerations are an excellent basic point of reference for the present analysis, 
which may base itself wholly or partly thereon. 
Gerlinde Mautner (2000) undertakes a so-called ‘critical and discourse-
orientated corpus analysis’ (C-DOC) of newspaper articles on European 
integration in the Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, and Sun in selected 
periods between 1971 and 1994 in order to analyse the linguistic realisation of pro 
and anti discourse surrounding the political process of European integration 
(Mautner 2000: 27). She emphasises that in C-DOC, corpus linguistic methods 
are used to serve critical discourse analysis, and not vice versa (ibid.: 49). She 
combines frequency lists and keyword lists with a qualitative framework for 
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analysis consisting of strategies, conventionalised argumentation, and linguistic 
means. Her elaborate typology of linguistic means is based on initial corpus 
linguistic findings, and features phenomena at the level of text (text type, 
structure, organisation, coherence and cohesion, polyphonic text voices, author 
and reader identities, author-reader relationship, intextuality, reported speech); 
syntax (transitivity, tempus, aspect and modality, illocution, active vs. passive, 
nominalisation, theme vs. rheme); lexis (keywords, contrastive pairs, associative 
meanings, co-text, technical terms, metaphor, metonymy); phonology and 
graphemics (phonetic writing style); nonverbal factors (emphasis marking, 
suggestive typography, graphics, illustrations) (82-84). She concludes that the use 
of corpus linguistics can add a solid empirical fundament to CDA, and that CDA in 
turn can add new interpretive potential to the corpus linguistic emphasis on 
distribution and regularity 
In Mautner’s Die kritische Masse: Korpuslinguistik und kritische Diskursanalyse 
(2012), she addresses the questions of what exactly the advantages are to 
combining CL and CDA, and the limits to these advantages (Mautner 2012: 82). In 
a case study based on two corpora of job advertisements in The Guardian (one 
containing advertisements from the year 1978 and the other containing 
advertisements from the year 2008), Mautner uses corpus linguistic methods to 
identify and diachronically compare linguistically constructed ideologies in the job 
advertisements. Computed word frequency lists reveal that three personal 
pronouns ‘we’, ‘our’ and ‘you’ are among the 15 most frequent words in the 2008 
corpus, but are negative keywords in the 1978 corpus. The corpus software 
additionally reveals that the number of evaluative adjectives (e.g. ‘exciting’, 
‘flexible’, ‘innovative’) had risen significantly in job advertisement discourse 
between 1978 and 2008. Using frequency and keyword lists as a starting point 
to identify lexemes for further analysis, she then generates concordances for 
these keywords in order to analyse the use of personal pronouns and evaluative 
adjectives in greater detail (Mautner 2012: 100-102). She concludes that the value 
of using corpus linguistic methods in CDA is firstly heuristic, in that statistics 
like word frequency and keyness provide important insights alone, but also 
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indicate phenomena to analyse qualitatively in greater detail (ibid.: 104), and 
secondly reduces the likelihood that CD analysts will make groundless or rash 
judgements (ibid.: 105). 
Garzone and Santulli’s 2004 analysis of early responses to 11
th
 September in the 
British press is a further enlightening study combining corpus linguistics and 
CDA. Garzone and Santulli alternate between corpus linguistic methods and 
qualitative analysis to form and test hypotheses. They use a qualitative analysis of 
selected text samples as a point of departure, using computer queries to verify the 
hypotheses formulated by means of qualitative analysis, checking whether they can 
be supported by objective data and their validity extended to the whole corpus 
(Garzone and Santulli 2004: 355). They then return to qualitative analysis to 
search for more complex repetition, as well as for synonyms, superordinates, and 
hyponyms of the computer-generated keywords (e.g. ‘world’, ‘war’, ‘enemy’). The 
qualitative analysis supplements the corpus analysis by identifying a series of 
motifs only rarely realised at the manifest level as explicitly developed arguments. 
It alerts the analysts to abnormally recurrent groups of semantically related lexical 
items, for example hyperbolic words associated with massacre and violence 
(‘terror’, ‘horror’, ‘evil’, ‘atrocity’, ‘slaughter’), and negative adjectives that 
imply that the events of September 11 can be described only in negative terms 
(‘incalculable’, ‘intolerable’, ‘unfathomable’) (ibid.: 358). The authors conclude that 
recourse to corpus linguistic instruments can help overcome some of the main 
objections to CDA by extending the validity of statements made on the basis of the 
analysis of limited text samples to larger and representative amounts of text, by 
providing material and verifiable evidence for the analyst’s arguments and 
statements concerning discourse, thus helping overcome ideological bias, and by 
obtaining basic indications for areas to be explored which may not be identified by 
means of qualitative analysis (ibid.: 366). 
Of greatest interest to the present analysis are studies that combine CDA and 
corpus linguistics to analyse the discourses of nationalism and/or racism. Based 
on the hypothesis that basketball and American football are symbols of national 
unity, patriotism and a feeling of belonging in the USA, Karsten Senkbeil (2012) 
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analyses the discourse of American sports reporting, questioning in particular the 
allegedly ‘unpolitical’ nature of American sports, and focussing on the construction 
and dissemination of the socio-economic ideologies behind the American sport 
scene and their linguistic realisation. Senkbeil uses WordSmith and particularly 
the Keywords tool to analyse a corpus of written sport journalism from the New 
York Times, USA Today, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post, as well as 
online journalism. The resulting keywords list reveals a recurring use of words 
pertaining to family (‘sister’, ‘husband’, ‘mother’, ‘daughter’, ‘father’, 
‘children’, ‘parents’), and of the prepositions ‘in’ and ‘out’ (Senkbeil 2012: 405-
406). Using concordances for these keywords to further analyse specific 
instances, Senkbeil concludes that family vocabulary not only emotionalises the 
story, but that many journalists construct a causal relationship between family 
ties and sporting success: American sports discourse forges a close and 
‘logical’ relationship between sporting success and a conservative family image 
(idid: 406), an instance of ‘naturalisation’. Using CMA in the tradition of Charteris-
Black and Stefanowitsch, Senkbeil also analyses the container metaphors in US 
sports discourse. He observes that on the one hand, the football pitch or 
basketball court is constructed as a container with an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, 
where those on the pitch are the ‘insiders’. On the other hand, however, the key 
cluster ‘out there’ most commonly refers to ‘out there on the pitch’, which is a 
reversal of the container metaphor. Senkbeil concludes that the ‘out there’ 
construction is a culturally determined reinterpretation of the historical ‘frontier 
myth’, in which the sports pitch is presented as separate from civilisation in the 
tradition of new American civilisation versus the native American wilderness: 
Im Falle der Phrase out there verwendet der amerikanische 
Sportdiskurs die Containermetaphoer „falsch herum“. Die Erklärung 
hierfür liegt in kulturellen Determinanten. Die out there 
Konstruktion ist ein Hinweis auf die kollektive Interpretation des 
amerikanischen Sports als von der Zivilisationi teilweise 
abgekoppelter Raum. Die amerikanische Sportkultur re-interpretiert 
den uramerikanischen Frontier-Myths, also das Gegenüberstellen 
von amerikanischer Zivilisation und nicht-besiedelter „Wildnis“, 
in die das amerikanische Individuum vordingt, um dort die 
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Herausforderung zu suchen und seinen Mann zu stehen (Senkbeil 
2012: 408). 
Geraint O. Edwards (2012) performs a comparative discourse analysis of the 
construction of ‘in-groups’ in the 2005 and 2010 manifestos of the British 
National Party. He combines corpus analysis with CDA in order to ascertain how 
the language of the BNP is changing in order to appeal to a wider electoral base. 
Edwards focuses on racial definitions of ‘in-group’ categories in the manifestos, 
looking in particular at ‘natives’ versus ‘indigenous people’, and the use of the 
word ‘white’ in reference to race. Amir Salama (2011) combines the two 
approaches to analyse how antagonistic ideologies have been realised at 
collocation level across anti-Wahhabi and pro-Wahhabi discourses since ‘9/11’. To 
answer the question of how Wahhabi-Saudi Islam has been ideologically 
recontextualised in discourse via collocation, Salama computes the collocates for 
all relevant keywords. Salama’s focuses on the lexico-semantic relations between 
the collocates: on synonymy, and on euphemism and dysphemism. Salama’s 
observation that collocational relations can contribute to the ideological 
recontextualisation of a discourse topic is deemed particularly significant for the 
present analysis of the discursive realisation of ideologies. 
Of central importance to this thesis is Felicity Rash’s 2012 CADS of 
Chamberlain’s Grundlagen. Rash uses close reading to identify which lexemes and 
affixes have particular significance for the analysis of images of the Self and 
Other in Chamberlain’s Grundlagen, and generates digital concordances for a 
selection of personal pronouns, noun and adjective stems, verb stems, affixes and 
prepotisions, and adverbs and particles. Rash makes a number of observations 
pertaining to the Grundlagen that concur with the results of the present analysis, 
notably the significance of the personal pronouns ich, wir and uns in 
Chamberlain’s discourse, as well as verbs, affixes and prepositions of upwards 
and downwards movement (e.g. herab, hinauf, herunter), and adverbs of time 
(immer, nie) (Rash 2012: 19). She additionally identifies the centrality of tat- as 
in in der Tat, Tatsache and tatsächlich in discourse strategies in Chamberlain’s 
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Grundlagen (ibid.: 19) and Kriegsaufsätze (ibid.: 182), which constitutes a major 




3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
The present research is based on a theoretical framework within the scope of 
Critical Discourse Analysis developed for the specific means and purposes of the 
thesis. In line with the work of Ineke van der Valk, the theoretical framework is 
based on the notion that political discourse predominantly has a persuasive function, 
and the formal structure of persuasion is frequently argumentative (van der Valk 
2003: 317). It is furthermore based on the assumption that argumentative persuasion 
is enacted using strategies, which are in turn constructed using topoi, rhetorical 
devices and other linguistic means. The analytical chapters of the thesis thus 
subscribe to the principles and intentions of CDA while developing and 
applying an individual theoretical framework comprising discursive strategies of 
persuasion (in particular strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation and the 
creation of global fuzziness), topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies, rhetoric, metaphor 
scenarios and the pragma-dialectical concept of the reduction of disagreement space. 
The critical discourse analysis is furthermore corpus-assisted, inspired by the proven 
synergy of corpus linguistic methods and approaches to doing CDA (Baker et 
al.2008). 
3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical Discourse Analysis is a critical approach to doing discourse analysis that 
evolved from critical linguistics, which in turn evolved from critical theory. It is 
characterised by a particular understanding of the nature of discourse and by 
socio-critical aims, rather than by a specific methodology. There are several 
‘schools’ of CDA associated with varying priorities, scholarly influences and 
theoretical emphases, including the Dutch School practised by Teun van Dijk, 
the Duisburg School practised by Siegfried and Margaret Jäger, and the Vienna 




CDA is characterised first and foremost by a specific understanding of the term 
‘discourse’, which shapes the present analytical framework. Whereas the original 
meaning of the term ‘discourse’ was derived from the French discours, meaning 
both direct and indirect speech and the act of ‘holding forth a subject in 
conversation’ (Mills 2004: 2), it now signifies a broad range of meanings across 
disciplines (Howarth 2000: 1). The critical understanding of the term is inherited 
from definitions developed by critical theorists in their analysis of the discursive 
construction of knowledge and of social and institutional power. The relationship 
between discourse and (institutional) power was questioned in the aftermath of the 
student protests of 1968, a discussion that was exacerbated by Althusser’s essay 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (1970). Educational institutions were 
scrutinised as disseminators of ideology rather than of knowledge, and the 
conviction that so-called ‘knowledge’ was the discursive creation of those with the 
institutional power to create it took hold (Macdonell 1986: 14-15). At around the 
same time, Habermas observed the transformation of the newspaper from an 
institution for the publication of news into a ‘bearer and leader of public opinion’ 
(Held 1980: 261), leading him to question the extent to which the public sphere 
genuinely represented public interest. Habermas viewed this shifting media 
dynamic in terms of dominance and subdominance, and strived to develop a practical 
theory of society that would encourage the self-emancipation of the people from 
institutional domination (Held 1980: 250). Critical theorists therefore viewed 
discourse as institutional and as a force in the creation of social dominance. 
Inspired by Habermas, Roger Fowler, Bob Hodge, Gunther Kress and Tony Trew, 
the ‘founding fathers’ of what is now known as Critical Linguistics, established 
critical theory as a major concern for linguists, combining critical notions of 
power, ideology, and discourse with detailed linguistic analysis in their pioneering 
publication Language and Control (1979). The authors explore the notion that 
language is a tool used in the maintenance and subversion of power. Fowler et al. 
thematise what they call ‘Orwellian linguistics’ (1979: chapter title): inspired by 
George Orwell’s satire of political language in 1984, the authors conclude that 
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‘linguistic constructions have social, interpersonal and ideological functions’ 
resulting from the unequal distribution of power in society (Fowler, Hodge, 
Kress & Trew 1979: 3). The practice of CDA adheres to this critical definition of 
discourse, viewing it not as a structure, but as social practice; as constitutive of 
social action and interaction. Discourse is understood to constitute situations, objects 
of knowledge and the social identities of and relations between people (Wodak 2001: 
359). By representing things and positioning people in certain ways, discursive 
practices can thus produce and reproduce unequal power relations, endowing 
them with the potential to have major ideological effects (op. cit.: 359). Accordingly 
CDA views discourse as social with the potential to be an ideological tool used in the 
maintenance and subversion of power. Consequently, CDA upholds that discourse 
can only be fully understood with reference to its context (Meyer in Wodak and 
Meyer 2001: 15). 
Scholars who analyse discourse analysis from a critical perspective are united by a 
shared interest in unmasking the discursive processes of the construction and 
maintenance of power, and therewith conversely of exclusion and subordination. 
A critical approach to discourse analysis in this sense endeavours to critique 
social and ideological practices as they are enacted using discourse. Ruth Wodak 
states that this concept of social critique integrates three related aspects: ‘text or 
discourse immanent critique’ that uncovers propositional inconsistencies, 
contradictions and paradoxes, ‘socio-diagnostic critique’ that demystifies the 
persuasive or manipulative character of discursive practices, and ‘future-related 
prospective critique’ that seeks to contribute to the improvement of 






3.3 CDA in the Analysis of Manipulative Political Propaganda 
CDA is an ideal framework in which to analyse manipulative political discourse 
because, as public discourse, political discourse is first and foremost a form of 
social action that emphasises people acting as social agents (van der Valk 2003: 
313). Political discourse can be used to reproduce stereotypes, discrimination and 
racism, and more generally to exert power by legitimising or delegitimising 
viewpoints or ideological positionings (Reyes 2011: 783). As Ineke van der Valk 
advocates, political discourse should be analysed at this level of social action; ‘as 
an instrument in the exercise of power, control and exclusion or, by contrast, as an 
instrument for achieving equality and democracy’ (van der Valk 2003: 313). 
Chamberlain’s war essays constitute manipulative political propaganda. Drawing 
largely on the conclusions of Sapir Handelman, ‘manipulation’ is understood as 
the discursive construction of a cognitive action that consciously aims to 
invisibly motivate a change in thought or behaviour, creating the illusion of 
freedom of thought in the process (Handelman 2009: 16-17). One of the most 
commonly noted distinctions between ‘manipulation’ and ‘persuasion’ is that 
persuasion is achieved in cooperation with the message recipient’s freedom of 
thought, whereas manipulation is achieved by blocking this freedom of thought 
(O’Keefe 2002: 5). Handelman and Saussure advocate that manipulation results 
from the illusion of freedom of choice (Saussure 2005: 117; Handelman 2009: 23). 
The present analysis thus assumes that the main element of deceit that renders 
manipulation morally reprehensible or illegitimate is the illusion of freedom of 
thought, and the way in which this limits the persuadee’s autonomy. Manipulation 
is furthermore understood in terms of transparency: manipulation, Nathaniel 
Klemp suggests, is immoral because, in contrast to persuasion, it is never transparent 
(Klemp 2011: 73). He asserts that incidents of manipulation hide the speaker’s 
wishes and do not respect the other agent’s capacity to choose (Klemp 2011: 73). 
The present thesis highlights the inherent connection between manipulative 
discourse and CDA as an approach to demystifying dominance relations because it 
views the propagator of manipulative discourse as in control and the receiver of 
manipulative discourse as dominated (cf. Chilton 2005: 17). 
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As propaganda, Chamberlain’s nationalist essays constitute a particular kind of 
manipulative discourse. The present understanding of ‘propaganda’ is based on 
definitions by Jowett and O’Donnell (2006) and Pratkanis and Aronson (2001). 
Jowett and O’Donnell differentiate between propaganda and persuasion: while 
persuasion denotes interpersonal influence, propaganda is a form of mass 
manipulation (Jowett & O’Donnell 2006: 1, 28). They also link propaganda to 
ideology, asserting that propaganda is ‘almost always some form of activated 
ideology’ (Jowett & O’Donnell 2006: 16). They argue that the conscious use of 
propaganda to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the 
propagandist is linked to a clear institutional ideology and objective (ibid. 2006: 
3). The present research similarly conceives of propaganda as a form of mass 
manipulation, and, moreover, a form of ideology-driven mass manipulation. This 
analysis also adopts an interactive or dialectical dimension from Jowett and 
O’Donnell. The authors state that: 
The propagandist is very likely to appear as a persuader with a stated 
purpose that seems to satisfy mutual needs. In reality, however, the 
propagandist wants to promote his or her own interests or those of an 
organisation (Jowett & O’Donnell 2006: 44). 
Propaganda can therefore be viewed as a verbal act of manipulation masquerading 
as persuasion; an act of manipulation which, on the surface, pretends to 
accommodate the needs and wishes of the message recipient. 
Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) define the concept of propaganda by contrasting it to 
the concept of education: whereas the role of education is to teach individuals to be 
independent and autonomous, propaganda attempts to prevent individuals from 
thinking and from acting as humans with rights (Pratkanis & Aronson 2001: 266). 
Warren Morris agrees that propaganda ‘excludes individual freedom and the burden 
of considering conflicting social alternatives’. As a combination of Pratkanis and 
Aronson’s (2001) and Jowett and O’Donnell’s (2006) definitions, this thesis 
perceives propaganda to be an ideology-driven form of manipulation addressed to 
 
 53 
the masses which works implicitly to render the readers passive while 
simultaneously giving the impression that the writer wishes to satisfy their 
dialectical standards. The dialectical obligations that Chamberlain claims to fulfil 
in order to create this impression are the reasonable argumentation norms 
identified by Jürgen Habermas as ‘validity claims’ (Geltungsanprüche): the 
writer’s obligation to make his utterances intelligible or comprehensible, true 
(wahr), sincere (wahrhaftig), and correct (richtig) (Habermas 1988: 411-413). 
3.4 Particulars of the Theoretical Framework 
The present critical discourse analysis is based on a hierarchical theoretical 
framework comprising Paul Chilton and Christine Schaeffner’s 1997 classification of 
discursive strategies of persuasion in political discourse, Theo van Leeuwen’s 2007 
typology of strategies of legitimisation and the creation of ‘global fuzziness’ as 
advocated by Louis de Saussure (2005), topoi, pragma-dialectical fallacies as 
conceptualised by Hans van Eemeren (1992) and Daniel Cohen (2003), and the 
pragma-dialectical concept of the reduction of disagreement space developed by Dale 
Hample (2001). This framework assumes that manipulative discourse is constructed 
using strategies of legitimisation/delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation, and 
fallacious argumentation, that these strategies and fallacious argumentation moves 
are enacted using topical motifs, topoi and rhetoric, and that these are constructed 
using language, ranging from the strategic use of punctuation and lexis to the strategic 
use of syntactic and suprasentential phenomena such as metaphor scenarios. 
3.4.1 Critical Disagreement Space 
This thesis assumes that the essays’ manipulative power lies in the author’s reduction 
or restriction of the readers’ critical disagreement space. When performed with 
sufficient manipulative will, the use of fallacious topoi, rhetoric and further 
linguistic means to enact discursive strategies of persuasion and manipulation not 
only constitutes unreasonable argumentation on a normative level, but functionally 
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reduces what is known in pragma-dialectics as ‘critical disagreement space’. This 
term was coined by van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (van Eemeren 
et al. 1993), who define it as ‘a structured set of opportunities for argument’ 
(van Eemeren et al. 1993: 95); it is the freedom in discourse for the recipient 
to disagree with the arguments and conclusions advanced by the proponent. The 
present analysis specifies that the deliberate neutralisation or eradication of critical 
judgement using fallacious rhetoric and argumentation demobilises the reader’s 
ability (rather than their willingness) to critically examine the propositional content 
of the discourse at hand. To advocate the existence of critical disagreement space 
in interaction has a logical corollary: if the proponent has the ability to control 
the amount of critical disagreement space available to ther reader, then the reader 
cannot be granted freedom of independent thought. The definition and application 
of this concept in the present analysis encompasses rule 1 of the pragma-dialectical 
rules for critical discussion, the ‘freedom rule’, which stipulates that parties must 
not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from casting doubt on 
standpoints (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208, c.f. Section 3.4.4).  
As manipulation is understood to function on the basis of the illusion of freedom of 
thought (see Section 3.3), the reduction of critical disagreement space as a 
violation of the freedom rule bears direct significance on the workings of 
manipulative discourse. The use of the concept in this thesis is more specifically 
informed by Dale Hample’s work on the elimination of disagreement space in the 
Inquisition (Hample 2001: 135), and subscribes in particular to Hample’s notion that 
argumentative discourse can prevent important standpoints from being argued 
about and direct attention to others that may not really be relevant (Hample 
2001: 135). As Hample has shown, disagreement space can be eliminated or 
reduced by the dominant party in argumentation, thus this analysis is based on the 
assumption that (critical) disagreement space is not always equally available to all 
parties (ibid.: 146-147). Based on Robert Goodin’s observation on the ability of 
language to constrain thought, language use is held to be the fundamental tool 
in the reduction of critical disagreement space (Goodin 1980: 65). 
 
 55 
3.4.2 Discursive Strategies of Manipulation 
Discursive strategies are understood to be the linguistic representation of an 
essentially cognitive-communicative activity with an ideological or socio-
psychological aim. This definition is based on Gerlinde Mautner’s understanding 
of the term as ‘die Auswahl, Struktuierung und Plazierung von Inhalten, um ein 
übergeordnetes persuasives Ziel zu erreichen’ (Mautner 2000: 83). The strategies 
analysed are based on the work of Paul Chilton and Christina Schaeffner (1997),  
who delineate strategies of dissimulation (the control of information, censorship or 
giving inadequate information, lying, verbal evasion, denial, euphemism), coercion 
(directive speech acts, speech acts backed by sanctions, and threats) 
legitimisation (communicating reasons for being obeyed, general ideological 
principles and positive self-presentation in the form of charismatic leadership 
projection and boasting about performance) and delegitimisation (ideas of 
difference and speech acts of blaming, accusing and insulting to present ‘the 
other’ differently) (Chilton & Schaeffner 1997: 212-213). These strategies provide 
an ideal basis for the present analysis as they were devised in relation to political 
discourse and bear direct relevance to Chamberlain’s essays.  
As found by so many scholars to be key in political and/or persuasive discourse (see 
van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, van der Valk 2003, van Leeuwen 2007, Reyes 
2011 in Chapter 2), the analysis will focus in particular on strategies of 
legitimisation and delegitimisation. As Reyes aptly highlights, legitimisation in 
discourse goes hand-in-hand with ideology, as ‘the very act of legitimisation 
implies an attempt to justify action or no action or an ideological position on a 
specific issue’ (Reyes 2011: 782-783). Four particular substrategies of 
legitimisation appear to be formative in persuasive or manipulative 
argumentation. These are the creation of a Feindbild on the one hand and 
Selbstinszenierung on the other using ‘othering’ or ‘semantic strategies of self- and 
other presentation’ (van der Valk 2003: 318; Reyes 2011: 787), and legitimising 
strategies of authority, moral abstraction, and rationalisation. Van Leeuwen shows 
that discursive legitimisation can be enacted by way of personal authority, expert 
authority, role model authority, impersonal authority, the authority of tradition and 
 
 56 
the authority of conformity, as well as by asserting commonsense moral values 
such as the ‘good’ and the ‘aesthetic’ (van Leeuwen 2007: 97). Furthermore, 
strategies of legitimisation may take the form of abstraction – ‘referring to 
practices in abstract ways that “moralise” them by distilling from them a 
quality that links them to discourses of moral values’, and rationalisation (op. cit. 
2007: 98). Following van Leeuwen, there are two kinds of rational legitimisation 
strategies: instrumental and theoretical. Instrumental rationalisation legitimises 
practices by refering to their goals and purposes, and theoretical rationalisation 
founds a statement or action on truth, or ‘the way things are’ (op. cit. 2007: 
98-103). 
In relation to van Leeuwen’s theory of legitimisation by abstraction, the present 
analysis is additionally informed by Louis de Saussure’s concept of ‘global 
fuzziness’, a concept he coined in his 2005 analysis ‘Manipulation and Ideologies 
in the Twentieth Century’ to refer to the use of entire ‘parts of discourse’ beyond 
the level of linguistic expressions and sentences to create interpretative problems 
for the addressee (Saussure 2005: 126). This concept forms a central concern of 
the present thesis, which highlights the creation of psycho-social fuzziness as a 
central mechanism of Chamberlain’s manipulative discourse. ‘Fuzziness’ is 
intrinsically connected to de Saussure’s (2005) theory of ‘trouble-and-resolution’ 
(Saussure 2005: 133). The trouble-and-resolution device is both discursive and 
psychological; it refers to the use of vague or incomprehensible language to create 
‘fuzziness’ in the mind of the readers, causing them to abandon their critical stance 
to the discourse and accept the topical content of the statements made in favour of 
‘resolving’ the problem or ‘trouble’ of confusion or incomprehension. It is based 
on the notion that the desire to counterbalance feelings of (intellectual) inferiority 
to the author is stronger than the desire to critically engage with inconsistency or 
vagueness. The present qualitative analysis shows how the trouble-and-resolution 
device can have a manipulative function on a grander scale. It takes the theory 
beyond linguistic vagueness and incomprehensibility and investigates 
Chamberlain’s use of discursive strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation to 
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incite the readers’ desire to resolve the trouble or ‘fuzziness’ that the author creates 
at a socio-political level. 
3.4.3 Topoi 
Persuasive strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation 
and the manipulative creation of ‘fuzziness’ or ‘trouble’ are constructed in part 
using topoi and rhetoric. The constitutive relationship between strategies and topoi 
is illuminated, for example, by van Leeuwen’s descriptions of strategies of 
legitimisation enacted using various topoi of authority (van Leeuwen 2007: 94-
97). Topoi or ‘common-places’ in English are understood in the way defined by 
van der Valk (2003) and Wodak (2009). They are general principles or socially 
shared beliefs that form parts of argument by supporting it without themselves 
constituting the argument itself (Anscombre 1995 quoted in van der Valk 2003: 
318). As Wodak and colleagues explain, topoi are ‘either explicit of inferable 
premises’, and ‘more or less formal or content-related warrants of “conclusion 
rules” which connect an argument or arguments with a conclusion, a claim. As 
such, they justify the transition from an argument or arguments to the conclusion’ 
(Wodak et al. 2009: 34). The nature of a topos as the transition from argument to 
conclusion necessitates explicit deconstruction of topoi in discourse; as many of 
them attempt to legitimise positions by providing ‘common-places’ or 
presuppositions instead of substantial evidence (Wodak and Reisigl 2009: 42), 
topoi potentially constitute controversial or fallacious aspects of argumentation. As 
non-evidential presuppositions, the present thesis holds topoi to be predominantly 
(if not exclusively) fallacious aspects of argumentation. Indeed, the fallacious 





3.4.4 Pragma-Dialectical Fallacies 
Deconstructing the topoi used in argumentation and identifying the fallacies in 
argumentation behind them is one major way of raising awareness of problematic 
discursive strategies in ideological discourse, as advocated by Martin Reisigl’s 
‘politolinguistic’ approach to discourse analysis (Reigisl 2008: 116). The literature 
on CDA-inspired analyses of argumentation indicate that CDA is compatible with 
the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis, and that the latter offers 
a highly systematic and effective way of classifying and analysing fallacies in 
persuasive argumentation.  
The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis was developed by 
Frans H. van Eemeren and colleagues in the 1990s. It is based on a normative 
model of argumentation which indicates which argumentative ‘moves’ are 
admissible in argumentation (named ‘critical discussion’ in pragma-dialectics) and 
which are not (Ietcu-Fairclough 2007: 41). Pragma-dialecticians advance ten ‘rules’ 
that prescribe acceptable conduct of participants in or reasonable argumentation 
norms in a critical discussion (van der Valk 2003: 309): 
1. The Freedom Rule: parties must not prevent each other from putting forward 
standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints. 
2. The Burden-of-Proof Rule: a party who puts forward a standpoint is obliged 
to defend it if asked to do so. 
3. The Standpoint Rule: a party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the 
standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party. 
4. The Relevance Rule: a party may defend his or her standpoint only by 
advancing argumentation relevant to that standpoint. 
5. The Unexpressed Premise Rule: a party may not falsely present something 
as a premise that has been left unexpressed by the other party or deny a 
premise that he or she has left implicit. 
6. The Starting-Point Rule: no party may falsely present a premise as an 




7. The Argument Scheme Rule: a standpoint may not be regarded as 
conclusively defended if the defense does not take place by means of an 
appropriate argument scheme that is correctly applied. 
8. The Validity Rule: the reasoning in the argumentation must be logically valid 
or must be capable of being made valid by making explicit one or more 
unexpressed premises. 
9. The Closure Rule: a failed defense of a standpoint must result in the 
protagonist retracting the standpoint, and a successful defense of a standpoint 
must result in the antagonist retracting his or her doubts. 
10. The Useage Rule: parties must not use any formulations that are 
insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the 
formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible. 
(Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 208). 
A violation of any one of the rules for critical discussion constitutes a so-
called ‘pragma-dialectical fallacy’; incorrect or unreasonable argumentation moves 
whose fallacious nature can be systemically explained in relation to one or more of 
the Rules 
A key aspect of the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation analysis for 
the present purposes is Daniel Cohen’s taxonomy of logical, rhetorical and 
dialectical fallacies (Cohen 2003: 119). Cohen’s taxonomy indicates in each 
category the respective pragma-dialectical rules that are violated by each category 
of fallacies. Logical fallacies may potentially represent violations of the rules of 
inference, and include false cause, hasty generalisation, begging the 
question/circular reasoning, ambiguities, affirming the consequent/denying the 
antecedent, ‘not’ hopping, slippery slope, missing the point, appeal to ignorance, 
weak analogy and unfinished demonstration. Rhetorical faults are posited as 
potential violations of the rules of fair presentation and include suppressed 
evidence, unwarranted premise, false dichotomy, complex question, ad hominem, 
non sequitur, appeal to (illegitimate) authority, appeal to emotion, ad populum, 
insincerity, straw man and obscurantism. Dialectical offenses constitute potential 
violations of the rules of rational engagement, and include appeal to force, 
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excessive argument, unanswered objections (by the proponent), unvoiced 
objections (by the opponent), unasked questions, misunderstanding, insufficient 
argument, insufficient counter-argument and ignoratio elenchi (ibid.: 119-120). 
Cohen’s taxonomy is ideally applicable in the present analysis as it allows not 
only for the analysis of the fallacious nature of the topoi underlying discursive 
strategies, but also of rhetorical devices that do the same. 
3.4.5 Rhetorical Devices 
This thesis understands ‘rhetoric’ to be the use of specific forms of language to 
enact a specific function. It is the verbal realisation of motivational appeal and 
linguistic style used to animate the inferences and propositional content of, in this 
case, ideological discourse (see Jacobs 2000: 261). The function of rhetoric is 
understood to be persuasive and aimed at the discourse recipient. This concept is 
based largely on the definition of rhetoric proposed by Michael Leff, who stresses 
that rhetoric is designed and implemented to persuade an audience (or reader) that 
does not participate directly in the exchange, and that it must answer (or appear to 
answer) to the extrinsic demands of this audience (or readership) (Leff 2000: 244-
246). Rhetorical means such as metaphors, irony, hyperboles, euphemisms and 
rhetorical questions may steer attention, enhance interest and thus reinforce the 
argumentation of the speaker. Rhetorical tools emphasize meaning. ‘Rhetoric […] is 
essentially geared towards the persuasive communication of preferred models of 
social events, and thus manages how recipients will understand and especially how 
they will evaluate such events, for instance, as a function of the interests of the 
participants. It is therefore not surprising that rhetorical structures play such an 





3.4.6 Metaphor Scenarios and Motifs 
This thesis explores the role of metaphor in Chamberlain’s linguistic construction of 
strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissmulation. In the 
tradition of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, this thesis assumes that metaphor is 
conceptual, meaning grounded in human experience and thought (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980: 115). As metaphors reflect mappings across domains of knowledge 
that underlie our understanding of the world in which we live (Musolff 2004: 1), 
metaphor is also granted a central role in the construction of social and political 
realities (Musolff 2004: 1), and metaphor analysis is thus central to analysing the 
construction of meaning in discourse. As CMT advances, the ensuing analysis 
upholds that metaphors can have an argumentative and rhetorical force (cf Musolff 
2004: 6) enacted by the social, emotional and aesthetic values carried by their 
entailments (cf Musolff 2012: 303). 
In particular, this thesis subscribes to the argumentative and rhetorical power of so-
called ‘metaphor scenarios’ (Musolff 2006). Musolff derives the term from a 
combination of Charles Fillmore’s notion of a conceptual ‘scene’ as ‘an kind of 
coherent segment of human beliefs, actions, experiences or imaginings that can be 
associated with an underlying conceptual “frame”’ and Lakoff’s ‘scenario’ as ‘a 
subtype of “idealised cognitive models” consisting typically of people, things, 
properties, relations and propositions’ (Musolff 2006: 27). A ‘metaphor scenario’ 
pertains to the occurrence of multiple elements of a conceptual source domain within 
the same discourse strand which combine to create a kind of metaphorical narrative 
or ‘scenario’. Consisting of multiple concepts relating to the same source domain 
(e.g. LOVE – MARRIAGE – FAMILY – ENGAGEMENT – BIRTH - DIVORCE (cf Musolff 
2006)), metaphor scenarios can carry particularly forceful evaluative and attitudinal 
biases as they appeal to or evoke the readers’ normative assumptions concerning 
multiple scenario participants and factors. Indeed, Musolff states that it is at the level 
of scenarios, rather than at general domain-level, that attitudinal biases and political 
preferences become discernible (Musolff 2006: 35). 
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A metaphor scenario must be differentiated from a ‘motif’. This word was taken 
from Gerlinde Mautner (2000), who defines a discursive motif as ‘ein 
wiederkehrender Inhalt, der zur Realisierung von Strategien eingesetzt wird’ 
(Mautner 2000: 83). ‘Motif’ is thus used in the following to denote the strategic 
recurrence of non-metaphor but abstract topical themes with a rhetorical and/or 
argumentative purpose (e.g. ignorance, truth and lies). 
3.5 Synergy between methods of Corpus Linguistics and CDA 
Finally, the present thesis is informed by Baker et al.’s 2008 findings regarding the 
mutual methodological benefit afforded by methods of CDA and corpus linguistics. 
‘The combination of methodologies traditionally associated with CDA and CL in 
research projects, and their potential theoretical and methodological cross-
pollination’, Baker et al. advocate, ‘seem to benefit both CDA and CL. Combining 
methods of CDA and CL strengthens the theoretical basis of both.’ (Baker et al. 
2008: 297). In sum, corpus linguistics is not based entirely on computers, but also 
requires manual human input, and methods of CDA provide a particularly fruitful 
way of performing the manual aspect. Corpus linguistic methods benefit CDA by 
providing the analyst with tools with which to examine frequencies for and other 
examples of specific phenomena already noted in qualitative close-reading analysis, 
to examine lexical patterns, and to add a quantitative, empirical dimension using 
statistical measures (Baker et al. 2008: 296). Corpus linguistics thereby lends 
practitioners of CDA greater scholarly objectivity, and helps to guard against bias, 
over-interpretation and under-interpretation (O’Halloran and Coffin 2004 quoted in 
Baker et al. 2008: 297). On the other hand, methods of CDA can expand the depth of 
linguistic analysis performed using corpus linguistic methods; corpus linguistic tools 
for analysis are in some respect restrictive in that they allow the analyst to focus 
largely only on isolated lexical patterns and collocations; CDA can facilitate a more 
detailed analysis which also takes in account the textual context (Baker et al. 2008: 
296). The crux of the synergy lies in Baker et al.’s observation that corpus-based 
analysis can reveal only what is explicitly written and not what is inferred, implied or 





The multi-methodological approach used in the present analysis foregrounds 
historical contextualisation, corpus-assisted discourse analysis (CADS) and an 
approach to rhetoric and argumentation analysis informed by multiple theories, all 
within a critical discourse analysis (CDA) framework. As an approach to doing 
discourse analysis rather than a methodology as such, the documented approaches to 
CDA and CADS do not provide a definitive set of methodological guidelines for 
analysis (van Dijk in Wodak & Meyer 2001: 98). Indeed, CDA scholars share the 
mutual conviction that no one set of procedural guidelines should be blindly adhered 
to, advocating instead ‘methodological pluralism’ (Wodak 2009: 9). Teun van Dijk 
states that an effective piece of critical discourse analysis should consider the work 
of multiple researchers from multiple disciplines and not just the work of one 
‘master’, adding ‘I do not want colleagues to “follow” me – a form of academic 
obsequiousness that I find incompatible with a critical attitude’ (van Dijk in Wodak 
& Meyer 2001: 95). As Paul Baker and colleagues (2008) summarise, ‘CDA adopts 
any method that is adequate to realize the aims of specific CDA-inspired research’ 
(Baker et al. 2008: 273). The methodology of the present analysis is thus guided by 
the CDA emphasis on the individual nature of each research project, and is tailored 
to suit the specific research questions driving the thesis (cf. Wodak & Meyer 2001: 
14-31).  
This is not to say that scholars of CDA and CADS, or indeed of a combination of the 
two approaches, do not document the stages and priorities in their analysis in order to 
demonstrate or suggest a (flexible) methodology to other scholars. The 
methodological guidelines informing this thesis were devised by combining the 
methodology documented by Meyer (2001), Baker et al. (2008) and Wodak (2009). 
Along the lines of Meyer 2001, the present methodology began by selecting 
theoretical concepts and assumptions (see Chapter 3), proceeded by operationalising 
procedures and instruments (corpus linguistic methodology and the theoretical 
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analysis framework), and ultimately concludes with an interpretation of the discourse 
and examination of the research hypothesis formulated at the outset (Meyer 2001: 
19-20). The analysis developed from a preliminary close reading of the war essays to 
a corpus analysis of frequencies, keywords and concordances as a second stage of 
analysis. This was followed by a further qualitative analysis stage that synthesises the 
results of the two preliminary analysis stages while expanding them according to a 
systematic analytical framework. Although this throws up issues of pre-formed bias 
as thematised by Michael Meyer (2001), who asks ‘is it possible to gain insight from 
purely empirical data without using any preframed categories of experience?’ (Meyer 
2001: 17-18), Baker et al. point out that both (CDA and CL) approaches can be used 
as entry points, creating a virtuous research cycle (Baker et al.2008: 295).  
4.2 Analysis and Contextualisation of Thematic Content 
The thematic content of discourse in CDA denotes the meaning and content of 
ideological statements in the discourse fragment (the discourse fragment here is an 
individual essay). The analysis of the thematic content of Chamberlain’s essays 
focuses on ideological statements regarding ‘Germanness’ and ‘un-Germanness’, his 
visions and aspirations for Germany and the German people, Germany’s innocence 
in the outbreak of the First World War, and England and France as war aggressors.  
Functional context in CDA is of the utmost priority, as CDA views the significant 
unit of linguistic analysis as the text as opposed to isolated, decontextualised words 
and sentences (Wodak 2009: 3). This thesis contextualises the results of the text 
analysis in relation to their historical context, and the ideological propositions 
expressed in the text are compared and contrasted to the actual historical facts and 
events. The present context analysis is a two-part context model that foregrounds the 
local (national) and global (international) historical settings of the thematic content. 
On a local historical level, the context analysis explores the history of nationalism 
and anti-Semitism in Germany, the 1848 revolutions, German unification, and 
German domestic policy thereafter. The global historical section of the context 
analysis examines foreign policy in Germany between the years 1848 and 1918. This 
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period was chosen because the 1848 revolutions were major formative events in the 
course of German nationalism shortly before Chamberlain’s arrival in Germany, and 
1918 signals the end of the First World War. The historical context of domestic and 
foreign policy in Germany during Chamberlain’s lifetime addresses German 
imperialism under Kaiser Wilhelm II and Bismarck, and the First World War. It is 
acknowledged that this context model is limited: a broader CDA context model 
would pay greater attention to authorship, medium, and reception, for example, along 
the lines of Partington’s (2003) comprehensive consideration of the wider historical, 
political and mediatic context of White House press briefings and the local and 
personal contexts of the speakers and hearers.  
4.3 Preliminary Linguistic Observations 
The discourse analysis began with a preliminary close-reading to obtain initial 
linguistic observations, using a combination of corpus analysis and further close-
reading to validate or disprove these observations later. The preliminary close-
reading was intuitive, and predominantly identified macro-strategies at work in the 
essays that justify their means vs. those that justify their message, as well as 
strategies of persuasion and metaphors. Some topoi, word strings and individual 
words were also noted that seemed significant because of the frequency with which 
they occur, because they appeared to be salient, or because they appeared to 
represent an innovative use of language. The main focus of the preliminary close-
reading, however, concerned the macro-strategies at work in the war essays; ensuing 
quantitative and further qualitative analysis intended to confirm or dispute the 
presence and role of these in the war essays and to analyse their linguistic 
construction. The intuitive identification at this early stage of authorial self-
reference, self-justification, addresses to the readers, and the undermining of 
epistemic certainty using motifs of intelligence, perception, truth and lies, proved 




4.4 Corpus Analysis:  
The corpus analysis is an interim stage of the analysis that uses statistics to check the 
validity of initial intuitive observations and to expand on these by collating a large 
body of empirically derived linguistic evidence upon which to base (in part) the 
qualitative analysis. Featuring a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS), the present 
thesis uses corpus linguistic methods to supplement the qualitative critical discourse 
analysis by adding a quantifiable, empirical base of frequency and keyness data, 
thereby limiting researcher bias. The corpus analysis is based on a primary corpus 
and a reference corpus. The primary corpus consists of the total collection of 
Chamberlain's war essays: Kriegsaufsätze (1914) (an essay collection containing the 
essays Deutsche Friedensliebe; Deutsche Freiheit; Die deutsche Sprache; 
Deutschland als führender Weltstaat; England, Deutschland), Neue Kriegsaufsätze 
(1915) (an essay collection containing the essays Grundstimmungen in England und 
Frankreich, Wer hat den Krieg verschuldet?, Deutscher Friede), Politische Ideale 
(1915), Die Zuversicht (1915), Hammer oder Amboß (1916), Ideal und Macht 
(1916), Demokratie und Freiheit (1917), and Der Wille zum Sieg (1917). This corpus 
contains a total of 170,593 tokens. Although, generally speaking, a larger corpus 
yields more reliable results than a smaller one, a significantly larger corpus would 
have presented an overwhelming amount of material for close reading analysis: when 
combining qualitative with quantitative analysis methods, an ideal corpus will be 
large enough to yield extensive digital results, but small enough to be manageable for 
a single analyst. The construction of the primary corpus was guided by advice from 
Pieter de Haan, who advances that ‘the suitability of the sample depends on the 
specific study that is undertaken, and there is no such thing as the best, or optimum, 
sample size as such’ (de Haan 1992: 3).  
The reference corpus acts as a control corpus in order to identify keywords in the 
primary corpus by comparing frequently occurring words in the primary corpus with 
frequently occurring words in the reference corpus to ascertain which words are 
significantly more typical of the primary corpus. The reference corpus built for this 
purpose consists of five publications by Paul Rohrbach: Der deutsche Gedanke in 
der Welt (1912), Zum Weltvolk hindurch (1914), Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik 
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(1914), Bismarck und Wir (1915), and Unsere koloniale Zukunftsarbeit (1915); a 
total of 169,631 tokens, making it approximately equal in size to the primary corpus.  
Paul Rohrbach (1869-1956) was a travel-writer, economist, political commentator 
and publicist, serving also as German Government Settlement Commissioner to 
South-West Africa between 1903 and 1906. Between 1912 and 1915 he wrote 
published nationalist and colonialist works such as those selected for the reference 
corpus. Felicity Rash notes that Rohrbach’s publications reached an exceptionally 
wide audience, including many future national socialists (Rash 2011: 381). These 
essays are used in the present reference corpus as they were written approximately in 
the same period as Chamberlain’s war propaganda essays, and because they address 
similar topics, broadly speaking. It should be pointed out at this stage that the limited 
and unrepresentative nature of the control corpus means that the statistical results 
documented in the following indicate first and foremost the differences and 
similarities between Chamberlain’s discourse and the discourse of Paul Rohrbach 
and cannot claim to reveal idiosyncracies in Chamberlain’s language use.  
The essays were photocopied from their original sources and digitalised (PDF 
format). The original Fraktur script in the PDF documents was converted into a 
standard font using ABBYY FineReader, and the resulting documents were proof-
read against the originals in order to identify and correct any spelling errors that had 
arisen during the conversion process, as spelling errors can affect the accuracy of 
digital word searches. The corpus analysis software WordSmith 5 was used to 
generate statistical data on Chamberlain’s war essays. WordSmith was chosen over 
similar software such as Wordcruncher and the Longman Mini Concordancer 
because it is the most user-friendly option. Although WordSmith is not the most 
advanced programme available, the present CADS requires word frequencies, 
keyness data, and concordance lines only, all of which can be obtained using 
WordSmith software. The WordList tool was used to generate a frequency list for all 
words in the essays, and the KeyWords tool was used to generate keyword data by 
comparing the frequency of each word in Chamberlain’s war essays (primary corpus) 
with their frequency in the writings of Paul Rohrbach during the same period 
(reference corpus). The Concord tool was used to generate a complete list of 
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concordance lines for each keyword, enabling a detailed analysis of the uses and 
functions of each keyword in context (KWIC).  
4.5 Qualitative Text Analysis  
The qualitative analysis focuses on Chamberlain’s use of discursive strategies of 
persuasion to construct and disseminate his ideology. Using prior observations by 
Nicoline Hortzitz (1988) and the Felicity Rash (2012), the qualitative analysis 
additionally highlights veiled but probable examples of anti-Semitic language in the 
essays, although this is not a priority for analysis. The analysis is deductive, 
beginning with the macro-strategies ‘justifying the message’ and ‘justifying the 
means’ identified during preliminary close readings, and identifying and analysing 
their discursive construction on the level of strategies, topoi, pragma-dialectical 
fallacies, rhetoric, and micro-linguistics. The analysis is performed by identifying 
and analysing discursive strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation, 
dissimulation, coercion and the creation of global fuzziness, of topoi, pragma-
dialectical fallacies, and the use of rhetoric and linguistic means to construct these. 
This approach assumes that, in discourse, manipulation is achieved using strategies 
of legitimisation/delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation and fallacious 
argumentation, that the strategies and fallacious argumentation are enacted using 
topoi and rhetoric, and that at the base of all of these is the strategic use of linguistic 
units ranging from punctuation and lexis to syntax and suprasentential phenomena:
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Macro-functions Strategies Pragma-dialectical fallacies Topoi Linguistic forms and 
means 
- Justifying the message 















4.5.1 Strategies, Topoi and Fallacies 
The qualitative analysis identifies and analyses discursive strategies of ‘coercion’, 
‘dissimulation’ and ‘legitimisation’/‘delegitimisation’ (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997, 
see Chapter 3). Particular attention is paid to ‘othering’ strategies, or the construction 
of the ‘self’ vs. the ‘other’ in order to effectively construct a Feindbild, and to 
strategies of legitimisation by authorisation, abstraction, moralisation and 
rationalisation (van Leeuwen 2007: 98-105). The nature of van Leeuwen's strategies 
is partly topological (e.g. the topos of authority), and thus these strategies in 
particular lend themselves to the analysis of topoi in Chamberlain's discourse. 
As the explicit or inferable bridge between an argument and a conclusion (see 3.4.3), 
there is a topos to be detected in any claim that can be reduced to the construction ‘A 
therefore B’ (and conversely ‘B because A’). Where such claims are identified by the 
Concord tool or the qualitative analysis as salient examples of discursive strategies of 
persuasion, the explicit or inferable premise linking A to B is deconstructed. The 
topos analysis does not begin from a set list of a priori topoi for analysis, but is 
informed in part by the persuasive and legitimising topoi identified by Martin 
Wengeler (2005) and Ruth Wodak (2009). Resulting from an analysis of German 
Kriegsbotschaften, Wengeler's topoi are considered to have particular relevance for 
the present methodology. Correspondingly, particular attention is paid to the topoi of 
necessity and urgency (Wengeler 2005: 221; Wodak 2009: 44), of which Wengeler 
specifices the topos of ultimate catastrophe; the topos of history (Wengeler 2005 
226; Wodak 2009: 44); the topos of principle (Wengeler 2005: 217); the topos of 
authority, and specifically appeals to God or a ‘higher power’ (Wengeler 2005: 
217/226). The topos analysis additionally reveals the use of further topoi, and of 
specific forms of the topoi identified by Wodak and Wengeler. These include the 
topoi of factuality, evidence and provability, the topos of the future, topoi of 
uniqueness and incomparability, the topoi of obviousness, doubtlessness and 
irrelevance, topoi of sufficiency and appropriateness, the victim topos, the topos of 
‘the only way’, and the topos of authorial imperfection. A considerable number of 
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the topoi identified can also be formulated in reference to van Leeuwen's strategies of 
legitimisation (e.g. the topos of factuality/provability as legitimisation by theoretical 
rationalisation). Topoi are also commonly found to constitute pragma-dialectical 
fallacies – the topos of authority may be an illegitimate appeal to authority and the 
topos of urgency is frequently a normatively unreasonable argumentative appeal to 
emotion – thus the topos analysis partially merges with the analysis of pragma-
dialectical fallacies. Where applicable, therefore, topoi are named and analysed in 
relation to the corresponding fallacy or fallacies. 
Fallacy analysis is a key constituent of the present methodology as fallacies enact 
what Saussure advances is the essence of manipulation, communicating the relevance 
of things that are not relevant by themselves, or retaining actually relevant 
information (Saussure 2005: 120). Pragma-dialectical fallacies are understood as 
violations of the pragma-dialectical rules for discussion, and are analysed here in 
order to show that Chamberlain reduces critical disagreement space partly by 
violating the rules for critical discussion. The pragma-dialectical approach to 
argumentation analysis identifies a specific taxonomy of fallacies in terms of 
violations of van Eemeren et al.’s pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion (see 
Section 3.4.4), of which the present analysis examines violations of Rules 1-8 (9 and 
10 are not applicable to Chamberlain's discourse). The present analysis supplements 
van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s 1987 taxonomy of rule-based fallacies with Daniel 
Cohen’s taxonomy of logical, rhetorical and dialectical fallacies (Cohen 2003: 119), 
addressing instances of van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s more general pragma-
dialectical fallacies in Chamberlain’s discourse and using Cohen’s taxonomy as a 
detailed reference for the forms that pragma-dialectical rule violations can take. In 
particular, the analysis explores Chamberlain’s use of the logical fallacies of non 
causa pro causa, hasty generalisation, disjunctive logic,circular reasoning, ignoratio 
elenchi, affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent, the rhetorical faults of 
suppressed evidence (obscurantism), ad hominem, positive ad populum, appeals to 
the elite or what Wengeler calls Appelle zum Gruppenegoismus (Wengeler 2005: 
215) as a particular form of ad populum or ad superbiam, appeal to illegitimate 
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authority, appeal to emotion, and dialectical offenses including unvoiced objections, 
unasked questions, and insufficient argument. 
4.5.2 Linguistic Forms and Means 
There is no consensus in CDA regarding which linguistic features should be 
prioritised in text analysis (Meyer 2001: 25); as Fairclough and Wodak summarise, 
‘a useful working assumption is that any part of any language text, spoken or written, 
is simultaneously constituting representations, relations, and identities’ (Fairclough 
& Wodak 1997: 275). It is not uncommon for CDA scholars to provide a list of the 
phenomena of text grammar and language use that play a significant role in their 
particular research material, for example coherence, anaphora, speech acts and turn-
taking (Wodak 2009:4, see also Fairclough 1995: 74; van Dijk 1997: 33; Meyer 
2001: 26; Toolan 2001: 221-227); however, it would be naïve to search for a pre-
formulated set of linguistic categories in any critical discourse analysis, as the 
analysis should be driven by the data and not by a priori categories. As a deductive 
analysis, the present analysis is not based on pre-selected linguistic categories; all 
linguistic forms and means analysed in the following were identified specifically in 
relation to the strategies at work in Chamberlain’s war essays.  
As examples of the linguistic means analysed in the following analysis, the 
preliminary close-reading and quantitative analysis revealed the primary importance 
of examining authorical meta-commentary and metaphor. Stylistic devices revealed 
by preliminary readings to be central to Chamberlain’s discursive strategies include 
intertextuality, juxtaposition and antithesis, aphorisms, minor sentence interjections 
and exclamatives, hyperbole in the form of universal affirmation and universal 
negation, intensifiers, expressions of immeasurability and numerousness, and 
affective adjectives and adverbs. The analysis furthermore examines classic 
rhetorical devices such as apostrophe, anadiplosis and paralepsis, as well as 
rhetorical figures of word repetition polyptoton, tricolon and epanelepsis. Lexical 
priming, evidential particles, modality and agency are also addressed. 
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The qualitative analysis identifies and analyses an array of salient and/or recurring 
metaphors, including, for example, metaphors of insanity and entangled thread, 
journeys and playing, but also, crucially, opposing metaphors of upwards and 
downwards movement, concealment and revelation, sight and blindness, light and 
darkness, and upwards and downwards movement. It is shown that these opposing 
metaphors frequently constitute a ‘metaphor scenario’ in Chamberlain's war essays, 
namely the epistemic scenario of knowledge and ignorance on the parts of the author 
and readers, respectively. This scenario is constructed using recurring metaphors of 
sight and blindness to reinforce Chamberlain’s assertion of inaccurate or distorted 
perception of the truth; its argumentative function is to delegitimise the readers’ 




5. SYNTHESIS OF THE WAR ESSAYS’ TOPICAL CONTENT AND 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
5.1 Introduction 
Chamberlain makes extensive use of strategies of legitimisation to justify his 
message, suggesting that the feasibility of his ideological statements is questionable. 
The following chapter situates Chamberlain’s ideological propositions in their local 
and global historical contexts in order to compare them with the historical facts and 
to assess if and to what extent these propositions are valid. In accordance with the 
topical content of Chamberlain’s essays, the focus is placed on German nationalism, 
the concurrent struggle between traditional and progressive forces. the causes of the 
First World War, anti-Semitism and developments in German scholarship during the 
period 1848-1918. 
5.2 Tradition vs. Progress 
For Chamberlain, the monarchy and the Prussian military are essentially German, 
and the only German institutions not to have been ‘infested’ by un-German 
influences. The particular aspect of the Prussian military that Chamberlain 
accentuates in relation to Germanness is the army’s spirit, or Geist (Kriegsaufsätze: 
79). Militarism and the values and conduct it both stands for and trains, Chamberlain 
asserts, are the human qualities on which the nation state is built; ‘Ohne Preußen 
gäbe es heute überhaupt kein Deutschland mehr, und ohne jene große Schule für die 
Verehrung von wahrem Menschenwert, hämisch „Militarismus“ genannt, gäbe es 
kein Preußen’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 76, 78). Whereas the Prussian military exemplifies 
ideal human values and conduct, the monarchy is truly and essentially German 
because its represents a time-honoured tradition in the German territories. The 
veneration of the monarchy is largely a feature of Politische Ideale, in which 
Chamberlain intensifies his belief that the monarch is the representative of the 
German state (i.e. of ‘Germanness’), and disregard for the monarchy is equivalent to 
disregard for the state (Politische Ideale: 74). 
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For Chamberlain, the ‘un-German’ at work within Germany is represented by 
deficient intellect and morals, and by a tripartite network of democracy, finance and 
the press. He perceives the greatest antagonist of the German cause to be 
parliamentary democracy, attacking it as ‘das Grundübel unserer Zeit’ (Demokratie 
und Freiheit: 70). In Chamberlain’s eyes, the deplorable nature of democracy lies in 
the ignorance and laziness on which it is based, and in the inevitability that universal 
suffrage will place incompetent politicians at the head of the country. Most 
importantly, however, democracy is posited as ‘un-German’ and incompatible with 
the more laudable German war ethics and German military conduct, and must 
therefore be replaced. Where the (Prussian) military is decisive and operational, the 
Reichstag is irresolute and a meeting place for mere circumlocution (Kriegsaufsätze: 
37-38). Universal suffrage thus has and will continue to put incompetent men in 
charge of Germany, who will lead to its downfall and destruction (Kriegsaufsätze: 
39; Demokratie und Freiheit: 50-53). The historical facts offer multiple explanations 
for Chamberlain’s anti-democratic stance. One explanation is that, as a staunch 
conservative, his political views were formed and informed by the struggle between 
conservative particularism on the one hand and the progressive forces of liberalism 
and social democracy on the other that had characterised non-traditional German 
politics from 1848. 
Although Chamberlain did not arrive in Germany until after 1848, the 1848 
revolutions were the origins of the battle between traditional and progressive forces 
that characterised his time in Germany, and thus cannot be overlooked. In the 
aftermath of an increase in literacy rates, new strands of liberalism, radicalism and 
socialism gained momentum, and the clash between the old system of authoritarian 
rule and new dynamic popular engagement in political affairs gave rise to a call for 
change. In 1848, conflicting forces reached a climax during a series of revolutions 
staged by liberals who fought for a German constitution and against the authoritarian 
government regimes. The uprisings of 1848 led to the formation of the Frankfurt 
Parliament. At this early stage, the parliament was comprised chiefly of self-elected, 
educated members of the middle class, and voted in favour of a constitutional 
monarchy. Thus although the new constitution appeased the liberals, it also preserved 
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the particularistic monarchy. For the radicals and socialists, who developed their 
conception of nationhood based upon a self-governing republic, these were 
unacceptable compromises, and left-wing groups proceeded to revolt anew in a 
revolution that was, however, quickly defeated.  
Chamberlain conceives of parliamentary democracy as an ‘internal enemy’. He 
constructs democracy as characteristic of the enemy nations, equating a pro-
democracy attitude with a pro-France and pro-England attitude (Politische Ideale: 
28). This nationalist hatred of democracy may be traced back to 1848, during which 
time radicals inspired by American and French ideals of freedom and equality 
initiated a movement to create a self-governing Volk; the antithesis to Prussian 
authoritarian rule. What Chamberlain does not acknowledge in his propagandistic 
discourse, however, is that his nation-oriented rejection of democracy as a 
fundamental argument for the maintenance of German national strength is self-
contradictory, as the formal ideology of nationalism originates in the French 
Revolution. In denouncing the French democratic concepts of liberté, egalité and 
fraternité, Chamberlain was quick to oversee the crucial role played by the French 
Revolution in generating nationalist sentiment in Germany: not only did the French 
threat to the Rhine in 1840 significantly increase nationalist sentiment when 
Germans united in a wave of anti-French nationalism, but the German revolutions 
incited by those in France also dramatically heightened nationalist feeling. 
Following German victory in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, Germany was 
united as a German Empire with a constitution, a parliament, and a chancellor. The 
Reich Constitution was a mixture of conflicting forces: of a representative parliament 
(Reichstag) made largely as a concession to social democrats in order to win support 
for Prussia and Lesser Germany, of the middle-class liberal demand for a 
constitutional unitary national state, and of conservative preservation of an 
authoritarian monarchical state and Prussian hegemony. The balance of power in the 
Reich was in favour of Prussian authoritarianism (Berghahn 2005: 178). The Reich 
under Bismarck was characterised by his conservative attempts to keep the Reichstag 
at bay: some historians allude to superficial constitutionalism here, referring to it as 
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an ‘artfully constructed pseudo-constitutional structure’ (Mommsen 1995: 35), or as 
‘a hybrid system that was both sham-constitutionalism and sham-absolutism’ 
(Blackbourn 2003: 310), for example. The decision-making powers of Bismarck’s 
team of executive advisors in the Bundesrat (Upper House) was untouchable by the 
Reichstag, and the Kaiser became president of the Confederation, retained control of 
the armed forces, and retained the right to dismiss parliament (Kitchen 2006: 106). 
Prussian executive legislative powers virtually excluded the Reichstag from 
government, and the Prussian right of veto of any constitutional changes meant that 
there was no scope for parliament to exert influence over any policy decisions. 
Bismarck thus dashed liberal-constitutional hopes and preserved conservative 
authoritarian institutions of government.  
Unlike the liberals, democrats made genuine gains from the foundation of the Reich 
Constitution of 1871. The constitution made a significant compromise in favour of 
democracy in order to win support from the anti-Prussian and pro-Greater-Germany 
Left. As Margaret Anderson highlights, not only did the first elections in the new 
German Empire represent the Germans’ first experience of direct, equal, universal 
manhood suffrage, but the elections and constitution were the most democratic in 
Europe, surpassing even the democratic scope of the British Reform Bill of 1867 
(Anderson 1993: 1448).  
Under Wilhelm II from 1888 and Bethmann-Hollweg from 1909, progressive forces 
were irrevocably annihilated. Described as ‘a born autocrat with a contempt for the 
constitution’ (Carr 1991: 141), Wilhelm II and Bethmann-Hollweg were 
conservatives and opposed to parliamentary government. Wilhelm’s Reich made a 
firm return to the authority of the princes and the military. As Blackbourn describes, 
military values and style influenced virtually all sections of society after 1888; 
beyond the special significance assigned to the armed forces, this included a trend 
towards professional uniforms and the intervention of the police in everyday life: 
‘almost nothing was left unregulated’, Blackbourn writes, ‘from the colour of 
automobiles to the length of hatpins’ (Blackbourn 2003: 289). Militarisation 
continued under Bülow, who supported the Tivoli Programme of 1892. This was 
based on the supremacy of Divine Law and pledged to defend the monarchy against 
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the ‘onslaught’ of parliamentarianism and democracy, and inspired a radical attack 
on socialism (Berghahn 1994: 217). 
Chamberlain’s denunciation of the Reichstag as ‘un-German’ may abe connected to 
its successful grapple for popularity and anti-war votes around 1912. During the 
periods in which the Reichstag had not been deactivated, Bismarck, Bethmann-
Hollweg and Bülow had kept its influence in check or rendered it as good as 
powerless. It was therefore an unwelcome surprise to staunch conservatives like 
Chamberlain when the Social Democrats initiated a backlash against obstructions 
from the Right in the pre-war period 1910-1914 and achieved a Socialist majority in 
the 1912 elections, defeating the Conservative and Centre parties: on the eve of the 
war, the Reichstag was a left-wing institution and had gained firm ground over the 
Conservative monopoly. The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 
produced a surge of integral nationalist euphoria divided between two conflicting 
strains: a conservative strain and a social democratic strain, or, as Konrad Jarausch 
and Michael Geyer summarise, ‘the war polarised politics’ (Jarausch and Geyer 
2003: 232). Under Tirpitz and Kapp, conservative ultra-nationalists founded the 
Fatherland Party (die Vaterlandspartei), which provided popular backing for the 
army and annexation, and opposed any political change. Elsewhere, democratic 
patriotism under the SPD strengthened; a form of nationalism that demanded 
constitutional reform and a compromise peace (Jarausch & Geyer 2003: 232). A 
certain faction of the SPD initiated an anti-war movement in which Karl Liebknecht 
and Rosa Luxemburg incited a surge of votes against war credits. The association 
that developed between the SPD and objection to the war bolstered existing 
Bismarckian accusations that social democrats were ‘un-German’. 
Ultimately, the left-wing Reichstag proved powerless in the outbreak of war in 1914. 
After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the subsequent breakdown 
of European diplomacy, the Reichstag’s political influence was entirely subjugated 
by the Supreme Command of the armed forces, which acted as the chief arbiter of 
German politics for the entire first half of the war (Blackbourn 2003: 367). Dwarfed 
by the political supremacy of the ‘Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship’ and lamed 
by the frequent application of State-of-Siege Laws, the Reichstag remained impotent 
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until 1917. Uprisings in Russia in 1917 inspired the Reichstag to reactivate itself. 
Radicals demanded universal suffrage in all states, the Independent Socialists 
demanded peace without annexations, and remaining strains of the Socialist Party 
joined forces with the National Liberals to draft a constitutional reform. Motivated 
by the Russian Revolution and disillusionment with the duration and conduct of the 
war, the German parliament was in a state of revolt in July 1917. 
5.3 War Guilt 
Despite Chamberlain’s thematisation of an ‘enemy within’, he is reluctant to concede 
any German responsibility for the outbreak of war. He constructs the war as the 
product of an international conspiracy to annihilate Germany, which from the very 
outset was only ever an innocent victim: England, France and Russia are portrayed as 
the aggressors, and any subsequent German (re)action as self-defence. Germany is 
portrayed as a pacific nation whose sole aim was to keep the peace; so much so that 
the German army had existed for defence purposes only, and never to incite war. 
This assertion forms a leitmotif that runs through all of Chamberlain’s propaganda 
essays, receiving particular attention in Wer hat den Krieg verschuldet? and 
Grundstimmungen in England und Frankreich, as well as in Hammer oder Amboß 
(1916) and Der Wille zum Sieg (1917).  
By 1915, England has become the ultimate enemy aggressor in Chamberlain’s eyes. 
He states that England traditionally eliminates anything that stands in its way on the 
path to world domination, and that Germany will be no exception (Ideal und Macht: 
19), that England has already decided to destroy Germany and nothing can change 
this objective (Hammer oder Amboß: 41), and that ‘Für den Engländer handelt’s sich 
nicht um einen Krieg, sondern um ein Duell, bei dem einer der beiden Gegner das 
Leben lassen muß’ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 12). England becomes the concrete agentic 
force behind the war for Chamberlain, who flippantly writes, ‘Über die Tatsache der 
Schuld Englands hätte ich kaum nötig‚ mich hier näher auszulassen: sie ist 
ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 39), and ‘von England 
geht der Krieg aus; einzig in England kann der Krieg enden’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 
 
 80 
38). What drove England to inflict war on Germany, Chamberlain asserts, was 
jealousy and hatred. In fact, Chamberlain perceives all three enemy countries to be 
guilty of an intense but irrational combination of hatred towards Germany, but 
England in particular: ‘Was die drei zusammengeführt hat, ist nicht Liebe, ist auch 
nicht irgend ein positiver Plan, sondern lediglich Neid und Haß gegen das 
neuentstehende, kräftig wachsende Deutschland [...]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 56). 
Although there can be no absolute consensus regarding German responsibility for the 
First World War (see Blackbourn 2003: 335), the facts suggest that German 
diplomacy was too clumsy and inconsistent in what was a volatile situation. 
Following the Franco-Prussian war, the new German dominance in Europe caused 
resentment in Austria, France and Russia. It was crucial to maintain harmonious 
relations with the other major powers, however Bismarck was not willing to risk 
renewed competition from France for the sake of preserving the peace and the status 
quo. In 1875, the French Cadre Law led to the Krieg-in-Sicht crisis in Germany. The 
law, which aimed to comprehensively reorganise the French army, added a 
heightened sense of alarm to the latent fear in Germany that France could not be kept 
down and was preparing for a Revanchekrieg (Mommsen 1993: 23). In the spring of 
1875, the German press reported on French ‘war preparations’ in the newspaper 
Post, possibly with the hope of convincing Great Britain that France was a threat to 
the balance of power in Europe. Germany’s plan backfired, however, when Britain, 
Russia and Italy decided not to crack down on France as a result of this, but instead 
to keep a closer eye on German government policy (Mommsen 1993: 24). 
The 1870s in Germany were additionally characterised by tumultuous relations with 
Russia. Traditionally, Prussia had always been careful to foster and maintain 
relations with Russia. Due chiefly to the deep-seated antagonism between Austria-
Hungary and Russia, however, maintaining healthy relations with both of Bismarck’s 
favoured conservative autocracies proved unrealistic. It thus became increasingly 
important for Bismarck to choose an ally and remain faithful to it, rather than trying 
to appease all parties. Germany began to consolidate relations with Austria-Hungary 
at the expense of Russo-German relations, forming a Double Alliance in October 
1879. This diplomatic move signalled a break with the pro-Russian traditions of 
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German foreign policy. Russo-German relations appeared to improve after 1881 
when the Three Emperors’ Alliance was signed between Russia, Austria-Hungary 
and Germany. However, although Russia was keen to use the treaty to guarantee 
German neutrality in the case of a war with Britain, it was still not happy to passively 
watch the German Empire grow from strength to strength: for Russia, it was crucial 
to ensure German neutrality, but also to keep Germany in check. At the same time as 
Russia negotiated the Three Emperors’ Alliance, therefore, it also began to 
consolidate relations with France (Mommsen 1993: 20). 
By the 1880s, Germany’s only real allies were Austria-Hungary and Italy (Italy 
joined the Double Alliance to form the Triple Alliance in 1882). The Dual Alliance 
with Austria-Hungary was anti-Russian and pro-British, and the Three Emperors’ 
Alliance was pro-Russian and directed against the western powers. Martin Kitchen 
describes Germany’s position in the early 1880s in terms of juggling: ‘it was a 
singularly unstable situation, and even a master diplomatist like Bismarck was 
unlikely to be able to keep all five balls up in the air for much longer’ (Kitchen 2006: 
68). As Kitchen concludes, Germany was trapped in an unsolvable dilemma: it could 
not maintain relations with Russia, Britain and Austria-Hungary, but its position was 
so fundamentally insecure that it could not afford to take sides (Kitchen 2006: 166). 
Germany’s decision to align itself with Austria-Hungary left Russia needing an ally. 
Due to the antagonism that characterised Russo-British relations during the 1870s, 
Russia turned to France. Germany had hoped to establish an Anglo-German alliance 
to stave off an official Franco-Russian alliance; however, having witnessed 
Bismarck’s bigamous diplomatic policy in the initial decade after the Reich was 
founded, Great Britain refused to enter into such an alliance. France and Russia thus 
proceeded to sign a formal alliance in 1893, placing Germany under the threat of a 
potential war on two fronts. Ahrenthal’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 
Russian sphere of influence was the decisive move in the collapse of Russo-German 
relations.  
In April 1904, Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale. This alliance was 
partly the consequence of Germany’s inability to prioritise one particular ally. Any 
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hopes that Germany may have had of forming an alliance with Great Britain were 
firmly annihilated by Bismarck’s colonial policy in the mid 1880s when he 
implicated Germany in the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in 1884, the China and Japan war 
of 1894-95, and the Boer rebellion against the British in South Africa. At the turn of 
the century, however, Germany was nonetheless offered a friendly handshake by 
Great Britain. Staunchly anti-Russian and unwilling to seek an alliance with pro-
Russian France, it sought an alliance with Germany in the aftermath of wide-scale 
clashes with potentially dangerous consequences. However, concerned that assisting 
Britain in a war against Russia would implicate Germany in a war on two fronts, 
Germany declined, cutting itself off from the opportunity to finally form a strong 
alliance and driving Great Britain towards an alliance with France and, ultimately, 
also with Russia.  
Anglo-German antagonism was exacerbated by German rearmament policy. In all 
probability, colonial defence was only one of the motivations behind the ambitious 
programme of naval expansion initiated by Admiral Tirpitz. A second motivation 
was to compete with the Royal Navy, which ultimately incited a naval arms race 
between the British Empire and the Kaiserreich. This naval rivalry was detrimental 
to Anglo-German relations: the British naval fleet was no longer invincible, and 
Britain felt threatened. Mommsen writes, ‘Bismarck tat alles, was in seiner Macht 
stand, um eine großangelegte diplomatische offensive gegen Großbritannien 
zustande zu bringen’ (Mommsen 1993: 63). Bismarckian imperialism and the Tirpitz 
Plan irrevocably destroyed Anglo-German relations and created intense anti-British 
sentiment within Germany. Germany was already highly suspicious of the Triple 
Entente, and when Russia joined in 1907, Germany was left feeling encircled. The 
reality was, however, that in failing to select one or one solid ally, Germany had not 
been encircled, but had rather shut itself out. 
There is thus a strong case for the argument that Germany was to blame for the First 
World War. Firstly because Germany could not identify and remain with one ally, 
choosing rather to swing between between pro-Russian and pro-British policy. The 
contradictions and inconsistencies in German foreign policy proved to be self-
defeating, achieving little but self-exclusion or Auskreisung (as opposed to 
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Einkreisung, see Blackbourn 2003: 337). Secondly, Germany acted provocatively, 
particularly in its pursuit of Weltpolitik. Blackbourn describes German imperialism 
as ‘a meddlesome, hyperactive policy which provoked universal distrust’ 
(Blackbourn 2003: 338), and blames the Tirpitz Plan in particular for Anglo-German 
enmity. It furthermore seems to be accepted that Germany was the most aggressive 
of the great powers (see Fischer 1977: 82, Carr 1991: 206; Mombauer 2001: 287 and 
Blackbourn 2003: 337). 
5.4 Lies and Misleading in the Press 
For Chamberlain, the press constituted a dangerous internal enemy in Germany, 
which he accuses of lying to, concealing information from, and misleading the 
German public. The Times is particularly attacked in the immediate aftermath of the 
outbreak of the war in the Kriegsaufsätze (1914). One particular journalist, who 
remains unnamed, is attacked for his ruthless disregard for other people as long as he 
gets the job done (Kriegsaufsätze: 11). More generally, he adds ‘Oscar Wilde schrieb 
einmal einen Aufsatz über „Die Kunst des Lügens“; seine Landsleute haben es 
seither in dieser Kunst weit gebracht’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 10). Chamberlain holds the 
foreign press particularly responsible for persuading the world that the Triple Entente 
are fighting for freedom whereas Germany aims to destroy it; in other words that it 
was only ever really Germany that wanted war (Kriegsaufsätze: 9, 11, 15). Based on 
the historical facts, it seems that Chamberlain conveniently confused two phenomena 
regarding the pre-war and war-time press in Germany: the new availability in print of 
a broad spectrum of differing ideological standpoints, and the real policy of press 
misinformation. 
During the years of Weltpolitik, mass-market journalism rocketed, printing a new 
wealth of differing ideological positions. Newspapers were divided between 
conservative intellectual journalists, left-liberal journalists, and right-wing 
journalists. Some newspapers favoured by the government were strategically 
rewarded with inside information, whereas other journalists were denied information 
(Mommsen 1995: 198). A Press Bureaux was founded to ensure that the 
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government’s ideas received sympathetic coverage in the press, and to this end, the 
newspapers often published limited information. The selective provision of 
information was intended to revive latent patriotism and legitimise the German war 
cause. As Martin Kitchen reports, particularly the SDP and those who were 
ambivalent in their support for the war were misled into believing that Russia was 
the aggressor because anti-Russian feeling among the more radical forces in 
Germany was high, thus it was particularly easy to construct an effective Russian 
Feindbild (Kitchen 2006: 204). 
In the immediate pre-war years, the German public had realised that they were 
subject to an official policy of misleading, and the press experienced a crisis of 
public confidence (Glaubwürdigkeitskrise). Public suspicion of the press led to a 
surge in external communication forms, which escalated to a chaotic circulation of 
‘rumours’ (Altenhöner 2008). As a result of the rumours crisis, a strict policy of 
press censorship was introduced. Realising that the press was no longer an effective 
means of influencing public opinion, Bülow had resorted to a policy of repression 
and control, conducting foreign policy as secretly as possible and providing the 
public with little information about the goals and conduct of German foreign policy.  
The war period 1914-1918 was characterised by an increase in initiative in all 
warring states to control and manipulate public and private communication 
(Altenhöher 2008: 88). In Germany, the necessity to forge public acceptance of 
official German war conduct grew, accompanied by a corresponding increase in what 
Altenhöher calls ‘acceptance strategies’ (ibid.). The greatest ‘acceptance strategy’ of 
all took the form of Die Nachrichtenabteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes (the Foreign 
Ministry’s News and Press Division), as well as a government-driven propaganda 
policy abroad. As Blackbourn reports, the German government strived to rally the 
nation, to mould popular attitudes, and to mould foreign opinion (Blackbourn 2003: 





Die Kluft zwischen der tatsächlichen Lage und den nationalistischen 
Erwartungen in bereiten Schichten der Öffentlichkeit gewann mit der 
Berufung der dritten Obersten Heeresleitung unter Hindenburg und 
Ludendorff eine neue Qualität (Mommsen 2004: 85).  
Crucially, the public was misled to believe that the war would only be short, even 
though German officials knew this to be a hopeless expectation: as Mommsen 
reports, Moltke had privately expressed the opinion as far back as 1890 that any war 
resulting from the international tensions exacerbated in Imperial Germany would 
probably last for a good seven years, if not thirty (Mommsen 2004: 79). The German 
public was additionally misled regarding the potential for a German victory: up until 
1916, the German people continued to believe in the ‘final victory’ propagated by the 
press. Indeed, so confident were they that Germany would win, that the question at 
the forefront of the German mind was not whether Germany would win, but how to 
proceed after victory (Carr 1991: 214). Schramm identifies the same tendency in the 
British press during the war. According to Schramm’s analysis, the British press 
similarly exaggerated the extent of allied victories abroad, informing the public only 
of the positive aspects of British war conduct and never of the negative ones, and 
manipulating the figures in reports of German military casualties and fatalities 
(Schramm 2007: 359-61). As Altenhöner stresses, although it may not be entirely 
justified to accuse the press of consistently lying, they were certainly guilty of 
exaggerating the positive truths and concealing the negative ones (Altenhöner: 84). 
The German press was thus used to mould and forge consent for public opinion. This 
was achieved by releasing only selective information, and by an extensive 
propaganda policy. A central concern of this propaganda policy was the depiction of 
the enemy, as explored by Bernhard Rosenberger (1998) and Fritz Fischer (1997). 
Fischer highlights comparative portrayals of England in relation to Germany in 
which England is represented as an old, weary, declining nation in comparison to the 
young and spirited Germany growing stronger by the day (Fischer 1997: 133). 
Rosenberger and Kestler highlight the use of Greuelpropaganda (‘horror 
propaganda’/‘black propaganda’) to spread rumours about the bestial enemy and to 
frame the enemy states as insidious conspirators who had calculatingly plotted and 
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incited the war. Propaganda of this kind painted the allegedly jealousy-driven 
enemies in an almost diabolic light, claiming that they were intent on destroying all 
traces of German culture and existence. As Kestler reports, the purpose of these 
depictions was to present their destruction by the German armed forces as legitimate, 
or, ‘um die Öffentlichkeit von der “Richtigkeit, Gerechtigkeit und Notwendigtkeit 
des Krieges mit seiner unerbittlichen Konsequenz des Töten- und Sterbenmüssen” zu 
überzeugen’ (Kestler 1994: 136). 
The selective provision of information by the press, however, pursued the same 
intentions as Chamberlain’s nationalist war essays: to revive latent patriotism and 
legitimise the German war cause. Essentially fighting for the same cause, 
Chamberlain was not genuinely questioning the morals and authenticity of the 
German press, but touching on existing public mistrust of the press in order to 
construct a ‘global fuzz’ of epistemic uncertainty. The key to understanding 
Chamberlain’s portrayal of the press is the tide of German mass-market journalism in 
the 1890s that was characterised by a new wealth and variety of ideological 
positions. Among the leading newspapers of the day, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung promoted official government views, the Frankurter Zeitung, Berliner 
Tageblatt und the Vossische Zeitung were liberal organs, and the Social Democrats 
also had their own press organs (Mommsen 1995: 194-95). Chamberlain thus 
exploits existing public mistrust of the press (Glaubwürdigkeitskrise) in order to 
discount newspapers representing alternative ideologies, expressing his loathing of 
ideological diversity in the press in the guise of disapproval of press censorship. 
The likelihood that scathing references to the damaging influence of the press are, at 
least in part, anti-Semitic is high. The following Section 5.5 elaborates on this 




5.5 Veiled Anti-Semitism in Context  
Although this thesis focuses on nationalism and not anti-Semitism, Chamberlain’s 
status as a prominent anti-Semite following the publication of Die Grundlagen des 
neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in 1899 calls for a brief examination of (veiled) anti-
Semitism in his war essays. As Felicity Rash documents, Chamberlain was not only a 
prolific anti-Semite of his time, but was also immersed in contemporary anti-Semitic 
discourse such as Wilhelm Marr’s Der Sieg des Judenthums über das 
Germanenthums (1879), Heinrich von Treitschke’s Unsere Aussichten (1879), Eugen 
Dühring’s Die Judenfrage als Racen-, Sitten- und Culturfrage (1881), and Heinrich 
Claß’s monograph Wenn ich der Kaiser wär (1912), to name just a few (cf. Rash 
2012: 84-117). Given his opus magnum and in the midst of this tradition of 
influential anti-Semitic publications, it it unlikely that Chamberlain’s war essays are 
devoid of anti-Semitic references. The following section examines what may be anti-
Semitic references in Chamberlain’s war essays, disguised as attacks on the press, 
materialism and finances. It is acknowledged that anti-Semitic references in the war 
essays probably exceed the examples mentioned below, but are veiled due to war-
time censorship which banned anti-Semitic agitation. Rash states that from 1915 
onwards, Chamberlain’s readers had to look for hidden meanings in his war essays, 
and suggests that the author’s advocacy of ‘reading between the lines’ of his essays 
in the Neue Kriegsaufsätze intimates veiled anti-Semitic messages (Rash 2012: 120). 
Chamberlain’s war essays do not feature explicitly racist or anti-Semitic diatribe. 
They do, however, as Rash notes, re-use some of the key terminology of anti-Semitic 
discourse of the time, such as Mammon, Gold, Geld, as well as stock insults to Jews, 
e.g. Teufelsbrut [progeny of the devil] or ‘grundböse, fluchwürdige Gesellen’ [an 
utterly evil, monstrous bunch] (Rash 2012: 119) In particular, they feature 
disparaging references to the job sectors of finances and trade, and to certain organs 
of the press associated at that time with the Jews. Chamberlain's references to 
Geldmänner and Finanzleute are not few and far between. Demokratie und Freiheit 
is particularly rich in such references, including a description of the French 
government as ‘a pack of poor devils’ – a collective noun usually applied to dogs – 
in the hands of the Finanzleute: ‘Die Revolution hat Frankreich den Geldmännern 
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ausgeliefert, die das Land seit hundert Jahren auffressen; diese sind jetzt die Herren 
und Gebieter. Was man die Regierung nennt, ist ein Pack armer Teufel, die im Solde 
der Finanzleute stehen' (Demokratie und Freiheit: 10). He repeats this sentiment in 
relation to supporters of democracy in Germany, who are, for him, chiefly the 
Finanzleute: ‘Wer nun ein wirkliches Interesse an dieser auf zwei so morschen 
Grundpfeilern — unfähige Wähler, unfähige Parlamentarier — aufgebauten 
Regierungsform hat, das sind die Finanzleute!’ (Demokratie und Freheit: 54). Two 
factors make it likely that there is veiled anti-Semitism behind references to 
Finanzleute and Geldmänner: explicit anti-Semitic references to Jewish economic 
influence in the Grundlagen (specifically in the chapter Der Eintritt der Juden in die 
abendliche Geschichte, cf. Rash 2012: 101-102), and the frequently reported strong 
Jewish engagement or representation in banking and merchantry (Hortzitz 1988: 
5/33/38; Pulzer 2004: 299). As Rash observes, Chamberlain forged a connection 
between finances and materialism in Grundlagen, positing materialism as at once 
dangerous to Germanic idealism and as a specific aspect of Judaism (Rash 2012: 
107), thereby making Judaism dangerous to Germanic idealism. 
The second sites of veiled anti-Semitism in Chamberlain's war essays are references 
to the press. As Rash points outs, anti-Semitic references to the press in Grundlagen 
were explicit, in which he states his opinion that the Jews had gained a dangerous 
influence in Europe, especially through the medium of the press (Rash 2012: 103). 
Indeed, one rare explicit reference to the Jews from the Kriegsaufsätze is enough to 
show that, although the majority of Chamberlain's references to the press do not 
explicitly mention the Jews, they are most certainty meant as veiled anti-Semitism: 
Deutschland zählt aber zehnmal so viele Juden, und wo sind sie jetzt? 
Wie weggeputzt von der gewaltigen Erhebung; als „Juden“ nicht mehr 
auffindbar, denn sie tun ihre Pflicht als Deutsche vor dem Feinde oder 
daheim, inzwischen die englischen Juden, die doch die leibhaftigen 
Brüder und Vettern der deutschen Juden sind, dort alles Schändliche 
wie toll mitmachen, ihre deutschen Namen in englische schnell 
umwandeln und in der ihnen fast allein gehörigen Presse an der Spitze 




This explicit association between the Jews and the press, alleged to be ‘almost solely 
in the hands of Jews’, is strongly indicative of veiled anti-Semitism in further 
references to the press. Chamberlain scorns press organs associated with the Jews: 
newspapers such as the Frankfurter Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt, to name the 
most significant examples, were consistently subject to anti-Semitism (Becker 1871: 
77, 125), and widely despised in right-wing circles. Criticism of the English Lord 
Northcliffe’s Daily Mail (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 21) and The Times in particular 
seems to be starkly anti-Semitic: Chamberlain asserts that The Times also controls 
the papers Matin and Nowoje, all three of which are more interested in financial gain 
than providing news (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 27) (cf. Rash 2012: 120). The latter 
association is heightened and solidifed by further associations forged between the 
press and money or finances as in ‘Die Hochschätzung des Geldes, die Verspottung 
aller idealen Regungen, die wachsende Macht des undeutschen Teiles der Presse, die 
systematische Untergrabung der Verehrung des Königtums, des Heeres, der 
christlichen Überzeugungen’ (Die Zuversicht: 11-12, see also Demokratie und 
Freiheit: 59). Here, the Jews, implicitly manifested in ‘die Hochschätzung des 
Geldes’ and ‘die Presse’, are labelled ‘un-German’, legitimised by the argumentative 
triad of undermining the authority of the monarchy (as proponents of Liberalism and 
Social Democracy), of the army (as anti-war), and of Christian values (based on the 
age-old anti-Semitic argument of religious difference). The most significant figures 
in the so-called German Judenpresse (‘Jewish press’) were Rudolf Mosse, Leopold 
Ullstein, Leopold Sonnemann, Bernhard Dernburg, Jacob Riesser, and Theodor 
Wolff. Sonnemann, Dernburg and Riesser were bankers by profession and Riesser 
was the Vice President of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce.  
A review of the developments in the Jewish status and social position around the 
time of Chamberlain's residence in Germany indicates that anti-Semitic sentiment 
may be behind even more of the thematic content in his essays: not just behind 
statements about the ‘internal’ enemy, but also behind those describing the ‘external’ 
enemy. This position is speculative; however, given the clear historical connection 
between the Jews, liberalism and parliamentary democracy on the one hand, and 
between conservative nationalism and anti-Semitism on the other, an outline of the 
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history of the Jews and anti-Semitism in nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Germany will highlight the potential anti-Semitic nature of topical statements in 
Chamberlain's essays that appear to relate first and foremost to democracy and the 
war guilt of the Western allies. 
Nineteenth century Germany was the scene of major change for the Jews at home 
there. Up until the end of the eighteenth century, the Jews still had the low legal 
status left over from the segregational ghetto regulations of the middle ages (Hortzitz 
1988:19). After the turn of the eighteenth century, the Jews in Central and Western 
Europe became integrated citizens with equal rights. The historical role played by the 
two French revolutions (1789-1799 and 1848) was paramount to this process. 
Revolution and Napoleonic occupation brought total equality to all men in France 
(1791), followed eventually by Germany in 1808 with equality of residence rights 
(Orts und Stadtbürgerrecht, 1808). With the Napoleonic revolutions Enlightenment 
took force, bringing with it the ideals of liberty and equality for all (Hortzitz 1988: 
20). Although the defeat of Napoleon meant a major setback to and, in part, an 
annulment of the achievements for Jewish emancipation, the ensuing revolution of 
1848 once again brought tempo and force into the movement towards Jewish 
emancipation. In the aftermath of the revolution of the eighteenth century and a 
failed attempt to gain equal rights at the Erster Vereinigter Preußischer 
Provinzialllandtag in Berlin in 1847, liberally and democratically minded Jews were 
particularly active in the 1848 revolution (Hortzitz 1888: 27-28). The constitution of 
the new Preußische Nationalversammlung founded in the aftermath of the 1848 
revolution introduced a fundamental right for the emancipation of the Jews: the equal 
status of all confessions and the independence of citizens’ rights from their religious 
confession. In the elections for its non-Prussian counterpart, the Frankfurter 
Nationalversammlung, four Jews were included. As Peter Pulzer (2004) points out, 
the Jews remained traditional supporters of Liberalism during the nineteenth century. 
Following the intensified rise of and struggle for Liberalism during the 1860s and the 
the liberal concessions made by the new constitutional monarchy of 1871, the Jews 
were granted total equality. 
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Notable Jewish participation in the revolutions and the legal benefits that the 
resulting parliament brought them forged an association between the Jews, 
liberalism, democracy and, western values in general. To be an anti-Semite meant to 
reject this trio of socio-political developments, and vice versa (Pulzer 2004: 292). 
The introduction of Chamberlain’s detested democracy, party politics and 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit to German political society was the result of the liberal fight for 
the fundamental right of human equality, including the equal right of men to decide 
how the country of Germany is governed. As dependent on the right to human 
equality, the Jews became seen by conservatives as the embodiment of all that was 
despicable about democracy, and parliament of all that was despicable about the 
emancipation of the Jews: (Pulzer 2004: 303). It may thus very feasibly be the case 
that Chamberlain's thematisations attacks on democracy are in fact veiled anti-
Semitic attacks.  
In addition, Chamberlain’s references to the press are probably instances of veiled 
anti-Semitism. He attributes part of the responsibility for the spiritual and intellectual 
shortcomings of the German people to the press, whereby one particular group of 
newspapers falls victim to Chamberlain’s denigration (die Frankfurter Presse). The 
evils of the German press represent a particular concern in Demokratie und Freiheit 
(1917), in which the Berliner Tageblatt and the Frankfurter Zeitung are accused of 
censoring information so that the German people have no access to the truth and 
cannot mature intellectually (Demokratie und Freiheit: 32-33, 59). The lack of any 
real distinction between Jews and democrats in the eyes of nineteenth century 
conservatives discussed above, however, adds a further dimension to this 
assumption. As a conservative monarchist, it may be that Chamberlain was railing, at 
least in part, against a body of newspapers that were not just Jewish, but liberal and 
pro-democracy. Peter Pulzer identifies three distinct groups of major newspapers in 
Wilhelmine Germany: those financed by the Conservative and Centre parties (e.g. 
Kreuzzeitung/Neue Preußische Zeitung, Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung), those 
financed by industrialists (e.g. Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, Die Post) and 
agriculturalists (e.g. Deutsche Tageszeitung, Berliner Blatt), and the so-called 
‘Jewish press’ – ‘eine Reihe von Zeitungskonzernen, die Juden gehörten, von ihnen 
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herausgegeben und zum großen Teil auch geschrieben wurden’ (Pulzer 1976: 216-
17). It is important to note that the ‘Jewish press’ represented a cohesive unit not just 
in the number of Jewish sponsors, editors and journalists who contributed to it, but 
also in its political ideology: these press organs were particularly – and even 
radically – democratic (Pulzer 1976: 216; Lowenstein et al. 2000: 188). Dernburg, 
Wolff and Riesser in particular were strong advocates of liberal politics: Dernburg 
was a left liberal whose father had served as a National-Liberal Reichstag deputy 
from 1871 to 1881, Riesser was a member of the National Liberal Party, and Wolff 
was a Democrat. Despite associations between the Jews and the Press in the 
Kriegsaufsätze, given the nature of the ‘Jewish press’ as doubly animous to 
Chamberlain – Jewish and Liberal - it is difficult to assess to what extent 
Chamberlain’s attacks on the press were motivated by racial antagonism and to what 
extent they were motivated by ideological antagonism, and to what extents both 
forms of antagonism merged into one. 
Not only may Chamberlain's attacks on democracy and the press be anti-Semitic, but 
also his attacks on England and France, and France in particular. As Hortzitz 
interestingly notes, the Jews came to be associated with the French during the 
Napoleonic occupation in eighteenth century Germany; a connection propagated by 
prominent German writers like Ernst Moritz Arndt and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn. 
Feeling threatened by the French politics of occupation, there developed in Germany 
during the last two decades of the eighteenth century a considerable hate of the 
French. In this climate, Arndt popularised the notion of the French as ‘un-German’ as 
a critical negation of ‘German’ (Hortzitz 1988: 255). Most interesting of all, 
however, is Hortzitz's observation that, in the struggle for Jewish emancipation that 
followed this initial revolution, the Jews – certainly in anti-Semitic circles and 
literature – were identified with the French ‘other’, or, as Hortzitz summarises, ‘Die 
Franzosen als Projektion des Feindbildes nach außen wie die Juden als ihre 
binnenländisches Äquivant’ (ibid.). The French occupation of Germany in the 1790s 
and 1840s brought with it the ideal of equality and therewith democracy, and, 
intensified by German nationalist anti-French feelings during the Franco-Prussian 
War of, the conservative-romantic reaction to liberalism as both a French and a 
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Jewish institution meant that one was identified with the other. As leading figures in 
Francophobia and anti-constitutionalism, German nationalists were thus generally 
also anti-Semities (cf. Pulzer 2004: 301).  
German nationalist Vereine at the turn of the nineteenth century were the main agents 
of anti-Semitic agitation (cf. Pulzer 2004: 244). As Pulzer (2004) and Rash (2012) 
note, the most significant of these organisations in propagating anti-Semitism after 
the turn of the century were the Deutsch-Nationalen, the Verein deutscher Studenten 
and the Alldeutscher Verband (Pulzer 2004: 244; Rash 2012: 83). Chamberlain was a 
member of the latter, which Pulzer identifies as being particularly clever in its 
ambiguity of expression regarding the ‘Jewish question’; as the masters of the kind 
of ‘latenten, stillschweigenden Antisemitismus’ (Pulzer 2004: 244) characteristic of 
Chamberlain's war essays. A further development in German anti-Semitism that 
would have born direct influence on Chamberlain as a citizen of the Bavarian city of 
Bayreuth was the re-focus of the anti-Semitic concentration to South Germany 
(Pulzer 2004: 259). What is more, being written between 1914 and 1917, 
Chamberlain's war essays themselves were written in a heightened climate of anti-
Semitism. The First World War is commonly viewed as a caesura in the history of 
German anti-Semitism (cf. Gräfe 2010: 213). Particularly towards the end of the war, 
from 1916 onwards, the fading likelihood of German military victory and an 
increasingly dire situation at home led to the aggravation of anti-Semitism. 
Furthermore, the war led to a nationalist and propagandistic merging of multiple 
enemies; it was a situation in which German nationalists felt that nationalist values 
were under attack from multiple directions. Perhaps, therefore, the ‘international’ 
enemy in Chamberlain's war essays stands for much more than the war enemies 




5.6 Subjectivism and Perception in Contemporaneous Scholarship 
For Chamberlain, there are few concrete bastions of Germanness; beyond the 
monarchy and the Prussian military, his concept of Germanness centres on 
intellectual and moral ideals. These qualities include a good education, discipline and 
an apt disposition (Kriegsaufsätze: 68), as well as reason, humanity, simplicity, 
loyalty and truth (‘„Vernunft, reine Humanität, Einfalt, Treue und Wahrheit,“ sagt 
Herder, „das ist Charakter der deutschen Nation”‘ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 13)). The 
superior German ideal lies partly in the (alleged) nature of Germany as the only 
bastion of true freedom, a conviction advanced frequently throughout the war essays, 
and particularly in Demokratie und Freiheit (1917). One of the reasons why it is so 
crucial that Germany triumphs in the war, Chamberlain maintains, is that it can then 
reinstate freedom around the world (Kriegsaufsätze: 13-14). What exactly the 
German and therefore ‘original’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 22) concept of freedom means for 
Chamberlain remains vague. He declares that the great ‘creators’ of German freedom 
(synonymous with freedom in its most genuine form) were Martin Luther, Friedrich 
(the Great), Kant, Goethe, Humboldt and Bismarck (Kriegsaufsätze: 21), and that the 
kind of genuine freedom, German freedom, at issue, is the spiritual and intellectual 
kind. The German concept of freedom posited by Chamberlain appears to be centre 
on human thought, intellect and achievement; on ‘die innere, echte Seelenfreiheit, zu 
sein und zu glauben und zu denken und zu reden und zu schaffen’(Ideal und Macht: 
29).  
Chamberlain conceives the nation not as a physical or biological construct, but as a 
national soul, each composed of its own unique set of ideals. He thus understands the 
battle of the nations that was the First World War as a clash of national souls, a clash 
of ideals, and a clash of Weltanschaungen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 90). Accordingly, 
the essence of Chamberlain’s solution to the war is primarily spiritual, whereas any 
pragmatic action encouraged is at best idealistic, and invariably superficial. The only 
way to win the war and achieve freedom, Chamberlain advises, is to engage in an 
internal, spiritual process of rebirth. This spiritual solution is present in 
Chamberlain’s war essays from the very beginning, but gains impetus from 1916 
onwards with the publication of Hammer oder Amboß (1916), and culminating in 
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Demokratie und Freiheit (1917). The war for Chamberlain is an internal process 
requiring self-development towards education by individuals: in order to be 
victorious, the Germans must strive for inner strength and intellectual power. 
Spiritual revolution entails improving one’s cognitive abilities, that is, learning to 
think and understand, or, more specifically, learning to understand ‘Germanness’ and 
what it stands for.  
The primacy of the human mind and the battle for the truth in Chamberlain’s essays 
can be situated in the contemporary battle between the introspective nature of the 
humanities disciplines at the time. 1871 saw the emergence of two conflicting 
theories of knowledge: one based on facts, evidence, and numbers, and one based on 
subjective analysis. As the study of science and technology gained in popularity and 
scope, a battle between science and the humanities emerged. This conflict is explored 
in detail by Volker Berghahn, who tells of a battle of superiority in which humanities 
scholars asserted the primacy of their disciplines over the sciences: humanities 
scholars were convinced that the insights to be gained from their disciplines were 
more profound, and held scientific research to be superficial (Berghahn 1994: 176-
79). The humanities thus experienced a shift towards subjectivism, focussing on 
theories of human cognition: scholarship realigned itself according to the progressive 
notion that cognition is subjective, and that the human mind is incapable of 
perceiving absolute truths (Berghahn 1994: 78). The concern with human cognitive 
faculties, subjective perception and access to absolute truths went hand-in-hand with 
a concern for external or ‘superficial’ versus more profound insights. Scholars began 
to consider the extent to which the human mind can see beyond the surface not just 
of the physical world, but also of the abstract world of concepts and insights. German 
psychology also saw a significant growth in scientific interest in human perception, 
such as Hermann von Helmholtz’s studies of the physiology of perception, Gustav 
Fechner’s optically inspired exploration of the relation between mental and material 
realms, and the physiologist Jakob Moleschott’s attempts to link scientific methods 
and philosophical materialism in pursuit of the argument that there is no knowledge 
other than perception (Sheenan 1989: 813-14). These new trends in the theory of 
knowledge and perception play a crucial role in the development of Chamberlain’s 
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ideology and rhetoric. He too appears to have been greatly influenced by 
contemporary debates on human access to absolute truths, optical metaphors, and the 
ability of the human mind to comprehend more than what is immediately perceptible. 
Chamberlain’s concern with alleged German ignorance can also be situated in the 
intellectual and political context of his time. Despite a strong sense of pride in 
German scholarship and scientific progress in the Reich (see (Blackbourn 2003: 
209), historians agree that one branch of education was critically neglected: political 
education. In 1917, Max Weber announced that ‘Bismarck left behind him as his 
political heritage a nation without any political education’ (Carr 1991: 145). The 
literature on political knowledge and ignorance in the German Reich contains a great 
variety of compatible opinions; Gordon Craig interprets the guiding motive behind 
Heinrich Mann’s social novels as the will to reveal the lack of comprehension in 
German society, ‘the potentially tragic consequences of a continuation of [their] 







6. PRELIMINARY LINGUISTIC OBSERVATIONS 
6.1 Significance of Pre-Reading 
Following the analysis of the war essays’ thematic content, the discourse analysis 
proceeded with close readings of the essays that concentrated on their linguistic 
construction (some phenomena had already presented themselves and been noted 
during the close reading for thematic content). The insights gained during this 
preliminary analysis stage were led by intuition with the intention of proceeding to 
corpus linguistic methods to confirm, develop or dispute the intuitive observations 
made here. A final qualitative analysis would then identify and more systematically 
analyse further examples of the discursive and linguistic phenomena identified in the 
two prior analysis stages, complementing existing data with further salient examples 
that can only be identified by human instinct and not by a computer (e.g. metaphors 
and topoi). In a first reading, discursive strategies and devices that appeared notably 
rhetorical, persuasive or otherwise noteworthy were recorded, followed by the exact 
words and word strings that gave rise to these assumptions in a second reading. The 
general impression gained at this early stage was that a considerable amount – 
perhaps even the majority – of the content of Chamberlain’s war essays is not a 
factual topical discussion, but an abstract discussion that skirts around the alleged 
thematic content and foregrounds the author, the readers and abstract concepts of 
truth and knowledge. 
6.2 Dogma and Authorial Presence 
The preliminary analysis revealed three striking features of Chamberlain’s war 
essays: a highly dogmatic writing style, dominant authorial presence, and abstraction. 
Indicative of a highly dogmatic writing style are first and foremost inclusive generic 
adverbs and pronouns (niemand, alle, nichts, alles, nirgendwo, allerort, überall, 
niemals), and polarised assertions of incomparability and uniqueness. Additionally, 
emotive and polarised adjectives of force, brutality, and monstrousness, for example, 
and expressions of size, amount and numerousness also contributed to the sense of 
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dogma in Chamberlain’s essays. Specifically, the striking sense of dogma was found 
to be created by the following words: allein, beispiellos, drastisch, einzig, 
erschreckend, erschütternd, ganz, gar, gänzlich, gewaltig, montrös, umfassend, 
unerschöpflich, unerschütterlich, ungeheuer, unvergleichlich, vollends. 
Besides a dogmatic style, the presence of Chamberlain the author in his texts was felt 
to be dominant and strategic. Authorial presence primarily manifests itself in 
utterances of self-justification and self-presentation intended to establish credibility 
and trustworthiness. Strategies that attempt to establish authorial credibility were 
noted to be particularly frequent and to intimate the author’s intellectual virtuosity by 
way of intertextual references, etymological diversions and the integration of foreign 
expressions and quotations into the main (German) body of text. Similarly, regular 
references to the author’s objectivity, his hyper-politeness and modesty in direct 
addresses to the readers, and what appears to be humility and a balanced 
consideration of both sides of all arguments construct Chamberlain as credible and 
trustworthy in his authorial role.  
Authorial presence additionally manifests itself in an authorial meta-commentary on 
both the content and formulation of his own statements, as well as on the act and 
medium of writing and the institution of publishing. Chamberlain often reinforces his 
statements with his own (positive) value judgements on their truth, correctness, 
exactness or sufficiency, an observation built from the repeated or salient use of the 
following words and word strings in conjunction with the authorial first person: 
andeuten, Andeutung, angedeutet, Antwort, beantworten, Beispiel(e), beschränken, 
Frage, fragen, genug, genügen, nötig, nur so viel, überflüssig, unnötig, 
zusammenfassen, Zusammenfassung, Zensur. 
The initial close reading additionally discovered that the author not only foregrounds 
himself in the essays, but also the readers and his relationship to them. This 
manifests itself at the most basic level in addresses to the readers, and additionally in 
what were assumed to be discursive strategies to anticipate and prevent objection or 
critical engagement. Furthermore, an attempt to forge reader empathy with the author 
was noted: the author seemed to strategically emphasise himself as the human behind 
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the pen, introducing anecdotes from his everyday life, and employing at times a 
familiar and colloquial writing style, subjective personal exclamations, and aphoristic 
sayings. 
6.3 Abstraction and Epistemics 
Finally, the preliminary close reading on the level of discursive and linguistic devices 
in the essays intuitively detected a tendency towards abstraction. What appear to be 
topical statements are often not really thematic propositions, but abstract propositions 
that assert lies, misleading and lack of knowledge on the one hand, and assertions of 
truth and factuality on the other. A good deal of what appears at first glance to be 
topical statements are in fact not comments on the events and political situation, but a 
comment on human powers of perception and the truth factor of assumptions, beliefs 
and theories in contemporaneous German society. In as much as German diplomatic 
relations and the First World War are a topic, knowledge, self-knowledge and truth 
seem to be on a par with this. The essays are particularly full of accusations of 
ignorance, secrets and lies, as well as, conversely, the notable use of the adjective 
wahr (‘in Wahrheit’) to describe the author’s own theories, assumptions and 
opinions. Words and word strings noted to so strongly create this impression include 
angeblich, Anschein, belügen, erlogen, fabriziert, falsch, fälschen, Falschspiel, 
Fiktion, Grundtatsache, Grundwahrheit, Heuchelei, im eigentlichsten Sinne, in der 
Tat, in Wahrheit, künstlich, Lüge, Lügendiplomatie, Lügenegewebe, Nebelgebild, 
Schein, scheinbar, Tatsache, täuschen, vertuschen, Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, Wölfe im 
Schafsfell, Zerrbild. 
In relation thereto, a salient network of metaphors was noted that consistently 
thematise the binary opposites hiding vs. revealing, burial and excavation, depth and 
surface, blindness and sight, and darkness and light (e.g. Auge(n), betrachten, 
beleuchten, Blick, Blindheit, Blitz, Brille, dämmern, dunkel, Einsicht, Nacht, Sonne, 
Strahlen, umnachtet). These metaphors all pertain to the related source domains of 
SIGHT and LIGHT, indicating an underlying metaphor scenario in the discourse. As 
metaphor scenarios have been shown to carry considerable rhetorical and 
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argumentative force (cf. Sections 2.5 and 3.4.6), it would thus prove particularly 
interesting to investigate the frequency and discursive function of lexemes such as 
sehen, blind and Auge, for example, and to use the concordance analysis to identify 
as many metaphorical uses of these lexemes as possible. 
6.4 Initial Insights 
The preliminary close-reading was used to get a feel for potentially operative and 
salient discursive strategies and linguistic features of Chamberlain’s discourse 
suggested two central areas for analysis: an examination of Chamberlain’s self-
presentation, self-justification and his construction of the author-reader relationship, 
and his resort to predominant moral abstraction (epistemic uncertainty which is 
intangible and immeasurable). This first close reading suggested that it would prove 
particularly interesting to investigate the proportional relation between apparent 




7. CORPUS ANALYSIS 
7.1 Introduction 
The corpus analysis in this thesis is an interim stage of the analysis as a whole that 
uses statistics to check the validity of initial intuitive observations (see Section 4.4 
and Chapter 7) as well as to expand on these by collating a large body of empirically 
derived linguistic evidence upon which to base (in part) the qualitative analysis. The 
corpus analysis is based on a primary corpus composed of Chamberlain’s war essays 
and essay series*, and a comparison corpus composed of contemporaneous 
publications by Paul Rohrbach: 
Primary Corpus Reference Corpus 
Kriegsaufsätze* (1914) 
Neue Kriegsaufsätze* (1915) 
Politische Ideale (1915) 
Die Zuversicht (1915) 
Hammer oder Amboß* (1916) 
Ideal und Macht (1916) 
Demokratie und Freiheit (1917) 
Der Wille zum Sieg (1917) 
Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt (1912) 
Zum Weltvolk hindurch (1914) 
Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik 
(1914) 
Bismarck und Wir (1915) 
Unsere koloniale Zukunftsarbeit (1915) 





The WordSmith tools ‘KeyWords’ and ‘Concord’ were used to identify the keywords 
in the primary corpus, generated in proportional relation to the comparison corpus. 
The first step was to compile a frequency list – or ‘word list’, in WordSmith 
terminology – for both corpora. A frequency list does not, however, differentiate 
between grammatical items such as prepositions and determiners, and words that 
carry a higher ideological value, rendering a number of lexemes in the list 
insignificant. A further step was therefore necessary to determine which of the items 
in the frequency list are salient as opposed to merely frequent. In order to determine 
which of the items in the frequency list are salient, the word list was converted into a 
keyword list using the KeyWords tool, which compares the most frequent words in 
the primary corpus with their statistical occurrence in the reference corpus. The 
KeyWords tool is used in the sense of Senkbeil’s summary of its function as a 
‘rough’ tool (‘ein grobes Werkzeug’) with which to discover hidden or explicit 
ideological patterns within genre-specific discourse (Senkebeil 2012: 409).  
The Concord tool was then used to obtain the kind of insights identified by 
Partington as a particular advantage to this tool: ‘concordancing can reveal patterns 
even within a single text that throw light on its meaning and function, and also on the 
conscious and unconscious strategies adopted by authors’ (Partington 2003: 9). 
Corpus linguistic techniques are thus used to identify patterns and abnormalities in 
Chamberlain’s discourse that the human eye might not have identified, or might not 
have identified as fast. The Concord tool proved invaluable in identifying further 
examples of phenomena identified in the pre-reading stage, as well as examples of 
related and new phenomena: as Partington aptly explains, ‘the prereading alerted me 
to the phenomena, but only the concordance revealed their extent and complexity’ 
(Partington 2003: 12).  
The following section presents the results of the corpus analysis in two steps: firstly, 
the keyword list is presented and resulting conclusions regarding Chamberlain’s 
ideological and rhetorical focus points and tendencies are drawn; secondly, the 
results of the concordance analysis of a selection of key verbs and key nouns are 
presented and discussed. The collocates for each keyword were also analysed; 
however, as the insights provided by the collocate analysis were invariably also 
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shown in more detail by the concordance analysis, the results of the collocate 
analysis are not presented here in order to avoid repetition. The keywords analysis 
looks at the keywords in both corpora in relation to each other as WordSmith 
identifies keywords using a relative calculation involving the primary corpus and the 
reference corpus. The concordance analysis refers to the primary corpus only. 
7.2 Keywords Analysis 
The following section analyses the positive keywords in Chamberlain’s essays by 
word class and compares these to the positive keywords in Rohrbach’s discourse. 
Although the KeyWords tool does generate a list of so-called ‘negative’ keywords – 
tokens in the primary corpus that occur with greater relative frequency in the 
reference corpus – this only identifies tokens in the Rohrbach corpus that also occur 
in the Chamberlain’s corpus, thus the negative keywords list does not take accountof 
all positive keywords in the reference corpus. It was thus necessary to generate a list 
of keywords for the Rohrbach corpus itself, using Chamberlain’s essays as a 
comparison corpus. 
As the following screenshot illustrates, the KeyWords tool displays the frequency of 
occurrence and relative frequency (keyness) ofoccurrence for every token occurring 




Keyword List for the Primary Corpus (Screenshot) 
 
Of the 18305 total words in Chamberlain’s essays, 201 were identified as keywords. 
125 of these were identified as positive keywords; that is, they occur with greater 
relative frequently in relation to the total word count of the primary corpus than the 
same word in the reference corpus (keyness = frequency ÷ total number of tokens). 
The 76 remaining keywords were identified as negative keywords, occurring 
statistically infrequently in Chamberlain’s discourse in comparison to the reference 
corpus. 11 tokens were omitted from the analysis: individual letters (R, Z), articles 
(ein and einem), and English and French words such as the, les and la. The final 
working keyword list for the primary corpus presented 114 positive keywords for 
analysis. 218 keywords were identified in Paul Rohrbach’s writing, of which 134 are 
positive. The tokens S and # were omitted from the reference corpus keyword 
analysis, leaving a total of 132 positive keywords. For a complete list of keywords 
for both corpora, see Appendix A.  
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7.2.1 Results of the Keywords Analysis 
The following section analyses the nature of Chamberlain’s keywords by word class 
and presents the frequency statistics for keywords in the primary corpus in 
comparison to the reference corpus. As the two corpora were used both as primary 
corpus and reference corpus to obtain two sets of keyword lists, they are hereinafter 
referred to as ‘HSC’ and ‘PR’, respectively, rather than as ‘primary corpus’ and 
‘reference corpus’.  
The key nouns in the Chamberlain corpus can be divided between concrete entities 
and abstract concepts to a notably greater extent than the key nouns in the Rohrbach 
corpus. A small number of concrete key nouns in the Chamberlain corpus pertain to 
nationality and democracy. The former include Deutschland (HSC 613, PR 529) and 
Franzose (HSC 29, PR 1) and indicate that one of Chamberlain’s greatest concerns is 
the depiction of Germany and of Germany’s war enemy France. The key nouns 
Freiheit (HSC 353, PR 29), Gleichheit (HSC 40, PR 1), Demokratie (HSC 38, PR 1) 
and Parlament (HSC 38, PR 3) are symptomatic of Chamberlain’s disdainful view of 
parliamentary democracy. The key nouns Staat (HSC 117, PR 51) and Vaterland 
(HSC 41, PR 10) are symptomatic of the author’s concern with the current state of 
and future development of the German nation. The proper place noun Bayreuth (HSC 
32, PR 1) reflects Chamberlain’s personal background as a member of the Wagnerian 
Bayreuth Circle, and resident of the city of Bayreuth. The percentage of keywords in 
Chamberlain’s essays pertaining to concrete concepts related to nationality and 
political institutions is markedly low in comparison to Rohrbach’s. In the 
Chamberlain corpus, 11 of 47 (23%) key nouns pertain to political institutions or 
nations, whereas 37 of 58 (64%) of Rohrbach’s key nouns pertain to politics, nations 
and/or colonialism and territory. These include Rußland (HSC 86, PR 440), Türkei 
(HSC 2, PR 152), China (HSC 2, PR 92), Ägypten (HSC 1, PR 78), Marokko (HSC 
0, PR 57), Orient (HSC 1, PR 69), Ukraine (HSC 0, PR 29), Polen (HSC 6, PR 55), 
Konstantinopel (HSC 0, PR 27), Kleinasien (HSC 0, PR 22), Österreich (HSC 5, PR 
43), Russen (HSC 8, PR 59), Türken (HSC 1, PR 34), See (HSC 2, PR 53), 
Mittelmeer (HSC 0, PR, 26) and Gebiet (HSC 1, PR 67), as well as concrete terms 
pertaining to naval and colonial policy and world domination: (Flotte HSC 15, PR 
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127), Weltpolitik (HSC 2, PR 41), Weltvolk (HSC 0, PR 26), Kolonie (HSC 0, PR 23) 
and Weltwirtschaft (HSC 1, PR 29). These results show a marked absence of words 
pertaining to the more concrete aspects of what may be expected from war 
propaganda in the Chamberlain corpus: territory, (global) domination, politics, and 
economics, for example. 
A further series of key nouns indicates a trend in Chamberlain’s rhetoric, namely 
those denoting famous cultural figures and published texts. Concrete key nouns 
describing cultural professions or behaviour Denker (HSC 25, PR 0) and Dichter 
(HSC 24, PR 1), nouns referring to written texts, Werke (HSC 48, PR 0) and Aufsatz 
(HSC 22, PR 1), and the names of esteemed German and British cultural figures 
Goethe (HSC 67, PR 3), Kant (HSC 45, PR 1 – Kants), Luther (HSC 52, PR 12) and 
Carlyle (HSC 23, PR 1) indicate that Chamberlain’s discourse may heavily feature 
intertextual references and cultural references in particular, and/or appeals to 
authority. Diverging occurrences of the key noun Werke in the two corpora in 
particular highlight the decisive difference between Chamberlain and Rohrbach’s 
writing: whereas Werke as an independent lexeme refers to literary works in 
Chamberlain’s essays (HSC 48, PR 0), it occurs only in compound nouns (-werke) 
denoting concrete operational systems in Rohrbach’s writings (e.g. Schleusenwerke, 
Bergwerke, Bewässerungswerke). Occurrences of this key noun alone highlight the 
rhetorical weight of Chamberlain’s essays, in this case intertextuality and appeals to 
authority, in comparison to Rohrbach’s greater concern with concrete thematic 
content. Of the keywords identified for Rohrbach’s work, only Seite (HSC 29, PR 
148) implies possible intertextual references. They include the name of only one 
great contemporary figure, Bismarck (HSC 28, PR 121) and Bismarcks (HSC 1, PR 
52), who was, however, a politician, unlike the philosophers and writers among 
Chamberlain’s key nouns. 
The remaining key nouns in Chamberlain’s essays denote more abstract concepts that 
are not, at first glance, related to foreign policy or war. Sprache (HSC 109, PR 33), 
Wort (HSC 99, PR 55), Worte (HSC 58, PR 22), Begriff (HSC 41, PR 11) and reden 
(HSC 65, PR 27) reveal a distinct interest in language and words. The key nouns 
Wahrheit (HSC 69, PR 15) and Lüge (HSC 30, PR 2) furthermore indicate a notable 
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epistemic concern in comparison to Rohbach’s essays. This observation is supported 
by a series of key adjectives and adverbs: genau (HSC 95, PR 9), wahre (HSC 45, 
PR 8), wissenschaftlich (HSC 27, PR 2), aufmerksam (HSC 31, PR 5), and dumm 
(HSC 16, PR 0), as well as the verb versteht (HSC 42, PR 12). This group of 
keywords suggests a significant concern with truth, factuality, intellect and 
perception. Equally noteworthy are a collection of key nouns pertaining to people or 
humanity, and to human emotion: Mensch (HSC 151, PR 17), Menschen (HSC 228, 
PR 82), Männer (HSC 125, PR 22), Leben (HSC 170, PR 96), Seele (HSC 33, PR 7), 
Liebe (HSC 53, PR 5), Haβ (HSC 42, PR 7) and Neid (HSC 15, PR 0). These nouns 
indicate a concern in Chamberlain’s essays with the human soul and intellect that is 
absent in Rohrbach’s work and therefore a crucial avenue for further analysis.  
Other more abstract key nouns in the primary corpus denote ideals: Ideal (HSC 64, 
PR 5) and Ideale (HSC 42, PR 10) and religion, nature and fate, as in Gott (HSC 49, 
PR 16), Natur (HSC 121, PR 61) and Bestimmung (HSC 27, PR 1). They 
furthermore denote confusion or lack of order, as in Willkür (HSC 23, PR 0, but 
willkürlichen 2 and Willkürlichkeit 1) and Chaos (HSC 17, PR 0), and indicate a 
concern with sight and light, as in Augen (HSC 82, PR 21), Tag (HSC 58, PR 10) and 
Nacht (HSC 23, PR 2). Although it is not possible to draw more definite conclusions 
regarding the potential rhetorical functions of these keywords without the cotext of 
the concordance lines, the fact that Chamberlain’s essays feature such a wealth of 
abstract key nouns constitutes a compelling initial finding. The relative significance 
of this is corroborated by the analysis of the key nouns in the reference corpus. Of 
the 58 key nouns in the Rohrbach corpus, only a small minority (10%) can be 
described as abstract, namely Gedankens (HSC 1, PR 50), Zukunft (HSC 56, PR 
169), Prinzip (HSC 2, PR 37), Idee (HSC 30, PR 108), Interessen (HSC 27, PR 100) 
and Fortschritte (HSC 28, PR 1). Although it cannot be maintained that Rohrbach’s 
discourse is entirely devoid of abstract concepts, the ratio of abstract concepts to 
concrete objects is much lower than in Chamberlain’s essays.  
Two groups of key verbs can be identified in the Chamberlain corpus: verbs relating 
to intellectual thought and expression, as in weiß (HSC 118, PR 31), wissen (HSC 
98, PR 63), verstehen (HSC 84, PR 30) and urteilen (HSC 43, PR 10), and verbs 
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relating to journey and discovery, as in führen (HSC 125, PR 98), entdecken (HSC 
29, PR 1), and finden (HSC 96, PR 54). These major categories again indicate a 
preoccupation with intellectual processes, with truth and lies, and with journeys and 
discovery. The significance of these two major categories of verbs in Chamberlain’s 
discourse is underscored by the nature of the key verbs in Rohrbach’s discourse, 
which are solely modal and auxiliary verbs, as in werden (HSC 389, PR 788), haben 
(HSC 257, PR 521), war (HSC 251, PR 535), gewesen (HSC 47, PR 151), können 
(HSC 130, PR 278), würden (HSC 26, PR 97) and müssen (HSC 87, PR 213). 
Although the relatively high frequency of the modal verbs können and müssen in 
Rohrbach’s discourse is undoubtedly significant, the even greater absence here of the 
kind of main verbs rich in meaning and potentially also rich in metaphorical 
significance found in Chamberlain’s essays is a particularly noteworthy finding. It 
shows that main verbs play a greater role in the construction of Chamberlain’s 
ideology and/or rhetoric than they do in Rohrbach’s discourse, and point to the 
necessity of analysing the function of these verbs in the Chamberlain corpus. 
The key adjectives einzig- (HSC 175, PR 38) and wahr- (HSC 125, PR 26) suggest a 
rhetorical emphasis on uniqueness and authenticity in Chamberlain’s war 
propaganda. The generic adjective gesamt- (HSC 43, PR 15) and the particular 
adjective einzeln- (which may also occur as a noun, Einzelne, in the essays) (HSC 
178, PR 75), the adverbs gänzlich (HSC 15, PR 0) and überall (HSC 72, PR 31), and 
the quantifiers alle (HSC 328, PR 163), alles (HSC 244, PR 123) and aller (HSC 
145, PR 93) indicate a hyperbolic rhetorical style tending towards universal 
affirmation and particular affirmation. Of the key adverbs identified, the majority are 
adverbs of time, nun (PC 202, RC 56), nie (HSC 103, PR 38), and niemals (HSC 30, 
PR 6). Beyond suggesting a preoccupation with time in general, these adverbs 
indicate a number of potential rhetorical tendencies in the essays: an emphasis on the 
here-and-now (nun), references to the past, and universal negation (nie, niemals). 
Again, the key adjectives and adverbs identified for the Rohrbach corpus underscore 
the importance of analysing those in the Chamberlain corpus in detail. The key 
adjectives in the reference corpus almost exclusively denote nationality and 
nationalism, as in national- (HSC 15, PR 346), russisch- (HSC 23, RP 361), 
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türkisch- (HSC 1, PR 135), europäisch- (HSC 8, PR 118), chinesisch- (HSC 0, PR 
61), and afrikanisch- (HSC 1, PR 51). The remaining key adjectives pertain to 
contemporaneous political concerns of colonialism and naval policy, as in 
überseeisch- (HSC 6, PR 70), weltpolitisch- (HSC 0, PR 42), kolonial- (HSC 3, PR 
61) and wirtschaftlich- (HSC 18, PR 117).  
Two significant groups of key conjunctions can be identified in the primary corpus. 
Wogegen (HSC 34, PR 1), sowie (HSC 30, PR 6) and vielmehr (HSC 88, PR 26) 
indicate a high frequency of comparative and contrastive constructions in the essays. 
The concessive conjunctions dennoch (HSC 17, PR 0) and nichtsdestoweniger (HSC 
15, PR 0) indicate a high frequency of concessive constructions, in which the pre-
conjunction clause consists of a rhetorical admission. Denn (HSC 253, PR 152) 
suggests frequent explanatory justifications, and sonst (HSC 74, PR 36) the use of 
threats. 
Although key pronouns only constitute a minor word class in the total keywords list, 
the fact that predominantly first and second person pronouns are keywords at all 
gives light to an important observation. The key pronouns ich (HSC 736, PR 134), 
mir (HSC 158, PR 20), mich (HSC 101, PR 23), meine (HSC 41, PR 8) and du (HSC 
41, PR 4) suggest strong authorial presence in the essays, and, to a lesser extent, also 
the presence of the reader by virtue of authorial addresses to his alleged 
correspondence partner, and to the reader (du). The key pronouns in Rohrbach’s 
discourse consist exclusively of third person pronouns, namely nominative wir (HSC 
619, PR 1,524), accusative or dative uns (HSC 346, PR 965), and possessive unser 
(HSC 36, PR 131) – also in the forms unsere (HSC 53, PR 344), unserer (HSC 51, 
PR 254) and unseres (HSC 11, PR 137). This suggests that Rohrbach’s discourse is 
concerned with the construction of a German national ‘we’, whereas Chamberlain’s 
discourse separately constructs two separate roles for the authorial ich and the reader. 
The status of question words welche (HSC 120, PR 32), welcher (HSC 50, PR 10), 
wer (HSC 146, PR 72), was (HSC 412, PR 379), and wie (HSC 784, PR 756) as 
keywords also indicates that the author relies on the frequent use of questions, and 
perhaps more specifically of rhetorical questions. However, as the words classed here 
as question words may also occur as pronouns (welche, welcher, wer, was) or 
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comparative particles (wie) in the essays, this observation can only be tentative at 
this stage. 
7.3 Concordance Analysis 
The following section presents the results of the concordance analysis, focussing on 
the Chamberlain corpus only. As it was not possible to undertake a concordance 
analysis for all keywords within the parameters of this thesis and the most 
represented word classes in the Chamberlain corpus are verbs and nouns, the 
WordSmith Concord tool was used to search for selected key verbs and key nouns 
(including one pronoun). Including salient adjectives and adverbs in the concordance 
analysis would have enriched the analysis results, however this decision was made 
on the basis that adjectives and adverbs would be given due attention in the 
qualitative analysis.  
The concordance analysis concentrates on key verbs and nouns pertaining to the 
three nations German, France and England, epistemic concepts of truth and 
understanding, language, people, and authorial ich. These are salient rhetorical 
and/or ideological themes in Chamberlain’s essays, thus the Concord tool was used 
to analyse discursive realisations of these themes and thereby to examine how they 
are constructed and for which purposes. Although no keywords were identified for 
the Chamberlain corpus pertaining to England, England was nonetheless included in 
the corpus analysis because England is a major constitutent of Chamberlain’s 
Feindbild (see Chapter 5), thus a concordance analysis of keywords pertaining to the 
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As the following screenshots show, the Concord tool lists each occurrence of the 
word in a concordance line or ‘keyword in context’ (KWIC), and all co-occurring 









A concordance line isolates every occurrence of the search term within its immediate 
discursive context, enabling the analyst to identify the discursive function(s) and/or 
meanings of a particular word by virtue of its cotext. After testing the Concord 
settings to determine how long a concordance line can be before the number of 
tokens displayed becomes unmanageable, the settings were adjusted to display 10 
tokens on either side of the search term or node word. The default concordance 
setting in WordSmith is Left 5 Right 5, however the often complex nature of German 
clause constructions necessitated longer concordance lines. 10 tokens on either side 
of the node word generated concordance lines of 21 tokens, which was deemed the 
maximum number of tokens that could be effectively analysed for one concordance 
line. In some cases, the concordance line did not provide an adequate amount of text 
from which to deduce the function or usage of the search token because this 
depended on a word or sentence that was not within its immediate discursive context, 
but further back or further forward in the text. This proved to be the case where the 
search term is connected to the negative particle nicht two sentences prior to it, or 
where the search term appears within a quotation but where the quotation marks are 
not displayed in the concorance line, or in a sarcastic remark where the sarcasm is 
only revealed within the context of the entire paragraph. It was thus frequently 
necessary to examine the source text and locate the search term in the context of its 
entire surrounding paragraph. Fortunately, the WordSmith Concord tool allows the 
analyst to view the relevant passage in the source text.  
7.3.1 ‘Carrot and Stick’ Persuasion 
This section presents the results of the concordance analysis for the selected key 
nouns and key verbs listed above. The concordance analysis gave rise to a new 
observation: Chamberlain’s manipulative construction of the essays’ ideological 
content follows a ‘carrot-and-stick’ approach; a rhetorical device that offers a 
combination of positive incentivisation and negative incentivisation to induce 
behaviour or thought modification. The typical image assocated with the saying 
‘carrot and stick’ is a donkey, encouraged forwards by a carrot at the head end and 
beaten forwards by a stick at the tail end. This metaphor was made famous by 
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Winston Churchill in a press conference speech in 1943 in which he annouced, ‘We 
shall continue to operate on the Italian donkey at both ends, with a carrot and with a 
stick’ (Coote, Batchelor & Churchill 1947: 140). The academic use of this term in 
the context of international relations has been recorded by Simpon and Mendis 
(Simpson & Mendis 2003: 430), and features in Herbert Simon’s analysis of the 
relationship between persuasion and the use of threats and inducements in social 
conflicts, in which he calls the carrot and stick ‘handmaidens of persuasion in 
conflict situations’ (Simons 1974: chapter title). Reference to the ‘carrot and stick’ 
paradigm in this thesis further locates manipulation as movement through space (cf. 
‘critical disagreement space’), equating the forwards movement of the donkey with 
the manipulation of the reader. 
The concordance analysis reveals that the author counteracts claims of German 
superiority (the carrot) with accusations of German deficits (the stick), constructing 
‘Germanness’ (D/deutsch-) not only in relation to a multitude of talents and virtues, 
but also to inadequacies and failures. The tension that Chamberlain creates between 
reassurance and inadequacy is encapsulated by the concordance lines for Mensch-. 
On the one hand, Chamberlain’s references to ‘wir Menschen’ focus the readers’ 
attention on their own humanity, promoting human solidarity and commonality, and 
appealing to fundamental human essence (Demokratie und Freiheit: 23, Politische 
Ideale: 78). He brings the concept of Mensch into association with morals and moral 
improvement, for example ‘ein starkes Gefühl für die Würde des Menschen’ 
(Politische Ideale: 97). On the other hand, he counteracts human community and 
moral potential with human weakness, drawing attention to the susceptibility of 
humankind to intellectual submission (Demokratie und Freiheit: 15), using bodily 
illnesses as metaphor representations of intellectual inadequacy: ‘doch unterliegen 
die Menschen zeitweise, wie der Erblindung, so auch der Vertaubung’ (Demokratie 
und Freiheit: 77). In addition, Chamberlain’s references to Menschen as animals 
(Tiere) posit humans as weak and dependent, reminding the reader that ‘kein Tier auf 
Erden tritt so elend hilfsbedürftig ins Leben wie der Mensch’ (Politische Ideale: 30). 
The following analysis uses concordance lines for key nouns and verbs to examine 
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the interplay of reassuring and undermining the readers as human beings and 
specifically as Germans. 
7.3.1.1 German Superiority by Contrast (‘The Carrot’) 
As the concordance lines for Mensch- show, Chamberlains’s discourse is saturated 
with the language of human hierarchy (‘hoch müssen diese Leute über den 
praktischen Menschen ihrer Zeit gestanden haben’ (Politische Ideale: 16)). Indeed, 
Chamberlain’s ideological Weltanschauung is governed by the general conviction 
that there is no such thing as equality among people: 
Weder in Bezug auf Größe, noch auf Farbe, noch auf Körperkraft, 
noch auf Gesichtszüge, noch auf Begabung, noch auf Willensgewalt, 
noch auf Herzensreichtum besteht Gleichheit zwischen den 
Menschen, vielmehr weichen sie fast unermeßlich voneinander ab 
(Politische Ideale: 31). 
Analysis of the concordance lines for Deutsch-, England, Franzose, Ideal, Seele, 
Sprache, Wort(e), Lüge, and Freiheit reveals frequent use of strategies of contrast to 
construct nationalist German superiority. These strategies encompass comparative 
declarations of German superiority (and in particular superior German intelligence), 
and comparative declarations of English, French, and Russian inferiority in 
Chamberlain’s Feindbild. The author’s construction of German superiority by 
contrast acts as a positive incentivisation to accept his ideological message by 
flattering the readers and alerting them to the proposed German potential for 
greatness. The concordance lines reveal how key nouns of nationality are subject to 
conscious lexical priming via discourse prosody. Lexical priming is a theory bridging 
corpus linguistics and psycholinguistics developed most notably by Michael Hoey. It 
holds that words are defined by how they interact with other words in patterns of use. 
Lexical priming is related to the corpus linguistic concept of discourse prosody in 
that it focusses partly on the relationship between the meaning and positive or 
negative evaluation of a word and the discursive context in which it is embedded. 
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This relationship is deemed to reveal word associations in the mind of the writer or 
speaker and therewith their attitudes (Hoey 2005; Chapelle 2013). Correspondingly, 
Chamberlain constructs German superiority by virtue of simple collocations of 
Deutschland with positively evaluated concepts such as sublimity and achievement, 
as in ‘Der erhabene Anblick, den Deutschland in dem Kriege 1914 bietet’ 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 22) and ‘fördersamer wäre es, man würde das von Deutschland 
Geleistete schätzen lernen’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 53). 
German superiority is additionally constructed using the topos of divine endorsement 
or appeal to God, identified by Martin Wengeler to be typical of twentieth century 
German Kriegsbotschaften (Wengeler 2005: 226). Chamberlain portrays Germany’s 
role in the war as a holy mission backed by the support of God: God is on Germany’s 
side because Germany is fighting for all that is good and virtuous in the world, 
therefore Germany must and will triumph: 
Diesem Teufelsgezücht gegenüber steht Deutschland als Gottes 
Streiter: Siegfried wider den Wurm, Sankt Georg, der 
Drachenbezwinger (Die Zuversicht: 11). 
Here, Chamberlain underscores his image of divine Germany (Gottes Streiter) using 
the antithesis of the contrasting image Teufelsgezücht (‘devil’s brood’), and by 
reference to a Wagnerian opera (Der Ring des Nibelungen) and the legend of George 
and the Dragon. This single sentence is rich in intertextuality, and the intellectual and 
cultural sources reflect Chamberlain’s English roots on the one hand and passion for 
the work of Richard Wagner on the other. 
Chamberlain’s strategies of contrast juxtapose superior ‘Germanness’ with inferior or 
corrupt ‘un-Germanness’ (for a discussion of what ‘un-German’ refers to in the 
essays, see Chapter 5). Un-German forces as one Feindbild are metaphori depicted as 




Schon jahrelang stand Deutschland unter dem Schatten der 
kommenden Katastrophe, noch mehr aber unter dem Schatten eines 
alles wahrhaft Deutsche durchseuchenden undeutschen, unheimlichen 
Wesens, das immer herrschbewußter auftrat und von Berlin aus sich 
wie ein fressendes Gift überallhin ergoß (Demokratie und Freiheit: 
31). 
[…] die grundsätzliche Entwickelung echt deutscher Eigenart und die 
ebenso planmäßige Ausrottung des am deutschen Holze fressenden 
Wurmes undeutschen Wesens […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 8). 
In the first statemement, das Undeutsche is described using mixed metaphors; as a 
monstrous creature (‘unheimliches Wesen’) that emerges and moves with a 
threatening sense of purpose and that has steadily grown in determination and 
corruption so that it now casts its monstrous shadow over the entire country of 
Germany. At the same time, it is portrayed as a liquid poison (Gift, ergoß) whose 
acidity eats away at everything it touches. Moreover, it is construed as a greater 
threat than the war, the metaphorical shadow of which is less monstrous and 
engulfing in recent German history than the metaphorical shadow of the ‘monstrous 
beast’ of un-Germanness. The image of the un-German in the second statement 
reconciles the two mixed metaphors in the preceding extract while undermining the 
image of ‘un-Germanness’ as a living being: here, the ‘un-German’ is a living 
creature like the monstrous being in the first statement, and eats away at the 
metaphorical wood of Germanness as does the toxic poison in the preceding extract 
(fressend). However, the scale of the ‘monstrous being’ is reduced to a worm. A 
worm is an unpleasant insect which, if left to gnaw as it chooses, can be destructive. 
More importantly, however, a worm is a very small and simple creature that can be 
exterminated or ‘stamped out’ (Ausrottung) with ease. Whereas the metaphoricity of 
the first statement creates alarm by highlighting the scope of the threat, the 
metaphoricity of the second statement diminishes the enemy to the level of an insect: 
a pest, but easily eradicated. 
In addition to the vague and overarching concept of the ‘un-German’, Chamberlain 
constructs German superiority in relation to English, French and Russian inferiority, 
the second major Feindbild. He exploits expressions of contrast and opposition such 
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as zwischen, entgegengesetzt, wogegen and trennen in order to create a fundamental 
sense of difference and opposition between Germany and the countries that made up 
the Triple Entente, as in ‘richtig ist aber, daß hier ein wurzeltiefer Gegensatz 
Deutschland von den Westmächten trennt’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 97). This 
description metaphorically presents the opposition between Germany and the 
Western Allies in terms of a plant: wurzeltief constructs the differences separating 
the warring parties as ‘deep-rooted’, implying unavoidable predisposition and 
essential irreconciliation, naturalised as irrefutable by the innovative, implicit topos 
of nature as the original, authentic and unchangeable state of being. 
[…] und nun standen sie alle drei unter dem sie fast überwältigenden 
Eindruck des Mannessinnes, der Organisationskunst, der 
ungebundenen geistigen Freiheit bei voller Selbstbeherrschung, die 
sie in Deutschland vorfanden, was ihnen um so mehr auffiel, als sie 
über Paris und London gereist waren und dort genau entgegengesetzte 
Eindrücke gewonnen hatten (Demokratie und Freiheit: 38). 
This statement illustrates Chamberlain’s evaluative comparisons of Germany on the 
one hand, and Germany’s war enemies, here England and France represented by their 
capital cities, on the other. Deutschland is associated with a list of positive attributes 
underscored by the powerful adjective überwältigend to insinuate the scope and 
impressiveness of these attributes. In contrast, Paris and London are associated with 
‘genau entgegengesetzte Eindrücke’ (the metonymy here is significant: Chamberlain 
reduces the enemy countries to their capital cities while using the name of the entire 
country to refer to Germany, contrasting size, unity and power). First and foremost, 
English and French inferiority here is moral inferiority: the phrase ‘genau 
entgegensetzte Eindrücke’ implies not just contrast, but an absence of the positive 
attributes assigned to Germany directly above, and therefore moral inferiority. 
Secondly, English and French inferiority is implied syntactically: Chamberlain’s 
reference to Germany is expressive and descriptive, whereas he does not describe 
Paris and London in their own right, but briefly, and purely in relation to Germany. 
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The concept of difference that Chamberlain asserts between Germany and England is 
especially hierarchical, and is constructed by vocabulary and images of superiority 
and inferiority: 
Was aber geschehen muß, ist die siegreiche Behauptung von 
Deutschlands Willen gegen Englands Willen; Englands Arroganz muß 
gebrochen werden, gedemütigt; England muß anerkennen, das 
Deutschland ihm überlegen ist (Hammer oder Amboß: 59). 
This extract demonstrates Chamberlain’s construction of comparative superiority in 
terms of strength and height. Chamberlain’s triumph of German will over English 
will rests on the contrasting notions of military victory (siegreich) and assertion 
(Behauptung) on the one hand, and brokenness (gebrochen werden) and humiliation 
or debasement (gedemütigt) on the other. Moreover, there is a subtle metaphor of 
height at work here: Behauptung comes from the noun Haupt (head) in the sense of 
‘raising one’s head’ which, in combination with the preposition über (above or on 
top) in überlegen, creates an image of hierarchy through contrasting height in 
relation to the physically low image of being ‘broken and debased’.  
7.3.1.1.1 The Superiority and Uniqueness of the German Ideal 
Chamberlain employs the topos of semantic (in)authenticity to construct a dichotomy 
between the French democratic ideal of liberté, egalité, fraternité and the superior 
‘German ideal’. He reduces his rejection of democracy as a political system to a 
rejection of the tripartite democratic ideal of terms (Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité) 
coined by the French. In so doing, he avoids the complexities of articulating an 
argument against a form of government and founds his discussion on abstract 
concepts: it is easier to philosophise about the intangible than to deconstruct a 
concrete form of political government. Attacking democracy by attacking the 
allegedly inauthentic use in the French and English languages of the three words on 
which it is based rests on the innovative topos of semantic evaluation, which 
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presupposes that there is a correct and an incorrect understanding of an abstract 
concept. Concordance lines for Freiheit highlight the frequency of distinctions that 
Chamberlain makes between cross-cultural understandings of this term in particular. 
These statements commonly take the form of dubitative rhetorical questions or 
exclamations in which the author’s own sarcasm is perceptible, as in ‘England: Eine 
eigentümliche Auffassung von der Freiheit der politischen Meinung und des 
Wahlrechts!’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 54), and: 
Des Königs Vetorecht ist schon längst entschlummert. Und so wird 
denn England von einem Konvent, besser gesagt, von einem 
Konventikel regiert. Das soll Freiheit heißen? (Kriegsaufsätze: 17). 
Concordance lines for L/lügen show that Chamberlain refers to the understanding 
and use of the words Freiheit, Gleichheit, and Brüderlichkeit in the enemy countries, 
and of Freiheit in particular, as ‘a lie’. Any form of freedom that pretends to exist in 
England, he elaborates, is not genuine freedom, but bogus freedom (‘in England is 
die Freiheit Schein’ (Politische Ideale: 36)): 
Dieses Ideal „Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit“ — verstanden, wie 
es von der französischen Revolution verstanden wurde, und wie es in 
den Köpfen von Millionen seitdem dogmatische Geltung gewonnen 
hat […] alle drei Teile dieses Ideals [sind] Lügen, Lügen im 
unbeschrankten Sinne des Wortes […] (Politische Ideale: 29). 
Concordance lines for Lüge and Wahrheit reveal that these key nouns are used in part 
to delineate alleged political lies regarding English and French foreign policy in the 
run up to and during the war. The chief political lie with which Chamberlain is 





Und zwar darum, weil alle drei Teile dieses Ideals Lügen sind, Lügen 
im unbeschränkten Sinne des Wortes, womit ich sagen will: 
Behauptungen, die der Wahrheit der Natur direkt widersprechen 
(Politische Ideale: 29). 
[…] in England erkämpft sich ein Volk politische Freiheit und 
schenkt dann die Gewalt […] einem scheinbar konstitutionellen, in 
Wahrheit absoluten Ministerium. Hier steckt die Quelle aller 
Heuchelei und Lüge der englischen Politik seit zweieinhalb 
Jahrhunderten […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 33). 
Stating that the general ideal of political democracy is based on lies and that its 
implementation in England is a farce, Chamberlain aims to delegitimise democracy 
for his readers. The discursive function of Lüge and Wahrheit in this context is 
ideological. Like the democratic ideal Freiheit, Gleichheit, Brüderlichkeit, the first 
statement consists of three repetitive parts: ‘weil alle drei Teile diese Ideals Lügen 
sind, Lügen im unbeschränkten Sinne des Wortes’ and ‘Behauptungen, die der 
Wahrheit der Natur direkt widersprechen’. The repetition of Lügen is combined with 
the hyperbolic and dogmatic adverbs unbeschränkt and direkt, and the generic 
determiner alle for rhetorical impact.  
Analysis of the concordance lines for Ideal and Ideale confirms that Chamberlain’s 
concept of the German ideal foregrounds a strictly ‘German’ concept of absolute 
liberty; the allegedly authentic concept that differs from the farcical democratic 
notion of liberty in England and France. He writes of Germany as ‘die eigentliche 
und einzige Heimat menschenwürdiger, menschenerhebener Freiheit’ (Kriegs-
aufsätze: 15), claiming: 
Deutschland will aus lauter Angst […] den Weg in die Hölle antreten 
und damit aufhören, das einzige Land der Welt zu sein, wo Freiheit 
eine Heimat hat und einer herrlichen Blüte entgegenging! 




Chamberlain’s discussions of freedom as an internal German ideal often combine 
comparisons and contrasts to (non-existent) freedom in the enemy nations with the 
adjective denoting (German) uniqueness, einzig. The alleged uniqueness of the 
German ideal that Chamberlain is so keen to emphasise is key: whereas the 
democratic ideal is shared by multiple nations, the German ideal is unique to 
Germany only; it is an oppositional force and counterweight to the French 
revolutionary ideal discussed in terms of its ‘otherness’ (‘ein anderes Ideal’): 
So gänzlich unfähig sind jene Leute, unser Denken zu verstehen. Für 
sie ist „führender Weltstaat“ so viel wie Totschlagen und in Ketten 
werfen; daß es ein anderes Ideal gibt, ein deutsches, blieb ihnen 
unbekannt (Hammer oder Amboß: 21). 
Using mixed metaphors, Chamberlain construes the French democratic ideal as a 
dangerously destructive force capable of irreversibly shattering the institution of the 
state (zertrümmern), and as an insatiable creature that has devoured any intellectual 
capacity that the French may have held: 
Dennoch haben [die drei Worte „Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité“] […] 
genügt, eine große Nation bis in die Grundfesten ihres staatlichen 
Aufbaues zu zertrümmern, so daß nichts mehr übrig blieb, woran eine 
neue Staatsverfassung sich hätte wieder emporrichten und dauernd 
befestigen können […]; aus sich heraus kann es das unmöglich 
vollbringen, weil seinem Ideal alles beste Blut zum Opfer gebracht 
wurde, und weil außerdem dieses verderbliche Ideal Denken und 
Empfinden des sonst so klugen Franzosen — das, was er mit einem 
schlechten, dem amerikanischen Englisch entnommenen Wort „la 
mentalité“ nennt — ganz und gar durchfressen hat, wie der Wurm das 
Holz, so daß kein Arzt sie heilen und kein Ingenieur sie neu instand 
setzen kann (Politische Ideale: 28). 
Here, the image of a ravenous worm is used to portray the destructive effect of the 
French political ideal: the menace is not the nation France, but the revolutionary 
ideal that has ‘corrupted’ (verderblich) the French mentality. The French mentality is 
presented as a victim of the corruptive revolutionary force using a double metaphor 
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for emphasis; as an incurably ill patient and as a broken machine. The French ideal is 
thus constructed as a force that takes health, life and functionality in terms of a 
metaphor from the natural world (‘wie der Wurm das Holz’) and in terms of bodily 
illness (‘kein Arzt kann sie heilen’). A further metaphor highlights Chamberlain’s 
tendency to reify the French revolutionary ideal in terms of sterility using nature 
metaphors based on vitality: 
Dieses Ideal ist nicht aus dem Boden hervorgesprossen, als ein 
Erzeugnis der mit Notwendigkeit wirkenden Natur; denn dann besäße 
es tief hinabreichende Wurzeln und würde auf jeder Stufe — selbst 
mitten im Vernichtungswerk — schöpferische Kraft verraten, 
wogegen die unbedingte Sterilität dieses Ideals sich zu jeder Zeit und 
an jedem Ort in erschreckender Weise kundgetan hat (Politische 
Ideale: 30). 
Here, the democratic ideal is constructed as a kind of anti-plant. The emphasis here is 
on the ideal’s figurative sterility (‘die unbedingte Sterilität dieses Ideals’), 
representative of its alleged inability to engender a valid or productive form of 
government. The accusation of sterility is an antithetical contrast to the virile verb 
phrase ‘aus dem Boden hervorgesprossen’ and revisits the representation of the 
French ideal as ‘devitalising’ discussed above. 
7.3.1.1.2 Superior German Intelligence vs. English Ignorance 
Concordance lines for the keywords Deutsch-, Ideal and Seele reveal that 
Chamberlain uses ameliorative lexical priming to associate ‘Germanness’ with 
intellect, culture and morals. For Chamberlain, das Deutsche relates to internal 
values such as intelligence, cultural brilliance, morals, ideals, and freedom. The 
primary facet of Chamberlain’s concept of ‘Germanness’ is intellect; he refers to 
Germany as ‘die Heimat des Genies’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 14), and many references 




England regiert durch Charakterstärke. Wohingegen der Deutsche 
[…] in Forschung und Industrie, in Technik, neuerdings auch in 
Finanz, sowie in manchen der sogenannten „Selbstverwaltung“ 
angehörigen Organisationen, außerdem in zunehmendem Maße in 
seinem ganzen Denken und Handeln wissenschaftlich verfährt […] 
(Politische Ideale: 80). 
Chamberlain forges a connection between the alleged inherently intellectual nature 
of the German people and the allegedly intellectual nature of the times. With 
statements such as ‘mit dem wissenschaftlichen Zeitalter tritt unstreitig das Zeitalter 
Deutschlands auf’ (Politische Ideale: 41), he insinuates that now is Germany’s time 
to flourish due to the potential symbiosis of fundamental German scholarliness and 
the academic or scientific nature of the ‘new era’: 
Jetzt muß Deutschland an eine staatsaufbauende Politik gehen, auf 
Grund schöpferischer Ideale, wie sie dem Eigenwesen des Deutschen 
und dem Geist unserer neuen wissenschaftlichen Zeit entsprechen 
(Politische Ideale: 41). 
The repetition of Zeitalter to refer to ‘das wissenschaftliche Zeitalter’ on the one 
hand, and ‘das Zeitalter Deutschlands’ on the other makes Deutschland equivalent to 
wissenschaftlich by virtue of the common noun and syntactic parallelism. 
Perhaps the greatest point of opposition constructed between England and Germany 
concerns educational and scholarly standards. References to the status of Schulen and 
Wissenschaft in England in comparison to Germany constitute the majority of 
contrasts: 
Die eine der tragenden Säulen des heutigen Deutschland fehlt also 
ganz in England: die allverbindende, das gesamte Leben der Nation in 
tausend Kanälen durchdringende und sie zu einer Kultureinheit 
erhebende Schule und Hochschule (Kriegsaufsätze: 50). 
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This architectural metaphor presents Germany as a classical building resting on 
columns: grandiose with a long historical tradition. The verbal adjective erhebend 
mirrors the height inherent in the image of columns, rounding off the sentence by 
reinforcing the notions of physical height (Säule) and cultural and intellectual 
elevation (‘die zu einer Kultureinheit erhebende Schule und Hochschule’). 
German knowledge is frequently pitted against English or French ignorance; thus 
there is a vivid opposition between the wealth of statements belonging to the rubric 
‘every German knows X’ on the one hand, and ‘nobody in England/France knows X’ 
on the other: 
[…] was damit gesagt wird, wissen wir in Deutschland genau und 
brauche ich darum nicht zu schildern; in England weiß man nichts 
davon (Kriegsaufsätze: 62). 
As the concordance lines for versteht indicate, statements that discuss English and 
French cognitive abilities also generally – if not exclusively –detail the enemy 
nations’ inability to understand X: 
Was sollte ein Volk bewirken, das nie Gelegenheit hat, sich spontan 
und einstimmig als „Kraft“ zu offenbaren, sondern sich jahraus, 
jahrein von Winkeladvokaten und Bierbankpolitikern dumm reden 
lassen muß über Dinge, die es nicht versteht […]? (Kriegsaufsätze: 
37). 
Ich habe es an einem der ersten lebenden Staatsmänner erfahren […] 
von deutschem Empfinden und Denken versteht er weniger als der 
Mann im Mond (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 13). 
Chamberlain additionally primes the meaning and connotations surrounding 
Deutschland and Deutsche(n) using the noun Geist. Geist is a broad term that can be 
interpreted as a reference to the mind and its workings. In addition to general 
references in which deutsch collocates with Geist such as ‘dem reinen, hohen, 
deutschen Geiste’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 94), Chamberlain declares that the cognitive-
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spiritual nature of Germanness is a facet unique to Germany alone, unattainable by 
any other nation, and capable of being upheld only by Germany: 
Die Folge ist aber, daß England von den höchsten Errungenschaften 
der letzten zwei Jahrhunderte wie abgeschnitten bleibt, indem es an 
dem bewußten und unbewußten geistigen Leben des führenden 
Deutschland nicht teilzunehmen vermag (Kriegsaufsätze: 31). 
The characterisation of Germanness as fundamentally intellectual and spiritual is 
further developed by statements that forge semantic associations between deutsch 
with cultural professions such as Dichter, Gelehrter, and Künstler: 
Wie muß der arme Mann erschrecken, wenn er je einer Aufführung 
von „Faust“ beiwohnt und den deutschen Gelehrten, Denker und 
Dichter seinen letzten, erhabensten Traum mit dem energischen 
Entschluß einleiten hört […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 21). 
7.3.1.1.3 German War Innocence 
For Chamberlain, German superiority rests partly on the nation’s status as the 
greatest or only advocate of peace. References to the physical and political 
dimensions of the war are generally disassociated from Germany and Germanness; 
participation in the war is presented as entirely against Germany’s will, and entirely 
against everything that Germanness stands for: 
Daß Deutschland an Krieg nicht dachte, am allerwenigsten an Krieg 
gegen England […] das ist nie irgend jemandem gelungen einem 
Engländer beizubringen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 19). 
In declarations of German disinterest in war and consequent lack of responsibility for 
its outbreak, Chamberlain makes notable use of hyberolic negations, such as ‘irgend 
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eine nur denkbare Veranlassung’, ‘am allerwenigsten’, and universal negation such 
‘nie irgend jemandem’ in the statement cited above. 
Chamberlain’s essays are typified by a victim vs. aggressor opposition: whereas 
Germany has the moral upperhand because it has only ever advocated peace and 
never war, her enemies are inferior because they are aggressive war-mongers who 
have singled out Germany and bullied her into war. Concordance lines for Franzose 
reveal how the information structure of a sentence can be used to group the French 
together with the remaining German war enemies England and Russia in isolation 
from Germany to create a sense of the overwhelming collective enemy: 
[…] jeder Franzose, jeder Belgier, jeder Engländer und Russe, der mit 
den deutschen Soldaten wirklich in Berührung kommt, ist erstaunt, 
was sie nicht allein für eisern disziplinierte, sondern für wackere, 
grundanständige, gutherzige Menschen sind […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 69). 
Der Angelsache wird durch seine Eisendrahtnerven, der Russe durch 
seine ungeheure Masse, der Franzose durch seinen ewig unruhigen, 
schlauen Geist noch viel zu schaffen machen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 
89). 
In these extracts, the French together with one or more enemy country form an 
intimidating combined majority. Indeed, references to the Germans invariably follow 
a list (‘jeder Franzose, jeder Belgier, jeder Engländer und Russe’), isolating Germany 
within the clause on a syntactic level, and within the war on an ideological level.  
The concordance lines for occurrences of D/deutsch- in particular reveal a clear 
division between agents and patients in Chamberlain’s conception of agency in the 
outbreak and progression of the war, in which Germany was allegedly passive, and 
her war enemies active. Some statements allude directly to a kind of conspiratorial 




[…] man weiß also, daß Deutschlands Feinde den Plan verfolgen, die 
Kraft Deutschlands endgültig zu brechen; dieser Plan umfaßt alle nur 
denkbaren Beziehungen und ist bereits bis ins Feinste ausgearbeitet 
und in einem weltumspannenden Netze organisierter Bekämpfung 
alles Deutschen am Werke (Ideal und Macht: 12). 
[…] wenn aber England die systematische Vernichtung Deutschlands 
[…] mit kaltem Blut seit langen Jahren plantund nunmehr 
durchzuführen entschlossen ist, da hat Deutschland keine Wahl: die 
einzige Wehr ist hier die Gegenwehr (Hammer oder Amboß: 23). 
Both statements emphasise the ‘significant’ length of time during which both 
England and France are alleged to have been plotting to wage war on Germany. The 
first statement is a causal construction that rhetorically overloads the ‘wenn’ clause 
with vocabulary of cold-bloodedness (‘mit kaltem Blut’) and with references to 
destruction (‘systematische Vernichung’) and will (entschlossen) pertaining to 
England. The ensuing da clause is notably more forceful, syntactically dividing 
England and Germany by sentence structure and comma (‘Wenn England [X], da hat 
Deutschland zu [Y]’), and juxtaposing a simple and punctuated causative statement 
with its preceding lengthy and fast-paced counterpart to accentuate the alleged 
simplicity and inevitability of Chamberlain’s rather bold conclusion. A particularly 
striking metaphor in the construction of the victim/aggressor opposition is: 
So war denn die von England und Frankreich erstrebte „Einkreisung“ 
nunmehr fertig; der Strick war Deutschland um den Hals geworfen, 
der Knoten war geschürzt, die Verschwörer brauchten nur einen 
günstigen Augenblick abzuwarten und dann fest zu ziehen (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 62). 
The policy of Enkreisung of which the enemy countries England and France are 
accused is metaphorically depicted as an act of hanging. Germany is the passive 
victim that has been set up to be hanged, trapped with a noose around its neck. The 
allies England and France are connected with the only active verb in the sentence; 
with the decisive and violent act of pullingat the noose around Germany’s neck (‘fest 
ziehen’). Elsewhere, active verbs denoting attack and destruction such as zermalmen 
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and ausrotten (Hammer oder Amboß: 27), überfallen and vernichten (Kriegsaufsätze: 
76) construe England and France as active aggressors and Germany as the victim of a 
one-sided battle of intended destruction. 
7.3.1.2 German Deficits (‘The Stick’) 
Where assertions of German superiority constitute the positive incentive in the 
‘carrot and stick’ dynamic, the stick is constituted by assertions of German 
insufficiency; negative incentivisation that coerces the readers to modify their 
thought and/or behaviour by making them feel uncomfortable. Unlike in the 
paradigm example of the donkey, negative incentiviation is achieved by making the 
readers feel intellectually rather than physically uncomfortable. Chamberlain 
constructs a general and all-encompassing tension between truth and lies centring on 
the key noun Wahrheit, or on the opposition between Wahrheit and its antonyms 
Lüge and Schein: ‘Die Lüge wirkt genau so stark wie die Wahrheit, denn sie wird 
geglaubt’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 10); ‘die Natur erwartet von moralischen Wesen 
Wahrheit, nicht Schein; dazu sind sie moralische, denkende, nicht bloß blind 
handelnde Wesen’ (Politische Ideale: 73-74). One of the most rhetorically effective 
expressions of this epistemic tension is the following extract, in which Chamberlain 
launches a list of oppositional pairs centring on the concept of truth to discredit the 
lack of truth and reality on which the German government is based: 
Die ganze alte Politik und Diplomatie, die unseren Hof- und 
Geheimräten, unseren Kanzlern und Botschatern, unseren Landtags- 
und Reichstagsmitgliedern heilig ist, gehört ebenso sehr in den 
altväterischen Plunder, wie die Astrologie und die Alchymie: auf eine 
Unze Wahrheit neunundneunzig Unzen Unsinn, Wahn statt 
Wissenschaft […] (Politische Ideale: 25). 
Indeed, concordance lines for Wahrheit reveal that Chamberlain emphasises the 
absence and distortion of truth within war-time Germany in particular, claiming 
‘Wüßten die deutschen Arbeiter die Wahrheit, sie würden sicher anders urteilen; sie 
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werden aber irregeführt’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 6) and deploring ‘die schamlose 
Verdrehung der Wahrheit in unseren Zeitungsberichten’ (Politische Ideale: 112). 
These assertions support frequent claims the the truth is ‘hidden’, as in ‘Wie ist es 
möglich, die offenkundige Wahrheit — die „Tatsache“ — den Blicken von Millionen 
zu verbergen?’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 9). Chamberlain’s depictions of distorted and hidden 
truths also extend to personifications of the truth. Inspired by the title of Goya’s 
artwork ‘Murió la verdad!’ or ‘Es starb die Wahrheit!’, which also constitutes the 
opening epigram to Chamberlain’s essay Wer hat den Krieg verschuldet?, 
Chamberlain portrays the truth as metaphorically ‘dead’, as something that is being 
or has already been buried in a grave:  
[…] alles zu verkehren, alles zu verwirren, um dann, nach Herstellung 
der gewünschten finsteren Stickluft, das Feuerwerk der Unwahrheit 
über dem Grabe der Wahrheit triumphierend abzubrennen. «Murió la 
verdad» es starb die Wahrheit: so betitelt der große Goya eine der 
ergreifenden Radierungen seiner „Schrecknisse des Krieges“ (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 63). 
Diese dummen Blau- und Rot- und Orange- und Weiß-Bücher, 
welche die Wahrheit zu Grabe tragen wollen […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 75-76). 
Further concordance lines for Wahrheit reveal that the key to understanding 
Chamberlain’s portrayal of the lamentable absence of the truth in Germany lies in the 
concept of the ‘die Auffindbarkeit der Wahrheit’ (the findability of truth), as in: 
[…] die [These] von der Nähe und Auffindbarkeit der Wahrheit […]in 
Wirklichkeit steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier 
liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, 
so erblicken wir die Wahrheit, und der Wahn entschwindet (Neue 




The assertion that the truth, although concealed, is ‘findable’, depicts the truth as 
existent and available to all, but the Germans as incapable of seeing it. In both cases, 
the responsibility for grasping the truth is placed on the German people themselves: 
they are not just victims of the omission and distortion of truth, but guilty of ignoring 
or failing to see the truth. By making good eyesight a metaphorical condition of 
perception and understanding, Chamberlain blames the people and not the situation. 
Chamberlain’s depiction of truth in war-time Germany does thus not present the truth 
as totally absent, nor as fully present. Instead, the truth is latent in German society, 
but is still waiting to be perceived by all.  
Correspondingly, the concordance lines analysed reveal that the motif of absent or 
hidden truth is constructed using blindness metaphors resting also on the keyword 
Augen, where blindness represents the inability to perceive or understand: 
[…] auch hier könnten die Deutschen viel lernen; sie bleiben aber 
blind und taub und lassen sich noch immer von den Phrasenmachern 
zum besten halten […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 49). 
Welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen hält 
[…] (Politische Ideale: 62). 
Concordance lines for Augen reveal that Chamberlain uses this key noun to articulate 
the (metaphorical) weakness of the German people’s eyes, and to declare the 
necessity for the Germans to (metaphorically) open their eyes. Chamberlain 
problematises the human eye as flawed and ineffective; the only references to eyes 
and sight that portray the eyes positively hint only at the potential to see properly, 
and more specifically at the potential of a hypothetical individual to see properly: 
[…] wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten 
Augen besitzt, die Pascal verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte 
und jeder brave Mann sie unbewußt sein eigen nennt, wenn er sie nur 
nicht durch die hundert Brillen der Lüge, des Klatsches, des 
Vorurteils, der Ruhelosigkeit verdunkelt — der weiß schon heute, wer 
den Krieg verschuldet hat und wer nicht, er ist in der Lage, die 
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weiteren und die näheren Kreise sich mit unbeirrbarer Deutlichkeit 
aufzuzeichnen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36). 
Die erste große Befreiungstat der Weltgeschichte hat ein deutscher 
Bauernsohn bewirkt: wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann aus dieser einen 
Tatsache die ganze Bedeutung des Deutschtums für die Freiheit 
entnehmen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 17). 
In the above examples the metaphoricity surrounding Augen is manifested by the 
presupposition that eyesight is connected to knowledge and truth. This is achieved in 
the first extract by associating lies (Lüge) with glasses (Brillen) and darkness 
(verdunkelt), that is, with weak or reduced powers of visual perception. Strong eyes 
(‘gute Augen’), constrastingly, are associated with clarity of perception 
(‘unberirrbarer Deutlichkeit’). The construction ‘wer die guten Augen besitzt, der 
weiß [X]’, or ‘wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann [X]’ (cf. Demokratie und Freiheit: 
17) thus implies the potential for select individuals to ‘see clearly’ in the sense of 
‘comprehend’. 
Chamberlain additionally uses metaphors of the human eye to allocate blame for and 
agency in German ‘blindness’. On the one hand, Chamberlain writes of blindfolds – 
an optical obstruction traditionally tied around the eyes by a second party: 
Sonst aber braucht man nur um sich zu blicken, um zu sehen, wohin 
wir alle auf diesem Wege kommen werden, und um sich betrübt zu 
fragen, welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen 
hält, daß sie blind ins Verderben laufen (Politische Ideale: 62). 
[…] Luther hat die Binde von den Augen gelöst, die uns Menschen 
seit urältesten vorgeschichtlichen Zeiten in furchtsamer Dumpfheit 
gefangen hielt (Demokratie und Freiheit: 18). 
In the first statement, the agent accused of having blindfolded the Germans is a 
negative but anonymous external force (Teufelsgeist), and in the second statement, 
the blindfold itself is the agent. In statements such as these, the German people are 
not to blame for their blindness. The guilty party responsible for the Germans’ 
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inability to see is not explicitly identified, however the Germans are portrayed as the 
victims.  
Alternative references to unfortunate events and developments that have occurred 
‘before our very eyes’ imply that the blind (in most cases the Germans) are not 
entirely free of blame for their own ignorance. These references are based on 
physical proximity, clarity, and all-encompassing generic pronouns that implicate 
‘everybody’ in their own ignorance, such as ‘und doch liegt die Sache klar vor jedes 
Menschen Augen’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 21) and: 
[…] sobald der Deutsche nicht Träumer und Held, nicht Schöpfer und 
Herr ist, so sinkt er herab zum emsigen Knecht, der fremder Größe 
frönt. Die Beweise hat Jeder aus Geschichte und Gegenwart vor 
Augen (Ideal und Macht: 10). 
Blindness as a German epidemic thus constructs the German people as ignorant as to 
the truth behind the causes of the war and the motivations and policies of both 
Germany and the enemy countries during the war.  
In order to promote his idea of acquiring or striving to acquire new German ideals, 
Chamberlain constructs and exploits a climate of uncertainty and confusion using 
metaphors of darkness and light. This is effectively illustrated by the following 
extract: 
[…] in einem Übergangszustand, wie das heute der Fall ist, wo die 
politischen Bestrebungen sich derartig kreuzen und bekämpfen, daß 
Keiner mehr weiß, was er will, noch was er wollen soll, da tritt das 
Bedürfnis ein nach neuen, klarleuchtenden Idealen, in denen eine neue 
Zeit sich erkennen und nach denen sie sich orientieren kann. Gerade 
hier nun straucheln die Meisten, weil sie nicht wissen, welcher Schritt 
zuerst getan werden muß, damit der Mensch aus dem Dunklen ins 
Helle gelange (Politische Ideale: 56). 
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This statement contains references to lack of knowledge, self-awareness and self-
reorientation (klarleuchtend; (sich) erkennen; (sich) orientieren; ‘keiner mehr weiß, 
was er will’), combined with an image of chaos (‘sich kreuzen und bekämpfen’). The 
necessity for new ideals is legitimised by positing that they are beneficial to human 
identity and awareness. The final metaphor denoting transition from a state of 
confusion into a state of awareness (‘aus dem Dunklen ins Helle gelangen’) revisits 
the figurative advice ‘ohne Zögern [dieses neue Ideal] aus den Nebeln der Zukunft zu 
erfassen und in die Gegenwart überzuführen suchen’ (Politische Ideale: 18). ‘Der 
Nebeln der Zukunft’ mirrors ‘das Dunkle’, and the verb phrase ‘erfassen und in die 
Gegenwart überführen’mirrors the verb phrase ‘ins Helle gelangen’, where the 
former represents ignorance and unknowing, and the latter represents clarity and 
awareness. 
7.3.2 Further Rhetorical Strategies 
The concordance analysis suggests that the primary strategy of persuasion in 
Chamberlain’s ideological doctrine is the ‘carrot and stick’ strategy. The analysis of 
concordance lines for the key nouns and verbs also, however, reveals further 
rhetorical strategies not directly linked to this positive and negative incentivisation; 
namely a penchant for semantic and etymological expositions and salient uses of the 
keywords to position the reader and the author, to naturalise opinion as fact, to 
legitimise propositions by citing external sources. 
7.3.2.1 Strategies of Author Positioning 
The concordance analysis shows a high instance of what Wengeler calls authorial 
Selbstdarstellung or Selbstinszinierung, one of the eight constitutive elements of 
twentieth century German Kriegsbotschaften. Analysis of the concordance lines for 
the first person pronoun ich reveals that the author regularly steps into his essays in 
order to make the readers aware of his authorial presence on the one hand and their 
status as readers on the other. Sagen often co-occurs with a modal verb and the first 
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person singular pronoun ich in authorial interjections that express the author’s 
communicative ability or intentions, as in ‘Indem ich Verständnis für einen bitteren 
Scherz voraussetze, will ich sagen: England bekriegt Deutschland aus Hochachtung’ 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 56). The key verb sagen additionally features in authorial 
elaborations that emphasise the exactitude of the author’s expression or linguistic 
choices:  
[…] politisch stand Deutschland nicht groß da, vielmehr, wie 
Schopenhauer es boshaft ausdrückt, einigermaßen „domestikenhaft“, 
oder sagen wir mit einem hübscheren Bilde „aschenbrödelmäßig“ 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 18). 
Aber, aber... wie soll ich’s sagen? ... ich fürchte, ich werde nun doch 
unlogisch oder gar unfromm […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 24). 
Such elaborations intimate authorial consideration of how best to formulate a claim 
in order to justify it through linguistic precision rather than reasonable 
argumentation. They direct the readers’ focus away from the propositional content of 
the statement and towards the extent of the author’s eloquence; a fallacious rhetorical 
strategy that attempts to justify the message by highlighting the author’s competence 
of expression.  
Concordance lines for the first or third person form of the verb wissen (to know), 
weiß, show that the author presents himself as the ultimate source of knowledge. This 
is construed mostly using the first person pronoun ich in conjunction with the verb 
weiß. Concordance lines featuring the construction ‘wer X, weiß Y’ refer to a unique 
or rare life experience that has already taken place in the author’s life. Chamberlain 
portrays these events as something that could have happened to any individual, 
whereas they in fact describe events that only he with his specific background has 
ever had the good fortune to experience. ‘Wer mit Engländern aus gebildeten Kreisen 
verkehrt hat, weiß […]’ (Die Zuversicht: 9), for example, relates to his personal 
experiences as a native English speaker with roots in upper middle-class English 
society. Yet more illuminating is Chamberlain’s statement beginning ‘wer nur einmal 
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in Bismarck’s Augen zu schauen das Glück genoss, weiß, dass [...]’ (Ideal und 
Macht: 6). This statement is not based on Chamberlain’s belief that any other reader 
or significant number of readers has ever been able to personally look Bismarck in 
the eyes, but is more an implicit expression of the author-reader hierarchy that 
highlights information and experience that only the author can access by virtue of his 
status within elevated political and cultural circles.  
Concordance lines for weiß containing the first person pronoun ich reveal that the 
author rarely admits to lacking concrete factual knowledge. Only two 
counterexamples were found: 
Ob ein wirklicher Bündnisvertrag damals schon bestand, weiß ich 
nicht, aber so hieß die Sache im Volksmund (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 
57). 
Jetzt wird behauptet — ob mit Recht oder Unrecht, weiß ich nicht —‚ 
diese im südlichen Deutschland allmächtige Zeitung sei überhaupt 
Feindesbesitz […] (Der Wille zum Sieg: 39). 
The author tends instead to admit that he is unable to make future predictions: ‘Was 
aus den Vereinigten Staaten in Zukunft wird, weiß ich nicht’ (Ideal und Macht: 23), 
he confesses, and ‘Wie lange der Waffengang, der jetzt die Welt in Atem hält, noch 
dauern wird? Das weiß ich nicht; darüber habe ich gar keine Meinung’ (Hammer 
oder Amboß: 30). The author exploits the verb weiß to give the reader the false 
impression that he is admitting gaps in his knowledge, thereby creating sympathy 
and trust. The reality is, however, that he is merely admitting to his inability to make 
future predictions; a skill that nobody possesses, and that is thus infinitely more 
forgivable. 
A collection of two-part authorial interjections were identified among the 
concordance lines for weiß that begin by admitting factual ignorance only to heighten 
the plausibility of a speculative claim in the subsequent clause. The following 
examples present statements in which the author precedes a speculative claim with a 
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plea of ignorance. This is a rhetorical device used to strengthen the feasibility of a 
subjective claim by relying on the misleading presupposition that if the author is 
honest enough to admit imperfect knowledge regarding X, then the unqualified 
statement Y must definitely be true: 
Ob wir uns heute in der vorletzten oder vorvorletzten befinden, 
entzieht sich meinem unbelehrten Urteil; was aber die letzte Phase 
bezeichnen wird, weiß ich genau, wie jeder es wissen kann […] 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 38). 
Dadurch allein kann Deutschland, und mit ihm die wahre Kultur der 
Menschheit, von dem ewigen Alp befreit und einer Zukunft des 
Friedens und der Freiheit entgegengeführt werden […] Durch welche 
Mittel das geschehen wird, das weiß ich nicht; daß aber Deutschland 
diese Mittel besitzt sowie die Macht, sie anzuwenden, dessen bin ich 
vollkommen überzeugt (Hammer oder Amboß: 48). 
Similarly, a number of occurrences of Franzose feature in the author’s displays of his 
intellectual virtuosity, in which he brandishes the breadth of his knowledge through 
quotations and his language skills. These statements cite either the words of a famous 
Frenchman, or French sayings: 
[…] unter der Devise „liberté, égalité, fraternité“ wird das Land von 
einer Klique gewissenloser Berufspolitiker beherrscht, die — wie der 
Franzose und Republikaner Gustave Le Bon im Jahre 1913 schreibt 
— „unter dem Wort Freiheit das Recht verstehen, ihre Gegner nach 
Belieben zu verfolgen“ (Politische Ideale: 35). 
Daß die Menschen in keiner Beziehung unter einander gleich sind, 
cela crêve les yeux, wie der Franzose sagt, „es drückt die Augen ein“ 
(Politische Ideale: 31). 
In statements like these, Chamberlain advertises not only his own educational 
expertise, but also his familiarity with French culture and language. Indeed, the 
author often weaves Frenchisms into his discourse.  
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First person ich additionally co-occurs with the verb empfehlen with notable 
frequency. The indirect objects in statements of recommendation are the desirable 
reader (‘geeigneter Menschen’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 26)), the undesirable 
reader, and the inclusive jedem, either alone or in combination with Leser; as in 
‘jedem Leser’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 64) or ‘jedem meiner Leser’ (Politische Ideale: 
113). Literature recommendations given to the ‘desirable’ reader address any reader 
who wishes to gain a more thorough understanding of the ideological topics featured 
in Chamberlain’s discussions: 
Wer sich vorstellen will, wie beständig Frankreich Deutschland mit 
Krieg bedroht hat, dem empfehle ich, Bismarck’s große Rede vom 6. 
Februar 1888 aufmerksam zu studieren (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 39). 
Literature recommendations given to the ‘undesirable’ reader are addressed to any 
reader who engages in behaviour or ways of thinking of which Chamberlain does not 
approve; for example any readers who read the ‘wrong’ newspapers, or any readers 
who believe in the French revolutionary ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity: 
[…] den treuen Lesern der Frankfurter Zeitung und des Berliner 
Tageblatt empfehle ich nun, an einem Morgen, anstatt des üblichen 
Leitartikels über die Herrlichkeit der freien englischen 
parlamentarischen Regierung, zur Abwechslung den Brief Carlyles an 
Emerson vom 13. August 1849, geschrieben gleich nach der Rückkehr 
von einer Studienreise durch Irland, zu lesen (Demokratie und 
Freiheit: 5). 
The literature that Chamberlain recommends is occasionally accompanied by a 
summary of the book’s contents, or at least a summary of those aspects of the book 




Ich empfehle den Anhängern des französischen Revolutionsideals das 
Buch des englischen Juristen Stephens „Freiheit, Gleichheit, 
Brüderlichkeit“, in welchem dieser Gelehrte überzeugend nachweist, 
daß wo Freiheit wirklich besteht, Gleichheit eo ipso ausgeschlossen 
ist, wo aber Gleichheit besteht, dies nur auf Kosten der Freiheit 
ermöglicht werden kann (Demokratie und Freiheit: 69). 
7.3.2.2 Strategies of Reader Positioning 
In addition to emphasising his presence as omniscient author, occurrences of the first 
person pronoun ich show that Chamberlain also reminds the readers of their status as 
readers by highlighting the discursive relationship between author and reader and 
emphasising the readers’ roles as discourse recipients. Chamberlain explicitly 
justifies authorial intentions motivating a chosen statement or example, and dictates 
the necessity for the reader to change their way of thinking and/or behaving. 
Da ich nun aus der reichen französischen Literatur, die mir zur 
Verfügung steht, auswählen muß und mir Leser denke, die ebenfalls 
darauf angewiesen sind, mit ihrer Zeit sparsam umzugehen, möchte 
ich die Aufmerksamkeit zunächst auf ein einziges, kleines, überaus 
vortreffliches Buch richten, geeignet eine ganze Bibliothek zu 
ersetzen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 81). 
In the above example, Chamberlain interacts with the reader concerning the length 
and structure of his essays. The author’s explicitly formulated intention with the 
reader’s behaviour as a reader (‘die Aufmerksamkeit [der Leser] auf [X] richten’) 
locates the reader as a figure within Chamberlain’s discourse, foregrounding the 
position of the reader as a discourse recipient. 
Concordance lines for Augen show that this noun plays a key role in reminding the 
reader of their status as discourse recipients. Chamberlain highlights the human eye 
as a receptacle for facts and for the written word. The expression ‘eine Tatsache 
springt in die Augen’ reifies eine Tatsache, implying that a fact is something that can 
be perceived and processed by the human eye: 
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Es genügt aber, den Zusammenhang deutlich darzulegen, wie ich es 
jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe 
(Politische Ideale: 22). 
There is a tension between the invisible concept of a fact or ideological proposition 
as the object to be processed, and the eye as the tool with which to process it. The 
only case in which the eye can be a non-metaphorical receptacle for facts is when the 
facts take the form of the written word: in the act of reading, it is indeed initially the 
eye that perceives a fact or proposition. The author builds on this relation between 
the physical representation of abstract propositions as words on a page, and the 
human eye as a reading tool. Using expressions such as vor Augen führen and ins 
Auge fassen, the written word in Chamberlain’s discourse becomes a ‘fact’ perceived 
by the eyes of the readers: 
Und darum bleibt es uns unbenommen, uns einige Umrisse dieses 
Friedens vor Augen zu führen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 93). 
Statements that express the author’s intention to change the readers’ thoughts or 
behaviour consist partly of justifications. These justifications explicitly state the 
intended effect that Chamberlain wishes to enact on the reader by choosing a 
particular statement or example: 
Auch hier wieder nur ein Beispiel, flüchtig hingeworfen, und mit dem 
Hauptzweck, den Leser aufmerksam zu machen, wie groß bei diesem 
Menschen „als Natur“ […] die Macht der Ideen ist (Politische Ideale: 
15). 
An diesem Beispiel hat der Leser lernen können, mit welcher Vorsicht 





Auch hierfür möchte ich zum Schluß — und da Ausführlichkeit 
ausgeschlossen ist — ein Beispiel greifbar hinstellen; der Leser wird 
einsehen lernen, auf welche Wege oder vielmehr Abwege England 
geraten ist (Kriegsaufsätze: 63). 
Each of the extracts cited above is constructed around the formula ‘example + 
objective factual verb + subjective claim’. Chamberlain states the reason for 
selecting this example from his personal memory. This is particularly explicit in the 
first statement with the formulation ‘mit dem Hauptzweck’. The intended effect that 
the author expresses here is intellectual; that is, he states that his examples aim to 
alter the reader’s thoughts. Notably, the verbs the author chooses in relation to his 
intended cognitive effect on the reader are objective verbs with connotations of 
factuality (lernen, einsehen lernen, vergegenwärtigen) and preclude any element of 
subjectivity. The claims that follow the intended effect, however, are entirely 
subjective: the power of ideas of ‘der Mensch „als Natur“’, the French predilection 
for brainwashing their children, and the extent to which England has ‘lost its way’. 
The author thus states the intended intellectual effect of his selected example in terms 
of factual objectivity, when the subject of the examples at hand is subjective. 
By positioning the reader as consumer of his discourse, Chamberlain can dictate the 
readers’ reading behaviour. He explicitly regulates the reader’s attention level before 
critical ideological statements, as in the following examples: 
Neben solchen, welche die gegen Österreich gerichtete dauernde 
Agitation betreffen, Unterdrückung von Vereinen usw., gab es 
namentlich eine, die der Leser beachten muß: Österreich forderte, daß 
bei dem sofort in Belgrad anzustellenden gerichtlichen Verfahren von 
ihm „zu delegierende“ Beamte (also österreichische) an der 
Untersuchung teilnähmen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 73). 
Um das deutlich zu machen, will ich ein Beispiel herausgreifen; an 
diesem einen Stück wird sich uns das ganze Gewebe in seiner 
lügenhaften Verstricktheit offenbaren; nur muß ich allerdings den 




The verbs beachten and um Aufmerksamkeit bitten refer to an increase in the reader’s 
attention demanded by the author. Although the reader’s attention is then directed to 
a specific ideological notion, the process of increasing attention is discursive as it 
signals that the reader must read the passages that follow with particular care: the 
attention emphasised is the readers’ attention to the author’s words. In so doing, the 
author directs the readers’ reading behaviour by explicitly demanding greater 
attention to the words on the page: in order to incite a change or modification of 
opinion, the author must first direct and control reading behaviour. 
7.3.2.3 Naturalisation of Opinion as Fact 
Concordance lines for they keywords pertaining to epistemic concepts and processes 
of acquiring or understanding truth Wahrheit, wissen and verstehen, show that these 
words are in fact rarely used to describe genuine facts or truths, but more commonly 
to describe speculative ideological opinion. Examining these concordance lines also 
highlighted the salience of further words in the semantic field of truth and 
understanding, Tatsache, erfahren and lernen. Occurrences of these words are thus 
included in the subsequent analysis section. 
Only a small minority of the concordance lines for the above-named words present 
truth or facts deserving of the words Tatsache, W/wissen and erfahren. These 
exceptional occurrences pertain, for example, to the existence of war in Europe (‘die 
ungeheure Tatsache des europäischen Krieges’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 9)), the historical 
conclusion of a military agreement between England and Belgium in 1906 (cf. Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 62), and to patterns in the history of Franco-German and Russo-
German relations: 
Wer es nicht aus anderen Quellen schon weiß, wird hier von den 
Belgiern eine entscheidende Tatsache erfahren: französische 
Staatsmänner haben im Laufe dieser Zeit mehr als einmal die 
Gewinnung dauernd guter Beziehungen zu Deutschland erstrebt, mehr 




That both France and Russia attempted to form agreements or treaties to guarantee 
long-term good relations with Germany is historically documented; the reader can 
thus genuinely ‘know’ (weiß) or ‘learn’ (erfahren) this information. 
The vast majority of concordance lines for Tatsache, Wahrheit, weiß, W/wissen, 
verstehen, lernen and erfahren reveal that these words are used to present speculative 
opinion in the guise of fact and truth. This is particularly true of expressions of 
Chamberlain’s two primary ideological concerns: declarations regarding war guilt 
and the futility and corruptive impact of parliamentary democracy. The respective 
concordance lines evidence numerous fallacious assertions of factuality concerning 
German innocence and victimhood in the outbreak of war, for example ‘die bloße 
Tatsache, daß Deutschland zu Kriegen gezwungen wird’ (Ideal und Macht: 32) and 
‘Jeder von uns weiß, daß in ganz Deutschland nicht ein Mann lebte, der Krieg 
wollte’ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 50). Similarly, in the following statement centring on 
the verb weiß Chamberlain declares that anybody whose will to understand the 
political situation at the outbreak of the First World War is strong enough and 
anybody with (metaphorically) good eyesight will know who was responsible for the 
war: 
Wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten Augen 
besitzt, die Pascal verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte und 
jeder brave Mann sie unbewußt sein eigen nennt, wenn er sie nur nicht 
durch die hundert Brillen der Lüge, des Klatsches, des Vorurteils, der 
Ruhelosigkeit verdunkelt — der weiß schon heute, wer den Krieg 
verschuldet hat und wer nicht […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36). 
By not naming a guilty party or guilty parties in this statement, Chamberlain’s 
intentional ambiguity leaves the reader to decide whom is meant by wer in ‘wer den 
Krieg verschuldet hat und wer nicht’; there is no way to determine the factual 
accuracy of a statement that rests on implication and speculation. The addition of 
‘und wer nicht’ furthermore contributes to the statement’s speculative nature: 
although it is and was difficult to determine a single cause of the war in the elaborate 
series of events that directly and indirectly lead to the war’s outbreak, it is even more 
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difficult to declare that any one country involved in these events was entirely 
innocent. The above quotation is speculative because it does not state whom the 
author finds responsible for the war, but also because it thematises German 
innocence, which was just as difficult to gauge. 
As in the above statement, the predominance of speculation and opinion in 
concordance lines for weiß is also evident in claims attributing knowledge to those 
‘desirable readers’ who are constructed as the elite few capable of seeing and 
thinking properly. Chamberlain employs ‘jeder weiß [X]’ constructions featuring the 
generic determiner jeder, either independently or in conjunction with a collective 
noun e.g. ‘jeder Deutsche’, ‘jeder Mensch’, as well as the passive pronoun man, 
which similarly denotes general knowledge shared by everybody, and the adjective 
ganz where it modifies universal nouns. Statements that present certain ‘knowledge’ 
as accepted and internalised by everybody have two functions. Firstly, they attempt 
to naturalise claims through the topos of obviousness, and secondly they activate the 
reader’s desire to belong to the ‘knowledgeable’ or ‘desirable’ group. If certain 
information is held to be shared by ‘everyone’, the reader will not wish to be the odd 
one out, and is likely to adapt his/her thinking behaviour in order to fit in with the 
apparently all-encompassing majority. 
Chamberlain’s assertions of the enemy countries’ premeditated and intentional 
provocation of war make particularly extensive use of the noun Tatsache: 
Eine Tatsache, so sicher wie daß die Sonne am Himmel steht, ist es, 
daß die politisch maßgebenden Kreise in Frankreich, in Rußland und 
in England seit Jahren den Krieg gegen Deutschland planten und 
vorbereiteten […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 38). 
Denn die große mittlere Tatsache, die absolut einfache Tatsache, für 
die es ebenso leicht ist, eine Million Belege beizubringen wie einen 
einzigen Beleg, die Tatsache, auf die allein es ankommt […] ist diese: 
schon seit Jahren ist die Vernichtung des unter Preußens Führung 
stehenden Deutschen Reiches der eingestandene oder 
uneingestandene Wunsch und die immer fester werdende Absicht 
aller politisierenden Engländer — und jeder gebildete Engländer 
politisiert von früh bis abend (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 16). 
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Über die Tatsache der Schuld Englands hätte ich kaum nötig‚ mich 
hier näher auszulassen: sie ist ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 39). 
The existence of intentionality is equally as difficult to prove, thus any proclamations 
of factuality regarding the enemy countries’ pre-war intentions and therewith 
responsibility for the war can also be viewed as an abuse of the term Tatsache. These 
statements are furthermore illustrative of Chamberlain’s emphatic modifications of 
Tatsache –‘so sicher wie daß die Sonne am Himmel steht’, ‘absolut einfache’ and 
‘ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen’ – denote absolute authority and validity. The 
second statement in particular abounds with expressions of factual certainty and 
authority, partly through repetition of Tatsache and combination of this assertion of 
factuality with vocabulary pertaining to proof (Belege) as well as through the 
singular dogmatic expression ‘die Tatsache, auf die allein es ankommt’. 
Fallacious assertions of truth and factuality also frequently feature in Chamberlain’s 
of parliamentary democracy. Using the introductory expression ‘in Wahrheit’, for 
example, Chamberlain asserts a subjective view of the popularity of parliamentary 
democracy as truth, however the high degree of subjectivty in the ensuing statement 
is at odds with the assertion that it constitutes truth: 
In Wahrheit sind alle Nationen der Erde satt der Parlamente, satt des 
hochheiligen, allgemeinen Stimmrechtes, satt der unerschöpflich 
quillenden Redekaskaden, unter denen die gesamte zivilisierte Welt 
wie unter einer neuzeitlichen Sintflut dem Tode durch Ersaufen 
entgegengeht (Kriegsaufsätze: 39). 
Here, the concise promise of factuality that opens the sentence is followed by a 
frenzied list of subjective descriptions (hochheilig, unerschöpflich quillend) and 
hyperbole (‘die gesamte zivilisierte Welt’). 
Concordance lines for wissen and lernen corroborate the significance of this 
rhetorical tendency in Chamberlain’s discussions of democracy, as in: 
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Nicht wenige Männer habe ich angetroffen, die ganz genau wissen, 
welches Elend der Reichstag schon verschuldet hat und auch, wie 
aussichtslos es ist, auf Grund dieser Verfassung eine große Zukunft 
für Deutschland zu erhoffen (Politische Ideale: 67). 
[…] [wir lernen] einsehen, daß die Grundformel einer demokratischen 
Regierung lautet: „Freie Bahn allen Untüchtigen!“ Von selbst ergibt 
sich die Ergänzung: „Herunter mit allen Tüchtigen!“ (Demokratie und 
Freiheit: 64). 
In the first statement, the subjective notion that the German Reichstag has only 
caused misery and ruin and does not constitute a feasible form of German 
government in the long-term is presented as knowledge (‘nicht wenige Männer 
wissen ganz genau’). In the second statement, the author exploits the verb lernen to 
present his ideological conviction that democratic governments may as well be 
founded on the motto ‘Herunter mit allen Tüchtigen!’ as something that the human 
mind can acquire or accept (‘einsehen lernen’) as it would a factual truth. 
It would seem that where the substance of an ideologically driven claim is 
particularly hard to prove or to reasonably justify, such as intentionality, innocence 
in or responsibility for the outbreak of war, or the doomed future of a particular form 
of government, Chamberlain resorts to the strategy of naturalising opinion as fact by 
mere use of vocabulary pertaining to truth and factuality. The same is true of 
ideologically driven judgements of national character and characteristics. Although 
national character is an unquantifiable phenomenon, Chamberlain relies on the word 
Tatsache to validate his personal conviction that the Germans are fundamentally 
apolitical (‘Es ist und bleibt halt Tatsache, daß der Deutsche für das, was man 
landläufig „Politik“ nennt, nicht zu haben ist’ (Der Wille zum Sieg: 14)), and the 
essential nature of the English: 
Die Tatsache des Hasses leugnen wir also nicht: dieser Haß reicht von 
der mehr oder weniger verdeckten Abneigung feinerer Geister bis zu 
der blutigen Wut der rohen und bis hinab zu der Tücke der feigen 
Unterzeichner des Genfer „Protestes“ (Kriegsaufsätze: 72). 
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Diese kleine Auswahl aus verschiedenen Lebensstellungen mag für 
heute genügen, jene große, grundlegende Tatsache vor Augen zu 
führen […] es handelt sich um eine allgemeine Seelenstimmung der 
Engländer; diese Stimmung erweist sich uns als zugleich verblüffend 
einfach und haarsträubend zynisch; andrerseits darf man nicht ihre 
unermeßliche Naivität übersehen, denn das ist der rettende Zug daran 
(Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18). 
Neither the fundamental apolitical nature of the German people nor a ‘general 
English cynicsm and naivety’ can be measured or tangibly proven, thus the lable 
Tatsache that Chamberlain attributes to these notions is a manipulative use of the 
term. 
7.4 Summary 
The keyword analysis of Chamberlain’s war essays reveals that the words occurring 
significantly more frequently in Chamberlain’s discourse than in Paul Rohrbach’s 
discourse pertain more to rhetorical devices than they do to ideological content. This 
suggests that Chamberlain’s essays are primarily an exercise in persuasive rhetoric. 
The keywords analysis identified an ideological focus on nationality, and on 
Germany and France in particular. Surprisingly, neither England nor englisch was 
identified as a keyword in Chamberlain’s essays. The key conjunctions wogegen, 
sowie and vielmehr suggest that Chamberlain presents his ideological statements 
partly in terms of comparison and contrast, depicting Germany in comparison and 
contrast to the enemy countries and vice versa. The key nouns Parlament, 
Demokratie, Freiheit and Gleichheit indicate an ideological concern with democracy 
and democratic ideals in particular. The keywords pertaining to concrete ideological 
content in Chamberlain’s essays are few, and hardly conclusive. Further key nouns 
Ideal and Ideale, Gott, Bestimmung and Natur, Willkür, Chaos, Haß, Liebe and Neid 
suggest that Chamberlain’s ideology is based substantially on abstract concepts. 
The keyword analysis allows for a more intricate typology of Chamberlain’s 
rhetorical trends. Keywords from all word classes signal the dominance of several 
topoi. The names of esteemed German and British cultural figures, nouns describing 
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cultural professions, and nouns pertaining to language imply that Chamberlain makes 
great use of the conventional topos of expertise/authority typical of twentieth century 
war discourse (see Wengeler 2005: 217) by citing intertextual references. The key 
nouns Wahrheit and Lüge, the key adjective or adverb wissenschaftlich, and the key 
adverbs genau, wahre, and einzig suggest that the author’s argumentation relies on 
topoi of truth and factuality, proveability, exactitude, uniqueness, and authenticity. 
The keywords also indicate a hyperbolic rhetorical style, suggested by the adjective 
gesamte, the adverb gänzlich, and the similarly all-consuming numerals alle and 
alles. The keywords additionally indicate frequent strategies of author and reader 
positioning. The personal pronouns ich, mir, mich, meine and du reveal strong 
authorial presence in the essays, and, to a lesser extent, the presence of the reader by 
virtue of authorial addresses to the reader. This is supported by the high frequency of 
question words welche, wer, welcher, was, and wie, which indicate author-reader 
interaction in the form of questions. They may also indicate rhetorical questions, 
which constitute only rhetorical addresses to the reader, but author-reader interation 
nonetheless.  
It is not always possible to differentiate between keywords pertaining to ideology, 
and keywords with a potential rhetorical function. Key verbs relating to thought and 
expression (weiß/wissen, Lüge, verstehen, G/glaube, urteilen) indicate motifs of 
intellectual processes, truth, and lies. The key adjectives wissenschaftlich- and 
aufmerksam similarly signal a concern with intellect and accuracy. The key nouns 
Sprache, Wort, Worte and Begriff reveal a distinctive interest in language and words, 
and adverbs of time nun, nie, and niemals suggest an emphasis on the here-and-now, 
references to the past, and hyperbolic universal negation. It is impossible to conclude 
whether these keywords and motifs have ideological or rhetorical significance in the 
essays. Indeed, the difficulty of categorising these keywords as either ideological or 
rhetorical suggests that they may fulfil both purposes, depending on the context, and 
that the transition between ideology and rhetoric in Chamberlain’s discourse is, to a 




The concordance analysis gives rise to further, more detailed insights into 
Chamberlain’s ideological focus and rhetorical tendencies, and confirms that the 
division between ideology and rhetoric in the essays is not always concrete. It reveals 
the particular salience of assertions of German superiority and potential versus 
German failure, as well as strategies of author and reader positoning and the 
naturalisation of opinion as fact. The concordance analysis reveals that these motifs 
and strategies function on both an ideological and a rhetorical level; that they 
represent persuasive rhetoric masquerading as (ideological) content. The two most 
significant manifestations of this are German superiority versus German inadequacy, 
and the essentially intellectual German ideal that is alleged to be hindered by an 
absence and/or lack of access to truth.  
Assertions of German superiority and potential versus assertions of German 
intellectual inadequacy combine to create what I have called a highly effective 
‘carrot and stick’ approach. The concordance analysis highlights the predominance 
of language pertaining to hierarchy, inequality and contrast in the essays. It identifies 
a wealth of comparative declarations of German superiority based on the proposed 
superiority of the German ideal and German intelligence, and comparative 
declarations of English, French, and Russian, or ‘un-German’ inferiority. The author 
delineates a strict dichotomy between negatively evaluated French and English 
ideals, and positively evaluated German ideals. Whereas Chamberlain’s concept of 
the French and English ideal is a dangerously destructive force, an insatiable creature 
that has irreversibly devoured any intellectual capacity that the two nations may have 
held, his conception of the (‘unique’) German ideal is multi-faceted, and consists 
predominantly of cultural, intellectual, and moral principles. Assertions of German 
superiority combine with assertions of German potential to reassure and flatter the 
reader, functioning as positive incentivisation (the carrot). Using plant and tree 
metaphors, Chamberlain constructs Germany as a young nation state with ancient 
roots. Descriptions that locate Germany within ancient history appeal to patriotism 
by representing the nation as founded on a long tradition of trials and triumphs. This 
is an ideological assertion that attempts to contruct the image of a cohesive nation by 
virtue of a shared history and united triumph over historical tribulations. The crux of 
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the image of Germany as a young nation state with ancient roots is the notion of 
growth potential. 
The fundamental tenets of Chamberlain’s superior German ideal are abstract and 
intellectual: ‘das wahrhaft Deutsche’ rests on intellectual and moral superiority, and 
cultural brilliance. Chamberlain’s chief focus is on superior German intelligence, and 
accordingly Deutschland frequently co-occurs with Wissenschaft, Genie, and Geist. 
These key nouns can also commonly be found to co-occur with the key noun Seele, 
which supports the notion that Chamberlain’s construction of ‘Germanness’ is 
introspective and emphasises intellectual processes. Chamberlain’s German ideals 
also revolve around the abilty to understand: German knowledge and the ability to 
understand or perceive X is frequently pitted against English and French ignorance. 
Using the key noun Wahrheit and antonyms such as Lüge and Schein, however, the 
author depicts an all-encompassing tension between truth and lies in war-time 
Germany, creating an alarming notion of a knowledge vacuum. Chamberlain’s 
preoccupation with lies, and distorted and absent truth appear to be ideological 
observations about the opacity of government and press communication with the 
public sphere. In fact, they are chiefly rhetorical, and serve the primary purpose of 
legitimising the necessity of accepting the ideological content of his discourse: in 
order to promote and justify the alleged necessity of acquiring greater knowledge and 
powers of perception, Chamberlain constructs and exploits a climate of epistemic 
uncertainty in which truth is latent and obscured, or hidden; something that the 
German people can potentially access, but that they must learn to ‘uncover’. This 
draws heavily on metaphors of sight and light, darkness and blindness, which portray 
the German people as blind, and light and sight as representative of knowledge and 
awareness. Thus what appear to be observations about Germanness are in actual fact 
rhetorical argumentative strategies used to chip away at the readers’ confidence in 
their own powers of perception and in the reliability of their discursive environment 
beyond Chamberlain’s essays. 
In conjunction with unsettling the readers’ confidence in the epistemic validity of 
their environment, the concordance analysis exposes the use of strategies of reader 
positioning. It shows that Chamberlain uses ich, du and der Leser to remind the 
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readers of their roles as discourse recipients, and to interact with them on the meta-
level author-reader. Concordance lines for Augen show that this noun plays a key 
role in reminding the reader of their status as discourse recipients, and suggest that 
Chamberlain exploits his creation of absent or hidden truth in German society to 
construct the printed words of his written discourse as ‘truth’ that can be perceived 
by the readers’ eyes in the reading process. Furthermore, by explicitly positioning the 
readers as discourse recipients, Chamberlain can dictate their reading behaviour, for 
example by explicitly regulating the readers’ attention level before making a critical 
ideological statement. This finding highlights the necessity of analysing the 
rhetorical value of authorial meta-commentary in the qualitative analysis. 
Beyond Chamberlain’s central ‘carrot and stick’ device, the concordance analysis 
also reveals salient uses of the keywords in strategic authorial self-positioning. 
Analysis of the concordance lines for the first person pronoun ich reveals that the 
author regularly steps in to his essays in order to make the readers aware of his 
authorial presence, and of their status as readers, communicating to them his 
authorial ability, eloquence and/or intentions.This finding signalled the necessity of 
paying attention to ad hominem argumentation in the qualitative analysis. This is 
corroborated by the concordance lines for the key verb weiß, which reveal that the 
author tends to presents himself as the ultimate source of knowledge, and draws on 
his personal life experience as ‘evidence’ for the validity of his ideological 
statements. A number of occurrences of Franzose feature in the author’s displays of 
his intellectual virtuosity, in which he brandishes not only his own educational 
expertise by quoting literature, but also his familiarity with French culture and 
language. Recommendations for further reading revolving around first person ich and 
the verb empfehlen position the author as teacher and the readers as pupils, while 
simultaneously advertising his seemingly encyclopaedic knowledge of intellectual 
and cultural sources. 
In conjunction with Chamberlain’s self-positioning as an omniscient authority, the 
concordance lines for Wahrheit, weiß, versteh-, Tatsache and erfahren revealed the 
author’s tendency to naturalise opinion as fact. A thorough examination of the 
propositions made in Chamberlain’s assertions of truth and factuality reveals that the 
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vast majority of these use these key or salient words to present speculative opinion in 
the guise of fact and truth. Where the substance of an ideologically motivated claim 
is particularly hard to prove or to reasonably justify, Chamberlain thus naturalises 




8. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSTON STEWART 
CHAMBERLAIN’S DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES 
8.1 Introduction 
The following chapter presents a qualitative analysis of Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain’s dualistic rhetoric of persuasion. It argues that Chamberlain’s essays 
are dedicated just as much to justifications of the author and the essays themselves 
(the means) as they are to justifications of the ideological statements they make (the 
message), and examines the role of discursive strategies of legitimisation, 
delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation in these justifications. The analysis of 
Chamberlain’s justification of the ‘means’ focuses primrily on abstraction or, more 
specifically, the construction of the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty. The 
analysis of authorial self-legitimisation examines self-positioning strategies 
(Selbstinszinierung) of personal and expert authority that present the author as 
teacher, architect, source of truth, source of light and sight to the blind, and guide to 
the lost. In the second section, the focus shifts to strategies of legitimisation used to 
justify the essays’ ideological message, which call on theoretical rationalisation and 
corresponding topoi of factuality and evidence, obviousness, history, and comparison 
and uniqueness. Coercive strategies to this end exploit hyperbole, stipulative 
constructions and topoi of urgency, immediacy and necessity. The analysis 
additionally examines dissimulative strategies that justify which and how much 
information the author provides, and which and how much information he does not. 
Dissimulative strategies are used to justify both the message and the means, as they 
provide a meta-commentary on both the nature and amount of information that the 
author provides, and the way in which he formulates it. The qualitative analysis 
furthermore makes reference to Vom Deutschen Wesen (1915), a collection of essays 





8.2 Justifying the Means 
8.2.1 Metaphors of das Innere 
This chapter will show that Chamberlain's essays are just as much legitimisations of 
the author, his authorial role and his essays as they are of his ideological messages. It 
will also argue that strategies of legitimisation by moralisaion and abstraction are the 
key discursive weapons that Chamberlain uses to achieve this. Chamberlain uses the 
metaphor of das Innere to depict the First World War as a fundamentally intellectual 
concern, downplaying concrete aspects of war and foreign policy in favour of the 
centrality of the human mind in the war. The author frames the value of his essays by 
asserting that the most important weapons in the war are knowledge, perception and 
the acquisition of information. Chamberlain’s metaphor of das Innere denotes the 
spirit and the mind and related intellectual processes of knowledge and 
understanding. This is totum pro parte synecdoche which uses the general concept of 
‘the internal’ to refer to specific intellectual processes that occur internally in the 
human mind. As demonstrated by the following extracts, Chamberlain’s Inneres 
specifically refers to thoughts, feelings and will, and to intellect and morals: 
[…] hinein in das innerste Gewebe unseres Denkens und Fühlens und 
Wollens […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 23). 
Doch, wie kommen wir zu den Tatsachen? Die materiellen, ja, die 
drängen sich uns auf; wie aber fangen wir es an, die intellektuellen 
und moralischen Tatsachen zu erfassen? (Kriegsaufsätze: 9). 
The metaphor of das Innere is accentuated by the significant relative frequency or 
keyness of both Mensch and Menschen identified by the corpus analysis tools (cf. 
Sections 8.2.1 and 8.3.1.1). Using a legitimising strategy of abstraction, Chamberlain 
directs the readers’ attention inwards towards their own humanity, making frequent 
use of the phrase ‘wir Menschen’. Abstractive illusions to the readers as humans help 
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to direct their focus inwards, creating the necessary environment in which to 
accentuate matters of the human mind. 
Chamberlain affords great significance to the relation between das Innere and the 
war. He constructs the war-time situation as an ‘internal’ concern, using 
juxtaposition to isolate das Innere from das Äußere (‘der innere Kernpunkt jener 
nach außen gerichteten Politik’ (Deutsches Wesen: 29)), and stating: 
[…] was aber wirklich vorliegt, was uns trennt und auf einander hetzt, 
ist im Grunde genommen seelisch, und es gäbe nur eine Möglichkeit 
für wirkliche Heilung: die Einsicht in diese inneren Zustände des 
Geistes […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 31). 
Here, Chamberlain claims that the fundamental differences that separate Germany 
from its war enemies and led to the First World War are seelisch. The assertive force 
of this statement is amplified by polyptoton – the repetition of words derived from 
the same root in different cases (Enos 1996: 542) – by which the word wirklich is 
repeated in two different word forms; an as adverb (‘was aber wirklich vorliegt’) and 
an adjective (‘wirkliche Heilung’). He describes the present state of military and 
political conflict in metaphorical terms of a spiritual illness, drawing on the noun 
Heilung derived from heilen, a verb traditionally associated with curing sickness, 
and, as Rash 2012 identifies Chamberlain's anti-Semitism in Grundlagen to feature 
metaphors of health and sickness in reference to the ‘sickness’ of the German people 
penetrated by the Jews (Rash 2012: 112), is potentially a veiled anti-Semitic 
reference. As the present conflict is fundamentally a spiritual one originating in 
‘internal’ rather than political differences, the author claims, the only possible 
solution to this situation is an internal one: ‘die Einsicht in die inneren Zustände des 
Geistes’. In marked contrast to the construction of common war aims as achieveable 
only by military measures identified by Wengeler to be typical of twentieth century 
German Kriegbotschaften, Chamberlain asserts that common war aims are 
achievable only by spiritual and intellectual improvement (‘Darstellung der Ziele, die 
nur durch einen Krieg zu erreichen sind’, Wengeler 2005: 216). The construction of 
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the war as a primarily intellectual phenomenon is a fallacy of oversimplified cause 
that asserts that the war has one characteristic only and ignores conjoint possibilities, 
for example that the war is military, political and intellectual. Like many of 
Chamberlain’s statements, the above example is also an appeal to humanity. This is a 
logical fallacy that violates the pragma-dialectical rules of starting-point and validity 
(Cohen 2003: 109). 
More specifically, Chamberlain promotes the ‘internal’ phenomenon of knowledge 
as a weapon in the war. In ‘Deutschland besitzt Quellen der Macht, die England 
unbekannt sind: es sind dies geistige und moralische […]’ (Ideal und Macht: 33), for 
example, he aligns military conflict with the ‘internal’, altering the signification of 
Macht from military power to intellectual and moral power. In further examples of 
the juxtaposition of military weapons with intellectual ones, he aligns the importance 
of the ability to form clear judgements in the war-time situation with the importance 
of possessing a sharp sword and ‘false thoughts’ with ‘unwanted battles’: 
Der Besitz eines klaren Urteils ist in diesen Zeiten kaum weniger 
vonnöten als der Besitz eines scharfen Schwertes (Neue Kriegs-
aufsätze: 7). 
Dort wie hier kommt es namentlich darauf an, das Heft fest in der 
Hand zu halten und sich ebensowenig zu falschen Gedanken wie zu 
ungewollten Schlachten hinreißen zu lassen […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 7). 
The assertion that Germany can win the war because it is intellectually and morally 
superior to England is a non causa pro causa that misrepresents a correlative 
relationship between intellect and military victory with a causal relation. It also 
constitutes circular reasoning by referring to a second assertion to prove an assertion 
(‘A is true because A is true’). These are logical fallacies that violate the validity rule 
and the starting point rule (Cohen 2003: 109, cf. Sections 2.4 and 4.6.4) by 
presenting a premise (Germany is morally and intellectually superior to England) as 
an accepted starting point for an argument. 
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8.2.2 Motifs of Misunderstanding, Ignorance and Misleading 
Chamberlain’s consistent abstractive construction of the motifs of misunderstanding, 
ignorance and misleading jars with his construction of the war as an intellectual 
phenomenon. Using an elaborate network of strategies of delegitimisation, 
Chamberlain delegitimises the readers and the stability of their epistemic 
environment by advancing that, although the war is solvable by the human mind 
alone, the Germans currently exist in a world in which knowledge and truth are 
obsolete. The war propaganda features abundant references to misleading on the one 
hand, and to ignorance on the other, dividing responsibility for intellectual ineptitude 
between the German people themselves, and the government and the press. At times, 
Chamberlain accuses the German people of ignorance, describing them as ‘die an 
politischem Scharfsinn besonders spärlich begabten Deutschen’ (Deutsches Wesen: 
37), and lamenting: 
Am meisten aber wundert einen sowohl in diesem Falle, wie 
überhaupt im heutigen Deutschland, (einschließlich der Regierung,) 
die Unkenntnis in Bezug auf die wirklichen Weltvorgänge 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 33). 
If the war is an intellectual phenomenon in which knowledge is the key weapon, the 
German people, Chamberlain implies, have far to go to triumph. This constitutes an 
appeal to emotion by appealing to the readers’ intellectual pride and is also an 
argumentum ad hominem that discredits the readers. This is a rhetorical fault that 
violates the freedom rule (Cohen 2003: 109) by preventing the readers from casting 
doubt on the author’s standpoint on the wartime situation by undermining their 
knowledge of ‘the truth’ behind the war (‘die Unkenntnis in Bezug auf die 
wirklichen Weltvorgänge’). 
Chamberlain asserts that the German people are not only ignorant, but are also 
victims of intentional misinformation by the government and press. He uses journey 
metaphors of misleading – ‘Jetzt werden völlig Arglose irregeleitet’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 
10) – and declares ‘gerade in diesem Augenblick läßt sich das ahnungslose 
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Deutschland betören’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 33), both of which employ the topos 
of immediacy, a particular form of the conventional Kriegsbotschaften topos of 
urgency (see Wengeler 2005: 221), using the adverbs of present time jetzt and 
‘gerade in diesem Augenblick’ to create impact via alarm. The agency in the second 
statement (‘sich betören lassen’) is problematic: it does not present the Germans as 
directly responsible for their gullibility, but neither does it exonerate them entirely: 
‘Deutschland läßt sich betören’ implies both the influence of a further party and 
submissiveness on the part of the German people: the Germans have been misled by 
the press and the government, however it was not inevitable that they could not 
defend themselves. Equivocal agency also finds expression in a series of further 
statements using the verbs ‘sich verleiten lassen’ and geraten, as in ‘sich auf dunkle 
Schleichwegeverleiten zu lassen […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 42), and ‘Nach Bismarck’s 
bedauerlich verfrühtem Abgang aber geriet Deutschland sofort wieder auf die 
fremden Irrwege […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 41). ‘Sich verleiten lassen’ implies that the 
Germans have actively been misled by a second party, but also that they played an 
acquiescent role in the process; that they ‘let’ themselves be led astray. The verb 
geraten is similarly ambiguous: on the one hand, this verb is active, implying that the 
Germans people have taken themselves down the ‘wrong’ path; on the other hand, 
geraten carries a minimal sense of agency, portraying an action completed rather 
subconsciously or by accident. Thus even statements that seem to imply that the 
German people have been led astray by others carry undercurrents of self-
recrimination. 
8.2.3 Motifs of Lies and Misleading Appearances 
Chamberlain’s construction of epistemic uncertainty relies to a great extent on the 
abstract motif of pervasive lies and Schein identified in the corpus analysis (Section 
8.3.1.2). Further close readings reveal that references to the permeation of ‘the lie’ 
through German society can be distinguished between those which denote the power 
of lies abroad in the enemy countries, and those which describe the power of the lie 
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at home in Germany. A collection of statements alerts the reader to general lies and 
hypocrisy in enemy politics, for example: 
[…] aus ihnen ersieht man, dass bestialische Grausamkeit nicht im 
englischen Volkscharakter liegt, vielmehr eine Folge des teuflischen 
Lügenfeldzugs der auf Deutschlands moralische Vernichtung 
hinarbeitenden leitenden Kreise ist (Hammer oder Amboß: 35). 
The rhetorical effect of this statement functions on the basis of the author’s initial 
rhetorical admission and of subjective, strongly evaluative adjectives (bestialisch, 
teuflisch, ‘auf Deutschlands moralische Vernichtung hinarbeitende’). Chamberlain’s 
attack on England’s ‘leitende Kreise’ is introduced by the apparently neutral 
observation that the English as a Volk do not have a brutish barbarian nature 
(‘bestialische Grausamkeit’). Following the disjunctive operator vielmehr, however, 
‘governing circles’ in England are described as ‘diabolical’ and ‘hungry for 
destruction’. The initial admission may lend the author the guise of neutrality and 
prudence, however this is merely rhetorical: the discursive association between ‘das 
englische Volkscharakter’ and ‘Englands leitende Kreise’ is in place not only by 
virtue of their discursive proximity, but also by virtue of the alignment of 
‘bestialische Grausamkeit’ used to describe the English Volk, and teuflisch, used to 
describe the ‘governing circles’ in England. Chamberlain also highlights the skill and 
brilliance with which the enemies lie, continuing the satanic metaphor common to 
many of his delegitimising accusations (cf. ‘teuflichen Lügenfeldzugs’), ‘[sie] treiben 
sie bis zur höchsten Meisterschaft die satanische Kunst der Verdrehung, der 
Verleumdung und der Lüge’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 39). The extract cited above is 
rich in the vocabulary that Hortzitz identifies as typical of nineteenth century anti-
Semitic discourse: grausam, teuflisch, Lüge, Vernichtung (Hortzitz 1988: 122-127). 
Untruths about Germany’s war-mongering intentions in the lead-up to the First 
World War, Chamberlain argues, were the primary causal factor of the war’s 
outbreak. The author forges an association between lies and destruction (‘nur durch 
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systematische Lügen angefachten blinden Zerstörungsleidenschaft […]’) 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 20), and between lies and the war:  
[…] über die ungeheure Macht der nackten Lüge hat uns der große 
Krieg ausreichend belehrt; die Lüge aber ist die ärgste Vernichterin 
der Freiheit, denn sie vergewaltigt des Menschen Selbstdenken und 
Selbstbestimmen und zwingt ihn zu Taten, die seinem freien 
Entschlusse nicht entspringen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 15). 
This hyperbolic metaphor forges an assocation between ‘die ungeheure Macht der 
nackten Lüge’ and both ‘der große Krieg’ and ‘die Vernichtung der Freiheit’. Not 
only are the German people forced to exist in a physically dangerous and cognitively 
confusing situation born of lies, but these lies additionally eradicate their ability to 
think, to understand and to make decisions (‘sie vergewaltigt des Menschen 
Selbstdenken und Selbstbestimmen’). 
Accusations of deception and lies within Germany are targeted primarily at the 
German press: 
Auch unsere Zeitungsberichte über die Debatten bilden ein fressendes 
Übel, denn in ihrer schamlosen Verdrehung der Wahrheit sind sie nur 
dazu angetan, die Leidenschaften aufzupeitschen und das 
Urteilsvermögen herabzusetzen […] (Politische Ideale: 112). 
The linguistic formulation of this statement is particularly vicious: in further proof of 
the frequency of metaphors of evil in Chamberlain’s strategies of delegitimisation, he 
accuses German newspapers of creating a ‘fressendes Übel’ (fressend here is 
probably anti-Semitic; an adverb used to describe the erosion of poison, a metaphor 
commonly used in conjunction with the Jews). By crowding the second clause with 
disorientatingly various dynamic expressions in immediate succesion – a 
nominalised verb of rotation (‘Verdrehung der Wahrheit’) and a verb of downward 
movement (herabsetzen) – he creates a sense of relentless force and confusion. 
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In his discussions of the German press, Chamberlain not only accuses the German 
press of consciously misrepresenting the information it provides, but also of 
suppressing information at its disposal. The German press represents an internal 
German enemy not just because it twists the truth, but also because it omits the truth: 
[…] daß jene obengenannte Zeitungsgruppe, die sich einen 
besonderen Ruf für „Wohlinformiertheit“ zu erringen gewußt hat, ihre 
feinste Kunst im Unterdrücken aller Nachrichten bewährt, deren 
Kenntnis ihr unerwünscht ist, so daß der treugläubige deutsche 
Michel, der sich außerordentlich genau unterrichtet wähnt, oft von den 
wichtigsten Vorgängen (namentlich auf geistigem Gebiete) nicht das 
geringste weiß […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 33). 
Here, Chamberlain undermines the asserted Wohlinformiertheit of a specific group of 
German newspapers through inverted commas. The misplaced trust placed in these 
newspapers is juxtaposed with the patronising ‘treugläubiger deutscher Michel’, 
which carries both neutral connotations of ‘the plain honest German’, and 
condescending connotations of a ‘gullible Fritz’, appealing to the readers’ intellectual 
pride by confronting them with the notion that their trust in German newspaper 
discourse is misplaced. Once again, Chamberlain employs legitimising strategies of 
abstraction, accentuating the intellectual weakness of the average German citizen 
(‘von den wichtigsten Vorgängen […] auf geistigem Gebiete […] nicht das geringste 
weiß’). This is an argumentum ad hominem, a rhetorical fault and simultaneously a 
dialectical offense that prevents the readers from casting doubt on the author’s 
standpoint by undermining the allegedly disillusioned faith that they have in their 
own knowledge, thereby violating the freedom rule. 
8.2.4 Metaphors of Entanglement, Opacity, and Sight 
Using metaphors of entanglement, Chamberlain implies that the political situation is 
so convoluted that it is impossible for anyone to see through the embroilment of 
information, lies, and actions. Two words are of particular significance here: 
Wirrwarr and verwickelt, or die Verwickeltheit: 
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Kein Mensch, der nicht alle zwischen den verschiedenen Höfen 
Europas vom 24. Juli bis zum 4. August 1914 gewechselten 
Depeschen systematisch durchliest, macht sich eine Vorstellung von 
diesem Wirrwarr […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 64). 
Das hat Ausführlichkeit erfordert, weil solche Fragen ungemein 
verwickelt sind und – was weit schlimmer ist – mit Absicht 
verwickelter gemacht werden, bis zuletzt kein Mensch aus noch ein 
weiß und der Teufel seinen Willen hat […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 83). 
Wirrwarr und Verwickeltheit construct a metaphorical image of the political situation 
as a convoluted entanglement of knots, where the knotted thread stands for 
information and communication. This metaphor is intensified by the co-occurrence 
of undurchsichtig (‘opaque’), as in: 
Die Dinge lägen so ungemein verwickelt, undurchsichtig, zum großen 
Teil noch unbekannt, daß vielleicht in ganz Europa kein Mensch lebe, 
der fähig sei, den Knäuel aufzudröseln und die Wahrheit den Blicken 
freizulegen […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 30). 
Chamberlain depicts the current situation as a tightly bound ball of string whose 
tangled thread wraps around itself in knots and must be unravelled. This metaphor 
rests on the verb aufdröseln: ‘den Knäuel aufdröseln’ means to unravel a ball of 
string; however, ‘etwas auseinanderdröseln’, which refers to the same act of 
unravelling on a metaphorical level, denotes making sense of something. Unravelling 
the entangled ball of string is thus a metaphor for disentangling the constructed 
political and discursive confusion of the time in order to make sense of it. A tightly 
bound ball of string, furthermore, displays no gaps: the thread is wound around itself 
so closely as to leave no spaces or holes, and is therefore opaque. This metaphor 
argues in favour of the German people’s blamelessness for their naivety and 
ignorance through the metaphor of opacity: the truth behind the present situation 
cannot be ‘seen’ or perceived. Hortzitz (1988) identifies the metaphorical term 
umgarnen – a similar image to the metaphor of winding string – as characteristic of 
nineteenth century anti-Semitic discourse. She identifies it amongst a list of 
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commonly recurring vocabulary pertaining to the concept of Hinterlistigkeit, making 
the image of winding around with string tantamount to being falsch and intrigant 
(Hortzitz 1988: 122). It may thus be that this image is thus not only a description of 
the confusion and opacity that reigns in German society regarding the truth, but also 
a reference to the Jews. Indeed, it may be the case that all or many of Chamberlain's 
references to lies and confusion pertain to the Jews. However, as the primary aim of 
the present research is to identify and analyse Chamberlain's discursive strategies of 
manipulation and persuasion, to perform this second task simultaneously would 
extend beyond the bounds of this thesis. 
Metaphors of concealment and darkness are key constituents of Chamberlain’s 
metaphor of opacity. Chamberlain characterises wartime Germany in terms of 
secrecy, as in ‘auch alle anderen Minister werden nicht etwa von der Partei, sondern 
von dem geheim waltenden Komitee auserkoren’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 16), and: 
Hier reden politisch neutrale Männer, deren persönliche Sympathien, 
ihrer Sprache und Bildung zufolge, französisch gerichtet sein müssen; 
sie wissen aber, was in den Geheimgängen der Politik vor sich geht, 
und sind verpflichtet, darüber wahrheitsgetreu zu berichten (Hammer 
oder Amboß: 39). 
As these statements demonstrate, references to secrecy primarily foreground the 
government, whether in Germany or abroad. This legitimising appeal to moral values 
fosters mistrust of the men in charge of the country and accuses them of withholding 
information from the public, thereby implicating them in the guilt for the German 
public’s ignorance and naivety. 
A further series of examples achieves the same effect by referring to the state of 




Man braucht nämlich in keine diplomatischen Geheimnisse 
eingeweiht zu sein, um zu begreifen, daß es in Englands Hand lag, die 
ganze Entwicklung, die zu der jetzigen Katastrophe geführt hat, zu 
verhindern […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 57). 
[…] bis ins einzelne eingeweiht in das verwickelte Getriebe unserer 
Industrie, unseres Handels, unserer Landwirtschaft, unserer 
städtischen Bodenspekulation, unserer Finanzgebarung […] (Ideal 
und Macht: 5). 
References to Eingeweihte, or ‘insiders’, depict an elite few with access to the truth; 
to information that Chamberlain asserts should be available to the entire German 
public. This implicitly alerts the reader to their status as uneingeweiht, or as not privy 
to the kind of information that they rightly deserve. 
The effect of references to secrecy is augmented by references to concealment. 
Statements centering on the verb verbergen or the adjectival noun das Verborgene 
allude once again to a small group of (government) men controlling the development 
and continuation of the war behind closed doors, as in ‘diese Herren wissen auch 
alles, was im Verborgenen geschieht […]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 31), and ‘[…] den 
despotischen Willen einer im Verborgenen waltenden Handvoll Männer […]’ (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 32). Explicit declarations that the truth is being concealed from the 
readers predominantly rest on the verbs verbergen and verschleiern (‘to disguise’, ‘to 
conceal’, ‘to veil’), as in Chamberlain’s incredulous question ‘Wie ist es möglich, die 
offenkundige Wahrheit — die „Tatsache“ — den Blicken von Millionen zu 
verbergen?’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 9), and ‘man redet von der „verschleierten Wahrheit“; 
das ist handgreiflich’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36). Verschleiern is generally used in the 
German language used to mean ‘to cover up the truth’, however it is derived from the 
noun der Schleier, meaning ‘veil’ or ‘curtain’. The figurative evolution of this verb 
lends a pictoral quality to the statements in which it features. Chamberlain’s 
descriptions of the concealment of information in metaphorical terms of fabric also 
draw on the verbal noun Zudeckung and then noun Deckmantel, as in: 
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Krieg erklärt die Regierung heute oder morgen, fragt keinen 
Menschen, kennt den ererbten Gehorsam und sorgt höchstens für 
irgend eine Parole, die dann einstimmig — wie jetzt die 
niederträchtige Lüge über Belgiens Neutralität — aufgenommen wird 
zur ein für allemaligen Zudeckung aller heimlich begangenen Sünden 
(Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 33). 
[…] nicht des elenden Wechselbalgs einer erlogenen „politischen“ 
Freiheit, eines Deckmantels für aristokratische oder plutokratische 
oder demokratische Tyrannei, sondern der inneren, echten 
Seelenfreiheit […] (Ideal und Macht: 29). 
The second statement represents disjunctive logic by implying that (albeit ‘bogus’) 
political freedom and internal spirtitual freedom are mutually exclusive alternatives 
(‘A or B, B therefore not A’). This is a logical fallacy that asserts that, as the two 
kinds of freedom are mutually exclusive and internal spiritual freedom is desirable, 
political freedom, albeit is restricted or ‘bogus’, is undesirable. 
The effect of ‘cloaking’ metaphors is underscored by Chamberlain’s metaphorical 
references to burial and graves: 
[…] die Lügenbrut, die […] bestrebt sein wird, alles zu verkehren, 
alles zu verwirren, um dann, nach Herstellung der gewünschten 
finsteren Stickluft, das Feuerwerk der Unwahrheit über dem Grabe 
der Wahrheit triumphierend abzubrennen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 63). 
Diese dummen Blau- und Rot- und Orange- und Weiß-Bücher, 
welche die Wahrheit zu Grabe tragen wollen, können auch zu ihrer 
Enthüllung dienen […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 76). 
The examples cited above intensify the rhetorical effect of the image of the grave 
using juxtaposition: the position of the grave as closed and dark in the depths of the 
ground is accentuated by the accompanying image of ‘the firework of untruth’, 
depicted in the first example as exploding in the sky above the truth buried 
underneath in a grave. Here, the darkness of the grave contrasts with the bright light 
of the firework image, the sky with the ground, and ‘untruths’ with ‘the truth’. A 
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similar juxtaposition operates in the second example, in which the image of being 
buried in a grave (zu Grabe tragen) is contrasted with an image of revelation 
(Enthüllung). 
A variation on Chamberlain’s burial and concealment of truth metaphors can be 
found in recurring metaphors of darkness and blindness. Just as the truth is presented 
as concealed as in a grave, the German people are presented as being ‘kept in the 
dark’ regarding the truth. In Chamberlain’s essays, darkness is equivalent to an 
absence of truth, and, existing in a state of darkness, the Germans are constructed as 
blind. As the corpus analysis has shown, this metaphor is constructed using 
references to darkness, night, and blindness (Section 8.3.1.2). The corpus analysis 
has also discussed the key issue of agency in the alleged ‘blindness’ of the German 
people, i.e. the portrayal of the German people as ‘blind’ versus their portrayal as 
‘blinded’ or ‘blindfolded’. Further close reading reveals a particularly illustrative 
example of the association that Chamberlain forges between blindness and sight as 
metaphorical expressions of perception. Here, the author juxtaposes der Blindeste 
with einsehen, a verb that denotes the intellectual act of perceiving and accepting in 
terms of sight (sehen): 
Der Blindeste muß doch einsehen, wenn er nur einen Augenblick aus 
dem engumzirkten Interessenkreise seines Heute und Morgen 
aufzublicken vermag, daß in dem Wettbewerb um Kolonien nicht eine 
Stunde mehr zu versäumen ist (Deutsches Wesen: 29).  
8.2.5 Motifs and Metaphors of Chaos, Confusion, Insanity and Illusion 
States of confusion and insanity are the antithesis to an ordered mind capable of 
proper and thorough understanding and perception. Chamberlain forges a connection 
between discursive confusion, general confusion and insanity, alleged to have almost 
the entire world in chaos: 
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Deutschland steht ihnen im Wege; um Deutschland wegzuräumen, 
haben sie von langer Hand alles vorbereitet und jetzt unter 
gewissenloser Ausnutzung der ungeheuren ihnen zur Verfügung 
stehenden Mittel heillose Begriffsverwirrung angestiftet und fast alle 
Völker der Erde in Wahnsinn gejagt (Die Zuversicht: 11). 
References to states of illusion, intoxication and delirium reinforce Chamberlain’s 
depiction of the allegedly limited cognitive-intellectual faculties of the German 
people, as in ‘Illusionen Raum zu geben, ist immer gefährlich’ […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 92) and ‘[…] hypnotische Wirkung und in Folge dessen 
Übergewicht brutaler Willensnaturen auf und über die feiner organisierten, klügeren 
Hirne’ (Politische Ideale: 63). Descriptions of states of mind beyond conscious 
human control portray a climate permeated by distorted presentations of reality.  
It should be pointed out here that both Wahn and Chaos have been identified as 
typical of anti-Semitic discourse at the time (Hortzitz 1988: 127; Rash 2012; 113-
115). Nineteenth and early twentieth century anti-Semitism revolved in part around 
what was referred to as Völkerchaos – the penetration of the German Volk by the 
Jews; of German blood by Jewish blood. Rash (2012) identifies many such 
references in her discourse-historical analysis of anti-Semitism in Grundlagen, for 
example ‘Doch bis heute ist es uns noch nicht gelungen, alle Gifte jenes Chaos aus 
unserem Blute zu entfernen’ (Rash 2012: 115). 
Adding to the disorientating effect of Chamberlain’s assertion that nothing is what it 
seems are recurring metaphors of theatre and games. References to theatrical 
productions foreground classical Greek and Shakespearian tragedies in particular, as 
in ‘der Eindruck eines Heldendramas’ (Deutsches Wesen: 34), and ‘so war doch, wie 
bei Hamlet’s Wahnsinn, „viel Methode drin“‘ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 12). These 
general theater references form a topical backdrop for Chamberlain’s ideological 
theater metaphors by introducing the metaphor of play-acting. The objects that 




Rede und Gegenrede hin und wieder wie einen Ball werfen, liegt der 
französischen Begabung gut, nicht minder das theatralische Wesen 
solcher abgekarteter Debatten, zu denen die Zuschauer beiderlei 
Geschlechts hinströmen wie ins Theater […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 40). 
Wer das gewaltige Schauspiel erlebt hat, Deutschlands Erhebung 
gegen eine Welt von Feinden im August 1914 […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 47). 
The first statement posits the French parliamentary government as a theatre attended 
by an audience that rushes to witness the theatrical spectacle of the great speakers. 
The second statement presents the outbreak and progression of the First World War 
as a theatrical spectacle, in which Chamberlain labels the events marking the 
outbreak of the war as ‘das gewaltige Schauspiel’. These metaphors imply that the 
words issuing from the mouths and pens of the politicians are scripted, ingeniune 
representations of reality, intensifying the impression that Chamberlain constructs 
throughout his essays that the Germans presently find themselves in a critical 
situation in which nobody can be trusted, and particularly not politicians. 
Chamberlain reinforces the effect of theatre references with metaphors of puppets 
and puppet shows, as in: 
Wir sind Werkzeuge und Vasallen der in den Kulissen waltenden 
Reichen. Wir sind Hampelmännchen; jene ziehen am Faden und wir 
tanzen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 47). 
[…] der vermeintliche oberste Leiter ein Theaterkönig mit einer 
Papierkrone auf dem Kopf, hinter dem sich die wahren Drahtzieher 
verbergen […] (Politische Ideale: 73). 
The extracts cited above both refer to the act of ‘string pulling’ (‘am Faden ziehen’) 
or to ‘puppet masters’ (Drahtzieher). The puppets, in this case, are the wir – the 
German people, the readers – and the Drahtzieher are typically politicians (‘die 
politischen Drahtzieher’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 65)). This rhetorical fallacy 
appeals to the readers’ sense of humanity by implying that they no longer have 
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control over their own minds or actions. It is also an argumentum ad hominem that 
prevents the readers from casting doubt on the author’s standpoints by discrediting 
their freedom of thought as puppets on a string, and as such is a violation of the 
freedom rule.  
Chamberlain’s references to theatre and puppets are set against a general backdrop of 
‘playing’ or ‘being played with’. This is constructed by references to games, as in: 
[…] die französische Revolution dagegen als ein Spiel lasterhafter 
Buben erscheinen wird […] (Politische Ideale: 94). 
[…] damit das Hin und Her eines jeden Spiels entstehe und alle 
Spieler die Gelegenheit bekommen, sich einmal auf dieser und einmal 
auf jener Seite zu betätigen, und immer wieder nach angemessener 
Pause die Wonne der Gewalt (power) zu kosten […] (Demokratie und 
Freiheit: 71). 
These statements forge both a discursive and thematic association between politics 
and games, at once trivialising politics by reducing it to the level of child’s play (‘ein 
Spiel lasterhafter Buben’) and reinforcing the metaphor scenario of a false reality. A 
game can either be a simulation of reality or a form of amusement intended to serve 
as a diversion from everyday reality. 
By discussing the war in abstract terms of intellect, perception and confusion, truth 
and lies, Chamberlain thus situates the German people in a highly unstable epistemic 
environment. The tenacity of artifice and deceit is portrayed to have led to the 
inevitable descent of Germany and the whole world into a state of intellectual 
confusion and disorientation so boundless that it is equivalent to insanity. As 
members of the German Volk, the readers are positioned as misled, confused, and 
lacking any solid intellectual grounding. Under these circumstances, the readers lose 
faith in their abilities to accurately perceive, to understand, and ultimately to be able 
to form their own judgments and conclusions. Chamberlain's justification of his 
authorial role and his essays is one large exercise in argumentum ad hominem, 
targeted not at an ideological opponent or enemy, but at the readers. In order to make 
 
 170 
the readers friends of his ideology, he must first make them enemies of themselves. 
The topoi of intellectual war, intellect as a weapon with which to win the war, 
intellectual superiority, intellectual potential, intellectual sufficiency and the topos of 
obsolete/hidden truth are used to legitimise the assertion that the reader needs to rely 
on Chamberlain and his essays because of these propositions.  
8.2.6 The Construction of ‘Desireable’ versus ‘Undesireable’ Readers 
Chamberlain constructs parts of his essays as a discursive exchange between the 
author and the reader. In actual fact, the essays are not a communicative exchange as 
there is no scope for reader interaction; however Chamberlain creates a semblance of 
dialogicity in order to draw the readers’ attention to their status as the recipients of 
his discourse in what appears to be a discursive exchange involving two parties. The 
key distinction that Chamberlain strategically overlooks is that there is no dialogical 
interaction in the reading process, and the recipients thus cannot influence or shape 
the proponent’s arguments. Essays that were originally written in the form of a letter 
to a friend or acquaintance are particularly effective in creating this sense of 
dialogicity: Chamberlain claims that a small number of essays such as Die deutsche 
Sprache (1914) were derived from his personal correspondence (for example to the 
unidentifiable ‘E.E.’). These essays contain informal addresses to the reader (Du, 
Dich, Dein) intended for the personally acquainted recipients of these letters, as in: 
Worauf ich Dich nun besonders aufmerksam machen möchte, ist 
folgendes […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 29). 
Wie Du siehst, es mischt sich in die Zuversicht, von der ich anfangs 
sprach, ein subjektives Element […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 35). 
Although these personal and singular addresses are often adopted from personal 
correspondence and thus perhaps not originally meant for the readers, they give the 
readers of the essays the impression that he is addressing them personally. 
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In his interaction with his readers, Chamberlain implicitly encourages them to 
position themselves in one of two categories: desirable (knowledgable) readers, or 
undesirable (ignorant) readers; legitimising strategies of authorisation that function 
both by role model authority and the authority of conformity. He makes great use of 
the conditional construction ‘only those who can X, can Y’, constructing 
hypothetical role models where Y represents an action or accomplishment which 
corresponds to the author’s ideological viewpoint. 
Dieser Weg kann aber nie zurückgelegt werden, wenn er nicht einmal 
eingeschlagen wird; einschlagen können ihn nur Menschen, welche 
verstehen, worauf es ankommt […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 17). 
[…] wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann aus dieser einen Tatsache die 
ganze Bedeutung des Deutschtums für die Freiheit entnehmen […] 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 17). 
These propositions details an ideological ‘achievement’ held by the author to be 
desirable: to embark on a particular journey, to appreciate the significance of liberty 
for Germanness while distinguishing between those people who have the potential to 
achieve this, and those who do not. The noun phrase ‘nur Menschen, die [X]’ and the 
pronoun wer delineate a group of people who can [X]. This constitutes a specific 
form of argumentum ad populum; it is less an appeal to the majority, but an appeal to 
a special few. There are no descriptions of this in the literature, however this 
rhetorical fallacy could be described as an ‘appeal to vanity’ (argumentum ad 
superbiam), or ‘appeal to the elite’ (Gruppeneogismus, Wengeler 2005: 215). The 
appeal to a majority constitutes an inappropriate and invalid argument scheme, 
thereby violating the argument scheme rule and the validity rule (Cohen 2003: 109). 
The implied existence of elite role models that can achieve X implies the parallel 
existence of a counter-group that cannot. This parallel group is delineated in the 
following example, in which the comparative form of the adverb hoch (höher) 
illustrates that Chamberlain ascribes a higher status to those who conform to his 
concept of ideal thought and behaviour: 
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Daß dieser Standpunkt dem […] geißtig und moralisch so viel höher 
stehenden Deutschen unsympatisch, unerträglich, ja sündhaft 
vorkommt, das ist natürlich; aber zum Verzweifeln ist es, dass noch 
große Massen von Deutschen garnicht einsehen wollen, dass die 
Sache in der Tat so liegt […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 22). 
The readers are confronted with two groups of Germans: those with the intellectual 
capacity and powers of perception to exhibit ‘desirable’ behaviour, and those 
without. Chamberlain intensifies this sense of intellectual division among his readers 
by some introductory statements to intertextual references, such as ‘Der Name 
Warren Hastings wird den Meisten bekannt sein […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 63), and 
‘Schopenhauer sagt bekanntlich […]’ (Die Zuversicht: 16). These statements carry a 
deliberate sense of presumption regarding the breadth of the reader’s knowledge. In 
theory, these are modal expressions which indicate that the author deems it highly 
probable that these names and quotations will be familiar to the masses. In practice, 
the generic term den Meisten and the generalisation bekanntlich are rhetorical 
devices used to imply an intellectual ‘norm’. Similarly, seemingly casual remarks 
such as ‘Der Mensch „als Freiheit“ ist das uns allen geläufige „Zoon politicon“ des 
Aristoteles’ (Politische Ideale: 10) and ‘was Burke laut sagte […] das wissen mehr 
oder weniger genau alle’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 33) imply to the reader that X should 
belong to their general knowledge, and if it does not then it certainly belongs to the 
general knowledge of the majority. Ultimately, these strategies may encourage the 
readers to covet knowledge. 
8.2.7 Strategies of Legitimisation: Authorisation by Expert and Personal 
Authority 
The corpus analysis identified that Chamberlain’s war essays are characterised in 
part by strategies of author positioning (Section 8.3.2.1). Further close reading 
revealed that Chamberlain endorses his authorial legitimacy by highlighting his 
education, experience, personal contacts, knowledge bias and reporting bias, and 
breadth of ‘evidential’ reference. These strategies constitute a positive argumentum 
ad hominem, a rhetorical fault that violates the relevance rule by attempting to 
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warrant a claim not by reasoning, but by calling on the author’s credentials. 
Chamberlain makes his authorial presence explicit through egocentric references to 
the act of writing, making sure to thematise his publications and accomplishments as 
an author: 
Vor einigen Monaten erhielt ich auf einen meiner Kriegsaufsätze von 
einem Mann, den zu verehren ich besondere Veranlassung habe, da er 
zugleich gelehrter Fachmann und Mann des praktischen Lebens ist, 
einen zustimmenden Brief, dessen Wärme mir wohltun mußte 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 32). 
Here, Chamberlain positions himself as a successful and popular author by referring 
to his earlier work Kriegsaufsätze, and the acclaim he has received for it (cf. Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 22). The effect of such statements is augmented by references to the 
author’s hic et nunc: in order to emphasise his authorial presence, Chamberlain 
provides occasional commentaries on events in his daily life that occur while he is 
composing a text, opening, for example, with the expression ‘Gerade während ich 
diese Worte schreibe’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 25) or ‘Gerade während ich diese 
letzten Abschnitte schreibe’ (Politische Ideale: 113). Chamberlain thereby steps into 
his work in order to confront the readers with the reality that he assumes the role of 
author and, as a natural consequence, that they assume the role of reader. 
Chamberlain uses authorial interjections to exercise self-promotion. It is a particular 
concern of his to reassure the reader that he has an excellent memory: 
So erinnere ich mich gewisser Episoden aus meinem vierten und 
dritten Lebensjahr, ja, Sogar an eine aus der Mitte meines zweiten 
Lebensjahres so deutlich, daß ich sie bis ins einzelne Schildern 
könnte: es steht alles haarscharf im Hirne abgebildet wie das Negativ 
auf einer photographischen Platte; nur aber der eine einzelne 
Augenblick, vor welchem und hinter welchem dunkle Nacht herrscht 




Mit dieser Erzählung hoffe ich die Treue und Lebhaftigkeit meines 
Gedächtnisses beglaubigt zu haben, namentlich in jener Beziehung, 
die von den Fachleuten als „visuelles Gedächtnis“ bezeichnet wird 
(Deutsches Wesen: 14). 
The reliability of the author’s memory is presented as so great that he can precisely 
recall events from when he was two years old. In the first statement he draws on the 
metaphor of a photographic negative in order to help the reader to conceive exactly 
how precise his long-term memory is by providing them with an accessible image. 
The alliteration on ‘haarscharf im Hirne’ further adds to the rhetorical effect of the 
metaphor. The second statement reveals how important it is for the author to present 
his memory as infallible; he uses a performative speech act to state this intention, and 
calls on the testimony of Fachleuten to validate his claim to a photographic memory 
(cf.‘das Negativ auf einer photographischen Platte’ above).  
Using the conventional topos of authority, the author furthermore draws the readers’ 
attention to his intellectual qualifications for authorisation by expertise. Chamberlain 
quotes widely from an impressive catalogue of foreign literature, drawing not only 
on his breadth of intellectual reference, but also on his skills as a polyglot: 
Auch besitze ich wenigstens eine Art Ahnung von dem Gefüge und 
der Kraft der alten Sprachen, kann Italienisch lesen und verdanke 
dauernde Eindrücke dem Studium des Spanischen und des 
Serbokroatischen (Kriegsaufsätze: 25). 
Auf Grund dieser Kenntnisse und auch anderer, aus den Ergebnissen 
der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft gewonnenen, behaupte ich 
[…] (Kriegsaufsätze: 25). 
The effect of authorial elaborations on his knowledge of foreign languages is 
augmented by the number of foreign words integrated into his texts, either in the 
form of full quotations, or of single words or phrases. The author is particularly keen 
to integrate Latinisms and Frenchisms into his writing: 
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[…] parcere subjectis et debellare superbos (den sich Unterwerfenden 
Gnade erweisen, die hochmütig Widerstrebenden vernichten) […] 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 5). 
Vous fûtes un poète, un soldat, le seul Roi 
De ce siècle où les rois se font si peu de chose! 
So ist es! (Politische Ideale: 74). 
Notably, Chamberlain translates some of his foreign expressions for the readers, and 
leaves others untranslated. Both translating foreign expressions and omitting 
translations lend the author a sense of intellectual authority. Where Chamberlain 
provides his own translations, he presents himself as a cultural mediator who applies 
his linguistic expertise for the benefit of the readers. Where he does not provide a 
translation, he implies that his level of understanding for foreign languages is the 
norm; that these do not need to be translated because the ‘desirable’ reader can keep 
up with him. This is particularly evident in the second statement, in which the author 
casually follows a lengthy French quotation with the colloquial German expression, 
‘So is es!’ 
Chamberlain’s exploitation of his linguistic knowledge is also manifested in 
etymological expositions: his knowledge of Latin in particular allows him to weave 
brief lessons on etymology into his claims, as in: 
Besitz (früher „Beseß“), ebenso wie das lateinische „possessio“, 
deutet zunächst auf „Sitzen“, auf „Seßhaftigkeit“, auf „Siedeln“ […] 
(Politische Ideale: 53). 
In statements like this, the author explores the etymological roots of a word or term 
where the word’s original meaning lends his ideological claim greater support, 
thereby committing an etymological fallacy. He diverts the readers’ attention away 
from the ideological arguments by focussing on a single word; he does not attempt to 
prove a claim through logical argumentation, but by presenting a key word from a 
particular ideological perspective, ultimately ‘supporting’ his argument by linguistic 
diversion. In these cases, the readers are willing to accept the author’s claim not 
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because his logic or evidence is convincing, but because he has proven himself to be 
intellectually viable by demonstrating etymological linguistic expertise.  
Chamberlain also constructs legitimising strategies of authorisation via expert 
authority by drawing the readers’ attention to his prestigious political, military and 
intellectual contacts, as in: 
Aus den Vereinigten Staaten erhalte ich ein Buch zugesandt, von John 
William Burgeß, dem bekannten Lehrer des Völkerrechts, einem 
Amerikaner von angelsächsischer Herkunft […] (Hammer oder 
Amboß: 43). 
Mir sagte vor wenigen Tagen ein hoher deutscher Offizier, wenn 
England im jetzigen Kriege auch nur neutral geblieben wäre, der 
Krieg wäre vor Ende 1914 beendet gewesen […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 57). 
These statements name esteemed cultural figures with whom the author is personally 
acquainted in order to highlight the intellectual and cultural circles in which he 
moves and lend him legitimisation by association; legitimisation by personal 
authority. Just as the American political scientist Burgess is modified by bekannt, 
Chamberlain describes his military contact as ‘ein hoher deutsche Offizier’, 
accentuating the status of his personal contacts. He thereby legitimises his credibility, 
as a high-ranking army officer can provide Chamberlain with insights to which the 
average German citizen does not have access. 
Legitimisation by personal authority additionally rests on the topos of life 
experience, a specific form of Wengeler’s Autoritätstopos (Wengeler 2005: 217). 
The author’s reliance on personal anecdotes to legitimise a claim represent an appeal 
to illegitimiate authority, as authorial self-reference is invariably biased. The author 
reminds the reader, for example, that he witnessed the meeting between Wilhelm I 




Meinen Augen war es nun im selben Jahre 1870 — einige Wochen 
vor der Fahrt an Triebschen vorbei — vergönnt gewesen, Zeugen 
eines weltgeschichtlichen Vorfalles zu sein, dem sehr wenige 
Menschen — vielleicht nicht mehr als zwanzig — beiwohnten 
(Deutsches Wesen: 14). 
Chamberlain’s first-hand experience of this momentous occasion seems to lend him 
authority on matters of German politics and the recent history of German 
nationalism. The author uses experiences from his personal life to legitimise his 
expertise not only on German politics and political history, but on the nature of the 
German people; that is, in ‘Germanness’ itself: 
Wer sechs Wochen in einem fremden Lande weilte, setzt sich getrost 
hin und schreibt ein flottes Buch, wo klipp und klar und verblüffend 
einfach der National-Charakter, die Sitten, die Eigenschaften und 
Fehler des Volkes beschrieben werden […] Etwas andres ist es, wenn 
ein Mann, der dem betreffenden Volke selbst angehört und daher eine 
unerschöpfliche und unausschöpfliche Kenntnis desselben besitzt, 
sinnend das ihm ebenfalls vertraute Vergangene an sich 
vorüberziehen läßt: tiefe Einblicke tun sich ihm dann an gewissen 
Punkten auf […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 44). 
This statement underscores the comprehensive extent of Chamberlain’s knoweldge 
and experience of Germany and the German people by a hypothetical description of 
the insights a foreigner can gain abroad, progressing from those who spend six 
weeks, six months and six years abroad to those who, like himself, have been 
resident in a foreign country for so long that they consider themselves a national 
citizen (Chamberlain acquired German citizenship soon after the publication of 
Kriegsaufsätze in August 1916).  
Chamberlain’s self-presentation as a foreigner who has fully assimilated himself into 
Germany society and the German Volk is a key self-positioning strategy in the 
establishment of source credibility. The necessity for Chamberlain to legitimise 
himself as an authority on ‘Germanness’ as a non-German is particularly urgent, and 
the rigorousness with which he pursues this objective may well have been driven by 
 
 178 
his first experiences as a writer for the Bayreuther Blätter: in 1882, Hans von 
Wolzogen rejected Chamberlain’s first contribution to the Wagnerian publication, 
stating that as non-German writer, Chamberlain would never be able to fully grasp 
the German or Wagnerian cause. Chamberlain asserts that, as a foreigner, he is 
ideally placed to publish on German nationalism and Germany’s relations to England 
and France; not only because he is immersed in German life, but also because this 
‘foreignness’ grants him a certain objective distance to German society and therewith 
neutrality of observation. Chamberlain as an Englishman who grew up in France and 
spent nearly his entire adult life in German-speaking countries, as he emphasises, can 
make qualified observations on Germany, England and France: 
Dieser Ausländer und Neutrale macht hiermit auf die Tatsache 
aufmerksam, daß in Deutschland eine Verschwörung am Werke ist 
[…] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 34). 
Zur Vergegenwärtigung der Art, wie die Franzosen so etwas machen, 
wie sie die Hirne der Kinder von klein auf auf Gloire und Revanche 
modeln, will ich dem Leser eine Erinnerung aus meiner eigenen 
Kindheit erzählen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 24). 
Far from being a disadvantage, Chamberlain constructs his status as a non-German 
national as a guarantee of the accuracy of his claims. The author asserts his own 
credibility through personal insight into the dominant views and opinions on 
Germany circulating in England and France: not only is the author an expert on 
English society and politics, but also on the purportedly ‘typical’ English attitude 
towards Germany, as in ‘Ich erinnere mich, als wie von gestern, der Schilderungen, 
die man mir als Kind von Deutschland gab’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 86). 
Chamberlain also underscores his passion for and dedication to the subject matter as 
grounds for source credibility. The topos of authorial passion is a specific form of 
Wengeler’s Autoritätstopos (Wengeler 2005: 217). A series of assertions express 
personal belief and deep personal engagement in the German cause, legitimising 
Chamberlain’s source credibility through a sense of personal concern for the German 
nation. These assertions include expressions such as ‘Mir liegt im Augenblicke nur 
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das eine am Herzen’ (Politische Ideale: 47), ‘keine Überzeugung hege ich fester und 
heiliger als die’ (Die Zuversicht: 9), and ‘[das Gerede über die politische Freiheit 
Englands] gehört zu den Dingen, die mich immer gereizt haben’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 
53). This sense of personal concern and engagement is furthermore expressed in 
minor sentence interjections and exclamatives such as ‘Gottlob!’ (Ideal und Macht: 
14), ‘Wohl bekomm’s!’ (Die Zuversicht: 10) and ‘Es ist zum Davonlaufen!’ (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 64). These exclamations are subjectivity markers indicative of the 
author’s personal engagement and passion for his subject matter. The same is true of 
the frequent subjective adjectives that can be identified in Chamberlain’s nationalist 
discourse, as in ‘in einen geradewegs Brechreiz erregenden Kultus […]’ (Hammer 
oder Amboß: 18), and ‘vermutlich ebenso verworren und frevelhaft willkürlich und 
diabolisch eigensüchtig wie die gestrige und heutige […]’ (Politische Ideale: 12). 
The adjective phrases ‘Brechreiz errgend’ and ‘frevelhaft willkürlich und diabolisch 
eigensüchtig’ are stark expressions of personal evaluation that draw on the bodily 
metaphor of vomiting, and on metaphors of blasphemy and evil. Such subjective 
accusations are common features of Chamberlain’s essays; he is particularly keen to 
denote views and actions that do not comply with his own ideology as 
‘blasphemous’, ‘shameful’ and ‘ridiculous’, for example, as in ‘Es ist dies eine so 
haarsträubend und frevelhaft dumme Forderung […]’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 53), 
‘[…] dem schmählichen, zugleich lächerlichen Mißtrauensvotum’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 
38). 
8.2.8 Strategies of Legitimisation: Endorsement of Authorial Character 
Chamberlain legitimises his character by using a series of strategies that construct 
authorisation by personal authority, including trust-building strategies. For the 
purposes of this analysis, trust-building strategies are defined as any strategy by 
which the author strategically lessens the intellectual or status gap between himself 
and the reader for rhetorical reasons. A good author of persuasive argumentation 
must assert personal and expert authority while remaining accessible to the reader by 
allowing for points of contact between himself and his readers: a solely omnipotent 
and untouchable authorial figure to whom the readers cannot relate may lose 
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credibility. The analysis of Chamberlain’s construction of authorial character 
subsumes his construction of trustworthiness, similarity with the reader, and 
perceived goodwill. All such strategies constitute a positive argumentum ad 
hominem, a rhetorical fault that violates the relevance rule by attempting to warrant a 
claim not by logical or rational argumentation, but by calling on the author’s 
personal character. 
One trust-building strategy is formed of rhetorical requests to the reader for 
permission to make a certain statement or to make a statement in a certain way, as in 
‘so erlaube man mir, Belege aus dem alltäglichen Leben zu wählen’ (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 17) and ‘Nur eine Vereinfachung sei mir gestattet, der kräftigeren 
Auffassung zulieb’ (Ideal und Macht: 22). These rhetorical requests for permission 
appear to be a form of dialogue between the author and the reader: the reader is led to 
believe that the author attaches importance to their approval, whereas in fact the 
speech act expressed is not a request or a question, but an imperative using the 
subjunctive I form erlaube. Chamberlain seems to lessen the authority gap between 
himself and his readers by giving them the impression that they have some kind of 
input into his writing, thereby flattering them. 
A further trust-building strategy involves the use of idiomatic sayings and aphoristic 
expressions. Chamberlain’s use of idiomatic German phrases varies from 
conventional applications through reformulation and/or extension to pure invention. 
The war essays feature a number of examples of sententia – the punctuation of a 
point with an aphorism – integrating conventional idiomatic phrases into his 
statements such as ‘man faßt des Pudels Kern’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 97), ‘ein Bild 
sagt mehr als viele Worte’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36) and ‘Das geschieht — wie der 
Bauer sagt — in der Woche mit den vier Sonntagen’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 60). 
Traditional idiomatic sayings help to build up the readers’ trust of the author firstly 
by cementing his native-like familiarity with the German language, and secondly 
because such expressions are gnomic, carrying connotations of timeless wisdom. 
Sayings are familiar to all or most readers, and help to create a sense of familiarity 
and trust. They are furthermore phrases used by the masses, and therefore by using 
them himself, the author positions himself as ‘one of them’. 
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Chamberlain additionally employs aphoristic sayings to demonstrate his intellectual 
virtuosity by virtue of his linguistic creativity. In addition to integrating traditional 
turns of phrase, Chamberlain also modifies and extends existing sayings: 
Um richtig verdaut zu werden, erfordert jede Depesche die Beigabe 
nicht eines Körnchens, vielmehr eines ganzen Salzfasses (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 67). 
Es ist immer das beste, man packt den Stier bei den Hörnern; gelingt 
es nicht, das wild gewordene Tier zu Boden zu ringen, so schwingt 
man sich ihm auf den Rücken und reitet es zur Erschöpfung […] 
(Politische Ideale: 67). 
Here, the author does not merely apply sayings, but adapts them and adds to them in 
order to achieve a rhetorical effect, or in order to explicate the significance of the 
saying for his ideological purposes. The ability to modify and extend idiomatic 
sayings in this way is testimony to the author’s linguistic and intellectual aptitude. 
8.2.9 Strategies of Legitimisation: The Author as Problem Solver 
Chamberlain’s central strategies of authorial legitimisation are strategies of 
abstraction that function by delegitimising the readers and the epistemic reliability of 
their environment. This is a key mechanism in Chamberlain’s creation of ‘global 
fuzziness’ and constitutes the ‘trouble’ of Saussure’s ‘trouble-and-resolution’ device 
(cf. Saussure 2005: 113). Chamberlain identifies and constructs a series of problems 
afflicting the German people: the German Volk is ill-placed to formulate its own 
thoughts regarding the current war-time situation, he asserts, as it is surrounded by 
media and government discourse that it cannot trust. He constructs the German 
people as having been led astray, and thus as in danger of stumbling onto the ‘wrong 
path’, or as already progressing down it. Most significantly, the author frames his 
ideological claims against the backdrop of reader ignorance and naivety, constructing 
a metaphor scenario in which the readers fundamentally lack the correct knowledge 
 
 182 
and are metaphorically ‘in the dark’. He constructs the war as a battle of intellect and 
morals, and yet, he asserts, the German people are crucially lacking the kind of 
intellectual faculties that they need to triumph in the war; the intellect, the powers of 
perception, the facts, the truth (cf. Sections 9.2.1 – 9.2.5). 
The following section argues that Chamberlain uses strategies of author positioning 
to advance ready-made resolutions to the trouble of epistemic uncertainty; the 
complementary device to the creation of ‘trouble’ hypothesised by Saussure 
(Saussure 2005: 113). Where the German people lack knowledge, Chamberlain will 
provide it; where they are lost, Chamberlain the guide will lead them down the right 
path; where the readers as Germans are ignorant and naïve pupils in need of 
‘education’, Chamberlain the teacher will teach them; where the truth is buried, 
Chamberlain the archaeologist will uncover it; where the reader is blind or 
submerged in darkness, Chamberlain the bringer of light will enable them to see once 
more. Whereas the construction of epistemic uncertainty is a strategy of 
legitimisation that functions via abstraction, Chamberlain's ‘responsive solutions’ are 
more multifaceted, drawing on abstraction, authorisation, and theoretical 
rationalisation to exploit abstract moral values of enlightenment and rational 
concepts of fact. 
8.2.9.1 Chamberlain as Teacher 
Chamberlain constructs his readers as naïve and ignorant and asserts that they need 
to undergo a process of learning by being taught the facts and the truth. A number of 
statements can be identified in which the author states the ‘educational’ intentions 
behind writing the war essays, as in ‘[…] die andern Völker, so weit es ihnen von der 
Natur gegönnt sein mag, zum Verständnis der Freiheit erziehen […]’ 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 23), and ‘[…] das Bewußtsein dessen, was jetzt vorgegangen ist, 
allgemein zu machen’ (Die Zuversicht: 12). The author sees it as his job and as the 
job of those who represent true ‘Germanness’ to ‘educate’ others. In the first 
example above, Chamberlain refers to the role of ‘real’ Germans to educate other 
nations regarding key moral standards such as liberty. In the second example 
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Chamberlain refers to the more general process which must be undertaken at home in 
Germany, namely to raise awareness of the true course of events in the war. This 
statement may not feature vocabulary pertaining to teaching directly, however ‘das 
Bewußtsein dessen allgemein zu machen’ denotes a process of creating awareness by 
disseminating information equivalent to that denoted by belehren. 
Chamberlain furthermore states his recommendations for current and future action in 
classroom terms, as in: 
[…] strebsame Knaben und Mädchen tun wohl daran, sich Listen von 
Königen und Päpsten mit Geburts- und Todesjahren ins 
widerstrebende Gehirn einzuprägen […] (Politische Ideale: 9). 
This example recalls a classroom situation, in which Chamberlain advises rote 
learning to ‘strebsame Knaben und Mädchen’, here representative of the ideal 
readers. 
If Chamberlain is a teacher then his readers are his pupils. Some of the clearest 
examples of Chamberlain’s teacher role can be identified in his instructions to the 
readers to consult further literature, as identified by the corpus analysis (cf. Section 
8.3.2.1). These instructions address his ideal readers, that is, those who wish to put as 
much effort into understanding the current wartime situation as the author deems 
necessary: 
[…] beide empfehle ich dringend jedem Leser: Hans F. Helmolt, „Die 
geheime Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges auf Grund urkundlichen 
Stoffes übersichtlich dargestellt“ (Leipzig bei Koehler) und Karl 
Hellferich, „Die Entstehung des Weltkrieges im Lichte der 
Veröffentlichungen der Dreiverbandsmächte“ (im Verlag der 
Norddeutschen Allgemeinen Zeitung) (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 64). 
Kjellén’s zwei kostbare kleine Bücher — „Die Großmächte der 
Gegenwart“, kurz vor dem Kriege erschienen, und „Die politischen 
Probleme des Weltkrieges“, 1916 — sind Allen zugänglich; Jeder hat 
die Pflicht, sie zu lesen […] (Ideal und Macht: 22). 
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In statements such as these, Chamberlain issues a homework exercise of further 
reading. These literature recommendations include precise publication data, recalling 
references provided by teachers or academic figures. 
If Chamberlain is a teacher then his publications are also the teaching material. 
Reading his essays, he asserts, is tantamount to undergoing a process of 
enlightenment; after reading the essays, the readers will allegedly find themselves to 
be wiser and more knowledgeable than before: 
Damit wird nun, glaube ich, jener äußere Kreis der mit 
Naturnotwendigkeit zum Kriege führenden Ursachen deutlich faßlich 
[…] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 53). 
Nunmehr sind wir reif, einen Gedanken Fichtes zu verstehen, den ich 
für einen der bedeutendsten halte […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 26). 
8.2.9.2 Chamberlain as Provider of Truth 
Chamberlain’s construction of himself as a teacher and his essays as teaching 
materials implies that the essays are factual sources of truth: it is the job of a teacher 
to convey factual information to his students, and not conjecture or hypothesis. 
Chamberlain disarms the readers, alarming them by insinuating that they have been 
denied access to authentic information. Using a further strategy of legitimisation that 
functions by theoretical rationalisation, the author attempts to resolve this problem 
for his readers by presenting himself as the provider of truth. 
As the corpus analysis has indicated, Chamberlain’s essays abound with the adjective 
wahr. Where X is modified by wahr- (‘die wahre Ursache’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 52) 
‘jeder wahren Freheit’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 16)), it is implied that something 
else is falsely posing as X; that there is a ‘true’ or ‘real’ version, and a ‘false’ or 
‘fake’ version of X. Chamberlain, as he is keen to emphasise, construes his discourse 
as addressing or identifying the genuine form or understanding of a cause, concept or 
conception, for example. In contrast to those causes, definitions and conceptions 
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parading as ‘real’ in other discourse, the author implies, he thematises the genuinely 
real ones.  
The rhetorical effect of modifying a noun with wahr is augmented by Chamberlain’s 
frequent use of the constructions in Wahrheit, ‘in Wirklichkeit’ and eigentlich: 
In Wahrheit sind alle Nationen der Erde satt der Parlamente […] 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 39). 
Fragen wir uns zunächst: wie steht es in Wirklichkeit mit der so viel 
gerühmten politischen Freiheit Englands? (Kriegsaufsätze: 16). 
Doch gleichviel, auf diesem Wege erfuhren wir allmählich, wer es 
eigentlich ist, der allerorten gegen Deutschland schürt und die Völker 
in den Krieg treibt […] (Die Zuversicht: 5). 
The modifiers ‘in Wahrheit’, ‘in Wirklichkeit’ and eigentlich insinuate that the made 
claims represent the truth in contrast to opposing conceptions of the same issue 
claimed by others. The contrast between Chamberlain’s ‘truths’ and ‘untruths’ 
circulated elsewhere is not always merely implied, but also explicitly formulated in 
juxtapositions such as 
[…] eben so frei wie der einzelne Mensch sich frei dünkt und weiß, 
und eben so unfrei wie — vom Standpunkt des erschauten 
Naturganzen aus — der einzelne Mensch in Wirklichkeit ist 
(Deutsches Wesen: 125). 
Here, the author uses antithesis and juxtaposition to alert the reader to the permeation 
of false conceptions in present German society and constructs his ideological claims 




8.2.9.3 Chamberlain as Archaeologist 
Chamberlain constructs the truth as hidden, buried or covered up (see Section 9.2.4). 
In order to correspondingly legitimise this proposition using expert authority and 
theoretical rationalisation to construct the author’s status as a ‘provider of truth’, 
therefore, Chamberlain makes reference to the act of ‘uncovering’ or ‘unearthing’ the 
truth. The corresponding solution with which Chamberlain provides the readers in 
his construction of source legitimisation is that the author functions as an 
‘archaeologist of truth’.  
The war essays feature a wealth of references to discovery or Entdeckung: 
[…] während sie uns weismachen wollen, was für humane Maximen 
solchem Verfahren zugrunde liegen, entdeckt sich jetzt, daß das wahre 
Motiv ein reales Objekt sei, ohne welches es die Engländer 
bekanntlich nie tun und welches man hätte wissen sollen 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 58). 
[…] und doch mußte diese im Wintersemester 1807/08 als 
selbstverständlich ausgesprochene Wahrheit in unseren Tagen neu 
entdeckt werden […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 26). 
The verb entdecken is a key constitutive element of Chamberlain’s archaeological 
image schema. Entdecken compounds the main verb decken, meaning ‘to cover’, and 
the prefix ent-. Ent- alone is not a semantic word, however when attached as a prefix 
to a main verb, it generally reverses the process denoted by the stem verb. This is 
equivalent to the English verb ‘discover’, where the prefix ‘dis’ turns the act of 
covering into an act of uncovering. Entdecken thus figurately denotes the process of 
removing the cover from something. Like an archaeologist, Chamberlain proposes 
that he is removing the cover that hides the truth; that he is excavating the truth.  
This sense of archaeological excavation is particularly evident in constructions such 
as ‘geht man jedoch der Sache auf den Grund, so entdeckt man’ (Politische Ideale: 
29), in which the verb entdecken co-occurs with the verb phrase auf den Grund 
 
 187 
gehen. Figuratively, this expression refers to the act of ‘getting to the bottom of 
something’, or to investigating a problem. The literal roots of the expression, 
however, are physical, and denote descending to the depths or lower limit of 
something in order to fully investigate it. An archaeologist digs far into the ground in 
order to uncover and bring up evidence. This metaphor is perpetuated by the 
recurring expressions hervorbringen and hervorholen, as in: 
Mann greift nicht tief genug, wenn man nur von einem Krieg der 
Konfessionen spricht […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 82). 
[…] das Volk, das Friedrich, Stein und Bismarck so schnell 
hintereinander hervorbrachte, birgt sicher auch heute Staatsmänner 
von genialer Gestaltungskraft, und die Not wird sie an die Oberfläche 
bringen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 93). 
Der Schatz der Reinheit und der idealen Anlagen, der ihm bisweilen 
so tief ins Innere hinabsank, daß er kaum mehr auffindbar war, muß 
jetzt hervorgeholt werden […] (Die Zuversicht: 12). 
The archeological image schema is complemented by a series of verbs pertaining to 
investigation. In addition to the verbs forschen and untersuchen to describe his 
research into the subject matter at hand, Chamberlain favours compound verbs using 
the stem dringen, meaning ‘to penetrate’, such as durchdringen and hineindringen, 
thereby describing the processes of exploring and presenting ideological topics in 
terms of the penetration of a surface. Hortzitz (1988) identifies the verb phrase ‘in 
etwas eindringen’ as characteristic of anti-Semitic discourse of the nineteenth 
century, a metaphor resulting from the notion of the Jews wrongly ‘penetrating’ their 
way through German society as an ‘eingedrungener Volksstamm’ (Hortzitz 1988: 
121). However, Chamberlain's positive use of this verb to denote the process of 
gaining access to the truth makes it unlikely that it carries anti-Semitic undertones in 




The metaphorical notion of penetrating the surface in order to access knowledge and 
information is further represented by references to Einblick and Einsicht. As with the 
English equivalent ‘insight’, Einblick and Einsicht denote the process of seeing into 
something. The Einsicht trope is thus a constituent element of Chamberlain’s 
archaeology metaphor: by uncovering or excavating the truth, the archaeologist also 
brings the gift of sight. Covered by a deceptive surface of falsities and lies, the 
German people have supposedly been hitherto incapable of seeing the truth. In 
physical terms of what can be seen and what cannot, the author advocates seeing 
beyond or below the surface to what is beneath; in other words, seeing beyond the 
misinformation to the truth. As an author and ‘archaeologist of truth’, Chamberlain 
presents himself as someone who, in the terms of his own metaphor, brings the truth 
back into the Germans’ field of vision by exposing it. 
Chamberlain accordingly evaluates the concept of ‘the surface’ negatively. The 
following statements feature a dismissive combination of sight metaphors and 
references to surface: 
[…] für den oberflächlichen Blick verwirrender zum Ausdruck 
kommt (Deutsches Wesen: 44). 
Nicht wirst du das Wesen der Kunst zu erfassen vermögen, wenn du 
sie nur auf den Gipfeln ihres Könnens betrachtest […] (Deutsches 
Wesen: 70). 
The sight noun Blick in the first statement cited above is modified by the adjective 
oberflächlich, denoting both the surface and superficiality. The combination of these, 
‘der oberflächliche Blick’, is deemed by the author to be insufficient. In the second 
example, the surface is represented by Gipfel: a pinnacle, like a surface, is merely the 
top of something much greater. Whereas combined references to sight and surface 
are negatively evaluated, references that allude to sight and depth are invariably 
positively evaluated, as in: 
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Milton gehört unstreitig zu den größten Intelligenzen, welche die 
Menschheit erzeugt hat; er sah den Dingen auf den Grund […] 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 12). 
Hierin offenbart sich Luthers geistiger Tiefblick und seine unbedingte 
Wahrhaftigkeit (Demokratie und Freiheit: 19). 
Der durchdringende, viel gefürchtete Blick des stolzen, bewußten, 
sicher urteilenden Schiller (Deutsches Wesen: 88). 
John Milton’s status as one of the greatest minds in the history of the world, as 
Chamberlain believed, is alleged to be a condition of the way in which he saw past 
the surface to the bottom of or to the true nature of things (‘er sah den Dingen auf 
den Grund’). The celebrated German figures Luther and Schiller are similarly 
attributed with the gift of ‘depth of sight’, or Tiefblick. Luther’s ‘geistiger Tiefblick’ 
and Schiller’s ‘durchdringender Blick’ gain positive evaluation by virtue of their co-
occurrence with the positive noun Wahrhaftigkeit and the positively evaluated 
adverbs stolz, bewußt and sicher [urteilend]. 
The expression ‘geistiger Tiefblick’ is of particular importance to Chamberlain’s 
metaphor of ‘seeing the truth’. The modifier geistig reveals that Chamberlain’s sight 
metaphor functions on two levels: seeing past the surface of lies, and seeing into or 
using the soul. As detailed in Section 9.1, Chamberlain foregrounds the notion of das 
Innere, which denotes intellect and the human spirit or soul. A significant number of 
Chamberlain’s references to Einblick or ‘in [X] blicken’ relate to das Innere: 
[…] plötzlich gewinnen wir einen Einblick querdurch in ein Innerstes, 
das sonst die täuschende Oberfläche dem Auge entzieht 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 45). 
Das Auge kann zunächst geradezu als „der Sinn der Oberfläche“ 
bezeichnet werden, und was es vermittelt — auch die Liebe — bleibt 
oberflächlich und vergänglich, wenn nicht zu den Eindrücken des 




8.2.9.4 Chamberlain as Bringer of Sight to the Blind 
Chamberlain makes extensive use of metaphors of sight and blindness. As 
established in Section 9.2.4, blindness metaphors inversely represent ignorance and 
naivety, and metaphors of sight represent the possession of knowledge. Chamberlain 
often expresses ‘understanding’, both as a verb denoting knowledge acquisition and 
as a noun denoting the possession of knowledge, in terms of sight: 
[…] wer Augen zum sehen hat, kann aus dieser einen Tatsache die 
ganze Bedeutung des Deutschtums für die Freiheit entnehmen 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 17). 
[…] wer Augen zum Sehen hat, bezweifelt wohl nicht, daß die 
Vereinigten Staaten und die englischen Kolonien über kurz oder lang 
den gleichen Weg gehen werden (Politische Ideale: 29). 
Here, good eyesight is metaphorically equivalent to the ability to fully understand the 
significance of Germanness for the concept of liberty, for example, or to 
understanding and accepting that Chamberlain’s ideological predictions for the future 
of the USA and the British colonies are beyond doubt. By implying the existence of 
an elite few who do possess good enough ‘eyesight’ to perceive X and, by default, an 
undesirable group of readers who do not, the first and third statements additionally 
constitute an appeal to the elite, a more specific form of ad populum that violates the 
argument scheme rule and the validity rule. 
Good eyesight is thus portrayed as a condition of understanding and realisation. The 
irony is, as the author asserts, that the truth is allegedly ‘in front of our very eyes’; 
that is, the truth is obvious and easily perceived and understood by those with the 
necessary intellectual faculties or adequate eyesight: 
Was den Konflikt zwischen Österreich und Serbien veranlaßt hatte, 
weiß die ganze Welt; was Österreich wollte und warum es dies wollen 
mußte, liegt ebenso offen vor Augen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 71). 
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[…] in Wirklichkeit steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der 
Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu 
entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit, und der Wahn entschwindet 
(Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 36). 
Here, ‘truths’ on a general level, and ‘truths’ such as political motivations and 
intentions are portrayed as obvious, where obviousness is expressed in terms of 
proximity to the human eye (‘offen vor Augen’ and ‘Es liegt ja alles da, vor Augen’). 
The author’s assertion that the truth is in actual fact in plain sight to all alerts the 
readers to their own responsibility for ‘seeing’ or perceiving the truth. 
Correspondingly, it also allows Chamberlain to create a further charitable role for 
himself as the figure who (allegedly) opens the readers’ eyes and directs the strength 
and perspective of their ‘vision’. The war essays contain a number of metaphorical 
vision references to the act of explaining or clarifying: 
Es genügt aber, den Zusammenhang deutlich darzulegen, wie ich es 
jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe 
[…] (Politische Ideale: 22). 
Diese kleine Auswahl aus verschiedenen Lebensstellungen mag für 
heute genügen, jene große, grundlegende Tatsache vor Augen zu 
führen, von der man in allen Blau- und Weiß- und Gelbbüchern der 
Welt kein Sterbenswörtchen erfahren wird (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18). 
The discursive acts of explaining in detail (‘deutlich darlegen’) and of providing 
examples or anecdotes in a discussion are presented as the means by which the 
human eye ‘sees’, i.e. perceives, the facts. These metaphors are examples of 
Chamberlain’s meta-references: these rest on a literal meaning of the process in 
which the eye ‘sees’ the facts, in that the eye of the reader reads the words on the 




Amidst the portrayed affliction of (intellectual) blindness, Chamberlain steps in as a 
figure who can improve and direct the readers’ powers of (in)sight. He makes no 
secret of his intention to do this: 
[…] kaum irgend etwas aber — macht Goethe einmal aufmerksam — 
ist so schwer gut ins Auge zu fassen, wie das, was unmittelbar vor 
Augen liegt; daß es doch gelingen möge, war der Zweck dieser 
Anleitung (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 83). 
In order to construct himself in the role of optician whose aim is to improve the 
readers’ vision/perception, Chamberlain integrates a number of optical exercises and 
adjustments into this discourse. Firstly, a number of declarations and instructions 
pertaining to optical ‘accommodation’ can be identified in the essays – the act of 
varying the distance from which an object is viewed: 
Eine andere Frage tut sich jedoch auf, sobald man den Blick weniger 
ausschließlich auf den allgemeinsten Zusammenhang der 
geschichtlichen Geschehnisse richtet und die Persönlichkeit des 
wunderbaren Mannes näher ins Auge faßt (Deutsches Wesen: 43-44). 
Die Politik Deutschlands seit 1870 und namentlich seitdem der „neue 
Kurs“ eingeschlagen wurde, kann nicht vom Kirchturm des 
einheimischen Dorfes aus übersehen werden; der weltgeschichtliche 
Blick muß geübt werden (Kriegsaufsätze: 88). 
Adjustments of viewing range are constructed by antithetical expressions of distance 
such as ‘vom Kichturm des einheimischen Dorfes’ and ‘der weltgeschichtliche 
Blick’, in conjunction with verbs of seeing, such as (über)sehen and blicken. 
Authorial adjustment of optical distances is particularly explicit in the second 
statement above, in which Chamberlain uses the expressions ‘den Blick auf [X] 




Optical metaphors in Chamberlain’s essays are additionally constructed using 
expressions pertaining to sharpness of vision such as ‘darum erblicken wir dieses um 
so deutlicher’ (Die Zuversicht: 18), and ultimately: 
[…] unter „guten Augen“ haben wir nicht bloß scharfe Augen zu 
verstehen, sondern — wie der französische Text es zeigt — solche, 
die ein ebenmäßiges, unverzerrtes, vom Mittelpunkt bis zum Rand 
klares Gesichtsfeld geben, — der Blick muß rein sein (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 36). 
Sharp eyesight leads to clear vision, and where vision metaphorically represents 
insight, knowledge, and understanding, it also leads to clarity of intellectual 
perception through enhanced powers of understanding. Chamberlain’s essays 
therefore abound with references to Klarheit – a concept that cements the 
metaphorical association between forged between seeing and understanding – found 
in expressions such as ‘bedeutend klarer sehen’ (Politische Ideale: 57), and ‘mit 
wunderbarer Tiefe des Blickes und in vollendeter Klarheit’ (Demokratie und 
Freiheit: 29). 
Multiple references to clarity construct legitimising strategies of theoretical 
rationalisation and expert authority by positing the acquisition of increased 
intellectual clarity as facilitated by the author. Chamberlain explicitly states that his 
essays are motivated at least in part by the aim of achieving clarity when he writes 
‘Wir werden Weite, Tiefe und Klarheit gewinnen’ (Politische Ideale: 11). Despite 
the inclusive pronoun wir, the author does not deem it necessary to achieve clarity 
for himself, but for his readers: he posits himself as the source of information that 
brings the kind of clarity to the readers that has previously been denied to them. The 
seemingly inclusive uns in the first statement below is similary rhetorical; it appears 
to unite the readers and the author in a joint quest for clarity, whereas actually the 
first person pronoun refers only to the readers; the author is already in possession of 
this clarity and leads rather than partakes in the quest. The readers can and will gain 
clarity, he asserts, by reading his essays: 
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Das nun ist die erste Klarheit, die in wachsender „Kläre“ (wie Goethe 
zu sagen liebte) uns jetzt zuteil wird […] (Die Zuversicht: 5). 
Wer jedoch mit mir der uneingeschränkten Verneinung beitritt, die 
der vorige Abschnitt brachte, der befindet sich — so glaube ich 
wenigstens — auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit (Politische Ideale: 
44). 
Und noch ein letztes muß zur vollkommenen Klarlegung der Lage 
gesagt werden […] (Deutsches Wesen: 84). 
These statements are causal: they describe the process of gaining clarity from X. The 
kind of clarity denoted here is intellectual clarity, as it is prompted by information, 
anecdotes and evidential examples: ‘die erste Klarheit’ refers to an ideological claim 
presented as fact. The second statement describes the acquisition of clarity in terms 
of a path/journey metaphor (‘auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit’) where Klarheit 
constitutes the destination of the journey. The route of this journey is necessarily via 
‘die uneingeschränkte Verneinung’, that is, the unmitigated negation of a view or 
proposition that is not compatible with the author’s ideological standpoint. The 
attainment of clarity is thus posited as a consequence of conforming to the author’s 
views. Chamberlain thus posits himself as a figure that provides his readers with 
metaphorical visual clarity by facilitating and directing their powers of vision and 
strengthening their clarity of understanding with his discourse. In the third example 
above, satisfactory understanding of the current wartime situation is expressed in 
terms of clarity (‘vollkommene Klarlegung der Lage’), allegedly achievable through 
discourse or through the act of ‘saying’ or ‘expressing’ (‘muss gesagt werden’), 
which, in the context of Chamberlain’s war propaganda, is tantamount to the act of 
writing. 
8.2.9.5 Chamberlain as Guide 
Chamberlain insinuates that the German people have been misled or led astray by the 
government and the press. He expresses this assertion predominantly in terms of 
journey/path metaphors, where the reader is located as progressing down the wrong 
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path; down a path that differs from the one sole path destined for the German 
people’s progress (see Section 9.2.2). Chamberlain’s role as guide functions on two 
levels: on a rhetorical level, he guides the readers as readers through his essays, and 
on an ideological level, he wishes to lead the readers as Germans to victory and 
triumph.  
As Chamberlain explicitly states, he is a Wegweiser with a ‘destination’, or 
objective: 
[ich möchte] versuchen, den Weg zur Bewunderung und zur Liebe 
dieses außerordentlichen Mannes zu weisen (Deutsches Wesen: 98). 
Nun endlich bin ich, wo ich sein wollte, und hoffe nur, der Leser hat 
nicht unterwegs die Geduld verloren (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 82). 
The essays are also interspersed with verbs of physical progression, as in: 
Den Gang weiter Schritt für Schritt zu verfolgen, ist an diesem Orte 
nicht nötig (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 61). 
Wer jedoch mit mir der uneingeschränkten Verneinung beitritt, die 
der vorige Abschnitt brachte, der befindet sich — so glaube ich 
wenigstens — auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit (Politische Ideale: 
44). 
These verbs are used in reference to the readers’ discursive progression through the 
war essays: der Gang refers to Chamberlain’s discussion of events, and ‘Schritt für 
Schritt verfolgen’ to the act of further stages of discussion. He thus describes his 
ideological explication in terms of physical movement through space, in which 
‘dieser Ort’ positions the current discourse fragment as physical space. Similarly, 
‘der uneingeschränkten Verneinung beitreten’ describes a cognitive process in which 
the reader should align himself with the author’s ideological views, and the 
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continued path metaphor ‘auf dem Wege zu größerer Klarheit’ refers to gaining 
clarity of perception. 
The author thus uses journey metaphors to position the readers as being on a journey 
through his essays. As the author, Chamberlain ‘guides’ the readers on the journey 
through the essays in constructions that combine the inclusive first person plural 
pronoun wir and verbs of movement or resting during a journey: 
Kommen wir also zu neueren Zeiten und hören wir z.B. John Milton, 
den unsterblichen Dichter, den großen Gelehrten, den erfahrenen, 
unerschrockenen Politiker! (Demokratie und Freiheit: 11). 
Doch, dieses Beispiel fällt mir im rechten Augenblick ein; verweilen 
wir hier! Wir werden Weite, Tiefe und Klarheit gewinnen (Politische 
Ideale: 11). 
Wir gelangen zu dem „Mittleren Kreis“ […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 
56). 
The verbs of physical progression kommen and gelangen [zu] and the verb verweilen 
(to sojourn) position the readers and the author as being on a joint journey. The 
destination of these movements is a discursive one; Chamberlain uses these verbs to 
lead the reader to where he wants their thoughts to be ideologically, for example to 
‘recent times’, to a particular example, and to his ideological concept of ‘the centre 
circle’.  
8.3 Justifying the Message 
8.3.1 Strategies of Legitimisation 
Chamberlain employs legitimising strategies in order to focus the readers’ attention 
on the content of his ideological messages. These strategies attempt to legitimise the 
author’s claims through the strategies of theoretical rationalisation based on alleged 
factuality and evidence, through historical legitimisation, through references to the 
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future, through comparison and uniqueness, and through the construction of 
perpetrator and victim roles. 
8.3.1.1 Topoi of Factuality and Evidence 
The corpus analysis has pointed to naturalisations of opinion as fact in the War 
Essays and to Tatsache as one of Chamberlain’s most essential nominal 
modifications: this single word can legitimise the validity of an entire statement by 
rebutting any claims to doubt (cf. Section 8.3.2.3). As Karl Sornig summarises, 
unmitigated apodictic assertions without justification or proof are ‘among the most 
direct and brutal ways of handling [oppositional] views and attitudes’ (Sornig 1989: 
99).  
The following statements are further examples of uncommented factuality in which 
the author describes preceding or ensuing claims as ‘fact’: 
Dieser Ausländer und Neutrale macht hiermit auf die Tatsache 
aufmerksam, daß in Deutschland eine Verschwörung am Werke ist, 
eine in der Hauptsache von Deutschlands Feinden angestellte 
Verschwörung […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 34). 
[…] Das folgt aus der Tatsache, daß Hauptaufgabe des Staates 
offenbar sein muß, das zu leisten, was der Einzelne nicht zu leisten 
vermag (Politische Ideale: 49). 
The sweeping description of ideological claims as facts, such as ‘in Deutschland ist 
eine Verschwörung am Werk’ and ‘Hauptaufgabe des Staates ist, das zu leisten, was 
der Einzelne nicht zu leisten vermag’ is so seamlessly integrated into the statement 
that it is quickly accepted, and its questionableness overlooked. Both statements 
constitute circular reasoning, fallaciously attempting to prove an assertion (e.g. the 
author deserves merit for alerting the readers to a crucial fact) with an assertion (this 
‘fact’ is that there is a conspiracy at work in Germany). This logical fallacy violates 
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the validity and starting-point rules by presenting a premise (‘the subjective opinion 
X is a fact’) as an accepted starting point (Cohen 2003: 109). 
Where the author deems it inadequate to posit a statement’s factual nature simply by 
naming the statement a fact, he adds an intensifier to the noun Tatsache, such as 
‘diese unabweisbare Tatsache’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 38), and ‘die grundlegenden 
Tatsachen’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 7). By drawing the readers’ attention to the 
alleged ‘indubitable’, ‘fundamental’ or ‘irrefutable’ nature of a fact, Chamberlain 
detracts from the necessity of proving the factual nature of these statements by 
emphasising or exaggerating their apparently unquestionable validity. He also 
itensifies the alleged concrete factuality of a claim using allusions to epistemic 
certainty and to ‘facts of nature’, as in: 
Diese Tatsache steht mathematisch fest […] (Ideal und Macht: 20). 
Kein Mensch auf der Welt ist fähig, die hier angeführten Tatsachen zu 
widerlegen; ewige Naturgesetze hören nicht auf zu wirken […] 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 80). 
The factual nature of the claim advanced in the first statement is augmented by the 
assertion that the claim is not just a fact, but a fact of mathematical certainty. Unlike 
ideological speculation and propaganda, mathematical formulae are black and white, 
correct or incorrect: a mathematical fact cannot be argued or disproved. On a more 
abstract level, related references to the laws of nature and human nature aim to 
communicate the same factual absolution. Natural law, as Chamberlain advances in 
the second example, is infinitely and unconditionally valid; lending the claims he 
makes the same kind of unconditional validity as natural law makes them 
untouchable by doubt or argument. This is underscored by the apodictic expression 
‘kein Mensch ist fähig, [X] zu widerlegen’, which attempts to justify the validity of 




Chamberlain’s ‘facts’ are commonly linked to evidential particles: 
[…] nichtsdestoweniger bringt er eine ganze Reihe ergänzender 
Tatsachen zu jenen Delaisis und zwar ausführlich belegt […] 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 63). 
Denn die große mittlere Tatsache, die absolut einfache Tatsache, für 
die es ebenso leicht ist, eine Million Belege beizubringen wie einen 
einzigen Beleg, die Tatsache, auf die allein es ankommt und die man 
sich durch kein diplomatisches Gewäsche je sollte verdunkeln ober 
abschwächen lassen, ist diese […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 16). 
These statements thematise at once Tatsachen and Belege or belegen; facts and 
evidence. Chamberlain’s references to ‘evidence’ for the so-called ‘facts’ that he 
presents, however, are deceptive. As the corpus analysis has shown (Section 8.3.2.3), 
only a minority of references to ‘evidence’ actually provide evidence: the remaining 
references are merely rhetorical fallacies which give the guise of providing 
‘evidence’ simply by naming the word ‘evidence’. A number of key words for this 
substrategy were not identified by Wordsmith: beweisen, nachweisen and bezeugen, 
and a noun deriving from the latter, das Zeugnis. The most frequently occurring 
tendency regarding Chamberlain’s deceptive references to supporting evidence for 
the factuality of his claims is the use of passive constructions, as in: 
Es läßt sich unwiderleglich nachweisen, daß diese Gefühle alle 
Schichten der ganzen Nation beseelten, so daß bis zum letzten 
Augenblick kein Mensch an die Möglichkeit des Krieges glauben 
wollte […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 8). 
The passive construction ‘es läßt sich unwiderleglich nachweisen, dass’ seems to 
express evidence or proof for the claim made. This construction, however, denotes 
provability rather than proof; it describes the potential for a claim to be proven, for 
evidence for X to be found, but they are not indicative of existing proof. There is a 
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significant distinction between the proven factuality of a claim that states or cites 
evidence, and the implication that it is possible to prove the claim. 
8.3.1.2 The Topos of Obviousness 
The author merges so-called ‘facts’ with a portrayed sense of obviousness: 
Über die Tatsache der Schuld Englands hätte ich kaum nötig, mich 
hier näher auszulassen: sie ist ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 39). 
Here, the ‘fact’ of England’s war guilt is construed as so obvious that it is 
unnecessary for the author to elaborate on his allegation. Chamberlain combines 
apodictic expressions of fact and evidence (‘ausführlich beweisbar und bewiesen’), 
with the topos of irrelevance and implied obviousness (‘ich hätte es kaum nötig’) to 
legitimise making a cursory, sweeping statement: ‘die Tatsache der Schuld 
Englands’. The polyptoton ‘beweisbar und bewiesen’ adds to the rhetorical impact of 
Chamberlain’s claim to factuality and proveability. This statement constitutes 
obscurantism – the practice of deliberately preventing the facts or full details of X 
from becoming known – and is a violation of the burden-of-proof rule. Moreover, 
this obscurantism is strategic; the author does not suppress evidence for fear of 
disproving his own claim, but rather rhetorically declares the he is suppressing 
‘unnecessary’ evidence, calling at once on obscurantism and paralepsis, rhetorically 
emphasising a point by seeming to pass over it. 
Indeed, the author periodically exploits the topoi of irrelevance in conjunction with 
obviousness such as ‘muß es denn erst gesagt werden?’ (Die Zuversicht: 15) and: 
Daß es über eine so fesselnde und zugleich so gewaltsam zum 
Widerspruch reizende Persönlichkeit noch viel zu sagen gäbe, bedarf 
keiner Versicherung […] (Deutsches Wesen: 32). 
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‘Es bedarf keiner Versicherung’ and ‘muss es denn erst gesagt werden’ imply that 
the claim and the truth of the claim is so obvious that the author does not need to 
provide any further details. This at once excuses him from having to provide details 
to which he may or may not have access, and lends the claim in question such a great 
sense of obviousness that the reader is unlikely to question it. In the first instance, the 
author is anticipating and countering reader objection on the part of insufficient 
information or insufficient comment, and in the second instance he once again 
exploits the notion of the ideal versus the undesirable reader. 
Chamberlain’s essays feature numerous implications of obviousness, such as ‘auf der 
Hand liegen’ (e.g. Deutsches Wesen: 184), ‘ohne Frage’ (e.g. Kriegsaufsätze: 63), 
and ‘mit vollkommener Gewißheit’ (e.g. Ideal und Macht: 27). These expressions 
attempt to legitimise a claim by insinuating that there is no need for legitimisation; 
that legitimisation and explanation are necessary only for those undesirable readers 
who are unaware or ignorant. These constructions represent the rhetorical fallacy of 
appeal to obviousness. Here, obviousness is used as legitimisation, whereas implied 
obviousness alone is only subjective and far from being legitimising grounds. 
The topos of obviousness is complemented by the topos of doubtlessness. 
Chamberlain formulates assertions of doubtlessness in two ways: as blunt statements, 
and as modal directives. On occasion, doubtlessness is seamlessly integrated into a 
statement as a modifying adjective, as in: 
Im umgekehrten Falle ist die Folge nicht zweifelhaft: das Deutsche 
Reich kann sich — wegen seiner kläglichen geographischen Lage — 
geschwächt unmöglich halten […] (Ideal und Macht: 21). 
Elsewhere, Chamberlain emphatically asserts doubtlessness in the form of directives, 
and particularly modal directives, such as ‘Daß […] kann nicht bezweifelt werden 
[…]’ (Politische Ideale: 52), and ‘an der Aufrichtigkeit dieser Überzeugung haben 
wir kein Recht zu zweifeln […]’ (Politische Ideale: 23). The force behind these 
commands varies: the modal verb können is indicative of a command pertaining to 
the possibility of occurrence – ‘it is not possible to doubt [X]’ – thereby guiding the 
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readers’ thought processes. The sentiment expressed in the second statement, 
however, is more forceful, appealing not to possibility, but to rights.  
8.3.1.3 The Topos of History 
Chamberlain attempts to legitimise the truth and relevance of his claims through 
references to history, to historical events, and to historical figures, broadly 
summarised as the Geschichts-Topos that Wengeler identifies as typical of twentieth 
century German Kriegsbotschaften (Wengeler 2005: 226), and a form ‘theoretical 
rationalisation’ as defined by van Leeuwen (van Leeuwen 2007: 98). Chamberlain 
presents history as a yardstick of epistemic validity. In actual fact, many aspects of 
historical study are a matter of interpretation: history consists of dates, names and 
events, but also of schools of thought and ideologies. 
Using vocabulary denoting teaching and demonstrating such as lehren, belehren and 
zeigen, Chamberlain constructs history as an all-knowing, objective teacher, and a 
neutral point of comparison against which the truth of his claims can be measured: X 
is true, he claims, because it has happened before, as in ‘Wie genau hiermit die 
wahre Bedeutung des Wortes getroffen ist, zeigte die Revolution […]’ (Politische 
Ideale: 34), and ‘wie alle Geschichte es lehrt […]’ (Politische Ideale: 96). This is an 
example of the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (‘if A then B; A, therefore 
B’) and as such constitutes a violation of the pragma-dialectical rules of inference.  
Chamberlain furthermore utilises historical continuity as a legitimising factor, as in 
‘Von Plato und Aristoteles an bis zum heutigen Tage hat jeder Denker in dieser 
Beziehung das gleiche Urteil gefällt […]’ (Demokratie und Freiheit: 68). Such 
statements seek to legitimise the validity of a claim not by alluding to a state or act in 
the past, but by foregrounding the historical continuity of which the claim at hand is 
alleged to be a product. Throughout Chamberlain’s essays, historical continuity is 
used not only to legitimise the truth factor of a claim, but also its moral merits and 
immoral faults. The logical fallacy constructed with expressions such as ‘wie heute, 
so damals’, ‘selbst heute noch’, ‘bis heute’, ‘von Anfang an’ and ‘schon seit Jahren’, 
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suggests not just ‘X is true because it is historically rooted’, but ‘X is good or bad 
because it is historically rooted’. This assertion is an example of circular reasoning 
that fallaciously centres on a double premise, whereby one premise is unexpressed: 
‘X is positive because it is rooted in history’ implies ‘historical tradition is positive’. 
This logical fallacy violates the validity rule (Cohen 2003: 109) as historical tradition 
is not a valid measurement of positive or negative evaluation.  
In reference to the enemy countries England and France, historical continuity is used 
to legitimise negative criticism: 
England verfolgt seit drei Jahrhunderten den Plan, Herr der Welt zu 
werden, sich ein Weltmonopol zu schaffen […] (Ideal und Macht: 
19). 
[…] die politische Theorie Englands lautet seit zwei Jahrhunderten: 
wir Inselvolk haben nur so lange Macht, als wir Allmacht besitzen 
(NeueKriegsaufsätze: 19). 
In the majority of cases, historical continuity as legitimisation of the negative is used 
to accentuate aggressive tenacity; that is, an unyielding desire for destruction, 
incessant and purposeful diplomatic agitation, and obstinate imperialism. These 
statements attempt to legitimise condemning claims regarding enemy behaviour by 
equating historical continuity with recalcitrant stubbornness.  
Elsewhere, Chamberlain infuses references to historical continuity with positive 
evaluation as befits his ideological opinion, as in: 
Diese Idee muß schon Jahrtausende vor den ältesten uns erhaltenen 
Zeugnissen menschlicher Kultur erfaßt und dann andauernd von 
Tausenden in aufeinanderfolgenden Generationen beharrlich gepflegt 
worden sein […] (Politische Ideale: 12). 
[…] hätten unsere Vorfahren sich alle durch diesen Einwurf 
abschrecken lassen, wir besäßen noch heute kein Brot, kein Gemüse, 
keine Viehzucht […] (Politische Ideale: 28). 
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These statements present historical continuity as estimable, associating it with 
innovation and productivity. Here, historical continuity symbolises admirable 
perseverance. Chamberlain thus modifies his evaluation of historical continuity in 
accordance with his ideological standpoint: continuity in relation to the enemy 
countries is negatively evaluated, whereas continuity in relation to Germany is 
represented positively. 
The positive value that Chamberlain assigns to historical tradition and continuity is 
most evident in his attempts to construct and motivate German national cohesion, or 
‘nation building’. For Chamberlain, German historical tradition is synonymous with 
superiority, prestige and strength: 
[…] die deutsche Heeresorganisation war zuerst eine Idee in den 
Hirnen einzelner Männer, ehe sie im Laufe eines Jahrhunderts zu dem 
wurde, was wir heute staunend bewundern; und weil sie eine Idee 
war, darum haben Tausende freudig an ihrer Verwirklichung 
gearbeitet (Kriegsaufsätze: 38). 
Und auf diesem reichen Boden hat nun „der Geist sich offenbart“ in 
einer solchen seit Jahrhunderten ununterbrochenen Fülle, daß auch der 
Inhalt der deutschen Sprache heute einzig dasteht (Kriegsaufsätze: 
30). 
As illustrated by the statements cited above, Chamberlain particularly emphasises the 
historical tradition of nationalist institutions such as the German language and 
military. He additionally foregrounds the historical tradition of ‘Germanness’ (das 
Deutschtum, das Germanentum, das Echtdeutsche), as in: 
[…] ins alte echte Land, von wo das Deutschtum ausgegangen war 
[…] (Kriegsaufsätze: 82). 
[…] doch leben noch große Traditionen aus dem echten alten 
Germanentum in dieser Versammlung fort […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 40). 
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Here, historical tradition is associated with the positive adjectives echt, groß and 
unvergleichlich. The author is keen to mark not only the ancient roots of the physical 
entity that is Germany or previously Germanic territory, but also of the abstract 
human-centric concept that is ‘Germanness’: the author incites nationalist sentiment 
by advocating admiration of long-standing national German institutions, but also of 
the ancient roots and perseverance of what he calls the German 
Volksseelengeschichte (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 86). 
8.3.2 Strategies of Influence and Coercion 
Chamberlain’s strategies of influence and coercion aim to focus the readers’ thoughts 
and attention on the content of his ideological messages. Coercive acts refer to 
threats, intimidation, and use of pressure or force. Strategies of coercion in 
Chamberlain’s essays are any discursive strategies by which he attempts to apply 
(verbal) force; to charge his statements with particular power or compulsion in order 
to incite the reader’s conviction. These include the use of hyperbole, intensifiers, 
legitimising strategies of instrumental rationalisation – the notion of ‘the only way’, 
the use of path metaphors and the creation of alarm through existential appeals – the 
topos of necessity and modal commands. 
8.3.2.1 Hyperbole 
Chamberlain’s use of hyperbolic expressions in the service of coercion 
predominantly concerns generic pronouns and generic adverbs of place. This is 
symptomatic of the frequent occurrence of argumentum ad populum in 
Chamberlain’s strategies of coercion; the attempt to exert pressure on anybody who 
may have different views to the author by appealing to the alleged majority view 
compatible with the author’s standpoint. The most frequently occurring generic 
pronoun is jeder; an inclusive pronoun which denotes comprehensive applicability to 
everybody, everywhere. In this context, jeder frequently co-occurs with the verbs 
wissen and kennen, as in: 
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Heute weiß jeder Deutsche auf dem ganzen Erdrunde, wo der 
Anfangspunkt des furchtbaren Krieges liegt […] (Hammer oder 
Amboß: 38). 
Was alles Deutschland seit jenem Augenblick zu erdulden gehabt hat, 
steht in aller Erinnerung; jeder weiß auch, wie es seine Friedensliebe 
immer wieder und immer wieder bewährt hat (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 
62). 
These statements attempt to convince the reader of the truth of a proposition through 
the logical fallacy argumentum ad populum. This fallacy insinuates that a certain 
proposition is held to be true by everybody, or at least by a significant majority, and 
that it therefore it must be true. This fallacy crucially aims to strengthen the 
epistemic status of a given assumption by insinuating that if many people hold a 
given belief, this is adequate evidence in its favour (Oswald 2011: 811).  
Generic adverbs of place achieve a similar effect. The expressions allerorts and 
allerorten express a sense of all-encompassing geographical validity, and enjoy 
particular popularity in Chamberlain’s nationalist discourse: 
[…] jeder verkehrt mit jedem unmittelbar an zwei verschiedenen 
Orten und — über das, was hier verhandelt wurde — mittelbar an drei 
weiteren Orten, ebenso geschieht es aber zu gleicher Zeit unmittelbar 
und mittelbar in jeder der anderen Hauptstädte […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 65). 
[…] vielmehr hörte ich immer und überall davon reden […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 25). 
Describing the topographical sites in which X is true in inclusive terms of 
‘everywhere’ compels the reader to believe that X is true by constructing a pair of 
extreme opposites that can be easily conceptualised: generic adverbs of place such as 
‘everywhere’ and ‘nowhere’ have an unequivocal frame of reference; the reader must 
conceptualise only simple, black and white polarised concepts, and is thus more 
likely to engage with and internalise the author’s proposition. This device constitutes 
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the rhetorical fault of false dichotomy, and violates the pragma-dialectical rules of 
validity and starting-point. 
Universal negation in the form of ‘nirgendswo ein vereinzelter Deutscher’ and ‘in 
keinem Land’, for example, is also abundant in Chamberlain’s essays, as in: 
Und dennoch keine Rache, keine Blutgier, nicht ein einziger Fall, 
nirgendswo ein vereinzelter Deutscher, der, unbeachtet, fern von aller 
zügelnden Disziplin, einen schlafenden oder einen verirrten 
Franzmann meuchelmörderisch überfallen hätte; unter Millionen 
Einwohnern nicht einer! (Kriegsaufsätze: 68). 
[…] darum findet in keinem Land echtes Talent schneller 
Anerkennung und Förderung […] (Die Zuversicht: 8). 
Chamberlain furthermore lends his claims emphatic weighting through the binary 
opposites ‘everything’/‘all’ and ‘nothing’/‘none’. Key words here are alles/alle, 
ganz/gänzlich, and sämtlich: 
[…] der Deutsche hat Alles getan, was menschenmöglich war […] 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 24). 
[…] alle nur denkbaren Beziehungen […] (Ideal und Macht: 12). 
In sämtlichen Erscheinungen der Natur, ohne Ausnahme […] 
(Politische Ideale: 48). 
Chamberlain’s predilection for hyperbole additionally manifests itself in his choice 
of adjectives and adverbs. Not only do his essays abound with intensifiers such as 
ganz, ganz und gar, gänzlich and vollends, but with expressions of immeasurability 




[…] es handelt sich um eine allgemeine Seelenstimmung der 
Engländer; diese Stimmung erweist sich uns als zugleich verblüffend 
einfach und haarsträubend zynisch; andrerseits darf man nicht ihre 
unermeßliche Naivität übersehen, denn das ist der rettende Zug daran 
(Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18). 
Die Idee, Korn anzubauen, zeugt von tausendmal mehr Genie, 
erfordert tausendmal mehr unbegreifliche Schöpferkraft der Phantasie 
und birgt in sich für die Geschichte des Menschengeistes tausendmal 
mehr Bedeutung als irgend eine der gerühmten Erfindungen und 
Entdeckungen unserer Tage (Politische Ideale: 11). 
Hyperbolic descriptions of immeasurability and numerousness aim to cement an 
ideological proposition by framing the issue at hand in terms of uppermost and 
lowermost parameters, Chamberlain removes the possibility of any negotiation: 
beyond and between the extremes there is nothing, thus there is no room for 
argument. 
As identified in preliminary close-readings (see Chapter 7), the sense of emphatic 
absolutism that permeates Chamberlain’s nationalist propaganda is heightened by a 
series of affective adjectives and adverbs. These modifiers are used to express force, 
for example by alluding to brutality and monstrousness as in ‘Die ungeheure 
Tatsache des europäischen Krieges’ […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 9), ‘Welches ungestaltete 
monströse Chaos stellt Rußland dar’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 40), and ‘ohne den ungeheuer 
angewachsenen Einfluß der Presse war es unmöglich, diese Teufelslist überhaupt zu 
ersinnen […]’ (Die Zuversicht: 4) (in which the compound noun Teufelslist carries 
strong undertones of  anti-Semitism, cf. Hortzitz 1988: 122-125). Affective modifiers 
are furthermore used to heighten a sense of the ‘horrific’ and of the ‘hair-raising’, for 
example, in descriptions such as ‘den schauererregenden Beisatz „Mann von Blut 
und Eisen“[…]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 86), and ‘verblüffend einfach und haarsträubend 
zynisch […]’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 18). The emphatic force of affective adjectives 
is particularly effective in lists. Adjectives that fulfil this function are used by 




[…] durch eine beispiellose Reihe tüchtiger, bedeutender, 
hervorragender, zum teil heroischer Geister […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 25). 
[…] um einen Vernichtungskampf gegen das Redliche, das Emsige, 
das nach Veredlung Strebende, das Hochgemute, das Heiligernste zu 
führen […] (Die Zuversicht: 6). 
8.3.2.2 Stipulating the Readers’ Thoughts and Reactions 
The most compelling strategies by which the author focuses the readers’ thoughts 
and attention on the content of his ideological messages are strategies of stipulation. 
These strategies function on a rhetorical level as they address the readers in their role 
as readers, and are concerned with cognitive processes, e.g. understanding, 
perceiving and learning. In their most blatant form, strategies of stipulation take the 
form of modal directives. Chamberlain’s nationalist discourse evidences two kinds of 
modal directives: those which function on a rhetorical level and address the readers’ 
processes of thought and perception, and those which address the ideological 
situation and issue instructions regarding how to proceed in order to negotiate a 
German victory. For the purposes of the present analysis, modal directives are 
deemed to be coercive because they only entertain one option; there is no room for 
compromise or alternatives. The modal verb müssen also invariably portrays a sense 
of necessity. The singularity of the commands discussed in the following is viewed 
as a coercive force. 
Chamberlain also employs imperatives to this end. He expresses these most directly 
in simple imperative statements rounded off by an exclamation mark, as in: ‘Weg mit 
französischen und englischen Vorbildern!’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 41), and ‘Der neuen Zeit 
die neuen Ziele und die neuen Methoden!’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 43). The modal verb 
müssen plays a significant role here, whereas its weaker counterpart sollen rarely 
occurs in coercive imperatives: 




Dieses Gesetz muß jetzt gemacht werden: Lügner, die den Frieden 
Europas gefährden, müssen gehängt werden! (Kriegsaufsätze: 11). 
Modal parallelisms are particularly emphatic expressions of coercive imperatives, for 
example: 
Will Deutschland als politische Macht ähnliche Erfolge erzielen wie 
als militärische Macht, so muß es hier gründlich aufräumen und für 
neue Bedürfnisse neue Formen, neue Methoden finden und erfinden 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 39). 
The construction ‘will [X], so muss [Y]’ juxtaposes the desirable objective (‘als 
politische Macht Erfolge erzielen’) in a conditional parallel, making the former seem 
a non-negotiable condition of the latter. 
Lists of modal verbs within commands carry a similarly effective coercive force: 
Deutschland muß die erste Macht der Welt werden, Deutschland kann 
die erste Macht der Welt werden, und Deutschland wird — wenn es 
nur will — die erste Macht der Welt werden (Ideal und Macht: 35). 
[…] darum kann und soll und muß und wird es neue Formen des 
politischen Lebens gebären (Kriegsaufsätze: 41). 
Notably, the modal repetition in the first statement is a climactic tricolon; three 
parallel words arranged in order of increasing importance or assertive force. 
Although the modal repetition in the second statement has four parts, its rhetorical 
impact similarly lies in the increasing urgency of the elements in the scalar 
construction: ‘kann und soll und muß und wird’ orders the modal verbs in climactic 
order of least to most compelling, starting with the hypothetical verb of potential 
kann, and ending with the verb of inevitable reality, wird. 
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Modal imperatives frequently feature in conditional sentences that make X 
dependent on Y, where X represents the desired ideological accomplishment, and Y 
represents the means by which Chamberlain believes this can be achieved. The 
majority of these constructions rest on the subordinating conjunction sonst, as in: 
Jetzt aber muß es anders werden, sonst unterliegt das politische 
Deutschland trotz aller Siege des militärischen Deutschlands 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 42). 
Indem der Deutsche, ob er es will oder nicht, zu Gottes Streiter 
gestempelt wird, muß er das Niederträchtige aus seinem eigenen 
Busen verbannen; sonst schwindet alle Zuversicht (Die Zuversicht: 
12). 
Imperatives additionally take the form of haben zu constructions. Although these 
rouses to action do not contain a modal verb, their mandative force is equally as 
powerful:  
In dieser Beziehung haben wir — und mit uns unsere 
Rechtssprechung — gründlich umzulernen (Politische Ideale: 104). 
Paul de Lagarde, den wir als das ergänzende politische Genie zu 
Bismarck zu verehren haben […] (Politische Ideale: 114). 
Again, these commands address the readers’ intellect; namely the necessity of 
‘relearning’ X, and whom they should admire. 
The effect of these statements is augmented by the directive construction ‘es gilt, [X] 
zu [Y]’, as well as mandative statements which declare the reader’s duty or 
obligation (Pflicht): 




[…] hier wird es dann Pflichtgebot, sich seines Tuns bewußt zu 
werden: und dazu gehört, daß man seine Ideale, seine Ideen und seine 
Ziele sich als Bekenntnis, als Gedanken, als Entschluß klar vor Augen 
hinstelle (Politische Ideale: 21). 
Chamberlain therefore uses commands in order to direct the readers’ thoughts, and to 
stipulate their ideological perceptions. Imperative forms and the use of the modal 
verb müssen are perhaps the most direct and overt forms of stipulation. Elsewhere, 
Chamberlain stipulates the readers’ thoughts simply by integrating the inclusive third 
person pronoun wir and the pronoun man. Chamberlain makes a variety of 
statements pertaining to ‘our’ knowledge, understanding and feelings, as in: 
Man begreift, welche besonders tief einschneidenden Folgen das 
Verbot, die deutsche Sprache zu lernen, für die Beziehungen zwischen 
England und Deutschland nach sich ziehen mußte (Neue Kriegs-
aufsätze: 16). 
[…] so haben wir in allererster Reihe eine Art physische, brutale, 
blinde Kraft zu verstehen, welche dieses ungeheuere, gestaltlose 
Reich treibt […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 44). 
Gewiß empfinden wir es hart […] (Die Zuversicht: 21). 
These statements transfer the author’s ideological perception of the subject or 
situation onto the reader, or at least imply that this perception is mutual. This transfer 
is subtle, as it rests solely on the pronoun wir or man. In actual fact, the author is 
dictating to the reader how they perceive (begreifen, verstehen), what they know 
(wissen), and what they feel (empfinden). 
The same applies to statements featuring the verb phrases ‘wir sehen’ or ‘man sieht’, 
as in: 
Wir sehen: damit eine Nation wahrhaft Großes leiste, dazu muß 
dreierlei zusammentreffen […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 37). 
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Man sieht also: erkennen wir in dieser ganzen von Eduard VII. und 
seinen Kreaturen ins Werk gesetzten Bewegung einen 
verhängnisvollen, verbrecherischen Wahn, so war doch, wie bei 
Hamlet’s Wahnsinn, ‘viel Methode drin’ […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 
12). 
The verb sehen, in these contexts equivalent to the verbs ‘to realise’ or ‘to 
understand’, takes over the readers’ independent thought by dictating to them their 
realisations and perceptions. The second extract additionally violates the argument 
scheme rule by appealing to illegitimate authority twice: in his discussion of the 
English preference for learning to speak the French language rather than German, 
Chamberlain calls on two familiar names that, although figures of authority in their 
own right (King Eduard VII and Shakespeare, indirectly), do not contribute anything 
to his argumentation beyond lending it the guise of authority via (irrelevant) cultural 
reference. 
Chamberlain furthermore stipulates the cognitive effect on the reader of the 
information or claims he provides, or the way in which this information is processed. 
In relation to anecdotes, ‘evidence’ and intertextual citations, Chamberlain infers that 
the readers can, should and do ‘learn’ from these: 
Auch hierfür möchte ich zum Schluß – und da Ausführlichkeit 
ausgeschlossen ist – ein Beispiel greifbar hinstellen; der Leser wird 
einsehen lernen, auf welche Wege oder vielmehr Abwege England 
geraten ist (Kriegsaufsätze: 63). 
An diesem Beispiel hat der Leser lernen können, mit welcher Vorsicht 
und Umsicht man solche diplomatische Dokumente lesen muß (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 83). 
Again, such statements remove the readers’ powers of independent thought by 
dictating the effect that an anecdote, example, or source should have on the reader: 
they can, should and do learn X from Y.  
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Chamberlain stipulates to his readers not only what to think, but also what not to 
think. He explicitly characterises conceptions and interpretations that do not align 
with his own ideological standpoint as irrig and unweis, as in ‘es wäre aber irrig, 
irgend eine historische Begründung dieses Hasses zu suchen […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 
86), and ‘Nichts wäre unweiser, als sich dieser Einsicht zu verschließen’ (Ideal und 
Macht: 11). 
The most forceful negative stipulations of all are those that accuse anybody who 
dares to entertain a different opinion to the author as stupid: 
Wir wollen nicht dumm-stolz sein; wir wollen uns namentlich nicht 
einbilden, Eisenbahn, Telegraphie, Luftschiffe, Riesendampfer, 
Kraftwagen, Anilinfarben usw. usw. bedeuteten an und für sich in 
irgend einem Sinne des Wortes für das Menschengeschlecht einen 
„Fortschritt“ […] (Politische Ideale: 18). 
[…] die Wissenschaft war es, die die Schlachten für sie schlug, die die 
Eroberungen machte, namentlich aber, die dem Unternehmen einen 
moralischen Hintergrund schuf, den es sehr töricht wäre gering zu 
schätzen (Ideal und Macht: 6). 
Here, Chamberlain’s accusations of stupidity are rhetorical; that is, they address the 
readers’ intellectual conceptions and interpretations (einbilden, ‘gering schätzen’). 
The author equates alternative conceptions to his own as intellectually inferior, 
thereby coercing the readers, who learn throughout the essays to covet the 
intelligence that they allegedly lack, away from their own views and interpretations 
and towards those of the author. 
8.3.2.3 Journey Metaphors 
Chamberlain’s journey metaphors delineate a single route to success, blocking or 
undermining alternative routes. In the journey metaphors identified in Chamberlain’s 
nationalist discourse, the path represents a particular way of thinking or behaving, 
thus journey metaphors can be said to enforce assent to the author’s ideology by 
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denouncing any other way of thinking by insisting on the existence of one singular 
correct way of thinking or behaving. 
Chamberlain constructs an image of a multitude of paths equivalent to a labyrinth. 
The labyrinth metaphor is suggested by references to Irrgärten and Irrwege, as in: 
[…] wer dagegen den Blick an den größeren, gewisseren, 
überpersönlichen Gesamterscheinungen geübt hat, wird nicht so leicht 
zu verhexen sein in diesem verteufelten diplomatischen Irrgarten 
(Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 67). 
Deutschland – zu hohen Dingen befähigt und berufen – ist heute auf 
Irrwege geraten und zu einem Sklaven des Revolutionsideals 
herabgesunken […] (Demokratie und Freiheit: 72). 
For Germany and the Germans, therefore, a multitude of paths exist, but, as in a 
labyrinth, only one path is the correct one. Accordingly, Chamberlain construes a 
single correct path for the Germans. This path is portrayed as specific to Germany 
and different from the ‘French path’, for example, where the ‘French path’ denotes 
the route paved by French democracy, as in ‘Dieser Weg – das genaue Gegenstück 
zu dem französischen – ist der einzige, der zum Erfolg führen kann’ (Demokratie 
und Freiheit: 28). 
The destination of the ‘German path’ varies according to Chamberlain’s respective 
ideological concern. In general, the destination or objective is an ideal or ideals 
advocated by the author. These ideals are, more specifically, ‘new’ socio-political 
ideals: 
Neue Ideale sind nicht auf alten Wegen zu erreichen […] 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 38). 
Nur klar bewußtes Erfassen neuer politisch-sozialer Richtlinien und 
entschlossen furchtloses Beschreiten dieser Wege gewährleisten die 
schließliche Erreichung des Zieles (Politische Ideale: 25). 
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The journey metaphor is particularly prominent in the second statement, in which 
Chamberlain discusses German socio-political objectives not only in terms of Wege, 
but also in terms of ‘die Erreichung des Zieles’, which can mean both ‘to accomplish 
a purpose’ and ‘to reach a destination’. 
Chamberlain’s journey metaphors often delineate the way to achieve one socio-
political ideal in particular – Freiheit: 
Wir dagegen erfahren, auf welchen Wegen Freiheit erworben wird 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 21). 
[…] um so deutlicher erblicke ich diesen deutschen Mann als den 
größten Mann der Weltgeschichte, sein Wirken als den ersten 
Wendepunkt auf dem Wege zur Freiheit – denn Luther hat die Binde 
von den Augen gelöst, die uns Menschen seit urältesten 
vorgeschichtlichen Zeiten in furchtsamer Dumpfheit gefangen hielt 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 18). 
The coercive effect of Chamberlain’s journey metaphors is augmented by references 
to navigation (steuern), as in ‘einzig Bismarck steuerte zwischen beiden Klippen 
geradeaus’ (Deutsches Wesen: 40), and ‘Wohin diese Fahrt steuert, ist klar […]’ 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 9). Chamberlain’s journey metaphors attempt to coerce the 
reader into believing that there is only one ‘route’ to triumph: the route prescribed by 
the author. Chamberlain additionally attempts to make this route not just unique, but 
exclusive: there is only one correct route for the German people, and this path is only 
accessible to the ‘right’ kind of German people: 
Dieser Weg kann aber nie zurückgelegt werden, wenn er nicht einmal 
eingeschlagen wird; einschlagen können ihn nur Menschen, welche 
verstehen, worauf es ankommt (Demokratie und Freiheit: 17). 
This statement forges a connection between Germany’s destined ‘path’ and the 
division between ideal and undesirable Germans and readers, appealing to vanity and 
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the innate wish to belong to the ‘elite’ group (Gruppenegoismus), also known as 
argumentum ad superbiam (cf. 8.2.3). By appealing to the readers’ vanity via the 
innate wish to belong to the desirable elite, the readers learn to covet this alleged 
path not only because it is the best and correct route, but also because only those who 
possess the intellectual strength and power of perception (‘nur Menschen, welche 
verstehen, worauf es ankommt’) are able to journey down this path. Chamberlain 
thereby unites the notion of German destiny with uncompromisingly singular 
methods of reaching this and with the notion of the ideal German and reader. 
8.3.2.4 The Topos of Necessity 
The coercive strategies discussed above additionally function as a solid background 
against which to herald the necessity of a particular view or action. The portrayed 
uniqueness of the times and the looming threat and danger to the existence of 
Germany and Germanness enables the author to exploit the topos of necessity 
identified by Wengeler to be conventional in twentieth century German 
Kriegsbotschaften (Wengeler 2005: 221). The topos of necessity is coercive because 
it carries strong connotations of obligation, of moral duty, and the implication of 
being indispensable; that is, that X cannot possibly be otherwise. The topos of 
necessity is thus connected to Chamberlain’s unconditional construction of ‘the only 
way’, and to his singular path metaphors. Although the topos of necessity has a 
compelling motivational force in itself, the author further heightens its coercive force 
in two ways. Firstly, he employs the compound noun Naturnotwendigkeit, using the 
concept of Natur to add weighting to the existing sense of obligation: 
[…] aus dem Dreibund Ungehorsam, Unehrerbietigkeit, Haß entsteht 
mit Naturnotwendigkeit Tyrannei, Mittelmäßigkeit, Herzlosigkeit; 
womit ich sagen will: despotische Regierung, Unterdrückung des 
Bedeutenden, Abstumpfung des öffentlichen Wesens gegen 
Ungerechtigkeit und überhaupt gegen Unrecht und gegen Leiden 
(Politische Ideale: 35). 
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Pairing the notion of necessity with the concept of nature or natural law augments the 
effect of the assertion that X is necessary as nature and natural law are 
unchallengeable; they typify the fundamental state of being. Notwendigkeit is 
additionally modified by uncompromising adjectives such as ‘die zwingende 
Notwendigkeit’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 32), ‘mit unentrinnbarer Notwendigkeit’ (Politische 
Ideale: 32), or ‘mit mathematischer Notwenidgkeit’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 20). 
The topos of necessity carries such coercive force because it implies a universal 
standard of urgency. This force is not man-made, but a natural, moral concept. Being 
subject to the laws of necessity is being subject to a fundamental moral standard that 
dictates human obligation or duty from above. Against a backdrop of urgency and 
alarm, Chamberlain’s assertion of personal obligation therefore seems entirely 
feasible: 
[…] berechtigt - ja, wenn die Not groß wird, verpflichtet […] 
(Hammer oder Amboß: 11). 
[…] hier wird es dann Pflichtgebot, sich seines Tuns bewußt zu 
werden: und dazu gehört, daß man seine Ideale, seine Ideen und seine 
Ziele sich als Bekenntnis, als Gedanken, als Entschluß klar vor Augen 
hinstelle. Ein solcher Augenblick - so behaupte ich — ist jetzt da 
(Politische Ideale: 21). 
8.3.2.5 Topoi of Urgency and Immediacy 
Chamberlain employs a number of strategies that compel the reader to assent by 
instilling a sense of alarm, awe and fear; three emotions that quickly motivate action 
or a change in thought or behaviour. Chamberlain attempts to substantiate his 
arguments with the topos of threat to human existence by making existential appeals 
to the readers based on threat and danger, and personal appeals which foreground 
human existence and its fragility. This is a form of the Endpunkt-Topos identified by 
Wengeler to be typical of twentieth century German Kriegsbotschaften (Wengeler 
2005: 223), and of instrumental rationalisation that legitimises a practice in terms of 
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goals and purposes (albeit here where 'not' to end up, rather than where to end up – 
alleged danger that the Germans will run into if they do ‘not’ to X). These appeals 
are made against a background of the urgency and immediacy of the present 
moment. Chamberlain is keen to emphasise the present as a decisive era in time: 
[…] keine leichte, unterhaltende Lektüre nach Art des Wells bietet, 
dafür aber echt deutsche, wissenschaftlich gründliche Belehrung, wie 
sie in einem entscheidenden Augenblick, wie dem gegenwärtigen, 
jedem Deutschen not tut (Demokratie und Freiheit: 43). 
The use of the adverb of time ‘in Augenblicken wie der jetzige mehr denn je’ 
positions the Germans in the midst of a unique epoch. The dramatic tension of this 
assertion is heightened by the portrayal of the current times as transitional, as in: 
Man verkleinere doch nicht den Horizont, der sich plötzlich vor uns 
aufgetan hat! Ich höre viel von einer ‘großen Zeit’ reden; sie ist noch 
nicht da, sie kommt erst; wir sind in die Vorschule zu einer großen 
Zeit eingetreten (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 92). 
Hat aber die Weltgeschichte große Umwälzungen herbeigeführt, steht 
der Mensch mitten inne zwischen zwei Epochen, also in einem 
Übergangszustand, wie das heute der Fall ist (Politische Ideale: 26). 
The portrayed transitional nature of the times is critical because it is a unique and 
significant phenomenon in itself, but also because of what is to come: Chamberlain 
situates the German people in a ‘Vorschule zu einer großen Zeit’, thereby 
simultaneously inciting both a sense of critical distinction, and anticipatory awe of 
the great future that is allegedly nearing. 
Indeed, the connection that Chamberlain forges between the present and the future 
contributes significantly to his assertion that the present moment is decisive. In what 
Wengeler would call a ‘Solidaritätsappell nach innen’ (Wengeler 2005: 217) 
Chamberlain advances that the future is dependent on action taken in the here and 
 
 220 
now in order to attune them to the seriousness of the situation: ‘Geschieht es jetzt 
nicht, so ist es für alle Zeiten zu spät […]’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 51). This 
conditional sentence functions through an almost monosyllabic parallelism that 
expresses authority and definitiveness. Jetzt is mirrored by ‘für alle Zeiten’, bringing 
the two chronological concepts into conjunction with each other, and the threat that 
not acting quickly enough could have irreversible consequences creates a sense of 
alarm and foreboding. 
Chamberlain heightens the sense of alarm created by emphasising the decisiveness of 
the present moment by a series of existential appeals alluding to threat and danger. 
The author reminds the readers that they are living in the midst of a war, and of the 
danger and precariousness that accompany this: 
[…] von dem Augenblick ab, wo die Wendung zum Seehandel 
stattfand, [hub] auch eine Änderung des im Laufe von fünf 
Jahrhunderten deutlich herausgebildeten Gesamtwesens [an], die im 
letzten Ende zu der Katastrophe führen mußte, zu der Katastrophe 
führen mußte, deren Anfang wir heute erleben (Kriegsaufsätze: 47). 
The rhetorical impact of this statement lies particulary in the anadiplotic repetition of 
the noun Katastrophe, which underscores the outbreak of catastrophe by repeating 
the verb phrase ‘zu der Katastrophe führen [mußte]’ in immediate succession at the 
end of one clause and the beginning of the next. Yet more effective in their attempt 
to compel assent though fear and alarm are those strategies that combine references 
to the here and now with direct references to danger, as in ‘die Lebensgefahr des 
gegenwärtigen Augenblicks […]’ (Ideal und Macht: 11), and ‘eine ebensolche ewig 
drohende, brutale Gefahr […]’ (Hammer oder Amboß: 55). The sense of danger 
portrayed by Gefahr is augmented by the adjective phrase ‘ewig drohend’, which 
adds to this sense of danger the notion of eternal threat.  
Chamberlain’s threats of catastrophe and the unknown are compelled by a dual force: 
on the one hand, the threat of impending catastrophe looms on the horizon; a vague 
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force or shadow. On the other hand, this catastrophe is portrayed as approaching with 
great speed: 
Ungleich bedrohlicher färbt sich der Horizont, sobald wir die Augen 
nach Russland Wenden […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 55). 
[…] doch geht die hinabrollende Bewegung jetzt so rasend schnell, 
daß die Katastrophe schon sichtbar am Horizonte dämmert (Politische 
Ideale: 37). 
The threatening force portrayed here is at once a barely visible glimmer on the 
horizon, and the product of ‘eine hinabrollende Bewegung’. The notion of rolling 
downhill creates an image of unstoppable, uncontrolled movement. The coercive 
force of this future threat thus lies at once in its looming presence and the 
uncontrollable inevitability with which it is speeding towards Germany and the 
German people. 
The exact nature of this threat is primarily the threat of the destruction or annihilation 
of the German nation, as in: 
Ein einziges solches Beispiel sollte, weiß Gott, genügen, die 
Deutschen den unermeßlichen Wert empfinden zu lassen dessen, was 
sie in jahrhundertelangem Ringen sich innerlich und äußerlich als 
heiliges Gut erworben haben — il y a des juges à Berlin! — und 
ihnen die Augen zu öffnen über den Abgrund, in den man sie 
hineinstürzen will (Demokratie und Freiheit: 42). 
Auf der einen Seite winkt eine stolze, würdige, ja, eine erhabene 
Zukunft; auf der anderen droht ein Ende mit Schande (Demokratie 
und Freiheit: 83). 
As illustrated by the extracts cited above, Chamberlain makes particular use of the 
notion of potential destruction, and of ‘the end’ of Germany, expressed by both Ende 
and Abgrund, the latter of which represents ‘the end’ in spatial terms by creating the 
image of decent into a bottomless abyss. The verb phrase ‘in den Abgrund stürzen’ 
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has been identified by Hortzitz as characteristic of contemporary anti-Semitic 
discourse (Hortzitz 1988: 129), a metaphorical allusion to what was portrayed as the 
immanent ruin that may be inflicted on the German Volk if no action was taken to rid 
it of Jewish influences. The alarm created by the prospect of an end to the German 
nation is augmented by metaphorical references to the life and death of the nation. 
This is a form of Wengeler’s Endpunkt-Topos (Wengeler 2005: 223) and is 
particularly notable in the essay collection Hammer oder Amboß, in which Germany 
the physical nation is constructed as fighting for its existence in terms of life and 
death: 
[…] auf diesem Wege würde ein siegreiches Deutschland sich 
eigenhändig sein Grab schaufeln. Und solche Ungedanken hält ein 
bedeutender und einflußreicher Teil der deutschen Öffentlichkeit für 
erörterungswert und vielversprechend! (Hammer oder Amboß: 10). 
Da ist es nicht anders möglich, als daß jeder denkende brave Mann 
verwirrt wird und sich an die Stirn greift: Ja, zum Henker! Kämpfe ich 
um mein Leben, oder kämpfe ich nicht um mein Leben? Gehtʼs um 
Deutschlands Dasein oder gehtʼs nicht darum? (Hammer oder Amboß: 
12). 
In order to make the concept of the destruction of Germany the national entity 
tangible to his readers, Chamberlain reifies the German nation as an organic entity 
with a lifespan such as that of a human being: the personification of the German 
nation eases the readers’ conceptualisation of its continuation or destruction by 
relating it to life processes with which they are familiar. 
While the First World War was in itself a life or death situation, the kind of existence 
and survival thematised by Chamberlain is not the life and death of soldiers on the 
battlefield, but of the German nation, and of humankind itself. In order to heighten 
the sense of urgency and alarm which function to compel a change in the readers’ 
attitude or behaviour, Chamberlain refocuses the metaphor of life and death, that is, 
the triumph or destruction of the German nation (the ‘body politic’), onto the triumph 
or destruction of humanity. His concern here is not with the physical survival of 
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human race around the world, but with the propagation of abstract values that he 
asserts are crucial pillars of humanity. 
Chamberlain’s war propaganda essays are interspersed with general references to 
humanity and human existence, as in: 
[…] die Menschen sind von Geburt frei und bleiben frei: das ist doch 
ein Hohn auf alle Wirklichkeit. Kein Tier auf Erden tritt so elend 
hilfsbedürftig ins Leben wie der Mensch […] (Politische Ideale: 30). 
The motif of human existence is complemented by inclusive references that address 
the reader’s status as a human being: 
[…] alle Sehnen des Geistes stramm fast bis zum Reißen gespannt 
hält, wissend – oder halbbewußt ahnend – daß der Kampf um eine 
Welt geht, um alles, was es uns wert macht, ‘Mensch’ zu sein […] 
(Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 86). 
[…] das Leben Kants gilt dem erhabenen Ziele, uns Menschen endlich 
zu ‘Menschen’ zu machen. ‘Ich lehre, was man sein muß, um ein 
Mensch zu sein’: diese seine Worte bezeichnen den Mittelpunkt 
seines Lebens und Strebens (Demokratie und Freiheit: 23). 
Statements such as those cited above modify Menschen or Menschenleben with an 
inclusive first personal pronoun such as wir or unser in order to draw the reader’s 
attention to their own humanity. Having consolidated the readers’ awareness of their 
own humanity, Chamberlain then alludes to the approaching decline or destruction of 
the human race: 
Und es könnte für alle Zukunft — für die ganze Zukunft des 




[…] die Schlacht um die Gestaltung der Zukunft des Menschentums 
auf Erden […] (Hammer oder Amboß: 51). 
In order to incite the kind of panic necessary for a change of attitude and behaviour, 
Chamberlain creates a penetrating sense of alarm concerning the future of the 
German nation and the continued existence of the readers themselves as members of 
the German and human race. The primary aim of Chamberlain’s topos of existential 
threat, however, is to alert the readers not to the questionable continuation of the 
human race as individuals, but of humanity in as far as it reflects the standards and 
values of ‘Germanness’: 
[…] es geht ans Leben - auch an das Leben jenes deutschen Denkens 
und Dichtens, desgleichen die ganze übrige Welt nicht aufweisen 
kann und ohne das es für uns Deutschgeborene und Deutscherkorene 
nicht länger Wert wäre, Mensch zu sein (Hammer oder Amboß: 19). 
Here, Chamberlain’s primary concern is the ‘life’ and survival of Germanness 
(‘deutsches Denken und Dichten’), without which, he claims, life would not be worth 
living, and without which the German people could not call themselves German. The 
author thus combines the motif of existence and survival with the metaphorical 
survival of Germanness: ‘Germanness’ becomes synonymous with humanity. It is 
thus often the case that what appear to be allusions to a threat to humanity actually 
alude to the threat to humanity as it is conceptualised and represented by 
Germanness; to the kind of moral human values which Chamberlain proclaims are 
first and foremost pillars of Germanness. Beth Innocenti Manolescu has analysed the 
status of emotional appeals in argumentation and observes that, although emotional 
appeals perhaps ought to be viewed a non-argumentative fallacy of relevance as they 
rely on emotion and not logical argumentation to defend or promote a stand point, 
appeals to emotions can in actual fact create pragmatic reasons for accepting premise 
adequacy and may therefore be relevant (Manolescu 2006: 327-333). Chamberlain’s 
emotive strategies constitute both psychological manipulation and relevant 
argumentation: they operate on a psychologically manipulative level because they at 
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once allude to the exaggerated notion of the destruction or decline of humanity in 
general, and foreground the reader as a member of this threatened human race in the 
process, and yet they represent relevant argumentation by outlining logical 
repercussions of the annihilation of the German nation and people for German 
culture, thought, and world view. 
8.4 Strategies of Dissimulation 
‘Dissimulation’ refers to the control of information, censorship or giving inadequate 
information, verbal evasion, denial and euphemism (Chilton and Schaeffner 1997: 
212-213). Chamberlain’s strategies of dissimulation control and justify which 
information the author provides and excuse providing inadequate information. They 
cannot be categorised in terms of van Leeuwen's typonymy, which falls short of 
legitimisation exercised by authorial metacommentary. Chamberlain employs 
dissimulative strategies in order to focus the readers’ attention on exactly what he 
wants them to think about, and away from what he does not wish them to think 
about. The dissimulative strategies identified in Chamberlain’s nationalist war 
propaganda are strategies of anticipating and countering reader objections, 
manipulating expectations of perfection, feigning a question and answer dialogue, 
and overt authorial censorship. 
8.4.1 Anticipating and Countering Reader Objections 
Chamberlain anticipates and counters reader objections in order to inoculate the 
readers to counter arguments by naming them himself (cf. Rogers 2007: 51). These 
strategies are realised in the war essays in two ways: acknowledgement or 
admissison, and countering. Chamberlain’s acknowledgement and countering of 
potential objections primarily concerns anticipated or hypothetical objections, but 
also objections that have apparently been raised against the author in real life. 
Addresses to real-life critics are formulated as follows: 
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Mattherzige, „räsonierende“ Deutsche haben gegen mich die 
Beschuldigung erhoben, ich schmeichelte den Deutschen, ich führte 
sie durch Lob und Preis irre, anstatt ihnen ihre Unzulänglichkeiten 
und Fehler und Sünden vorzuhalten […] (Die Zuversicht: 15). 
[…] in einer auffallend großen Anzahl wird mir der Vorwurf gemacht 
— oder wird wenigstens die Sorge laut: ich hätte zu günstig über 
Deutschland geurteilt […] Diesen verehrten unbekannten Freunden 
antworte ich, daß die Behandlung dieser Fragen nicht die Aufgabe 
von „Kriegsaufsätzen“ sein konnte, und daß außerdem, wer zwischen 
den Zeilen zu lesen versteht […] mich weder für einen seichten 
Optimisten, noch für einen Schmeichler halten wird (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 3). 
Chamberlain recounts criticism he has received from members of the public in 
response to his writings, his personal stance, and his ideology. However, he is always 
quick to describe his critics condescendingly: in the first statement, he describes the 
Germans who do not support his views as ‘mattherzig und „räsonierend“’, whereby 
the inverted commas around räsonierend indicate the sarcastic use of a euphemism, 
and that the perjorative meaning of the adjective, ‘grumbling’, is meant. Similarly, he 
notes that he has received criticism from both ‘upstanding’ and ‘dishonorable’ 
opponents (‘redliche und unredliche Gegner’ (Politische Ideale: 90)). In the second 
statement cited above, Chamberlain undermines the intelligence of his critics by 
positing that everybody clever enough to read between the lines would realise that 
this critic’s interpretation is superficial and inaccurate. Chamberlain thus names 
objections to his person and his work, and counters them by discrediting the critic. 
This strategy effectively quashes not only real opposition to the author’s views, but 
also warns the reader against pursuing any adverse opinions they may have, 
constituting a dialectical offense by discouraging the readers from casting their own 
doubt on a standpoint and thereby violating the freedom rule.  
The most rhetorically significant admissions and counters are those that feature 
hypothetical objections. By naming and refuting hypothetical objections, 
Chamberlain creates and controls potential objections to his ideological claims that 
he can manage: admitting that his claim may be problematic, or that his perspective 
is not the only perspective, gives the author a guise of fairness, neutrality and 
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prudence, whereas such admissions are an effective form of opposition management. 
The essays which were originally written as letters, such as Die deutsche Sprache 
(Brief an E.E.), present particularly effective examples of anticipation and 
countering, as these appear to address the reader directly: 
Gewiß, Du hast Recht; es wäre frevelhaft, wollte man gerade in diesen 
Septembertagen, wo die erste große Entscheidung noch schwebt – 
diejenige, die wahrscheinlich über alle weiteren Entscheidungen 
‘entscheiden’ wird – , es wäre frevelhaft, wollte man sich dem Rausch 
einer übermütigen Zuversicht hingeben […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 24). 
Many hypothetical objections fulfill the same function without the use of a direct 
address to the reader. The majority of these statements feature an anonymous 
hypothetical opponent entitled man, jemand or einer: 
Man wirft vielleicht ein, der Reichstag habe sich jetzt gut benommen? 
So verhält es sich aber nicht (Kriegsaufsätze: 38). 
Man weise nicht auf die Analogie im Frankreich des ancien régime; 
sie führt irre (Kriegsaufsätze: 47). 
These statements acknowledge the possibility of a difference of opinion by naming 
it, only to immediately follow it with a counterargument. Objections are commonly 
introduced in the form of questions, negated imperatives, and potential predictions. It 
is noticeable that the invalidating counterargument is briefer than the potential 
objection voiced. The conclusions of these statements are often largely monosyllabic 
(‘so verhält es sich aber nicht’ and‘sie führt irre’). The relative brevity and concision 
of Chamberlain’s counterarguments imply that the objection is so redundant that it 
can be effortlessly overruled. Discrediting potential counterarguments discourages 
the reader from casting doubt on a standpoint or venturing an alternative standpoint, 
violating the freedom rule. 
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Chamberlain achieves an equally effective counterbalancing act by juxtaposing 
expressions of positive conviction such as freilich and sicherlich with rebutting 
conjunctions such as aber and doch: 
[…] sicherlich tüchtig und tapfer, doch nicht der Ausdruck einer 
nationalen Not und einer moralischen Idee (Kriegsaufsätze: 49). 
Daß es über eine so fesselnde und zugleich so gewaltsam zum 
Widerspruch reizende Persönlichkeit noch viel zu sagen gäbe, bedarf 
keiner Versicherung. Ich habe aber heute nur den „Kaiser“ im 
Menschen, nicht den „Menschen“ im Kaiser in Betracht ziehen wollen 
(Deutsches Wesen: 32). 
If the statements cited above aim to prevent the readers from critically engaging with 
Chamberlain’s discourse to form their own opinion, a series of further statements 
serve to ‘guarantee’ against what the author construes as potential misunderstandings 
or misinterpretations of his claims, as in ‘Damit will ich nicht sagen, daß […]’ 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 60), and ‘ich will in keiner Weise zu verstehen geben, sie 
seien nicht gute Patrioten, nein, aber […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 88). By stating what he 
does not wish to say or what he does not mean, the author guards against alternative 
interpretations of claims. 
8.4.2 Manipulating Expectations of Perfection 
In order to block any potential to find fault with his arguments or ideological claims, 
Chamberlain attempts to legitimise faults, inaccuracies and deficits in his essays by 
explicitly stating his personal and professional difficulties and imperfections. 
Strategies that manipulate the readers’ expectations of authorial perfection constitute 
a dialectical offense that violates the freedom rule by implying that it is not necessary 
for external readers to criticise the author since he critisises himself, implicitly 
‘alleviating’ the readers from their need to do so. 
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Chamberlain offers a critique of his own intellectual faculties, admitting, for 
example, ‘Mir fallen Fichte’s Schriften im Allgemeinen, ich gestehe es, nicht leicht 
[…]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 26), and ‘Vor einigen Jahren habe ich mich fleißig damit 
befaßt und möchte mir doch nicht getrauen, heute eine Prüfung zu bestehen’. 
(Demokratie und Freiheit: 42). He additionally confesses to gaps in his knowledge, 
stating: 
Ob ein wirklicher Bündnisvertrag damals schon bestand, weiß ich 
nicht, aber so hieß die Sache im Volksmund […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 57). 
Die genauen Tagesdaten weiß ich natürlich nicht mehr; doch besitze 
ich Anhaltspunkte […] (Deutsches Wesen: 14). 
Although acknowledging that he is not omniscient can potentially constitute a face-
threatening act (Chilton & Schaeffner 1997: 216; Partington 2003: 133), the author 
heightens his credibility here, as absolute omniscience in any one person is 
unfeasible. By explicitly highlighting the few knowledge gaps that he admits to 
having, Chamberlain simultaneously manages and controls the probability that the 
reader will find fault with his arguments. Given the impression that the author had 
already identified his flaws for them, the reader may assume that it is unnecessary to 
independently find fault with Chamberlain’s discourse. 
The author is particularly honest in regards to the extent of his foresight, as in: 
Wie soll er das können? Ich habe es gesagt: ich bin kein Prophet, ich 
baue keine Luftschlösser; ich möchte nur dem erwartenden Blicke 
Richtungen weisen, aus denen das Heil sicher kommen wird, damit 
wir bereit seien, es zu erkennen und anzuerkennen, wenn die Reife der 
Zeiten es heranführt (Politische Ideale: 55). 
So wenig ich es mit meinen schwachen Augen vermag, die Gestaltung 
des kommenden Staates zu erblicken, so deutlich erblicke ich die 
Verachtung, mit der unsere Enkel auf uns zurückschauen werden, als 
auf unbeholfene Narren (Politische Ideale: 115). 
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Such ‘admissions’ are deceptively humble. They appear to express admissions of 
authorial imperfection (‘Wie soll er das können? Ich habe es gesagt: ich bin kein 
Prophet’), whereas they admit merely a limitation common to every human being: 
the inability to predict the future. Statements such as those cited above have high 
rhetorical value and little substance. 
On an authorial level, Chamberlain criticises his inability to express himself verbally, 
as in ‘Aber, aber... wie soll ich’s sagen? ... ich fürchte, ich werde nun doch unlogisch 
oder gar unfromm […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 24), and ‘Alles, was von Gott kommt, und 
ich fühle mich mehr als bloß unfähig, es zu beschreiben oder auch nur zu 
umschreiben […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 24). These admissions attempt to block readers’ 
criticism of the author’s word choice: Chamberlain confronts his readers with the 
challenges of precise and effective expression in order to prevent them from picking 
holes not just in his argument, but in his linguistic formulations. The first statement 
is particularly effective as it resembles a transcript of spoken language with ellipses 
and hesitation indicated by the initial repetition of aber.  
8.4.3 Question and Answer Constructions 
One of the most effective dissimulative strategies in Chamberlain’s nationalist war 
propaganda is the way in which he structures his discourse according to an imaginary 
system of questions and answers. In order to justify selecting particular topics for 
discussion, Chamberlain poses questions which allegedly ‘need’ to be asked, or 
which he posits as concerns originating from the readers or a third party. In reality, 
the questions the author poses are ultimately only ever his own questions, 
constructed as universal concerns or the concerns of his readers in order to justify 
their thematisation. By posing and answering these questions, he controls what is 
discussed and from which perspective. Erotetic strategies constitute the dialectical 
offense of responding to unvoiced questions,violating the standpoint rule by 
implying that the author’s articulation of a standpoint was necessitated by the reader 
or by a third party. 
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A key device for the question and answer strategy is the exhortative 
speech act ‘fragen wir [uns] [X]’: 
Fragen wir uns zunächst: wie steht es in Wirklichkeit mit der so viel 
gerühmten politischen Freiheit Englands? (Kriegsaufsätze: 16). 
Um hierüber Klarheit zu gewinnen, wollen wir uns fragen […] 
(Deutsches Wesen: 77). 
These imperative statements combine with the inclusive personal pronoun wir to 
posit the question as a mutual concern of the author and the reader. This is a kind of 
argumentum ad populum that falsely infers that the narrow self-interests of the 
speaker or writer are actually the interests of the people as a whole, (cf. Reyes 2011: 
784).  
The function of these exhortative speech acts is additionally enacted by statements 
that rely on the seamless integration of the first person possessive pronoun unser to 
modify the key noun Frage: 
Doch genug über diese Schmäher auf Deutschlands Ehre; hinein mit 
ihnen Allen in ein Massengrab ewigen Vergessens, und kehren wir zu 
unserer Frage zurück: ‘Warum wird Deutschland so geliebt?’ 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 81). 
Here, the author not only implies a hypothetical mutual question, but explicitly 
formulates it and places it in inverted commas, thereby placing words into the 
reader’s mouth. The same strategy is evident in the following: 
Lauter Fragen! unlösbare Fragen! Und immer wieder der Kehrreim: 
Wie rümt sich dös zusamma? Nun, die Antwort will ich dem Leser 




Here, Chamberlain at once constructs an explicitly formulated question as originating 
from the reader, and his answer to this question, that is, his cause to embark on 
ideological ‘explication’, as ‘owing’ to the reader (‘die Antwort will ich dem Leser 
nicht schludig bleiben’). This portrays the author as driven to write what he does by 
an impetus of duty and responsibility to his readers. Similarly, the hypothetical other 
denoted by man in constructions beginning ‘man fragt’ insinuates that Chamberlain 
chooses his topics and perspectives out of a duty to answer questions posed to him by 
others. This creates a sense of necessity, as if the author were performing a favour for 
the benefit of a second party, thereby mitigating authorial responsibility for omission 
of information, or for selective inclusion of information: 
Und fragt man, welche Rolle dem Volk als Gesamtheit in der 
Ökonomie des neu zu gestaltenden politischen Ganzen zukäme, so 
antworte ich […] (Kriegsaufsätze: 39). 
Fragt man mich um ein Urteil über die drei Mächte, die den Krieg 
verschuldet haben, so antworte ich […] (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 84). 
Jinjun Wang has analysed the ‘natural joint of questions with power’ (Wang 2006: 
532) and concludes that questions possess the ability to dominate and control 
discourse because they can control the development of a topic, produce a new topic, 
or control the old one (Wang 2006: 542). The present analysis has also found that 
questions in monological discourse can contribute to the construction or propagation 
of power not just by directing the topic by presenting it from a particular angle 
achieved by asking a specific question, but by portraying questions as mutual 
questions, or as the ‘right’ questions to ask in order to gain ‘sufficient’ answers. In 
reality, Chamberlain has the answers to his ‘mutual’, ‘universal’, or ‘necessary’ 
questions ready and prepared; his answers are not a response to the questions, but a 




8.4.3.1 Overt Authorial Censorship: Inclusion and Exclusion of 
Information 
Authorial metacommentary and overt sentence structuring are common features of 
Chamberlain’s war essays. These interjections are diverse and fulfill a multitude of 
discursive functions. One function is to assess the appropriateness and necessity of 
including and excluding certain ‘information’. Such dissimulative strategies can be 
divided into those which justify the inclusion of information, and those which justify 
the exclusion of information, whereby Chamberlain places greater emphasis on the 
latter. 
The inclusion of selected information is justified partly by Chamberlain’s assertions 
that they are important and ‘worthy of attention’, a form of Wengeler’s Prinzipien-
Topos, or topos of codified norms and values (Wengeler 2005: 217). A number of 
positively evaluated adjectives expressing significance are used to modify a claim, a 
piece of information, or a source, as in ‘hier liegt der kritische Punkt […]’ 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 48), and ‘ich kann aus dem Ausland einen so gewichtigen Zeugen 
anführen, daß vor ihm alle Verleumdunge in nichts zerfallen’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 81). 
Claims to being worthy of attention are particularly frequent in Chamberlain’s 
essays, as in ‘Hier ist zweierlei besonders beachtenswert […]’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 80), 
and ‘Keine Tatsache verdient nun mehr Beachtung als folgende […]’ (Demokratie 
und Freiheit: 19). Whereas claims to being kritisch or gewichtig are subjective 
evaluations, claims to being beachtenswert refer directly to relation of the claims to 
the reader: they are worthy of the readers’ attention. These statements suggest to the 
readers that they must to take particular care to understand and internalise a certain 
piece of information. The combination of Beachtung and verdienen is a particularly 
forceful legitimisation of the inclusion of information: the author’s assertion that a 
fact or claim ‘deserves’ attention affords the claim itself a merited existence.  
It is often necessary for the author to justify not only the inclusion and exclusion of 
information, but the thoroughness or partiality of his arguments. He thus provides 
commentaries on the length of time and the amount of detail he attributes to certain 
claims and topics. With the expression ‘nebenbei gesagt’ and variants of this, 
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Chamberlain acknowledges the secondary status of the claim or information at hand. 
In so doing, he provides a pseudo-justification for brushing over a topic, or for 
omission of detail: 
Zum Glück denkt sich der deutsche „Genosse“ bei keinem der beiden 
Fremdworte etwas. Doch dies nur nebenbei (Demokratie und Freiheit: 
52). 
Dieses Wenige sei nur im Vorübergehen angedeutet […] (Die 
Zuversicht: 8). 
Daß sich der einzelne Deutsche — einem sehr hohen Ideale 
gegenüber — meistens unzulänglich erweisen wird, das ist 
bedauerlich, aber nebensächlich (Ideal und Macht: 36). 
Expressions such as ‘nur im Vorübergehen’, ‘dies nur nebenbei’ and nebensächlich 
indicate that the topic at hand is of secondary importance in order to justify glossing 
over them. These are examples of paralepsis, which emphasises a point by seeming 
to pass over it. Expressions used to admit the brevity of discussion perform a similar 
function, such as ‘nur kurz sei noch ein Drittes erwähnt’ (Kriegsaufsätze: 52), ‘So 
viel in aller Kürze und Verkürzung’ (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 63) and ‘Auch hier 
wieder nur ein Beispiel, flüchtig hingeworfen’ (Politische Ideale: 15). These 
justifications by admission are not legitimate, but signal to the reader that the author 
is aware of the brevity and perhaps inadequacy of the discussion, thereby alleviating 
them of the necessity to voice their own criticisms. The fallacious employment of 
explicit authorial censorship constitutes a fallacy of insufficient argument and 
violates the burden-of-proof rule (Cohen 2003: 109). 
Explicit commentaries on the author’s selection and inclusion of information 
additionally refer to anecdotal or evidential examples in order to prove or illustrate 
his claims. Chamberlain explicitly acknowledges that he uses a limited selection of 
examples, while simultaneously creating the impression that he has an extensive 
catalogue of examples at his disposal from which to derive his evidence: 
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Es ist immer die selbe Geschichte: 1200, 1600, 1700 und 1900; ich 
könnte mit Dutzenden von Belegen dienen (Kriegsaufsätze: 51). 
Ich könnte die Beispiele vermehren, denn bekannte und unbekannte 
Freunde haben mir viel Material zugeschickt […] (Neue 
Kriegsaufsätze: 52). 
[…] dieses Beispiel wähle ich aus der Fülle absichtlich, weil sich in 
dieser geschmacklosen Art sich zu vergnügen das Gegenteil des 
„merry“ kundtut (Kriegsaufsätze: 61). 
Here, the nouns Dutzdenen and Fülle and the verb vermehren create an impression of 
plenty, and imply that time and space restrictions force the author to select a limited 
number of examples from the wealth of evidence available to him. The notion of 
selection foregrounded in the third statement is particularly important. As illustrated 
by the performative first person verb in combination with authorial intention 
(absichtlich), Chamberlain draws attention to the process of selecting which 
examples, quotations or anecdotes will serve to support his claims: 
Ich suche mir mit Absicht nüchterne Ausdrücke heraus; es ist nicht 
der Augenblick, sich an Phrasen zu berauschen (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 
91). 
Da ich nun aus der reichen französischen Literatur, die mir zur 
Verfügung steht, auswählen muß und mir Leser denke, die ebenfalls 
darauf angewiesen sind, mit ihrer Zeit sparsam umzugehen, möchte 
ich die Aufmerksamkeit zunächst auf ein einziges, kleines, überaus 
vortreffliches Buch richten, geeignet eine ganze Bibliothek zu 
ersetzen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 51). 
Such commentaries are potential face-threatening acts of communication (Partington 
2003: 133) as they risk foregrounding the processes of subjective authorial selection. 
The primary effect of these statements, however, is to suggest that the author’s 
catalogue of examples is so great that he is forced to select the most appropriate or 
demonstrative ones.  
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The topos of sufficiency is complemented by the topos of appropriateness, as in: 
In einer Flugschrift muß man fliegen; darum sage ich hier kein Wort 
mehr über die politischen Zustände Amerikas; vielleicht genügen 
diese ‘flüchtigen’ Andeutungen, einige deutsche Männer 
nachdenklich zu stimmen und sie zu einer Nachprüfung ihrer 
demokratischen Neigungen zu veranlassen (Demokratie und Freiheit: 
49). 
Here, the legitimising topos of sufficiency (genügen) is paired with the statement ‘in 
einer Flugschrift muß man fliegen [darum sage ich hier kein Wort mehr]’, using the 
medium in which the essay was published to legitimise the exclusion of information. 
Chamberlain’s polyptotonic pun on Flugschrift, fliegen and flüchtig adds to the 
validating effect by softening the ensuing statement with a jovial lightness. Claims 
that ‘this is not the place to [X]’ (‘schlecht am Platz’,‘hier ist nicht der Ort’) fulfill a 
similar function, as in ‘Weiter ins einzelne der kantischen Weltanschauung zu 
dringen, ist hier nicht der Platz’ (Deutsches Wesen: 69) and ‘darüber zu 
philosophieren ist hier nicht der Ort’ (Deutsches Wesen: 44). 
In addition to explicit assessments of sufficiency and inappropriateness, Chamberlain 
justifies providing limited information by stating that he only wishes to make the 
reader think. The key word here is Andeutung or andeuten, as in: 
Ich beschränke mich darauf, von hüben und drüben Einiges 
anzudeuten; nur Stoff zum Nachdenken will ich geben 
(Kriegsaufsätze: 16). 
Nicht habe ich in dieser kleinen Arbeit den ganzen Grund aufdecken 
wollen; so vermessen war ich nicht; ich wollte bloß einige 
Standpunkte feststellen, einige Methoden andeuten, einige Winke 
geben (Neue Kriegsaufsätze: 83). 
These statements imply that it is acceptable to provide incomplete information if it 
serves to incite independent thought on the part of the reader. The author absolves 
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himself of responsibility by constructing brevity and omission as conditions of 
independent thought, and thereby the information he has provided as inspiration for 




8.5 Case Studies 
8.5.1 Case Study A: Kriegsaufsätze, pp. 11-13 
Wohl niemals in der Weltgeschichte wurde die Irreführung eines 
ganzen Volkes so schamlos, so ruchlos und so geschickt-schlau 
angelegt und durchgeführt wie die Irreführung Englands in Bezug auf 
Deutschland. Diese Irreführung trägt die Schuld an dem jetzigen 
Krieg. Von Anfang an ist England die treibende Macht gewesen; 
England hat den Krieg gewollt und herbeigeführt; England hat die 
Entfremdung Rußlands von Deutschland bewirkt, England hat 
Frankreich unablässig aufgehetzt. Möglich wurde diese frevelhafte 
Politik einzig durch berechnete, systematische Irreführung des 
englischen Volkes... 
Und nun, nach der erlogenen Tatsache des kriegwollenden 
Deutschland die wahre Tatsache: Deutschland als einziger 
Friedenshort. Hierüber mag das Zeugnis eines Ausländers einigen 
Wert besitzen. 
Seit 45 Jahren verkehre ich vorwiegend mit Deutschen, seit 30 Jahren 
lebe ich ständig in deutschen Landen; die Liebe zu deutscher Art, 
deutschem Denken, deutscher Wissenschaft, deutscher Kunst schärfte 
mir das Auge, ohne mich blind zu machen; mein Urteil blieb völlig 
objektiv und an gar Manches, was mir beim ersten Betreten deutschen 
Bodens nicht behagte, habe ich mich noch immer nicht gewöhnen 
können. Mit Frankreich seit frühester Kindheit verwachsen, England 
durch Blutsbande angehörig, blieb ich vor parteiischer Verblendung 
bewahrt. Freilich habe ich stets zurückgezogen gelebt und suchte 
nicht durch Gassen und Vordrängen Volk und Land kennen zu lernen; 
von einiger Entfernung erblickt man aber die Dinge klarer als aus der 
Nähe; aus der Stille vernimmt das Ohr deutlicher als mitten im 
Wirrwarr. Und mein Zeugnis lautet dahin: {S in ganz Deutschland hat 
in den letzten 43 Jahren nicht ein einziger Mann gelebt, der Krieg 
gewollt hätte, nicht einer.} Wer das Gegenteil behauptet, lügt — sei es 
wissentlich, sei es unwissentlich. 
Mir wurde das Glück zuteil, Deutsche aus allen Gauen und aus allen 
Ständen gründlich genau kennen zu lernen, von des Kaisers Majestät 
an bis zu braven Handwerkern, mit denen ich tagtäglich zu tun hatte. 
Ich habe Schulleute, Gelehrte, Kaufmänner, Bankiers, Offiziere, 
Diplomaten, Ingenieure, Dichter, Journalisten, Beamte, Künstler, 
Ärzte, Juristen intim gekannt: niemals habe ich einen Kriegslustigen 
oder genauer gesprochen einen Kriegslüsternen angetroffen. In 
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England dagegen fand ich bei meinen letzten Besuchen, 1907 und 
1908, allerorts einen geradezu erschreckenden blinden Haß gegen 
Deutschland und die ungeduldige Erwartung eines 
Vernichtungskrieges. Die Abwesenheit jeglicher Animosität gegen 
andere Völker ist ein auffallendes Kennzeichen der Deutschen — und 
zwar der Deutschen allein. Sie pflegen eher nach der Seite der 
übertriebenen Anerkennung fremder Verdienste zu irren. Außerdem 
weiß jeder Deutsche, daß er bei der geographischen Lage seines 
Landes von einem Kriege alles zu fürchten und wenig zu hoffen hat. 
Wie sollte ein Volk, bei welchem Industrie, Handel und Wissenschaft 
von Jahr zu Jahr immer höher blühen, wie dies im Deutschland der 
letzten 43 Jahre der Fall war, Krieg herbeizetteln wollen, der alle drei 
vernichtet? 
Ich überschreite den mir zugemessenen Raum, übergehe darum gar 
vieles und beschränke mich heute auf das eine: ich will nur noch von 
Kaiser Wilhelm reden. Nur er könnte als Einzelner eine 
ausschlaggebende Wirkung ausgeübt haben. Ich bin dem Kaiser nicht 
oft, doch unter besonderes günstigen Umständen begegnet: außerhalb 
der Hofetikette, zu zwanglosem Meinungsaustausch, unbelauscht. 
 
Written at the onset of the First World War in 1914, this extract from Kriegsaufsätze 
details Chamberlain’s opinions on the causes of the war and is a prime example of 
the persuasive interplay between discursive strategies intended to legitimise the 
means and those intended to legitimise the message The extract opens using the 
topos of history to legitimise an ideological message using apparent theoretical 
rationality. The claim that Chamberlain attempts to legitimise is that the war was 
caused by misleading accusations of German warmongering abroad in England. The 
author does this using the topos of uniqueness in the history of the world (‘Wohl 
niemals in der Weltgeschichte’); a reversal of the logical fallacy ‘denying the 
antecedent’ that perverts the (equally fallacious) topos of historical continuity. The 
perversion of this fallacy can best be seen in relation to the directly ensuing use of 
the topos of historical continuity, ‘Von Anfang an (ist England die treibende Macht 
gewesen)’. Here, the logical fallacy is ‘A is true because it has always been so’, 
whereas the previous example reverses this to become ‘A is true because it is 
happening for the first time’. 
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The opening claim is rich in authorial subjectivity and hyperbole, combining the 
subjectivity marker wohl with a dogmatic exclusive adverb of frequency, niemals, 
and a triad of subjective emotive adjective phrases that gain rhetorical weighting 
with the repeated equal modification so: ‘so schlamlos, so ruchlos und so geschickt 
schlau’. The legitimisation of the ideological message using the topos of uniqueness 
in global history thus assimilates a strong aspect of authorial passion for the subject 
matter; an application of the topos of personal authority that adds emotional 
weighting to the statement by indicating emotional authorial engagement with the 
topic. The authorial emotion behind the sentence is additionally expressed by its 
complexity; a sentence dense with words and ideas that follows a subjective emotive 
triad with two verbs to emphasise magnitude and extent. In ‘Wohl niemals in der 
Weltgeschichte wurde die Irreführung eines ganzen Volkes so schamlos, so ruchlos 
und so geschickt-schlau angelegt und durchgeführt’, the extended length of the 
sentence is a syntactic reflection of the extent of England's ‘misleading’: just when 
you think you have reached the end of the clause following the verb phrase, ‘so 
ruchlos und so geschickt-schlau angelegt’, the clause is prolonged and complicated 
by a further verb, ‘[...] und durchgeführt’; an expression of the allegedly never-
ending and rigorous nature of England's ‘misleading’. The actual claim that 
Chamberlain wishes to legitimise follows this weighty opening sentence: ‘Diese 
Irreführung trägt die Schuld an dem jetzigen Krieg’. This key sentence is short and 
monosyllabic in comparison to its predecessor, lending it emphasis and weight by 
contrast. 
A further dominating strategy to legitimise the ideological message here is othering: 
the presentation of the English (the other) as liars and aggressors, and the 
presentation of the Germans (the self) as pacifist victims in the outbreak of the war. 
The statement beginning ‘Von Anfang an’ is characterised by the almost rhythmic 
repetition of ‘England’ at the beginning of each of the four constituent clauses. 
‘England’ is paired in each clause with active verbs of intent ‘gewollt und 
herbeigeführt’, ‘bewirkt’, ‘unablässig aufgehetzt’ in order to present it as the active 
cause of war. The action missing from the verb gewesen in the first clause is 
compensated by the adjective treibend. A further strategy of othering in the same 
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sentence is constructed by positioning England as an enemy and counterpoint not 
only to Germany, but also to Germany’s two other war enemies, France and Russia. 
By diminishing the role even of her two other enemies by positing them too as 
victims of England’s aggressive actions, Chamberlain does not so much mitigate 
their roles in the war, but insulates England as the sole or main aggressor by placing 
Russia, Germany and France together both ideologically and syntactically as the 
passive recipients of action. 
This strategy of othering is continued in the passage centring around ‘niemals habe 
ich einen Kriegslustigen oder genauer gesprochen einen Kriegslüsternen angetroffen. 
In England dagegen [...]’. This is a clear example of othering using the topos of 
comparison, as manifested most evidently in the use of contrastive dagegen to 
modify England in relation to Germany. Dagegen compares and contrasts two 
claims. On the one hand, a claim of unconditional German pacificity ‘niemals habe 
ich einen Kriegslustigen oder genauer gesprochen einen Kriegslüsternen 
angetroffen’, and on the other, ‘in England, dagegen, fand ich bei meinen letzten 
Besuchen, 1907 und 1908, allerorts einen geradezu erschreckenden blinden Haß 
gegen Deutschland und die ungeduldige Erwartung eines Vernichtungskrieges’. The 
dogmatic absolution with which the author constructs his presentation of German 
pacificity is constructed using the topos of numbers/magnitude and therewith the 
rhetorical fallacy argumentum ad populum based on a long list of different kinds of 
German professional roles that attempts to legitimise the validity of his claim 
through extent and scope (a list of professional roles that vary in essence; from 
scholars to artists, merchants to doctors). The construction of the German ‘self’ as 
anti-war continues throughout the passage, and includes the proposition ‘Außerdem 
weiß jeder Deutsche, dass er bei der geographischen Lage seines Landes von einem 
Kriege alles zu fürchten und wenig zu hoffen hat’. This statement, which argues that 
the Germans could not have wanted war because to actively want war in its 
‘geographical position’ (presumably referring to that fact that Germany is as good as 
land-locked) would be foolish is a coercive stipulation that dictates to the reader as a 
German what they ‘do’ (i.e. ‘are to’) think (‘Außerdem weiß jeder Deutsche, daß 
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[...]’) that simultaneously fallaciously attempts to legitimise the factuality of his 
assertion using the rhetorical fallacy argumentum ad populum. 
This same passage illustrates how Chamberlain's legitimisations of his message are 
so often underscored by or at least intertwined with legitimisations of his authorial 
self. This passage beginning ‘Ich habe Schulleute […]’ is namely just as much an 
exercise in authorial self-legitimisation as it is in the accusatory othering of England. 
Tellingly, the passage begins with the first person pronoun ich; a sure sign that the 
author is about to give way to a deluge of self-legitimisation. Sure enough, the 
passage abounds with the implicit topos of life experience (‘A is true because I 
myself have experienced it first-hand’). Indeed, the extract in its entirety is rich in 
discursive strategies that attempt to legitimise the validity of a claim or claims via 
personal authority. In the sentence beginning ‘Mir wurde das Glück zuteil, Deutsche 
aus allen Gauen und aus allen Ständen gründlich genau kennen zu lernen’, 
Chamberlain uses the double topos of life exprience and personal contacts to lend 
him authority on matters of German politics, political history and the nature of 
‘Germanness’ itself. The repetition of the hyperbolic inclusive quantifier alle 
combines with the adjective phrase of thoroughness and exactitude ‘gründlich genau’ 
to add rhetorical weighting to the statement. This is an echo of the topos of numbers 
used earlier on in the extract to legitimise the same proposition: ‘Seit 45 Jahren 
verkehre ich mit Deutschen, seit 30 Jahren lebe ich ständig in deutschen Landen’, in 
which the consecutive repetition of two high numbers communicates length and 
therewith magnitude; a discursive device that gains weighting by virtue of the higher 
number appearing first. 
A further strategy of legitimising the means in this extract is the use of the topos of 
objectivity or neutrality. In what is a cautious tightrope act of balancing between his 
status as a fully integrated member of German society and his status as a foreigner, 
Chamberlain asserts that his full integration in and associations within German 
society authorises him to write truthfully and accurately about ‘Germanness’ and the 
politics of war, and that this is complemented by his neutrality of perception; 
something that he, and he as a rare example only, is lucky enough to possess by way 
of his status as a ‘foreigner’. The topos of neutral authorial objectivity is primarily 
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constructed using metaphors of blindness and sight, where blindness represents bias 
and subjectivity (‘Mit Frankreich seit frühester Kindheit verwachsen, England durch 
Blutsbande angehörig, blieb ich vor parteiischer Verblendung bewahrt’) and clarity 
of visual perception represents objectivity, a key prerequisite of an accurate and 
trustworthy narrative (‘die Liebe zu deutscher Art, deutschem Denken, deutscher 
Wissenschaft, deutscher Kunst schärfte mir das Auge, ohne mich blind zu machen; 
mein Urteil blieb völlig objektiv’). The use of this metaphor enables Chamberlain to 
construct a further strategy of legitimisation shortly afterwards: authorisation resting 
on the topos of superior ability. With his statement ‘von einiger Entfernung erblickt 
man aber die Dinge klarer als aus der Nähe’, Chamberlain makes a metaphorical 
comment on the powers of perception to which he as one of few is privy as both a 
foreigner and as a foreigner integrated in German society on the scale of an optical 
zoom; with his double national status, he has the ability to ‘view’ the situation both 
from the inside and from the outside, having access to first-hand details while being 
able to ‘zoom out’ to the neutral positioner of the foreigner ‘looking in’; a complex 
strategy of legitimisation by personal authority and superiority that draws on 
metaphors of sight and perception. 
Strategies used to legitimise the author by personal authority are again intertwined 
with strategies that legitimise the message: theoretical rationality via the assertion of 
evidence and/or provability. Here, Chamberlain's legtimising strategies of self-
positioning are topoi of personal superiority used to justify the assertion that the 
ideological message he presents may be called a Zeugnis. In ‘mein Zeugnis lautet 
dahin’ and ‘Hierüber mag das Zeugnis eines Ausländers einigen Wert besitzen’, 
Chamberlain refers to his ideological assertions as a Zeugnis. Cleverly, the author 
uses a noun with two connotations, meaning both an ‘eye-witness report’, which 
tallies with authorial legitimisation via the topos of life experience, but also ‘proof’, 
with juridicial connotations of testimony before a court.  
The noun Zeugnis is a semantic echo of the earlier statement ‘Und nun, nach der 
erlogenen Tatsache des kriegwollenden Deutschland die wahre Tatsache: 
Deutschland als einziger Friedensort’. This is characteristic of the way in which 
Chamberlain thwarts the reader’s sense of epistemic certainty. Calling on 
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legitimisation by theoretical rationalisation, Chamberlain emphasises the ‘true’ 
nature of his assertion that Germany is the one and only site of true freedom in the 
war by contrasting two opposing kinds of Tatsache: ‘erlogene Tatsache’ (German as 
war-hungry) and ‘wahre Tatsache’ (Germany as peace-loving). It is the opposing 
modifications of Tatsache that make this assertion to effective: ‘eine erlogene 
Tatsache’ is an oxymoron and therewith an impossibility, highlighting the ‘truly 
authentic’ nature of what Chamberlain proposes as fact: Germany as peace-loving. 
The blunt proposition ‘hierüber mag das Zeugnis eines Ausländers einigen Wert 
besitzen’ is a strategy of dissimulation or information control embedded in the main 
body of the extract that uses authorial metacommentary to stipulate to the reader how 
to evaluate the ensuing ‘information’ (as possessing ‘quite some value’). Authorial 
metacommentary on the significance, value and amount of information that the 
author provides is characteristic of Chamberlain's essays and is illustrated in the final 
paragraph of the extract: 
Ich überschreite den mir zugemessenen Raum, übergehe darum gar 
vieles und beschränke mich heute auf das eine: ich will nur noch von 
Kaiser Wilhelm reden. Nur er könnte als Einzelner eine 
ausschlaggebende Wirkung ausgeübt haben. Ich bin dem Kaiser nicht 
oft, doch unter besonderes günstigen Umständen begegnet: außerhalb 
der Hofetikette, zu zwanglosem Meinungsaustausch, unbelauscht. 
This is a typically Chamberlainesque maneuver, leaving the ideological argument he 
had been so fiercely engaged with hanging on the power of a rhetorical question and 
resorting to a strategy of authorial metacommentary to ‘legitimise’ the exclusion of 
information (‘Ich übergehe darum gar vieles und beschränke mich heute auf das 
eine’) simply by virtue of admission and the topos of external restriction placed on 
him by the institution of publishing (‘Ich überschreite den mir zugemessenen 
Raum’), and by personal authority using the topoi of life experience and personal 




8.5.2 Case Study B: Demokratie und Freiheit, pp. 7-9  
Nicht folgerichtig und darum zu einem Lügengewebe innerer 
Widersprüche führend ist dagegen der Standpunkt der französischen 
Revolutionäre und ihrer heutigen Nachkommen in Deutschland: denn 
diese Leute sind womöglich noch reinere Materialisten als Hobbes 
und weisen mit Verachtung alles von sich, was Philosophie oder 
Religion heißt, und nichtsdestoweniger schwärmen sie für angebliche 
„Menschenrechte“ — als ob innerhalb einer bloßen Natur der Begriff 
„Recht“ irgend einen Sinn besäße — und stellten als ersten Anspruch 
den auf „Freiheit“ auf, der — wie schon längst erwiesen — der reine 
contradiktorische Gegensatz des Begriffes „Natur“ bildet. Unschwer 
kann man das Entstehen dieses Wirrwarrs im Frankreich des 18. 
Jahrhunderts verfolgen, wo zuerst philosophische, später politische 
Rücksichten vorherrschen. Pierre Bayle ist noch sattelfest, weil den 
heraufziehenden politischen Umwälzungen fern genug: er leugnet alle 
Möglichkeiten der Freiheit. Schon bei Voltaire fällt das unsichere 
Schwanken auf: denn, hat er auch in versteckten philosophischen 
Schriften die Unmöglichkeit der Freiheit des Willens eingestanden, so 
hat er sie in den im ganzen damaligen Europa überallhin verbreiteten, 
glänzenden Versen seiner „Reden über den Menschen“ behauptet und 
gepriesen, zugleich die Denker mit Spott überschüttet; dazwischen 
blitzt dann plötzlich (siehe den Brief an Friedrich vom 23. Jan. 1738) 
die richtige Einsicht auf: „sans Dieu 
point de liberté“ — ohne Gott keine Freiheit; in deutsches Denken 
übertragen: Freiheit ist ein Gedanke, ist ein Ideal, ein Leitstern, nicht 
eine Tatsache der Natur.  
Hin und her pendelt ebenfalls die große Enzyklopädie; die gefährliche 
Inkonsequenz, die darin liegt, die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens 
zu leugnen und dennoch ein angeborenes Recht auf politische Freiheit 
zu lehren, empfinden die scharfsinnigen Verfasser: als Denker 
möchten sie sich nicht bloßstellen, als Politiker ihrem Programm nicht 
untreu werden; die Wolke einer zwiefachen Unaufrichtigkeit lastet 
verdunkelnd auf dem ganzen Abschnitt. Am allerauffallendsten 
benimmt sich Condillac, der in seinem „Traité des Passions“ mit 
unerreichter Folgerichtigkeit die ausschließlich sinnliche Natur des 
Menschenverstandes verficht und den Menschen mit einem 
beweglichen Steinbilbnis vergleicht, nichtsdestoweniger aber diesem 
Werke eine „Dissertation sur la Liberté“ anhängt, um durch allerhand 
sophistische Kunststücke aus der lückenlosen Naturmechanik die 
Freiheit taschenspielerartig herauszuwickeln. Dies bedeutet, die 
Herrschaft der Phrase einführen, d. h. die Herrschaft inhaltsloser 
Worte, unter welcher die ganze Revolution gestanden hat, unter 
welcher Frankreich sich noch heute chaotisch weiterwälzt, und unter 
welcher alle Nationen der Welt aus den Fugen zu springen drohen. 
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So standen sich und stehen sich denn zwei Richtungen gegenüber: 
die e n g l i s c h e leugnet die Freiheit, indem sie darunter nur ein 
angeborenes Vorrecht der angelsächsischen Völker, alle anderen 
Völker zu unterdrücken, versteht — im übrigen aber mit diesem 
Begriff lediglich zur Betörung der leichtgläubigen Massen und der 
fremden Nationen spielt (denn zu den erlaubten Mitteln des „Macht 
geht vor Recht“ gehört in erster Reihe die klugersonnene, 
langanhaltende, nie 
sich verratende Lüge, unterstützt von jener meisterlichen Kunst der 
Heuchelei, die englische Autoren darum so unvergleichlich zu 
schildern wissen); wogegen die f r a n z ö s i s c h e Richtung sich an 
einem Worte berauscht, indem sie zwar edleren Beweggründen folgt, 
die vielgerühmte Klarheit ihrer Begriffe aber auf Kosten einer 
sündhaften Seichtigkeit des Denkens erkauft, die im Leben zu 
blutigen Welttragödien und zur Vernichtung unwiederbringlicher 
Güter geführt hat. Die englische Richtung bedeutet eine geistig weit 
tiefere und folgerichtigere Erfassung, und — da der Geist bei uns 
Menschen stets in irgend einer Form den Untergrund aller Taten 
bildet — so folgt mit Notwendigkeit, daß die den englisch redenden 
Ländern gemeinsame „Philosophie der Freiheit“ ungleich 
bedeutendere und fester gegründete politische Erfolge erzielen mußte, 
als die lärmende, blendende, schwatzhafte des französischen 
Revolutionsideales.  
Freilich, wie Carlyle vor schon siebzig Jahren schrieb: „Der letzte 
Schimmer des Göttlichen ist von England gewichen; Überzeugung 
und Wahrhaftigkeit kennt man in diesem Lande nicht mehr; gewichen 
ist das alles der modernen Herrschaft des Nicht-Gottes, den die 
Menschen Teufel nennen“ („Cromwells Briefe“, Kap. I der Einl.); 
aber es ist ein grimmiger, gewaltiger Teufel, der als solcher Achtung 
einflößt, wenn nicht gar Bewunderung. Wohingegen das 
Revolutionsideal Tatkraft einzig im kopflosen Zerstören alles vom 
Menschen mühsam Errungenen entwickelt, dagegen sich ohne 
jegliche Befähigung zu aufbauenden, schöpferischen Leistungen 
erweist; überall schafft es nur Chaos und in diesem Chaos schalten die 
Unredlichen, Unsauberen, die Verbrechernaturen, die überall 
vorhanden sind, sonst aber in dunklen Niederungen ihr Wesen treiben, 
während sie hier die Macht an sich reißen und wie Hyänen vom Blute 






This extract is a further prime example of the interplay between Chamberlain's 
legtimisation of his message and of his means, rich in allusions to the metaphor 
scenario of epistemic uncertainty and the use of the motifs of truth, lies, confusion 
and language and metaphors of darkness and light, blindness and sight to construct 
this.  
Before proceeding with the linguistic analysis of this extract, it is important to point 
out that the extract is simultaneously a paradigmatic example of veiled anti-Semitism 
identifiable by ‘reading between the lines’. Considering the discussion in Section 5.5 
of the notion of Chaos as characteristic of contemporaneous anti-Semitic discourse, 
the closing statement of this extract appears to carry undercurrents of anti-Semitism. 
This sentence is rich in vocabulary and imagery that has since been identified as 
characteristic of anti-Semitic discourse of the time, and specifically of Chamberlain's 
Grundlagen: 
[...] überall schafft es nur Chaos und in diesem Chaos schalten die 
Unredlichen, Unsauberen, die Verbrechernaturen, die überall 
vorhanden sind, sonst aber in dunklen Niederungen ihr Wesen treiben, 
während sie hier die Macht an sich reißen und wie Hyänen vom Blute 
des Volkes sich vollsaugen 
Not only the lexemes Chaos, unsauber, and Verbrecher, but also the metaphor of 
blood-sucking hyenas, which a contains a metaphor comprised of three linguistic 
aspects reported to be typical of anti-Semitic discourse: the Jews as devouring 
animals, the metaphor of ‘blood-sucking’, and particularly the metaphor of sucking a 
nation dry of its blood. 
The notion of Chaos fulfils a double role in Chamberlain's discourse. Not only is it 
symptomatic of anti-Semitism, but also a key component of the author's construction 
of epistemic uncertainty. This extract demonstrates the various components of 
Chamberlain's corresponding strategies of legimisation by abstraction on which his 
construction of epistemic uncertainty hinges. ‘Der Geist’, Chamberlain asserts, 
‘bildet bei uns Menschen stets in irgend einer Form den Untergrund aller Taten’, 
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placing essential primacy on the role of the human Geist (intellect). In the preceding 
sentence, Chamberlain primes the evaluative connotations associated with Geist in 
order to cement its essential primacy, bringing it into semantic association with Tiefe 
and Folgerichtigkeit, two desirable moral values, and later with the superlative 
descriptions ‘ungleich bedeutender und fester gegründete’ and thereby intensifying 
the abstract moral evaluation of das Geistige. The emphasis on the importance of the 
abstract intellectual is repeated later with the claim ‘Freiheit ist ein Gedanke, ist ein 
Ideal, ein Leitstern, nicht eine Tatsache der Natur’, which emphasises the ideational 
nature of the subject at hand (Freiheit), adding further emphasis by contrasting it 
with what it is not, namely concrete (‘eine Tatsache der Natur’). Ironically, 
Chamberlain relies heavily on the topos of factuality to justify his ideological 
message, but when it comes to highlighting the abstract ideational nature of the 
subject matter itself, he rejects the validity of concrete facts. 
Against the backdrop of the primacy of intellect, the notion of chaos conributes to 
Chamberlain’s construction of a metaphor scenario pertaining to intellectual 
insufficiency. This scenario rests on the portrayed permeation of German society 
with lies (Lügengewebe, ‘die klugersonnene, langanhaltende,nie sich verratende 
Lüge’) and hypocrisy (‘die Kunst der Heuchelei’). The notion of chaos combines 
with a metaphor pertaining to a ‘web of lies and inner contradictions’, in which 
Gewebe calls on both the image of a web, and of woven fabric. Both images pertain 
to interwoven strands and create a sense of intellectual opacity; the inability to keep 
epistemic strands of information apart, letting strands of truth mesh with strands of 
lies until there is only one chaotic knot of information and claims. Notions of chaos 
and confusion recurr throughout the extract in differing lexemes and images, 
including Wirrwarr and verbs or verbal nouns of unstable, uncontrolled movement 
such as Umwälzungen, weiterwältzen, ‘das unsichere Schwanken’ and ‘hin und her 
pendeln’. 
Where Chamberlain constructs a sense of epistemic chaos in society resulting from 
lies, these lies, he asserts, are first and foremost produced by a fallacious use of 
language. Using the topos of definition and thereby creating an etymological fallacy, 
Chamberlain plays on the questionable semantics of Menschenrechte and Freiheit in 
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particular as ‘ein natürliches Recht’ using the adjective angeblich (‘so-called’) to 
question the nature of the terminology in allegedly fallacious use: 
[… und nichtsdestoweniger schwärmen sie für angebliche 
„Menschenrechte“ — als ob innerhalb einer bloßen Natur der Begriff 
„Recht“ irgend einen Sinn besäße — und stellten als ersten Anspruch 
den auf „Freiheit“ auf, der — wie schon längst erwiesen — der reine 
contradiktorische Gegensatz des Begriffes „Natur“ bildet. 
In the same passage, Chamberlain intensifies the alleged epistemic instability of 
language and terminology by alluding to the use of these to create Betörung 
(infatuation) and Berauschung (intoxication); mental states of unclarity. This is 
explicitly asserted in the description ‘die vielgerühmte Klarheit ihrer Begriffe auf 
Kosten einer sündhaften Seichtigkeit des Denkens erkaufen’; a construction that 
unites the notion of a loss of semantic clarity with a ‘sinfully shallow way of 
thinking’ and thereby with intellectual ineptitude.  
Chamberlain constructs the causal relationship between language, lies and 
intellectual confusion or chaos using polar metaphors of darkness and light and of 
blindess and sight. He describes the French revolutionary ideals as ‘lärmend, 
blendend, schwatzhaft’; a triad that forges a connection between an amerliorative 
adjective pertaining to spoken language (schwatzhaft) and the ‘noise’ (lärmend) it 
makes (presumably both in literal terms of the acoustics of speech, and the 
metaphorical intellectual ‘noise’ of chaos), as well as the adjective blendend 
(blinding). The intellectual confusion in society allegedly created by the discourse of 
lies of the French revolution is thus tantamount to ‘blinding’; a metaphorical 
expression of the inability to perceive where ‘perception’ denotes both the act of 
seeing and the act of understanding. This metaphorical relationship is reinforced by 
the expression ‘die Wolke einer zwiefachen Unaufrichtigkeit lastet verdunkelnd (auf 
dem ganzen Abschnitt)’; a metaphor that lends the immoral traits of ‘dishonesty’ or 
‘falseness’ the metaphorical power to ‘cast a dark shadow’. In contrast, what 
Chamberlain alledges to be the ‘German’ understanding of liberty – the only true 
understanding of the term – he identifies in Voltaire's Brief an Friedrich'(1738): 
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'sans Dieu point de liberte – ohne Gott keine Freiheit; in deutsches Denken 
übertragen: Freiheit ist ein Gedanke, ist ein Ideal, ein Leitstern, nicht eine Tatsache 
der Natur'. In relation to the process of reading Voltaire’s work, Chamberlain 
provides the commentary ‘dazwischen blitzt dann plötzlich […[ die richtige Einsicht 
auf'; a commentary that describes accurate perception, or, simply, truth (‘die richtige 
Einsicht’), in terms of a flash of light (aufblitzen). 
Meanwhile, amidst a complex construction of epistemic uncertainty, the extract also 
features strategies of authorial self-legitimisation. In the above-mentioned reference 
to the ‘true’ German understanding of liberty in Voltaire's Brief an Friedrich 
Chamberlain positions himself as a cultural translator, not just translating French 
words into German words (‘sans Dieu point de liberté — ohne Gott keine Freiheit’), 
but also positing himself as a translator of national thought (‘in deutsches Denken 
übertragen [...]’). Furthermore, the extract is rich in intertextual references (e.g. to the 
work of Pierre Bayle and Condillac, as well as Voltaire). As the author largely 
disputes the validity of the ideological content of the references he cites, these 
references serve less to legitimise the author’s claims using a further source of 
authority on the subject matter, than to demonstrate the author's high intellectual 
standing via breadth of reference, thereby legitimising his own authority on the 





Chamberlain's rhetoric is spanned between two rhetorical poles of tension: an 
elaborate negative ad hominem used to construct the reader, and a corresponding 
positive ad hominem used to construct the author. The war essays are also 
characterised by a dualistic rhetoric of persuasion that justifies the means just as 
tenaciously as it justifies the message. Chamberlain’s key discourse strategies are 
strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation, which play a central role in both the 
justification of the author’s ideological message and of his means: whereas the 
former legitimise assertions of German superiority (the self) and delegitimise 
England, France and parliamentary democracy (the other), the latter legitimise the 
author and delegitimise the reader in what may be seen as reader ‘othering’ in 
relation to the authorial self. Strategies of dissimulation are used to legitimise both 
the message and the means, whereby their extent and manipulative function is 
secondary to strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation.  
Chamberlain frames his ideological message by strategically constructing ‘global 
fuzziness’ in order for his message to be received and accepted with minimum 
resistance. Using a metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty constructed by 
metaphorical references to das Innere, chaos, insanity, and illusion, entanglement, 
secrecy, concealment, darkness and blindness, and motifs of mutual 
misunderstanding, ignorance and misleading, lies and misleading appearances, he 
constructs powerful strategies of abstractive delegitimisation. In what can be seen as 
an extention of Saussure’s ‘trouble-and-resolution’ hypothesis, Chamberlain 
delegitimises the readers by positioning them as ignorant and weakening their 
confidence in their ability to accurately perceive, understand and judge. 
The central strategies in Chamberlain’s strategies of self-legitimisation correspond 
directly to his creation of ‘trouble’ by delegitimising the readers’ epistemic 
environment. Such strategies rely on metaphors of the author as teacher, sole source 
of truth, archaeologist, guide, and bringer of sight and light, which combine to 
complete the metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty versus enlightenment that 
runs throughout the war essays. Chamberlain presents himself and his writings as the 
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‘resolution’ to the problem of German intellectual inadequacy: where the German 
people are lost, Chamberlain the guide will lead them down the right path; where the 
readers as Germans are ignorant and naïve pupils in need of ‘education’, 
Chamberlain the teacher will teach them; where the truth is buried, Chamberlain the 
archaeologist will uncover it; where the reader is blind or submerged in darkness, 
Chamberlain the bringer of light will enable them to see once more. 
While using delegitimising message framing strategies to undermine the readers’ 
knowledge, Chamberlain uses strategies of legitimisation resting on expert and 
personal authority to justify his own authorial credibility and omniscience. Such 
strategies rest on the topoi of life experience, superior intellectual qualifications, life 
experience, foreigner neutrality and personal association (‘name-dropping’). The 
author also uses strategies of legitimisation to endorse his personal character, using 
the topos of personal dedication to the subject matter and trust-building strategies.  
Strategies of legitimisation used to justify Chamberlain’s ideological message can be 
classified in terms of van Leeuwen’s ‘legitimisation via theoretical rationalisation’ 
and in terms of self and other presentation, or the construction of Feindbilder. They 
call on the topoi of factuality and evidence, the laws of nature and human nature, 
obviousness, irrelevance, doubtlessness, historical continuity, uniqueness, and the 
polarised topos perpetrator versus victim. Further strategies legitimise the German 
cause and delegitimise the Anglo-French cause using the topoi of comparison, 
uniqueness and superiority. Chamberlain additionally justifies his message using 
strategies of influence and coercion, which include the motif of one single correct 
way of thinking, journey metaphors, the topos of necessity, stipulating the readers’ 
thoughts and reactions, the topos of duty/obligation, and appeals to urgency, fear and 
humanity.  
Chamberlain’s strategies of dissimulation justify both the means and the message as 
they provide a meta-commentary on both the amount of information the author 
provides, and the way in which this information is expressed. Such strategies include 
anticipating and countering reader objections, manipulating the readers’ expectations 
of perfection, question and answer constructions and overt authorial censorship.  
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The following table presents the main strategies, topoi, fallacies and rule violations 
identified for the two macrofunctions ‘justification of the means’ and ‘justification of 
the message’ in a systematic tabular overview, as well as the strategies of 




Macro-Function Strategy Topoi Pragma-Dialectical Fallacies Pragma-Dialectical 
Rule Violations 




The war as intellectual 
Intellect as a weapon 
Intellectual superiority 
Intellectual potential 
Oversimplified cause (logical 
fallacy) 
 
Non causa pro causa/ circular 
reasoning (logical fallacy) 
 
Appeal to emotion (rhetorical 
fault) 
 
Argumentum ad hominem 
(rhetorical fault) 













Ignoratio elenchi (dialetical 
offense) 
 
Argumentum ad hominem 
(dialectical offense) 
 
Argumentum ad superbiam 
(dialectical offense) 
 
Non causa pro causa/circular 













Passion for the subject matter 
Author-reader equality 
Consideration of the reader 
Argumentum ad hominem 
(rhetorical fault) 
Relevance rule 







Previous authorial success 
Definition 
















Appeal to obviousness 
(rhetorical fault) 
 
Affirming the consequent 
(logical fallacy) 
 
Denying the antecedent 
(logical fallacy) 
 









Argumentum ad populum 
(rhetorical fault) 




















Circular reasoning (logical 
fallacy) 
 
Insufficient argument (logical 
fallacy) 
 
Affirming the consequent 
(logical fallacy) 
 






Emotional appeal (rhetorical 
fault 
 
Appeal to obviousness 
(rhetorical fault) 
 




Starting point rule 
 
Burden-of -proof rule 
 
Rules of inference 
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Unexpressed premise (logical 
fallacy) 
 
Appeal to history (logical 
fallacy) 
 
False dichotomy (rhetorical 
fault) 
 

















‘The only way’ 
 









Decisiveness of the present 
moment  
Argumemtum ad populum 
(rhetorical fault) 
 
False dichotomy (rhetorical 
fault) 
 
Appeal to emotion (rhetorical 
fault) 
 
Appeal to illegitimate 
authority (rhetorical fault) 
 
Circular reasoning (logical 
fallacy) 
 








Justification of the 









































Worthiness of attention 
 
Modest authorial intentions 








Speaking on behalf of a silent 








Appeal to emotion (rhetorical 
fault) 
 
















This thesis has analysed Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s use of discursive strategies 
of legitimisation, delegitimisation, coercion and dissimulation to reduce the reader’s 
critical disagreement space in his nationalist German war propaganda. It has 
investigated the hypothesis that Chamberlain’s war essays are manipulative 
propaganda whose persuasive force is generated by a complex network of strategies 
of argumentation, legitimisation and abstract epistemic motifs used to gain the 
readers’ trust while simultaneously limiting or removing their critical disagreement 
space. It has analysed the linguistic construction of these strategies from the 
dominant use of metaphor scenarios down to rhetorical devices of repetition, 
answering the question: 
(1) What is the discursive role of strategies of legitimisation, 
delegitimisation, coercion, dissimulation and abstraction in 
Chamberlain’s discourse and how are these strategies linguistically 
constructed?  
(2) What is the discursive role of epistemic metaphors and motifs in 
Chamberlain’s discourse? 
This research was pursued in the context of a gap in Chamberlain scholarship and a 
socio-political problem using a tailor-made theoretical framework. First and 
foremost, the thesis offers the first detailed linguistic analysis of Chamberlain’s war 
essays in the English language. This was motivated by the scholarly focus on 
Chamberlain as a race theorist and lack of attention to his war propaganda, 
particularly in light of intertextual analyses that identify the significance of 
Chamberlain’s linguistic influence on his National Socialist successors (Rash 2012) 
(Lobenstein-Reichmann 2008: 444-45). Not wanting to ignore Chamberlain’s infamy 
as an anti-Semite, the historical contextualisation of the war essays presented in 
Chapter 6 nonetheless pays due attention to contemporaneous anti-Semitism and to 
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the relationship between the Jews, liberalism and Social Democracy in 
Chamberlain’s Germany, and the text analysis highlights probable instances of veiled 
anti-Semitism in the essays.  
The thesis has additionally responded to calls by discourse analysts and 
psychologists to identify the discursive mechanisms of manipulative political 
discourse and propaganda (Reisigl 2008: 262; van Dijk 2006: 380; Saussure and 
Schulz 2005: 4; Pratkanis and Aronson 2001: 341). It has pursued a critical approach 
to discourse analysis in order to critique manipulative ideological practices as they 
are enacted in and by discourse: in an age in which propaganda is still used to 
promote ideas, this thesis has sought to contribute to the awareness of manipulative 
mechanisms in nationalist propaganda by detecting and exposing some of the indices 
of propagandistic political discourse. 
The thesis was also motivated by the conviction that CDA is an ideal toolkit for 
analysing not only the discursive construction of ideology, but also discursive acts of 
manipulation, and that more work should be undertaken to demonstrate this (cf. van 
Dijk 2006: 380). This aim was pursued by devising an analysis model to address the 
individual nature of the research project, combining pragma-dialectical theory and 
methods of corpus linguistics within a CDA framework. The present synthesis of 
CDA with pragma-dialectics has shown that critical discourse analysts who focus on 
manipulative rhetoric can more systematically justify critique of institutional 
ideological discourse using the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion and 
corresponding fallacies. This framework lends itself to the exploration of discourse 
strategies employed to prevent discourse recipients from assessing the truth, 




9.1 Synthesis of the Analysis Results 
It has been shown that Chamberlain’s discourse has a predominantly manipulative 
function. The formal structure of Chamberlain’s manipulative persuasion is 
argumentative, enacted using strategies of legitimisation, delegitimisation, 
dissimulation and coercion. These strategies are largely either restrictions of the 
readers’ disagreement space, or violations of the pragma-dialectical rules of 
argumentation, or both, and are constructed in particular using topoi, rhetoric and the 
metaphor scenario of epistemic uncertainty versus enlightenment. The key 
observation elucidated by this thesis is that Chamberlain’s essays are just as much 
legitimisations of the author and his essays as they are of the essays’ topical 
ideological propositions. This implies a two-fold application of ‘othering’: on the 
topical ideological level of Germany (the self) versus her war enemies (the other) on 
the one hand, and on the self-referential meta-level of the author (the self) versus the 
reader (the other) on the other. Attempts to delegitimise the reader and to legitimise 
the author and his essays largely rest on the construction of the metaphor scenario of 
epistemic uncertainty versus enlightenment, a scenario that taps into an array of 
concepts pertaining to the same broad source domain: LIES – IGNORANCE – 
MISLEADING – GETTING LOST – WANDERING OFF COURSE – HIDING – BLINDNESS – 
DARKNESS – TRUTH – PERCEPTION ––GUIDING – DISCOVERY  – LEARNING – TRUTH – 
SIGHT – LIGHT.  
Strategies of (de)legitimisation by moralisation and abstraction are targeted at the 
readers and act as a springboard for strategic authorial self-positioning. Reader 
delegitimisation strategies also act as a springboard for strategic authorial self-
positioning and are the most complex and frequent strategies in the essays. They are 
constructed using an elaborate network of topoi, abstract motifs and the metaphor 
scenario of epistemic uncertainty. In order to frame his delegitimisation of the reader, 
Chamberlain portrays the war, wartime politics and war victory as matters of human 
cognition, perception and intellect. Constructing the metaphor of das Innere (the 
mind and soul, as opposed to ‘external’ material and political concerns), 
Chamberlain uses totum pro parte synecdoche, illness metaphors (THE WAR IS A 
SPIRITUAL ILLNESS), metaphors of destruction, polarisation, and vocabulary from the 
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semantic fields of the soul and intellect to present knowledge, perception and the 
acquisition of information as the most important weapons in the war, simultaneously 
asserting that Germany has the potential to win the war because it is intellectually 
superior to England and France. As fallacies of oversimplified cause, emotional 
appeals to humanity, non causa pro causa and circular reasoning, these strategies 
violate the validity rule, argument scheme rule, and starting-point rule. 
The concordance analysis revealed that, against the backdrop of the metaphor 
scenario of the war as an ‘internal’ concern of the mind, Chamberlain counters 
assertions of German superiority with assertions of German inadequacies, employing 
a manipulative ‘carrot and stick’ rhetoric of positive and negative incentivisation. 
Using a complex network of epistemic motifs of misunderstanding, mistrust, 
ignorance, misleading, false realities, chaos and confusion and metaphors of insanity 
and illusion, Chamberlain uses delegitimising strategies of abstraction to destabilise 
the readers’ confidence in the ability of the German mind to triumph in the 
purportedly intellectual war by creating a pervasive sense of epistemic uncertainty. 
This is an elaborate form of the kind of ‘trouble’ that, according to Saussure (2005), 
proponents often create for discourse recipients. Chamberlain’s ‘trouble-and-
resolution’ device, however, goes well beyond the level of discursive utterances, 
creating global psycho-social ‘fuzziness’ (cf. Saussure 2005: 133). Chamberlain 
confronts the readers with their own alleged ignorance, misinformation and 
metaphorical blindness, planting doubt about their own intellectual capacities and 
powers of perception. This strategic scenario is predominantly constructed using 
metaphors of concealment, darkness, night and blindness, burial and graves, cloaking 
with fabric, a tightly bound ball of string, intoxication and delirium, and recurring 
metaphors of theatre, puppet shows and games. Vocabulary from the semantic fields 
of lies (Lüge), false appearances (Schein), confusion (Wirrwarr, verwickelt), opacity 
and sight (undurchsichtig, sehen, einsehen, blind) play a correspondingly important 
role in the construction of this scenario. 
While also drawing on the topos of immediacy, of nature as an evaluative yard stick 
for the moral superiority of truth, and of immorally low transparency, the key topos 
in the construction of reader delegitimisation strategies is the topos of intellectual 
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insufficiency. Concrete examples of these topoi constitute logical and rhetorical 
fallacies that violate a variety of the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion, 
primarily the unexpressed premise rule (ignoratio elenchi) and starting-point rule 
(non causa pro causa and circular reasoning). The most significant and strategic 
fallacious rule violation committed by constructing the purported intellectual 
inadequacies of the readers as the primary ‘enemy within’ is argumentum ad 
hominem in combination with an appeal to vanity (argumentum ad superbiam), or 
Wengeler’s appeal to Gruppenegoismus (Wengeler 2005: 215). Moreover, 
Chamberlain’s use of these fallacies does not constitute a rhetorical fault, as 
conventional uses of ad hominem and appeal to emotion do (cf. Cohen 2003: 109), 
but a dialectical offense: by discrediting the German people’s intellectual capacities 
and knowledge of the truth, Chamberlain weakens the readers’ confidence in their 
own powers of perception, decreasing the likelihood that they will cast doubt on the 
author’s standpoints or formulate alternative standpoints, and thereby repeatedly 
violating the freedom rule.  
This thesis has additionally analysed the role of strategies of authorial self-
positioning as Chamberlain’s ‘resolution’ to his construction of ‘trouble’ (cf. 
Saussure 2005: 113). In accordance with Sassure’s theory, the thesis found that 
Chamberlain causes ‘trouble’ (epistemic uncertainty and mistrust) in the readers’ 
understanding procedure in order that he may offer ready-made resolutions. In this 
instance, Saussure’s hypothesis is so relevant to Chamberlain’s discursive strategies 
that it should be quoted in full: 
The addressee is led to believe the speaker’s word, since it is 
communication to solve the double-bind, which it thought to be due to 
the hearer’s incompetence but which is in fact created by the 
manipulator himself. The hearer abandons some of his cognitive 
abilities for the sake of higher values presented by a discourse 
originating from a seemingly higher intellect. This way, the addressee 
is in a position of moral, intellectual and psychological dependence 
towards the speaker, who in turn appears as a saviour, a genius, a 
‘God-like’ being (Saussure 2005: 134). 
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While positioning his readers as ignorant, Chamberlain offers a solution in the form 
of himself as knowledge provider and his essays as knowledge. In his metaphor 
scenario, the author is teacher, provider of truth and facts, ‘archeologist’ of truth, 
bringer of light, bringer of sight to the (metaphorically) blind, and guide to the lost, 
all of which rest of the topoi of authority and resolution. In addition to authorial 
meta-commentary, speech acts of recommendation, instruction and request, and 
extensive use of vocabulary from the semantic field of truth and factuality (wahr, 
Wahrheit, Wirklichkeit, Tatsachen, eigentlich), this scenario is constructed using an 
elaborate network of metaphors. Key metaphors employed here are teaching 
metaphors including the (non-inclusive) first person pronouns wir/uns, metaphors of 
discovery, exploration and penetrating the surface, metaphors of light and dark/night 
and day (DARKNESS IS EPISTEMIC OBSCURITY, LIGHT IS INTELLECTUAL 
ENLIGHTENMENT/EPISTEMIC CLARITY), metaphors of sight and blindness (SIGHT IS 
ACCURATE PERCEPTION, BLINDNESS IS IGNORANCE/NAIVETY), including optical 
metaphors of distance and sharpness of vision, and journey metaphors featuring 
verbs of physical progression (kommen, verweilen, gelangen zu). This major 
metaphor scenario constructs a strategy of delegitimising abstraction, an example of 
indirect argumentum ad hominem that attempts to justify Chamberlain’s ideological 
statements by presenting the author as the solution to the readers’ epistemic 
problems, thereby justifying the message by justifying the means. As is also true of 
Chamberlain’s delegitimisation of the readers, this elaborately constructed 
argumentum ad hominem, albeit positive in this case, functions as a dialectical 
offense that violates the freedom rule by presenting the author and therewith the 
statements he makes as the solution to the problems that he himself has strategically 
constructed. 
The thesis has also shown that Chamberlain uses language to create the illusion of 
freedom of thought while reducing critical disagreement space firstly by 
counteracting trust-building strategies with strategies of dissimulation, and secondly 
using fallacious strategies of legitimisation and delegitimisation and strategies of 
influence and coercion to justify his message. Chamberlain’s trust-building strategies 
create a false sense of reassurance by convincing the readers that he fulfills their 
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dialectical standards (benevolence and good will, sincerity, trustworthiness, and 
expertise). Using strategies of legitimisation by personal and expert authority, 
Chamberlain endorses his authorial character and credibility. This resonates with 
Wengeler’s concept of authorial Selbstinszinierung, which specifies an emphasis on 
the author’s responsible and pacifistic nature in particular (Wengeler 2005: 216), 
while also far exceeding it. The results correspond to the theories advanced by 
Perloff (2010) and O’Keefe (2002) that proponent credibility is established by 
accentuating authority (Perloff 2010: 159), expertise (O’Keefe 2002: 182; Perloff 
2010: 167), education, occupation and experience (O’Keefe 2002: 184), knowledge 
bias (Perloff 2010: 171) and reporting bias (Perloff 2010: 174). As manifestations of 
positive argumentum ad hominem, appeals to illegitimate authority and argumentum 
ad superbiam (emotional appeals to flattery or vanity), these strategies violate the 
pragma-dialectical rules of freedom, relevance, and argumentation scheme. 
The author legitimises his expertise on Germany, England, and France using specific 
forms of the general topos of authority: intellectual qualifications, excellent memory, 
personal association with prestigious political, military and intellectual contacts, life 
experience and foreigner objectivity/neutrality. These strategies of legitimisation are 
constructed against a backdrop of egocentric references to the author’s hic et nunc in 
general, and to the act of writing in particular, which draw the readers’ attention to 
the man behind the pen. Strategies that aim to endorse author credibility are 
constructed using metaphors of a photographic memory, authorial interjections, 
personal anecdotes, and performative and assertive speech acts. They also rely on the 
author’s demonstration of polyglot language skills and encyclopedic knowledge, 
conveyed using intertextual references and etymological expositions and by 
integrating foreign language quotations in English, French and Latin into his writing 
with and without his own translations.  
Chamberlain’s endorsement of authorial credibility is complemented by strategies 
that aim to endorse his authorial character (personal authority). As identified by Stiff 
and Mongeau and Perloff as key proponent characteristics, Chamberlain establishes 
trustworthiness of character and similarity with the readers (Stiff & Mongeau 2003: 
119-121; Perloff 2010: 176; O’Keefe 2002:199). His trust-building strategies include 
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the topos of personal dedication to or passion for the subject matter, constructed 
using subjectivity markers such as minor sentence interjections and exclamatives, 
affective adjective phrases, lists of affective adjectives, and stark expressions of 
personal evaluation. He additionally attempts to win the readers’ trust using 
linguistic creativity and familiarity by integrating traditional idiomatic sayings and 
aphorisms as well as modified aphorisms into his essays that carry connotations of 
timeless wisdom, tradition and familiarity: gnomic sayings are familiar to most 
readers, creating a sense of trust. By using these, the author positions himself as ‘one 
of them’, lessening the status gap between himself and the readers and enhancing his 
personal accessibility.  
Authorial meta-commentary also plays a key role in the creation of trust. By 
addressing (rhetorical) requests to the readers to make a statement or to use certain 
linguistic formulations, Chamberlain constructs a semblance of dialogicity that 
flatters his readers by giving them the impression that they have some kind of 
influence on his writing. The author furthermore gains the readers’ trust through the 
topos of authorial good will (see Perloff 2010: 167): using and the verb andeuten and 
the derived noun Andeutung, Chamberlain implies that he wishes to inspire the 
readers’ independent thought, rather than to present them with a fait accompli. The 
readers consider themselves in the hands of a trustworthy and credible author who 
provides them only with the basic information in order that they may use his 
Andeutungen to form their own thoughts and opinions.  
The trust and reassurance thus created are undermined by his use of information-
controlling strategies of dissimulation. Although the author gives the reader the 
impression that they can trust him as a benevolent expert who wishes to incite their 
independent thought, the meta-commentaries surrounding the author’s ideological 
statements tightly control the information the readers receive. Strategies of 
dissimulation to this end are anticipating and countering reader objections, 
manipulating expectations of authorial perfection, fallacious question and answer 
constructions, overt authorial censorship, and explicit legitimisations of the inclusion 
and exclusion of information. 
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Strategies of anticipating and countering reader objections suggest possible 
objections to the author’s person and his work, and counter them by discrediting the 
critic using the topoi of ridiculousness and careful aforethought, both of which 
violate the relevance rule as examples of ad hominem (in the latter case positive ad 
hominem). Furthermore, they represent dialectical offenses that violate the freedom 
rule by discouraging the readers from casting their own doubt on a standpoint. Using 
rhetorical admissions, rhetorical questions, sarcasm, addresses to the reader, generic 
pronouns (e.g. man, jemand, einer) and juxtaposing expressions of positive 
conviction such as freilich and sicherlich with rebutting conjunctions such as aber 
and doch, Chamberlain creates and controls potential objections to his ideological 
claims by giving voice to objections that he can manage. Admitting that his claims 
may be problematic or that his perspective is not the only perspective gives the 
author a guise of fairness, neutrality and prudence, whereas, in fact, such admissions 
are an effective form of opposition management. This is what Rogers calls 
‘innoculating the audience’ to counter arguments by naming downside arguments 
yourself (Rogers 2007: 51). The device quashes any real opposition to the author’s 
views and warns readers against pursuing any adverse opinions they may have. 
Strategies of dissimulation that manipulate the readers’ expectations of perfection 
attempt to legitimise the author’s faults, inaccuracies and deficits by explicitly stating 
his personal and professional difficulties and imperfections. This strategy is 
constructed using the topos of institutional restrictions (censorship) and human 
limitation. As a dialectical fallacy of unvoiced objections and a hybrid rhetorical 
fault comprising positive ad hominem and emotional appeal (appeal to the readers’ 
humanity), it violates the freedom rule, the standpoint rule, and relevance rule. It is 
constructed using admissions, humiliative acknowledgements of authorial 
imperfection, and linguistic reflexivity. Chamberlain particularly criticises his 
inability to express himself verbally, thereby blocking reader criticism of his word 
choice: by confronting his readers with the challenges of precise and effective 
expression, he prevents them from criticising not just his arguments, but his 
linguistic formulations. References to the hindrances and restrictions imposed by the 
institutions of writing and publishing furthermore allow him to attribute missing or 
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inadequate information to external restrictions beyond his control. By describing 
selected faults, the author appears honest and self-critical, thereby seeming to 
alleviating the readers of the necessity to criticise him themselves. Confronted with 
the impression that the author is honest regarding his own flaws, the readers believe 
it is unnecessary to find fault with his discourse as he has seemingly identified his 
faults for them. 
Question and answer constructions are a further form of Chamberlain’s information 
management. Calling on the topoi of duty and responsibility to the reader and 
universal relevance, Chamberlain posits the questions that correspond to the 
ideological statements he wishes to make as universal concerns, and his ‘endeavour’ 
to answer these questions as ‘owing’ to the reader. As a dialectical offense, the 
fallacies of unasked questions and speaking on behalf of a silent antagonist violate 
the starting point rule and the freedom rule. The primary linguistic means used to 
construct this strategy are variations on the exhortative speech act ‘fragen wir uns 
[X]’, erotetic constructions, and the use of inverted commas to construct a question 
as originating from the reader, or from a third party. Ultimately, the questions the 
author poses are only ever his own questions, allowing him to control who is 
discussing what and from which perspective. 
Chamberlain’s most direct strategy of dissimulation is overt authorial censorship. As 
fallacies of obscurantism and insufficient argument, the topological construction of 
this strategy violates the burden-of-proof rule. Using the topoi of appropriateness, 
sufficiency, (ir)relevance and worthiness (of attention), the author legitimises the 
inclusion or exclusion of ‘information’ and the thoroughness and/or partiality of his 
arguments. The strategy of overt authorial censorship furthermore calls on the topoi 
of modest intentions and the availability of an abundance of (hypothethical) further 
evidence.  
Secondly, Chamberlain uses fallacious strategies of legitimisation and 
delegitimisation to imply that his ideological message and argumentation are true and 
correct. The author’s contrastive legitimisation of the self and corresponding 
delegitimisation of the other on the topical level is fallacious because it relies on the 
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topoi of the superiority and uniqueness of ‘Germanness’ and the inferiority of ‘un-
Germanness’, the topoi of divine endorsement, history, and victim versus aggressor. 
These topoi constitute rhetorical faults of false dichotomy, unexpressed premise, 
appeal to God and appeal to history, and violate the validity rule, starting-point rule, 
relevance rule, argument scheme rule, and unexpressed premise rule. They are 
constructed using a variety of metaphors, including metaphors of height, good and 
evil, shadow and light, murder and the scaffold, poison and bodily illness, 
woodworm, trees/plants and sterility, architectural metaphors, the reification of un-
Germanness as a monster, and personification of the German language as guardian 
and conquerer. They additionally rely on the use of ameliorative lexical priming, 
metonymy, speech acts of blaming and accusing, dubitative rhetorical questions and 
exclamations, hyperbolic universal negation, particular affirmation, contrastive 
conjunctions, and polarisation. 
The strategies Chamberlain uses to justify his general ideological message above and 
beyond German superiority are equally as fallacious. These call on legitimising 
strategies of theoretical rationalisation that found a statement on truth, or ‘the way 
things are’. These strategies are constructed using the topoi of factuality, evidence 
and provability, natural law, obviousness, doubtlessness, irrelevance and history, 
constructed using an array of apodictic expressions (e.g. Tatsache, Tatsachen, 
Belege, belegen, beweisen, nachweisen, bezeugen, Zeugnis), paralepsis, adverbs of 
conviction such as gewiss and offenbar, modal directives, negated generic pronouns, 
negated adverbs of time and place, and inclusive universal affirmation. As logical 
faults of circular reasoning and affirming the consequent/denying the antecedent, and 
as rhetorical faults of appeal to obviousness, emotional appeal to alarm and 
humanity, ad populum and obscurantism, these strategies violate the starting-point 
rule, the validity rule, the relevance rule, and the burden-of-proof rule.  
A number of strategies that Chamberlain uses to legitimise his ideological message 
were found to be coercive, and are thereby fallacious by default. Chamberlain’s 
‘legitimising’ strategies of coercion call on the topoi of threat/danger (Endpunkt), 
urgency and immediacy, ‘the only way’, necessity, obligation, and nature. These 
topoi constitute the rhetorical faults of appeal to emotion, false dichotomy and appeal 
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to illegitimate authority, and violate the pragma-dialectical rules of relevance, 
argument scheme and starting-point. These strategies of coercion are partly 
constructed by combining reifications of the German nation as an organic entity with 
references to humanity and human existence (Menschen/Menschenleben), including 
first person pronouns such as wir and unser, and metaphors of life and death. 
Chamberlain appeals to the reader on a human level using the topos of existential 
threat. Uses of this topos constitute emotional appeals to alarm, fear and awe; three 
emotions that can quickly motivate action or a reorientation of thought or behaviour. 
Strategies of coercion also rely on the extensive use of hyperbole, including 
intensifiers, expressions of immeasurability and numerousness, universal affirmation 
using generic pronouns (jeder), generic adverbs (alles/alle, ganz/gänzlich and 
sämtlich) and generic adverbs of place (allerorts/allertorten). Hyperbole is 
particularly effective when it occurs in the form of binary opposites (alles/nichts 
immer/nie), creating polarisation. Using journey metaphors and corresponding 
vocabulary pertaining to paths, movement, destinations, labyrinths, and guiding, 
Chamberlain constructs the notion of one single correct way of thinking in terms of 
the assertion that there is one sole path leading to the desired destination or to 
achieving the desired objective. By delineating a single route to success, 
Chamberlain blocks or undermines alternative ‘routes’.  
9.2 Methodological Limitations 
It is acknowledged that the methodological approach and procedure were subject to 
limitations, and as such were not flawless. The first limitation concerns historical 
contextualisation, which proved a challenge for a non-historian. It was particularly 
difficult to complete a non-interpretative account of Chamberlain’s historical context 
and to avoid sourcing selective information that corresponded to prior knowledge of 
his ideology and work.  
With hindsight, the construction of the secondary corpus was a flaw in the 
conception of the thesis. Consisting only of the discourse of one contemporaneous 
writer, the secondary corpus acted merely as a comparison corpus and not as a 
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representative reference corpus. In order to really ascertain the linguistic peculiarites 
of Chamberlain’s discourse, it would have been more fruitful to use a larger 
contemporaneous corpus of general discourse as a control; for example the corpus 
resources available at the Institut für deutsche Sprache, or the DWDS corpus 
(Digitales Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache). 
In addition, the analysis may have benefitted from beginning with a corpus analysis: 
as it is, the pre-reading stage may have led to intuitive bias regarding salient motifs, 
metaphors and linguistic tendencies. Although corpus investigations depend on 
human agency to a certain extent, making it difficult to rule out interpretative bias in 
the selection and analysis of concordance lines, for example, the analysis may prove 
more objective if it were based on and guided by frequency and collocation statistics 
from the outset were this research to be repeated. It is also acknowledged that the 
concordance analysis was limited: selecting certain keywords for concordance 
analysis inevitably narrowed the research focus onto certain discursive phenomena 
and neglected other phenomena that may have complemented the analysis results, 
but that also may have challenged them. In defence of the approach taken, however, 
the qualitative analysis addressed a broad range of salient words and linguistic 
devices, and the results of this analysis confirmed and complements the results of the 
corpus analysis.  
9.3 Contribution to Knowledge and Directions for Further Research  
The research documented in this thesis makes a three-fold contribution to the body of 
knowledge within the areas of study. Firstly, it makes a contribution to Chamberlain 
scholarship by demystifying a number of (albeit not all) discursive mechanisms of 
manipulation at work in his war essays. Secondly, it has shown that combining CDA 
with pragma-dialectics is an effective methodological approach to developing a 
systematic typology of discursive strategies of manipulation. Finally, this research 
contributes to the body of scholarship that strives to understand the workings of 
propaganda. It has done this by ascertaining a promising focus on the interplay of the 
strategic dichotomy ‘justifying the message’ versus ‘justifying the means’, and, 
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within the latter, of the strategic interplay between author positioning and reader 
positioning. The revelation that strategies of recipient positioning can play an equally 
significant role in manipulative political discourse as author positioning is a 
compelling insight into the discursive mechanisms of manipulation in politics. 
Furthermore, this thesis has not only shed light on the general significance of reader 
or audience positioning in Chamberlain’s war propaganda, but more specifically on 
the manipulative function of reader delegitimisation via the creation of global 
fuzziness. Analysing strategies of reader delegitimisation could expand the scope of 
critical discourse analysis, thus the present research has unearthed a promising 
avenue for future research for critical discourse analysts interested in the mechanisms 
of manipulation in ideological discourse. 
In future, it could prove worthwhile to investigate manipulative strategies of reader 
delegitimisation in other political discourse. Most immediately in the discourse of 
Adolf Hitler as an alleged ideological and linguistic successor to Chamberlain, but 
also beyond the discourse of nationalism and fascism, extending to any political 
discourse of dominance and power that addresses a mass audience or readership. 
Such research should aim to confirm or disprove the status of reader delegitimisation 
as a stable characteristic of manipulative political discourse, and to investigate 
potential further strategies of reader delegitimisation besides the creation of global 
fuzziness. In exploring the status of reader delegitimisation as a characteristic of 
manipulative political discourse, a diachronic study of, for example, twentieth 





APPENDIX A: Keyword Lists 
Positive Keywords in the Primary Corpus 
Set Keyword (pos.) Freq. 
RC. 
Freq. 
1 ICH 736 134 
2 FREIHEIT 353 29 
3 ER 746 328 
4 R 235 33 
5 MENSCH 151 17 
6 MIR 158 20 
7 NUN 202 56 
8 MENSCHEN 228 82 
9 MÄNNER 125 22 
10 GENAU 95 9 
11 WELCHE 139 32 
12 ALLE 328 163 
13 JEDER 183 62 
14 GOETHE 67 3 
15 EINZIG 73 5 
16 HIER 230 102 
17 WERKE 48 0 
18 EIN 1130 947 
19 WEIß 118 31 
20 IDEAL 64 5 
21 KANT 45 0 
22 DENN 283 152 
23 MICH 101 23 
24 ALLES 244 123 
25 MANN 137 49 
26 SPRACHE 111 33 
27 VIELMEHR 98 26 
28 AUS 614 472 
29 LIEBE 53 5 
30 GLEICHHEIT 40 1 
31 SAGT 83 20 
32 GEWIß 43 2 
33 WOGEGEN 39 1 
34 THE 39 1 
35 DE 48 4 
36 DEMOKRATIE 38 1 
37 AUGEN 82 21 
38 WER 155 72 
39 WAHRHEIT 69 15 
40 TAG 58 10 
41 OF 29 0 
42 NIE 103 38 
43 WORT 126 55 
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44 EINEM 308 211 
45 BAYREUTH 32 1 
46 DU 41 4 
47 LES 27 0 
48 PARLAMENT 38 3 
49 DESSEN 118 51 
50 STAAT 117 51 
51 DENKER 25 0 
52 STAATES 64 17 
53 GLAUBE 45 7 
54 Z 67 19 
55 FRANZOSE 29 1 
56 BESTIMMUNG 29 1 
57 LEBEN 170 96 
58 BESITZT 73 23 
59 HINDENBURG 24 0 
60 WORTE 71 22 
61 NÄMLICH 52 11 
62 WELCHER 50 10 
63 DIESE 376 286 
64 NATUR 125 61 
65 WILLKÜR 23 0 
66 WAHRE 45 8 
67 GOTT 59 16 
68 LUTHER 52 12 
69 DEUTSCHLAND 613 529 
70 LÜGE 30 2 
71 HAß 42 7 
72 USW 69 23 
73 LÄßT 72 25 
74 SOWIE 39 6 
75 WAS 462 379 
76 STAATE 29 2 
77 DENNOCH 21 0 
78 WIE 850 784 
79 ZUGLEICH 75 28 
80 SELBEN 38 6 
81 EINZIGEN 42 8 
82 URTEILT 20 0 
83 MEINE 41 8 
84 IRGEND 55 16 
85 WILL 146 85 
86 DICHTER 24 1 
87 SCHAFFT 24 1 
88 WISSENSCHAFTLICH 27 2 
89 LA 27 2 
90 EINZELNE 61 20 
91 NIEMALS 36 6 
92 CARLYLE 23 1 
93 FINDET 45 11 
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94 IDEALE 43 10 
95 SR 18 0 
96 CHAOS 18 0 
97 GEMEINSAMKEIT 18 0 
98 FINANZ 18 0 
99 BLOß 44 11 
100 AUFSATZ 22 1 
101 GESAMTE 25 2 
102 SONST 80 36 
103 SPUR 17 0 
104 HELDEN 17 0 
105 NICHTSDESTOWENIGER 17 0 
106 ANDEREN 157 100 
107 VATERLAND 41 10 
108 AUFMERKSAM 31 5 
109 HABE 108 59 
110 DIESES 159 103 
111 ÜBERALL 72 31 
112 DUMM 16 0 
113 LE 16 0 
114 SELBE 16 0 
115 NACHT 23 2 
116 SEGEN 20 1 
117 BEGRIFF 41 11 
118 REDEN 65 27 
119 FÜHRT 44 13 
120 ALLER 145 93 
121 VERSTEHT 42 12 
122 SEELE 33 7 
123 GÄNZLICH 15 0 
124 NEID 15 0 





Negative Keywords in the Primary Corpus 
Set Keyword (neg.) Freq. 
RC. 
Freq. 
126 JAPAN 3 34 
127 ZUR 197 373 
128 MILITÄRISCHEN 5 41 
129 FALL 26 90 
130 VERHÄLTNIS 17 71 
131 KRISIS 3 35 
132 HÄLFTE 7 47 
133 DABEI 23 84 
134 STARKE 10 55 
135 MACHEN 61 156 
136 STARK 25 89 
137 DESTO 5 42 
138 POLITIK 132 276 
139 AUCH 566 915 
140 OESTERREICH 5 43 
141 NACH 379 649 
142 STÜCK 9 56 
143 KÖNNEN 130 278 
144 ÜBERSEEISCHEN 4 42 
145 IDEE 32 108 
146 HER 15 72 
147 WÜRDEN 26 97 
148 DAFÜR 25 95 
149 DARAUF 33 112 
150 WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN 6 50 
151 DER 4145 5696 
152 ÜBRIGEN 12 67 
153 MÜSSEN 87 213 
154 BISMARCK 36 121 
155 # 1071 1643 
156 RUSSEN 8 59 
157 ODER 302 562 
158 OB 47 147 
159 POLEN 6 55 
160 UNGARN 18 87 
161 WENN 352 641 
162 DURCH 354 646 
163 MILLIONEN 52 160 
164 GEWESEN 47 151 
165 UNSER 36 131 
166 AUF 874 1414 
167 HABEN 257 521 
168 ENGLISCHEN 118 294 
169 DINGEN 15 91 
170 NATÜRLICH 19 103 
171 GEGNER 14 91 
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172 TROTZDEM 6 68 
173 MILLIARDEN 3 60 
174 EUROPÄISCHEN 6 72 
175 DEN 1428 2243 
176 WAR 251 535 
177 MARK 3 63 
178 NOCH 389 754 
179 IM 606 1085 
180 NATIONALE 7 80 
181 ENTWICKLUNG 17 113 
182 SEITE 30 148 
183 WERDEN 389 788 
184 DIE 4504 6480 
185 AFRIKA 5 90 
186 S 199 495 
187 GEGENÜBER 36 180 
188 FLOTTE 15 127 
189 ABER 502 996 
190 UNSERES 11 137 
191 MIT 639 1270 
192 RUSSISCHE 7 125 
193 UNSERER 51 254 
194 RUSSISCHEN 11 187 
195 DAß 778 1670 
196 FÜR 514 1243 
197 UNSERE 53 344 
198 UNS 346 965 
199 RUßLAND 86 440 
200 NATIONALEN 6 218 





Positive Keywords in the Reference Corpus 
Set Keyword (pos.) Freq. RC. Freq. 
1 WIR 1524 619 
2 NATIONALEN 218 6 
3 RUßLAND 440 86 
4 UNS 965 346 
5 UNSERE 344 53 
6 FÜR 1243 514 
7 DAß 1670 778 
8 TÜRKEI 152 2 
9 RUSSISCHEN 187 11 
10 IMSTANDE 132 1 
11 UNSERER 254 51 
12 RUSSISCHE 125 7 
13 MIT 1270 639 
14 UNSERES 137 11 
15 CHINA 92 2 
16 TÜRKISCHEN 78 1 
17 ÄGYPTEN 78 1 
18 ABER 996 502 
19 FLOTTE 127 15 
20 GEGENÜBER 180 36 
21 S 495 199 
22 AFRIKA 90 5 
23 ORIENT 69 1 
24 GEBIET 67 1 
25 DIE 6480 4504 
26 WERDEN 788 389 
27 MAROKKO 57 0 
28 SEITE 148 30 
29 ENTWICKLUNG 113 17 
30 NATIONALE 80 7 
31 IM 1085 606 
32 NOCH 754 389 
33 MARK 63 3 
34 WAR 535 251 
35 DEN 2243 1428 
36 BISMARCKS 52 1 
37 EUROPÄISCHEN 72 6 
38 MILLIARDEN 60 3 
39 GEDANKENS 50 1 
40 GLEICHZEITIG 43 0 
41 SEE 53 2 
42 TROTZDEM 68 6 
43 REICHS 41 0 
44 TÜRKISCHE 41 0 
45 GEGNER 91 14 
46 NATÜRLICH 103 19 
47 DINGEN 91 15 
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48 ENGLISCHEN 294 118 
49 HABEN 521 257 
50 ARMENIEN 36 0 
51 AUF 1414 874 
52 UNSER 131 36 
53 STÄRKE 44 2 
54 GEWESEN 151 47 
55 MILLIONEN 160 52 
56 DURCH 646 354 
57 WENN 641 352 
58 VERBINDUNG 37 1 
59 BEVOR 37 1 
60 UNGARN 87 18 
61 POLEN 55 6 
62 WELTPOLITIK 41 2 
63 HELGOLAND 30 0 
64 OB 147 47 
65 ODER 562 302 
66 CHINESISCHE 29 0 
67 NATIONALER 29 0 
68 WIRKUNGEN 29 0 
69 UKRAINE 29 0 
70 RUSSEN 59 8 
71 MOMENT 28 0 
72 OSTASIEN 28 0 
73 CHINESISCHEN 28 0 
74 TÜRKEN 34 1 
75 # 1643 1071 
76 BISMARCK 121 36 
77 KONSTANTINOPEL 27 0 
78 MÜSSEN 213 87 
79 AFRIKANISCHEN 33 1 
80 ÜBRIGEN 67 12 
81 DER 5696 4145 
82 PRINZIP 37 2 
83 WIRTSCHAFTLICHEN 50 6 
84 UNSRER 26 0 
85 MITTELMEER 26 0 
86 WELTVOLK 26 0 
87 DARAUF 112 33 
88 DAFÜR 95 25 
89 WÜRDEN 97 26 
90 HER 72 15 
91 IDEE 108 32 
92 ÜBERSEEISCHEN 42 4 
93 KÖNNEN 278 130 
94 STÜCK 56 9 
95 PERIODE 24 0 
96 SYRIEN 24 0 
97 CHINAS 24 0 
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98 GLEICHFALLS 24 0 
99 KONGO 30 1 
100 WELTPOLITISCHEN 23 0 
101 ANGOLA 23 0 
102 SELBSTÄNDIGKEIT 23 0 
103 KOLONIE 23 0 
104 WELTWIRTSCHAFT 29 1 
105 KOLONIALEN 29 1 
106 NACH 649 379 
107 OESTERREICH 43 5 
108 AUCH 915 566 
109 POLITIK 276 132 
110 SCHWIERIGKEITEN 28 1 
111 FORTSCHRITTE 28 1 
112 KLEINASIEN 22 0 
113 OSTAFRIKA 22 0 
114 SÜDAFRIKA 22 0 
115 DESTO 42 5 
116 STARK 89 25 
117 MACHEN 156 61 
118 STARKE 55 10 
119 DABEI 84 23 
120 HÄLFTE 47 7 
121 KRISIS 35 3 
122 VERHÄLTNIS 71 17 
123 FALL 90 26 
124 MILITÄRISCHEN 41 5 
125 ZUR 373 197 
126 EINGEBORENEN 27 1 
127 EISENBAHNEN 27 1 
128 SÜDWESTAFRIKA 21 0 
129 ÜBERWIEGEND 21 0 
130 AUTORITÄT 21 0 
131 BEINAHE 21 0 
132 JAPAN 34 3 
133 OZEAN 26 1 










Negative Keywords in the Reference Corpus 
Set Keyword (neg.) Freq. RC. Freq. 
    
135 SEELE 7 33 
136 VERSTEHT 12 42 
137 ALLER 93 145 
138 FÜHRT 13 44 
139 REDEN 27 65 
140 BEGRIFF 11 41 
141 ÜBERALL 31 72 
142 DIESES 103 159 
143 HABE 59 108 
144 AUFMERKSAM 5 31 
145 VATERLAND 10 41 
146 ANDEREN 100 157 
147 SONST 36 80 
148 BLOß 11 44 
149 IDEALE 10 43 
150 FINDET 11 45 
151 NIEMALS 6 36 
152 EINZELNE 20 61 
153 WILL 85 146 
154 IRGEND 16 55 
155 MEINE 8 41 
156 EINZIGEN 8 42 
157 SELBEN 6 38 
158 ZUGLEICH 28 75 
159 WIE 784 850 
160 WAS 379 462 
161 SOWIE 6 39 
162 LÄßT 25 72 
163 USW 23 69 
164 HAß 7 42 
165 DEUTSCHLAND 529 613 
166 LUTHER 12 52 
167 GOTT 16 59 
168 WAHRE 8 45 
169 NATUR 61 125 
170 DIESE 286 376 
171 WELCHER 10 50 
172 NÄMLICH 11 52 
173 WORTE 22 71 
174 BESITZT 23 73 
175 LEBEN 96 170 
176 Z 19 67 
177 GLAUBE 7 45 
178 STAATES 17 64 
179 STAAT 51 117 
180 DESSEN 51 118 
 
 282 
181 PARLAMENT 3 38 
182 DU 4 41 
183 EINEM 211 308 
184 WORT 55 126 
185 NIE 38 103 
186 TAG 10 58 
187 WAHRHEIT 15 69 
188 WER 72 155 
189 AUGEN 21 82 
190 DE 4 48 
191 SAGT 20 83 
192 LIEBE 5 53 
193 AUS 472 614 
194 VIELMEHR 26 98 
195 SPRACHE 33 111 
196 MANN 49 137 
197 ALLES 123 244 
198 MICH 23 101 
199 DENN 152 283 
200 IDEAL 5 64 
201 WEIß 31 118 
202 EIN 947 1130 
203 HIER 102 230 
204 EINZIG 5 73 
205 GOETHE 3 67 
206 JEDER 62 183 
207 ALLE 163 328 
208 WELCHE 32 139 
209 GENAU 9 95 
210 MÄNNER 22 125 
211 MENSCHEN 82 228 
212 NUN 56 202 
213 MIR 20 158 
214 MENSCH 17 151 
215 R 33 235 
216 ER 328 746 
217 FREIHEIT 29 353 





APPENDIX B: Keywords in Context (KWIC) 
ich KWIC 
1 Übel wird der Staat steuern müssen. Wie soll er das können? Ich habe es gesagt: ich bin kein Prophet, 
ich baue keine Luftschlösser; ich möchte nur dem erwartend 
2 — begründen. Wer also von einem dauerhaften Staate spricht, spricht von einem — ich will mich kurz 
und bequem ausdrücken — „guten“ Staate, von einem Staate, in  
3 Einzelnen, den der Staat aus eigenem Interesse stützt und hebt. Darum glaube ich auch hier eine  
Richtlinie der Zukunft zu erblicken: diesem Übel wird der 
4 Bauer, so auch dieser neue, feigere Gewaltmensch gegen alle redliche Arbeit. Ich empfehle jedem, das 
Buch von Wells über die Vereinigten Staaten zu lesen. 
5 will ich nicht ins Werk pfuschen. Seit Ausbruch des Krieges habe ich, trotzdem ich in stiller 
Zurückgezogenheit lebe, also politisch ohne Bedeutung bin, 
6  Pamphlete zu schmieden; wir hassen alle heute die falschen Analogien; worauf ich aber hiermit die 
ungezählte Schar der Naturblinden aufmerksam machen will,  
8 diese deutschen politischen Ideale beschaffen sein? Ich stelle diese Frage, und ich beantworte sie im 
Sinne der vorangegangenen Abschnitte: nicht ist's mir um  
9 für wahr hält, — bekennen mit Wort und 70 mit Tat. Gottvertrauen — ich finde kein anderes Wort für die 
Gemütsstimmung — ist zu allem entscheidenden 
10 auswendig au lernen: „Nichts ist widerwärtiger als die Majorität....“: da muß ich schon einhalten, um das 
Wort zu unterstreichen: Nichts ist widerwärtiger als 
11 wogegen der Feige einfach aufgespießt wird. Nicht wenige Männer habe ich angetroffen, die ganz 
genau wissen, welches Elend der Reichstag schon 
12 Tage treten, einerseits weil sehr starke Interessen vertreten sind, weil — wenn ich mich so ausdrücken 
darf — Dinge, Tatsachen, Verhältnisse vertreten sind 
13 Teile dieses Ideals Lügen sind, Lügen im unbeschrankten Sinne des Wortes, womit ich sagen will: 
Behauptungen, die der Wahrheit der Natur direkt widersprechen.  
14 Begabung, nicht arm an Tatkraft und an Erfindungsgeist; noch rennt (während ich diese Worte 
schreibe) sein Mut an der Ostgrenze heldenhaft an gegen die 
15 zu fassen. Es genügt aber, den Zusammenhang deutlich darzulegen, wie ich es jetzt zu tun versuchte, 
damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe:  
17 politischen Befugnisse, und der König besitzt kein Vetorecht {F Gerne benütze ich hier die Gelegenheit, 
um eine kurze, ganz vorzügliche Schrift, die dieser 
18 daß die Katastrophe schon sichtbar am Horizonte dämmert. Mehr will ich hierüber nicht sagen; das 
Fiasko des Revolutionsideals ist zu offenkundig;  
19 Hunderte von Briefen von Männern aus den verschiedensten Lebensstellungen habe ich in den letzten 
Wochen erhalten, die es bezeugen. Nun! warum packt man die 
20 gestellt wurde — wie ich mir die neue politische Organisation denke, beantworte ich zunächst mit dem 
einen Wort: „kantisch“. Hiermit ist sofort zweierlei gesagt 
21 vorgearbeitet worden; das erste Gerüst steht schon fertig da. Gerade während ich diese letzten 
Abschnitte schreibe, führt mir ein günstiges Geschick ein Werk 
22 und seine Leistungen in der Selbstverwaltung“; jedem meiner Leser empfehle ich dringend, sie zu 
studieren. „In keinem andern Lande“, schreibt Dr. Luther, „ 
23 im politischen Leben Deutschlands an hervorragender Stelle steht. Hier möchte ich nun ein längeres 
Bruchstück abschreiben aus einem Brief, den ich selbst zwölf 
24 
fertig. In dem Aufsatz „Die Zuversicht“ führte ich neulich Zeilen an, die ich im November 1914 von 
einem Manne erhalten hatte, der mitten im politischen 
25 
krankhaften Überreizung, einem „morbus bellicosus“. Die Briefstelle — die ich fast wortwörtlich anführe 
— zeigt dann wenigstens, daß die betreffende 
26 
und trotzdem die Macht behält, wir alle ersticken werden. Im Augenblick rede ich nur von der 
Organisation, und mein Zweck ist, aufmerksam zu machen, daß die  
27 
politische Organisation auf wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen denke, so antworte ich mit dem 







Oskar Meyer. Der Verfasser zeigt, daß zu allen Zeiten Deutschland mehr wahre Freiheit genoß als 
England; in England ist die Freiheit Schein, in Deutschland 
2 
ganz vorzügliche Schrift, die dieser Tage erschien, warum zu empfehlen: "Deutsche Freiheit und 
englischer Parliamentarismus" von Professor Arnold Oskar Meyer. Der 
3 
wie ich. Übersetzen wir also das „heilige Original“ der stolzen Fanfare „Freiheit, Gleichheit, 
Brüderlichkeit“ in unser geliebtes, redliches Deutsch, so  
4 
Einzelnen zu Gunsten Aller einzuschränken, so hieße ein Bekenntnis kurzweg zu „Freiheit“ einfach 
die Verkündigung der Anarchie: soweit dachten diese Leute aber 
5 
und ihre Erfinder schreiten sofort zu Unterdrückung, Massenmord und Völkerkrieg. Freiheit im 
Munde des Franzosen und aller von ihm Belehrten besitzt überhaupt 
6 
Zeiten Deutschland mehr wahre Freiheit genoß als England; in England ist die Freiheit Schein, in 
Deutschland Wirklichkeit.}. Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts —  
7 
aufmerksam: „In allen Regierungsformen, wie sie auch heißen, existieren Freiheit und Knechtschaft 
zugleich polarisch.“ Der dauerhafteste Staat wird 
8 
Kopf und Herz von Millionen gefunden haben: und so zeugte denn das Feldgeschrei „Freiheit“ die 
Guillotine, das Feldgeschrei „Gleichheit“ die Proskriptionen, das  
9 
Eingang finden, sich notwendigerweise stets einstellen wird. Die sogenannte „Freiheit“ löst die 
Menschen in Atome auf, die „Gleichheit“ macht sie zu 
10 
hell zu erleuchten: er unterscheidet zwischen „Mensch als Natur“ und „Mensch als Freiheit“: da 
haben wir die zwei Horizonte, und sowohl Politiker als Historiker  
11 
Hat die höhere Bildung des Mittelstandes, namentlich aber die angeerbte innere Freiheit, die den 
Deutschen auszeichnet, jener verhängnisvollen Wirkung bisher 
12 
grenzt“ erreichbar vorgestellt werden kann; dem Menschen unbegrenzte moralische Freiheit zu 
sichern, wäre die höchste Errungenschaft eines starken, streng 
13 
eines starken, streng gegliederten Staates; nirgends wird von jeher wahre Freiheit so schlecht 
geschützt wie in allen demokratischen Staaten. Diesen Begriff 
14 
könne der Staat von innen aus umgestaltet und durch weise Begrenzung wahre Freiheit erst 
möglich gemacht werden; vor Allem: dort das uralte Vorurteil, die  
15 
französischen Revolution. In den drei Worten „Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité“ — Freiheit, Gleichheit, 
Brüderlichkeit — scheint zunächst nichts Gefährliches zu l 
16 
Freiheit der Wissenschaft ist ein kostbares Gut; Freiheit der Lüsternheit, Freiheit des Betruges, 
Freiheit der Ausbeutung, Freiheit des Widerchristentums,  
17 
solche Gedanken ist im Glaubensbekenntnis des Materialismus kein Platz; die „Freiheit“, die so laut 
gepriesen wird, ist die Freiheit, Menschen zu knechten; 
18 
in vernünftige Möglichkeiten. Goethe sagt einmal, was wir Menschen Freiheit nennen, ist nichts 
anderes als „verworrene Willkür“; er hat recht; wir  
19 
nach außen die Grenzen der 104 Herrschaft, so nach innen die Grenzen der Freiheit festzustellen 
und zu bewachen. Diese Worte schreibe ich im Sinne  
20 
wäre. Für das, was er Freiheit nennt, hat der Engländer seine wirkliche, innere Freiheit — diejenige, 
die er zur Zeit seiner absoluten Monarchen, eines Heinrich 
21 
er aber bei dem, was er in Amerika entdeckt, dem Lande demokratischer Freiheit, wo er 
sechsjährige Knaben zwölf Stunden Fabrikarbeit leisten sieht!  
22 
Leistungen bleiben muß. In Frankreich glaubten die 73 Bürger auf Freiheit, Gleichheit und 






jeglichen Staates aufhebt. — Nicht in Wahrheit größer, doch mehr in die Augen fallend, ist die 
Stupidität der zweiten Behauptung: „Tous les hommes sont  
2 
gleich sind, cela crêve les yeux, wie der Franzose sagt, „es drückt die Augen ein“. Weder in Bezug 
auf Größe, noch auf Farbe, noch auf Körperkraft, noch 
3 
das Fiasko des Revolutionsideals ist zu offenkundig; man braucht bloß die Augen aufzutun und um 
sich zu blicken. Wenige aber dringen bis zu den Ursachen  
4 
denkende Mensch; doch schwebt das Künftige ebenso unfaßbar vor unseren Augen wie etwa der 
noch nicht 44 siegreich durchgedrungene Ackerbau in der  
6 
Staaten leben aus dem selben Grunde in kaum unterbrochener Anarchie, und wer Augen zum Sehen 
hat, bezweifelt wohl nicht, daß die Vereinigten Staaten und die  
7 
Ideen und seine Ziele sich als Bekenntnis, als Gedanken, als Entschluß klar vor Augen hinstelle. Ein 
solcher Augenblick 22 so behaupte ich — ist jetzt da  
8 
hat das Gift dieser drei Worte von Land zu Land weitergewirkt: unter unseren Augen geht Italien 
daran zu Grunde, die anderen Mittelmeerländer sind bedroht,  
9 
wie ich es jetzt zu tun versuchte, damit eine Tatsache sofort in die Augen springe: im gegenwärtigen 
Augenblick ist Deutschland allein unter allen  
10 
mehr kann man von mir nicht verlangen; ich bin kein Phantast; was noch kein Auge erblickt, kann 
kein Mensch schildern. Sollen nichtsdestoweniger einige 
11 
daß Ich der Kaiser bin. Mir aber öffnete vor Jahren gerade diese Stelle die Augen, und ich begriff 
fortan: Ein Fürst ist kein Fürst. Der arme Einsame von  
12 
auf die Art der politischen Organisation verdient nämlich noch schärfer ins Auge gefaßt zu werden 
und das Briefliche verleiht den Ausführungen unmittelbare  
14 
des gegenwärtigen Krieges allgemein großen Eindruck gemacht und Vielen die Augen geöffnet; 
häufig hörte man den Ausruf: „Ach, wenn's nur auch nach dem  
15 
sogar Animosität. Bis in diese Kleinigkeiten hinab entdeckt das beobachtende Auge Zeugnisse für die 
Unnatürlichkeit unserer staatlichen Verhältnisse: wir  
16 
hatten beide Welten (also das Schicksal der Menschen hier und im Jenseits) im Auge, als sie den 
Fürsten, das überaus große Wesen, schufen, indem sie dachten,  
17 
seinen Eigenwert, und selbst der hervorragendste Einzelne verdient in ihren Augen nur insofern 
Beachtung, als seine Leistung Bezug auf die Gesamtheit gewinn 
18 
sich betrübt zu fragen, welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine Binde vor die Augen hält, daß sie 
blind ins Verderben laufen. Man wettert gegen Ausländerei  
19 
kraft — wirkende Gemeinsamkeit; ich suche nur einige Hauptrichtlinien genau ins Auge zu fassen: 
vermittelst Ablehnung und Zustimmung schreitet man doch aus dem  
20 
beginnt sich schon — wie die Weisen es vorausgesagt hatten — vor unseren Augen etwas Positives 
aufzubauen: die Schätzung des Staates als Staates, den es  
22 
ist uferlos; wer aber will, wer richtig zu wollen versteht, wer die guten Augen besitzt, die Pascal 
verlangt, wie Gott sie uns in den Kopf setzte und jede 
23 
steht die Wahrheit strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir brauchen 
den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit 
24 
gegeben, dessen ganzes Entstehen so vollkommen und ausführlich deutlich vor Augen läge, wie das 
bei dem des Jahres 1914 der Fall ist. Ich will nicht hier  
25 
Augen 36 besitze — und unter „guten Augen“ haben wir nicht bloß scharfe Augen zu verstehen, 






1 Arnold Oskar Meyer. Der Verfasser zeigt, daß zu allen Zeiten Deutschland mehr wahre Freiheit 
genoß als England; in England ist die Freiheit Schein, in Deutsch 
2 keine Verehrung, keine Dankbarkeit zu bezeigen. Wie genau hiermit die wahre Bedeutung des 
Wortes getroffen ist, zeigte die Revolution, indem sie die 
3 nur das eine am Herzen: die Überzeugung mitzuteilen, daß im eigentlichsten, wahrsten, ewigen 
Sinne der Staat den Menschen erst zum Menschen macht. In dem 
4 Formen könne der Staat von innen aus umgestaltet und durch weise Begrenzung wahre Freiheit erst 
möglich gemacht werden; vor Allem: dort das uralte Vorurteil 
5 den altväterischen Plunder, wie die Astrologie und die Alchymie: auf eine Unze Wahrheit 
neunundneunzig Unzen Unsinn, Wahn statt Wissenschaft, Dogmen statt 
6 Zunächst sind nun, wie gesagt, alle drei Behauptungen Lügen gegen die Wahrheit der Natur. „Les 
hommes naissent et demeurent libres“ — die Menschen sind 
7 liegenden Besitz —‚ den Besitz selbst überflügelt hat, so daß jetzt der wahre Besitz durch einen 
Scheinbesitz in den Hintergrund zurückgedrängt wird. 
8 Selbstverwaltung“ wird das ganze Reich umfassen — das Reich eines Volkes, würdig wahrer 
Freiheit. Auch die „richtende Gewalt“ hat in Deutschland bereits den  
9 — als ausschlaggebend — peinlich genauer Sachkenntnis, das heißt also wahrhaften Wissens, nicht 
bloßen Wähnens und Behauptens; unter „wissenschaftlich 
10 verbergen, dann ist nicht viel gewonnen: die Natur erwartet von moralischen Wesen Wahrheit, nicht 
Schein; dazu sind sie 74 moralische, denkende, nicht bloß  
11 eines sonst schwer auszusprechenden Gemütszustandes; in Wirklichkeit steht die Wahrheit 
strahlend unverhüllt da, der Schleier liegt auf unseren Augen, und wir  
12 unseren Augen, und wir brauchen den Star nur zu entfernen, so erblicken wir die Wahrheit, und der 
Wahn entschwindet. 37 Und noch eine Tatsache gibt es 
13 aus zu einem ausführlichen und abschließenden Urteil. An dieser grundlegenden Wahrheit wird die 
Zeit und ihr Schwarm fähiger und unfähiger, redlicher und 
14 in ganz Europa kein Mensch lebe, der fähig sei, den Knäuel aufzudröseln und die Wahrheit den 
Blicken freizulegen. Dieser Vorwurf hat mir in einem gewissen Sinne 
15 wo es gilt den Opfermut der Völker anzuschüren, jetzt wird uns Keiner reine Wahrheit einschenken, 
Jeder — auch bei uns — verhüllt gewiß vieles und erfindet  
16 Fühltaster der Liebe ergründen. Hiermit haben wir aber nur die eine Hälfte des wahren Sachverhalts 
hervorgehoben; bei der Betrachtung eines Lebendigen gibt es  
17 aller deutschen Lande westlich des Rheins fest beschlossen. Es ist nicht wahr, daß Napoleon III. die 
Feindschaft aus dynastischen Gründen aufgestachelt  
18 verantwortlichen Diktator, sondern einem 33 scheinbar konstitutionellen, in Wahrheit absoluten 
Ministerium. Hier steckt die Quelle aller Heuchelei und Lüge  
19 Diese dummen Blau- und Rot- und Orange- und Weiß-Bücher, welche die Wahrheit zu Grabe tragen 
wollen, können auch zu ihrer Enthüllung dienen: 
20 zugezogen“; das heißt doch die Dinge auf den Kopf stellen! Österreich hat in Wahrheit genau das 
Gegenteil getan: es hat nicht ein ganzes Volk angeklagt, viel 
21 den Krieg beschlossen hatte, war es ihr ein Leichtes, die ganze Nation über die wahren Vorgänge 
vollkommen irrezuführen und die erdichtete Veranlassung des 
22 könnte verhängnisvoll werden. Darum mußte ich, Engländer, den Mut haben, die Wahrheit zu 
bezeugen. Uns alle kann einzig ein starkes, siegreiches, weises Deutschland 
23 Ruskin — haben schon seit 100 Jahren und mehr auf die erschreckende Abnahme der 







1 kein Deutschland mehr; und ebenso ist seit dem Jahre 1870 alles Große, was Deutschland zu 
dem gemacht hat, was es heute ist, im Kampfe gegen die Volksvertreter 
2 untergehn, früh oder spät, Wo Mehrheit siegt und Unverstand entscheidet. In Deutschland merkt 
man das noch nicht mit aller Deutlichkeit, weil der Bundesrat  
4 Wege kommen werden, und um sich betrübt zu fragen, welcher Teufelsgeist den Deutschen eine 
Binde vor die Augen hält, daß sie blind ins Verderben laufen. 
5 der bisher allgemein geführten Betrachtung zu dem Problem übergehen, soweit es Deutschland 
allein betrifft. 67 IV. Wissenschaftliche Organisation 
6 disdaining servitude.{F Nun gewahre ich den kühnen, mannhaften Heldenmut der Deutschen, 
Knechtschaft verachtend.} (Milton.) Es ist immer das beste, man 
7 der aus allgemeinem Wahlrecht hervorgegangenen Volksvertretungen: daran wird Deutschland 
noch zu Grunde gehen, wenn nicht beizeiten eine vollkommene Umwandlung 
8 einzeln betrachtet, zum Teil recht gescheit, meist unterrichtet, regelrechte deutsche 
Universitätsbildung“, und so gelangt er zu der Einsicht: „Sie werden 
9 Not könnte man sich von einem sehr gebildeten Volk — sagen wir dem künftigen deutschen — 
vorstellen, es käme einmal so weit, sich nicht durch Worte und 
10 überlegen: mit dem wissenschaftlichen Zeitalter tritt unstreitig das Zeitalter Deutschlands auf. 
Doch nur wenn Deutschland auch politisch neue Ideale zur 
11 redenden Verbände ihm zuvorgekommen; in der anderen Beziehung dagegen ist Deutschland 
allen Völkern der Welt überlegen: mit dem wissenschaftlichen Zeitalter 
12 worden ist. Was die Völkerbewegungen anbetrifft, so steht die Sache für Deutschland 
augenblicklich nicht günstig, hier sind England und die anderen 
13 wir uns die Schnattermäuler dazu aus. Das Wort „Parla-ment“ bedeutet ja auf Deutsch 
„Schwatzbude“. Wenn es möglich wäre, die Kraftmenge, die jährlich in 
14 verpflichtet hat, so z.B. zur Anbetung Englands und 57 zur Anfeindung Deutschlands. So sieht die 
Freiheit der Wissenschaft aus, wo die frevelhafte 
15 Politik gehen, auf Grund schöpferischer Ideale, wie sie dem Eigenwesen des Deutschen und dem 
Geist unserer neuen wissenschaftlichen Zeit entsprechen. 
16 zugeschickt bekommen, daß ich über die ausschweifende Einbildungskraft der Deutschen 
erschrocken wäre, hätte ich mir nicht sagen müssen, das alles sei 
17 dazu anerkennt. Was die Revolution geschaffen hat, ist gewaltsame Reaktion; Deutschlands Weg 
führt in die genau entgegengesetzte Richtung, und jede ihm von  
18 zur Genüge erfahren — und fälscht das gesamte staatliche Leben der Nation. Deutschland tut 
nicht gut daran, von Frankreich und von England zu borgen; diese 
19 auf der anderen staatserhaltende Kräfte. Die Richtlinie der Zukunft weist für Deutschland auf 
Monarchie: denn es bedarf für seine Aufgabe eines Höchstmaßes an 
20 Lebens. Die Tatsache, daß es hierzu fähig ist, das ist der Trumpf, den Deutschland in der Hand 
hält, der einzige; weiß es ihn auszuspielen, so kann es  
21 begriffen ist, jedoch unbewußt — wäre ein zweiter politischer Grundsatz der deutschen Zukunft: 
die ihr ohne allen Zweifel gewiesene Richtlinie eines 
22 und wohl immer schließlich dem Unedlen zur Beute fällt. Wer von Republik in Deutschland redet, 
gehört an den Galgen. Das monarchische Ideal ist hier heilig 
23 Ideal ist hier heiliges Gesetz des Lebens. Die Monarchie stellt uraltes deutsches Erbgut dar; neu 
dagegen — insofern es zwar schon um uns herum im 
24 Erlösung eines „besseren“ Deutschland aus den Schlingen eines dämonisch bösen Deutschland; 





1 Ideale, deren wir heute bedürfen. Wir müssen nämlich das Eine vor Allem wissen, ja, in der Weise 
innerlich wissen, daß wir es an uns selber erleben und  
2 haben. Die künftige Gestaltung können wir nicht enträtseln, doch das eine wissen wir sicher: von 
dorther kommt uns wie in der Vergangenheit, so auch in 
3 an die französische Revolution anknüpfen, die Grundsätze hergeleitet werden, so wissen wir auch 
sofort, welche Wege diese Staaten notwendig wandeln müssen: aus  
4 machen sie, nicht macht sie der Mensch „als Freiheit“; willenlos hingerissen wissen wir nicht, ob 
es durch einen himmlischen Wirbelwind geschieht, der uns 
5 orientieren kann. Gerade hier nun straucheln die Meisten, 27 weil sie nicht wissen, welcher Schritt 
zuerst getan werden muß, damit der Mensch aus dem Dunklen 
6 sofort von neuem üppig hervorschießen. Millionen 103 von guten Deutschen wissen dies alles, 
sind darüber trostlos, manche bis zur Hoffnungslosigkeit 
7 denen Minister, welche anrüchige Börsenverwandtschaften besaßen, ihr geheimes Wissen von 
beabsichtigten Verträgen zwischen der Regierung und der Gesellschaft  
8 in Deutschland geht das nicht: hier will und muß Jeder von allem Anfang an wissen, woran er ist; 
denn hier greift ein Krieg jeder Familie des ganzen Landes 
9 verschoben werden; denn von den 180 Millionen Einwohnern dieses Reiches wissen gewiß 100 
Millionen nicht, wo und was Deutschland ist, und von den 
10 Politik rücksichtslos zu führen, sie selbst aber — wie schon ausgeführt — wissen wenig von dem, 
was da vorgeht, und glauben grundsätzlich ohne weiteres 
11 nennt, einen Punkt der höchsten Sättigung; darüber hinaus wird bei zunehmendem Wissen unser 
Urteil zunehmend trüber. Wie Pascal sich kühn ausdrückt: „Zu viel 
12 und unfähiger, redlicher und unredlicher Zeugen nichts ändern; wir werden mehr wissen, nicht 
aber mehr erfahren; wir stehen dem „Optimum“ schon nahe. Halten 
13 wo (wie in Rußland) ein Tyrann befiehlt und arme Völker gehorchen, die nicht wissen, warum und 
gegen wen sie die Waffen führen, unmöglich dagegen dort, wo 
14 denn was Burke laut sagte (siehe Kriegsaufsätze erste Reihe S. 65), das wissen mehr oder 
weniger genau alle; sie wissen, daß ununterbrochen Intrigue, 
15 bisher, ein ekler Wurm — dann unterliegt Deutschland. Was wir jetzt genau wissen, was wir alle 
wissen sollten, was dieser Krieg uns ein für allemal gelehrt 
16 gewaltig erleichtert hatte? Ich weiß es nicht und brauche es auch nicht zu wissen. An diesem 
Beispiel hat der Leser lernen können, mit welcher Vorsicht  
17 werden wird: das vermag kein Orakel zu verkünden; uns genügt es, das Eine zu wissen: wir sind 
in einen Krieg eingetreten, der — durch {R pax} und {R bellum}  
18 Geschieht daß wirklich, so erfolgt alles 102 Weitere von selbst; wir wissen es aus dem Leben des 
einzelnen Menschen; im Leben des Staates kann es aber 
19 Wurm — dann unterliegt Deutschland. Was wir jetzt genau wissen, was wir alle wissen sollten, 
was dieser Krieg uns ein für allemal gelehrt, ist, daß es einen  
20 möchte ich dringend empfehlen, es nicht zu versäumen, sich dieses klare Wissen und klare Urteil 
anzueignen; nur dann ist er gewappnet gegen die Lügenbrut 
21 Deutschland jetzt um seine Existenz und um die seines Verbündeten führt — wissen wir zwar 
noch lange nicht alle Einzelheiten, vieles wird man vielleicht 
22 Wir — die wir die Sache von einem umfassenden Standpunkt aus überblicken — wir wissen von 
vornherein, daß diese Worte keiner Wirklichkeit entsprechen 
23 Thomas De Quincey — eine der reichsten Begabungen an Geistesschärfe, Wissen, 
Gedächtnis, Federkraft, die England je hervorgebracht — zeigt, daß die 
24 daß jeder einfachste Mensch etwas davon abbekommt; was damit gesagt wird, wissen wir in 





1 leben aus dem selben Grunde in kaum unterbrochener Anarchie, und wer Augen zum Sehen hat, 
bezweifelt wohl nicht, daß die Vereinigten Staaten und die englischen 
2 vor, die Ersparnisse des Einzelnen wären gerade so gut verwaltet wie heute; wir sehen es ja an den 
Sparkassen und dem Postscheckverkehr; die Milliarden aber, 
3 stellen: was nützt dem Staate? was schadet dem Staate? wir bedeutend klarer sehen; damit ist viel 
gewonnen. Von diesem selben Standpunkt aus möchte ich  
4 Jeder Umsturz in den Grundbedingungen des Lebens bringt Kampf mit sich. Wir sehen aber gleich 
hier den grundsätzlichen Unterschied zwischen dem Raubkrieg 
5 wandelt blühende Länder in Wüsteneien um. Auch dieses bewirken die Ideale. Man sehe, was die 
Turkomenen 17 aus dem Euphratgebiete — der ältesten und 
6 18 Nun erst sind wir dort angekommen, wo ich hin wollte. Denn einerseits sehen wir, daß die Ideale 
des Menschen „als Natur“ von unberechenbarem und oft  
7 die anderen Güter eingeschlossen liegen: das ist die deutsche Forderung. Und da sehen wir denn 
ein, es genügt nicht, daß Diesem und Jenem an der Öffnung seines  
8 zum Erfolg. Auf allen Pfaden des sich um uns herum entwickelnden neuen Lebens sehen wir, daß 
mehr und mehr nach Zeitersparnis, nach Vereinfachung der Mittel  
9 müssen?“ Ich sagte, der Staat habe nur auf Dauer, nicht auf das Individuum zu sehen (S. 48 f.): von 
diesem Grundsatz muß ausgegangen werden; der Staat darf 
10 haben wir — und mit uns unsere Rechtssprechung — gründlich umzulernen. Denn ich sehe nicht ein, 
wie wir zu einer neuen, höheren Politik Kraft und Geschicklichkeit 
11 die Katastrophe noch ab. Sonst aber braucht man nur um sich zu blicken, um zu sehen, wohin wir 
alle auf diesem Wege kommen werden, und um sich betrübt zu fragen 
12 ihnen „blutig ernst“ war; und nichts konnte dem Zwecke, den wir heute erreicht sehen, förderlicher 
sein als dieses grundsätzlich durchgeführte Zerschneiden 
13 ging das so weiter; wir Buben glaubten, alle Völker der Erde aufmarschieren zu sehen; es folgte die 
oratorische Frage: {R «Et vis-à-vis de ces multitude?»} 
14 sie innerhalb einer Gemeinsamkeit geboren wird. Wohin die andere Theorie führt, sehen wir nicht 
bloß an der Guillotine sowie an der Pistole, welcher Jaurès zum  
15 heute wieder den Staat als „freiwillig eingegangene Genossenschaft“ gefeiert zu sehen, gestiftet 
zugunsten der Rechte des Einzelnen; und man faßt des Pudel 
16 durch den Sinn gezogen: Wenn wir im urgewalt'gen Streit Die großen Männer sehen Mit innerster 
Notwendigkeit Dem Tod entgegengehen, Dann möchten wir dem  
17 bloß an der Guillotine sowie an der Pistole, welcher Jaurès zum Opfer fiel, wir sehen es auch an der 
ganzen heutigen Politik Englands: Freiheit der Lüge, Freiheit 
18 nicht dem deutschen Heere der tiefe sittliche Wille ein, den wir jetzt am Werke sehen — es wäre 
bewaffnetes Chinesentum. Sind die künftigen deutschen 
19 vertragsgemäß verpflichtet, findet es günstig, Rußland nach Wunsch in Glut zu sehen, ungünstig 
aber, daß als Vorwand des Krieges die Verteidigung von  
20 Scheußlichkeiten seiner panslawistischen Politik vor aller Welt aufgedeckt zu sehen, will um jeden 
Preis Österreich von der Beteiligung an den 
21 eine patriotische Beteuerung; wir verlangen als ein Recht, bis auf den Grund zu sehen. Nicht habe 
ich in dieser kleinen Arbeit den ganzen Grund aufdecken wollen 
22 Lettern über das Eingangstor zum Generalstabsgebäude in Berlin eingegraben sehen möchte: {S 
Sternentreue!} Entweder also, ihr falschen Scheinfreunde 
23 nur einen Tag in Deutschland war, sich so lächerlich machen kann. Wie die Liebe sehend, so macht 







Wir müssen das Bessere wollen, dann gewinnen wir es auch; wollen wir nicht, verstehen wir nicht 
zu wollen, ist unser Staatsleben schon der greisenhaften 
2 
menschlicher Politik zu erfassen. Unter anderen Völkern werden nur Vereinzelte verstehen, wovon 
die Rede ist; eine Gesamtheit dafür gewinnen zu wollen, wäre 
3 
ganzen Volkes, Mann für Mann, in einer Frage, die jeden betrifft und die jeder versteht, wird oftmals 
ebenso überwältigend richtig ausfallen, wie die stille 
4 
Politik losgelöst sein wird — aus allem, meine ich, was wir sonst unter Politik verstehen und als 
Jagd nach Macht kurz zusammenfassen können. Was auf der 111  
5 
Disziplin erzogen werden und die vom Geist der Wissenschaft geleitete Politik es verstehen, daraus 
eine nationale Präzisionswaffe zu schmieden“. „Wir sind 
6 
Haß weiß {R «la revanche»} wenig oder nichts; dazu ist sie viel zu anämisch. So versteht man, daß 
die gebräuchlichste Anwendung des Wortes sich auf das Spielen  
7 
36 besitze — und unter „guten Augen“ haben wir nicht bloß scharfe Augen zu verstehen, sondern 
— wie der französische Text es zeigt — solche, die ein ebenmäßiges 
8 
bekümmern. Ist jedes Volk — sobald man unter „Volk“ 44 die Gesamtheit versteht — friedliebend, 
so gilt das vom russischen Volke, nach allem was ich 
9 
Kriegsaufsätzen“ sein konnte, und daß außerdem, wer zwischen den Zeilen zu lesen versteht — 
wo nach einem alten Weisen immer das Beste für die Besten verborgen 
10 
ganzen Welt; darum ist Gesellschaft — sonst eine Last — dort ein Vergnügen. Man versteht, daß 
der Engländer, der einmal drei Monate Ferien dazu verwendet, ir 
11 
Menschen und Ideen Fühlung zu vermitteln; von deutschem Empfinden und Denken versteht er 
weniger als der Mann im Mond, schreibt und redet zwar darüber und 
12 
man näher hinsieht. Man fasse nur den Begriff {S Freiheit} ins Auge: der Eine versteht unter 
Freiheit ein jedem Einzelmenschen angeborenes Recht der Willkür,  
13 
der hohlen Phrasen, das bedarf ebenso wenig Auseinanderlegungen; England aber versteht unter 
Freiheit nur Faustrecht, und zwar Faustrecht für sich allein; man 
14 
Vorgang, von dem sie im besten Falle wenig erblicken und auf keinen Fall etwas verstehen, da zu 
einer Beurteilung der Leistung die genaue Kenntnis von allerlei 
15 
Unter „Adel“ versteht man in England nicht, was man in anderen Ländern darunter versteht; es 
handelt sich nicht um eine Titulatur, durch welche sämtliche 
16 
Willen, sondern einerseits aus organischer Unfähigkeit, deutsche Ideale zu verstehen, und 
andererseits aus Mattheit, Bescheidenheit, gar häufig einfach aus 
17 
die ebenso axiomatisch unumstößlich dasteht wie ein Naturgesetz. Nur dann verstehen wir den 
Zusammenhang des schon Geschehenen und Erreichten mit dem, was 
18 
das jenes einfache Volkslied nicht singen, ja, nicht übersetzen und nicht verstehen kann, weil es 
überhaupt kein Wort für Heimat besitzt! Dem Engländer 
19 
nicht einmal eingeschlagen wird; einschlagen können ihn nur Menschen, welche verstehen, worauf 
es ankommt; daß unsere westlichen Nachbarn nicht in Betracht 
20 
Zeugnis ein geborener Idiot zu sein ausstellen will, kann nicht anders als ihn verstehen: „Das Sollen 
drückt eine Art von Notwendigkeit und Verknüpfung mit 
21 
wieder durch ein wenig Freiheit gemildert. Was Freiheit eigentlich bedeutet, verstehen (in England) 
sehr wenige.“ ({R Facts and Comments,} 1902, S. 102.) 
22 
ganzen Volkes, Mann für Mann, in einer Frage, die Jeden betrifft und die Jeder versteht, wird 
oftmals ebenso überwältigend richtig ausfallen, wie die stille 
23 
trägt es das Gepräge, das Kant ihm aufgedrückt hat, der darunter jenen Menschen versteht, der in 
die Freiheit eingetreten ist, wodurch „er über sich selbst als  
24 
macht frei!“ Wer obige Ausführungen gelesen hat, wird diesen Ausspruch sofort verstehen; in 






wo Besitz Anerkennung genießt. Soll aber Proudhon's Satz gedeutet werden: einzig die abstrakte 
Allgemeinheit darf besitzen, so ist darauf zu erwidern:  
2 
hätte ich mir nicht sagen müssen, das alles sei „lebendige Kraft“, die diesem einzigen Volke über 
kurz oder lang zugut kommen wird. Ich aber will mich 
3 
Sinne, ist das Zueigenhaben von Grund und Boden, von „liegender Habe“; einzig die Mutter Erde 
vergeht nicht — wenigstens nicht in den Äonen, die für 
4 
es hierzu fähig ist, das ist der Trumpf, den Deutschland in der Hand hält, der einzige; weiß es ihn 
auszuspielen, so kann es die ausschlaggebende Macht unter 
5 
in einem Zustand ununterbrochener Anarchie und frevelhafter Einzelwillkür: einzig die despotische 
Gewalt des jeweiligen Präsidenten und die unglaublich  
6 
Mauer des deutschen Willens; doch politisch ist es für immer zerstört, und einzig eine Wiederholung 
fränkischer Überflutung könnte es allenfalls zu neuer  
7 
die Gipfel ziehen sich die Spuren früherer Kulturen; die Apenninen müssen einen einzigen herrlichen 
Gartenhain dem Blicke geboten haben; jetzt starrt der nackte 
8 
Werk und ruft die das Germanentum bedrohende Gegenwirkung des Panslavismus als einzige 
mögliche Abwehr hervor; die meisten südamerikanischen Staaten leben aus  
9 
offen aussprechen, und wo sie sich doch sagen müßten, daß diese verrohte Welt einzig und allein 
aus dem Einfluß der französischen Revolutionsideale hervorgegangen 
10 
Ziel, das nur ein sittlich hochstehender Staat sich stellen kann, und das einzig nach Analogie mit 
Goethe's Wort „äußerlich begrenzt, innerlich unbegrenzt 
11 
die so laut gepriesen wird, ist die Freiheit, Menschen zu knechten; die einzige Frage lautet: 
knechtest du mich? oder knechte ich dich? Die brutale Macht 
12 
unter dessen Wucht eine ganze Lügenwelt zusammenstürzt: im Staate darf es keinen einzigen 
Menschen geben, der nicht „jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß 
13 
inneren und äußeren Politik bildet, ist freilich nichts hier zu hoffen; ein einziger Leitaufsatz des 
„Berliner Tagblatts“ gilt manchem deutschen Staatsmann  
14 
„gesetzgebendes Amt“ bezeichnen? Staatsrechtslehrer verneinen diese Frage. Einzig die 
ausführende Gewalt übersieht die gesamte Lage und kann beurteilen, 
15 
und sich ihr einzugliedern“, nannte (S. 90). Immer muß ich wiederholen: einzig der Phantast entwirft 
da fertige Gebäude, als wüßte er, wie die Menschen  
16 
die schwerste Verantwortlichkeit; will man verwickelte Verhältnisse in einen einzigen Satz 
zusammenziehen: England regiert durch Charakterstärke. Wohingegen  
17 
errichtet, gehalten und verwaltet worden. England ist der erste — und bisher einzige — Staat, dem 
man planetarische Bedeutung zusprechen kann; es hat nicht 
18 
auch aller Wissenschaft und aller philosophisch besonnenen Überlegung geführt; einzig das 
unmittelbar Praktische wird geschätzt, das, was auf kürzestem Wege zu 
20 
Träumereien entsprechen, er aber — bei den Anlagen der Deutschen — führt einzig zum Erfolg. Auf 
allen Pfaden des sich um uns herum entwickelnden neuen 
21 
leicht hingeworfenen, witzigen 43 Pasquills, jedenfalls hat es keinen einzigen Zug gemein mit den 
genannten kriegerischen Schriften der Franzosen und 
22 
Mitteleuropas ziert den Umschlag: das Deutsche Reich ist verschwunden, 41 einzig ein kleines 
Königreich Thüringen, das nach Norden Braunschweig umfaßt und 
23 
things will fall into our laps without trouble or exertion to ourselves“ —} das einzige, was uns obliegt, 
ist, uns in Geduld zu fassen, bis dieser Krieg vorbei  
24 
Niemanden — wie sollte man eine {SR “foreign nation“} lieben? — aber es lebt einzig von Industrie, 
Handel und Finanz, und das führt notwendig von Krieg zu 
25 
Mensch der Welt hat so wenig Begriff von „Rasse“ wie der Engländer; ihm gilt einzig die politische 
Nation. Der Japaner spannt seine ganze Energie auf die zu  
26 
gedungenen Mörder gleich zu Beginn des Krieges erschießen, denn er war der einzige Franzose, 







Deutsche will nicht schlechter gestellt sein als die Bürger anderer Nationen; niemals kann es 
gelingen, die politische Uhr zurückzustellen; usw. usw.“ Diese 
2 
planvolle (und das heißt wissenschaftlich-organische) Aufbau. Das Zweite wird niemals gelingen, 
wenn das Erste unbeachtet bleibt. Ein eiserner Besen muß  
3 
kommen selbstbeherrschten, bewußt aufbauenden Vernunft. Bis jetzt, sagt er, und Niemand wird ihm 
widersprechen können, ist „die Kultur gleichsam planlos 
4 
ieden“. „Wir sind heute an einem weltgeschichtlichen Wendepunkt angelangt. Nie, so weit die 
Geschichte zurückzuschauen vermag, 87 hat eine auch nur 
5 
Regierung {S aufgezwungen} wird, wenn nötig durch Krieg — aber alles schweigt, Niemand weiß 
nichts, Fragen, welche die allgemeine Politik des Reiches betreffen 
6 
„natürlichen Grenze“ zulieb, auf einen Happen hinunterschlucken; ich habe auch nie anders in meiner 
Kindheit gehört, als daß Belgien nur zeitweilig von Frankreich 
7 
dieses Recht aber ohne die einmütige, begeisterte Zustimmung des ganzen Volkes nie auszuüben 
vermöchten. {F1 Man vergl. Bismarck's Rede im Reichstag am 6. Februar 
8 
einfach weil es nicht die geringste Gestaltungskraft besitzt und darum auch niemals irgendwelche 
Grenzen als solche erkennen und anerkennen wird; sobald der 
9 
meine „Kriegsaufsätze“ regten ihn an, mir zu bezeugen, daß auch er niemals einem 18 einzigen auf 
Krieg lüsternen Deutschen begegnet sei, daß  
10 
glaubte, edelste germanische Kultur über die Welt zu verbreiten, das ist nie irgend Jemandem 
gelungen einem Engländer beizubringen. Denn die politische 
11 
Offiziere waschen sich im ganzen Leben nicht.“ Geistig gilt das gleiche: nie hat ein Franzose 
begriffen, daß man Shakespeare für einen bedeutenden Dichter 
12 
und so habe es der große Napoleon wieder hergestellt; Frankreich dürfe nie nachlassen, bis es sich 
diese Grenze wieder erobert habe. Dieser Revanchegedanke 
13 
verraten, desgleichen ich in keinem Lande der Welt gefunden habe; mir gelang es nie, festzustellen, 
wo die eine dieser Eigenschaften aufhörte und wo die andere  
14 
der Schein, die {R «revanche»} wird schon den Gegner eines Besseren belehren. Niemals — weder 
im Spiel noch in der Wirklichkeit — wird der Franzose loyal 
15 
Verhandlungen mit Österreich Grey versichert: „Zar, Regierung und Volk werden niemals die feste 
Haltung Großbritanniens vergessen“ — fest, heißt das, gegen 
16 
vorliegende Untersuchung für manchen andern schon genügen; denn wir haben mit nie zu 
widerlegender Bestimmtheit erkannt, wer diesen Krieg heraufbeschworen hat 
17 
haben, so antworte ich: Frankreich war die brutalste, aufrichtigste, es hat nie Versteck gespielt, es 
brannte auf Krieg, und seine Minister und Diplomaten  
18 
Wer Osteuropa kennt, weiß, daß Serbien es ist, welches diesen ganzen Weltteil nie zu Ruhe kommen 
läßt: ganz Serbien ist ein einziges Nest von Verschwörern, 
19 
also von vornherein auf die Seite der Mörder gestellt: das darf man ebenfalls nie vergessen. Der Zar 
— genau wie das serbische Volk — hat kein einziges Wort  
20 
vielleicht wird darüber lachen können; Rußland ist und bleibt unfaßbar, man hat nie das Gefühl, daß 
die leitenden Persönlichkeiten wirklich leiten, immer greift 
21 
— gleich heute — den Sinn dahin richten müssen und auch den Fuß; jetzt oder nie muß der Traum 
Tat werden; ist die Gegenwart nicht zeugungsfähig, so kann die 
22 
daß man, will man diese Dinge recht eigentlich 96 gründlich betrachten, nie mit dem einen allein 
auskommt. Auch hier wieder kommt uns ein berühmtes Wort 
23 
Ergebnissen führten; der unhistorische Schwärmer hat, wie vielleicht nie ein einzelner Mann, {S 
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